
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Vol. VI. No. 1. April, 1923.

The Army Quarterly

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and

CUTHBERT HEADLAM, D.S.O., O.B.E.
(late Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff, B.E.F.)

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UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. VI. No. 1. APRIL, 1923

EDITORIAL

So much eloquence has been expended both inside and outside the two Houses of Parliament, so much ink has been poured out either in disapproval or in defence of the policy of "direct action" which is now being carried out by the French and Belgian Governments in Germany, that we feel our readers will not expect from us at this comparatively late hour in the day a detailed exposition of our views on the subject of M. Poincaré's policy. Still less will they expect us to prophesy what will be the outcome of the extraordinarily complicated and intricate military and economic tangle which has resulted therefrom.

• • • • •

There is no doubt, in our opinion, that His Majesty's Government and the various sections of His Majesty's Opposition are right, and that the occupation of the Ruhr Valley will neither lead to the payment of reparations by the Germans, nor promote the cause of peace, that primary British interest, in the years to come. It seems to us, too, that the policy of France is rather rendering impossible the payment of reparations by Germany, whilst it is certainly hardening and unifying German public opinion—fluid, vacillating and politically indeterminate three years ago—into a solid, nationally-centred spirit which the daily course of events at the present time can only make more and more dangerous to future peace. The very impotence of Germany to-day makes greater the future danger.

• • • • •

The English are not infrequently accused by foreign observers *

* A great French historian, the late M. Albert Sorel, in writing of the foreign policy of England in the eighteenth century, notes a peculiarity of our race which has continued to our own days. "On les voit tour à tour abandonner l'Europe et la commander, négliger les plus grandes affaires du continent et prétendre diriger jusqu'aux plus petites, passer de la paix quand même à la guerre à outrance." *See* "L'Europe et la Révolution Française," Première Partie, p. 341.

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of being too much inclined to meddle with things which do not primarily concern them—of being too ready to tell the citizens of other countries what they should, or should not, do. However wise the voice of England may be from the British point of view, it is not surprising that foreigners often do not appreciate it. They feel, perhaps not unreasonably, that they know their own business best. At the same time, the criticism directed against our foreign policy is not soundly based, for the truth is that it always has been and always will be determined by our geographical situation * and our circumstances. The British Government speaks for a far-flung Empire, dependent upon the sea for inter-communication and defence, with a dangerously overpopulated centre, dependent upon overseas trade for its very means of life! We must trade—even with our late enemies if possible—or starve—unless, indeed, we decide to resign the unequal contest and to leave these islands for good and all. The economic ruin of Central Europe is opposed, therefore, to British interests. We cannot afford to see any Power —even the most friendly Power—dominate the Continent of Europe —and this is less a traditional policy than a policy essential to the continued security of our national existence.

* * * * *

But, whatever may be the views of responsible or of irresponsible people in this country as to the legality, or the advisability, or the likelihood of success, of the present proceedings of the French and Belgians in Germany, it is clear that His Majesty's Government has acted with much good sense in adopting an attitude of neutrality. Moreover, too much haste to assume the part of mediator would assuredly only defeat its own object. Probably—almost certainly—the time will come.

* * * * *

It would be a mistake, in our opinion, to imagine that the people of France and Belgium are whole-heartedly united in support of the policy which has been adopted by their respective Governments. There must be many moderate men who view the existing state of affairs with considerable trepidation and who realize that, as a result of the continued resistance of the Germans, French and Belgian action is being conducted by events, not directing them. But in times of national crisis the voice of moderation is little heard, and the weight of public opinion is probably still behind M. Poincaré.

* "L'Angleterre est une île marchande: toute sa politique résulte de ce fait. . . . Leur économie politique est leur raison d'Etat." *See* "L'Europe et la Revolution Française," Premiere Partie, pp. 337, 338.

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The vast majority of the French and Belgians, as we have pointed out more than once in these notes, are firmly convinced that their national security is still threatened by the Germans, and, as they have not been successful in obtaining a definite military pact with Great Britain and the United States of America, they intend to secure their own salvation by taking full advantage of the military superiority which they enjoy to-day. The matter, in fact, is not one of reparations at all, as is proved by the wholly impossible level at which France proposes to fix those reparations. It is a matter of real or fancied military security.

This object of the Franco-Belgian invasion of Germany has been very frankly stated by M. Maginot, the French Minister of War. In a speech recently delivered in the Senate, in which he stated that the Army of France must be maintained at a strength of 660,000 men in time of peace, this Minister declared that France must assure her watch on the Rhine in such a way that, on the outbreak of hostilities, she might be able to move with strategic force upon the enemy's territory. He added that the policy of the French Government " was one of security and reparations, and in order to prevent the recurrence of war France must be in a position to prevent the war-like tendencies of other countries. For France it was a matter of life or death that Germany should pay in full, and she was accordingly bound to use all coercive measures at her disposal. Germany was demobilizing neither morally nor materially. She was awaiting her revenge and munitions of war were being accumulated secretly." There is probably less fact than fancy in these latter assertions, but, if the French people are convinced of their truth, they will hardly withdraw their support from a Government which acts upon the old maxim *Si vis pacem, para bellum*—a maxim which has never been popular in this country, least of all after a great war.

* * * * *

Mr. Lloyd George, speaking with " the military knowledge " which the present Prime Minister gravely confessed he did not himself possess, in the course of his speech on the Ruhr question during the debate on the Address, suggested that the occupation of the Ruhr Valley had been undertaken by the French Government without the knowledge of their military advisers.* We do not know whether

* " The Ruhr is an open salient without any natural frontier. I do not believe that any military adviser of France has ever committed himself to the proposition that France ought to seize the Ruhr. I never saw any enthusiasm when the question was referred to in the presence of the military experts. It is a most dangerous position to put an army into. It is an absolutely untenable position for anyone to hold. . . . I do not believe the military had anything to do with it." *See* Official Report Parliamentary Debates House of Commons, Vol. 160, No. 5, p. 703.

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this suggestion was a rhetorical surmise on Mr. Lloyd George's part, based presumably upon his own experience of the way in which grave military decisions have sometimes been made in this country, or whether he had any real grounds for what he said. But to us, in our innocence, it seems improbable that the French and Belgian advance into Germany would have been undertaken by responsible statesmen without the concurrence of their military advisers.

* * * * *

We should do well to remember that the Army of France to-day is the most formidable military weapon in the world, and that it is supported by an Air Force which is immeasurably superior to that of any other nation in Europe. It is directed by the greatest soldier of the day, and its commanders are men of tried experience whose abilities have been tested in the hard school of war.

There does not lack material for historical parallels. Yet—there must be a mutual forbearance and understanding between ourselves and the French. We have fought by their side, and they by ours. We must remember—and they must remember—that our respective interests are not at the moment identical—cannot be immediately identical owing to differences in geographical and economic and political circumstances. Each nation must serve its own interests with the maximum of sympathy with, and forbearance for, the action taken by its friends in pursuit of what seem to them their interests . . . *che sará sará.*

* * * * *

We are glad to see that " Sir Douglas Haig's Command "—the important work by Mr. G. A. B. Dewar and Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Boraston which was reviewed in the January number of the *Army Quarterly*—is being so widely read. We welcome the success of this book because, although we agree with our reviewer that it is " a partisan rather than a judicial exposition " of the case, it yet seems to us to be just such a record of the war as the British people would do well " to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest." If only the ordinary citizen—the so-called " man in the street "—is really studying it with diligence and attention, he will be less ready to accept as true much of the mischievous nonsense which hitherto he has looked upon as serious military criticism. He will also, perhaps, begin to understand some of the evils which arise during the course of a great war when the politicians, not content with their proper function of laying down the policy, insist upon directing the strategy, of the armies in the field. So unfair have been the criticisms

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levelled against Earl Haig's conduct of the operations in France, that it was quite time his countrymen should be given some faint idea of the manifold difficulties against which he had to contend and of the work which he actually accomplished. It was time, also, that the full extent of the part played by Earl Haig and his Army Commanders in the great Allied offensive from the 8th of August, 1918, to the Armistice should be made known to the mass of their countrymen. Englishmen, with their proverbial readiness to depreciate their own merits, have been too ready to believe that the victories achieved by the British Armies in France in the closing 100 days of the war were entirely due to the military genius of the French Generalissimo.

* * * * *

Needless to say, Marshal Foch has put forward no such preposterous claim for himself. During those great days in 1918 he made no secret of his admiration for the British Army, and in the introduction which he wrote to "Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches," * published in 1919, he gave the fullest credit for its achievements to its Commander-in-Chief.

"Jamais, à aucun moment de l'histoire, les Armées Britanniques n'avaient obtenu dans l'offensive de plus grands résultats que dans cette attaque continue de 116 jours, du 18 juillet au 11 novembre. C'était bien là une victoire complète obtenue grâce à la valeur des Commandants d'Armée et de grandes unités, grâce surtout au désintéressement, à l'intelligente, loyale et énergique volonté de leur Commandant en Chef qui avait facilité les plus grandes combinaisons et permis les plus vastes et les plus longs efforts. Nettement éclairé par l'expérience, n'était-il pas intervenu en effet, dès le 24 mars 1918, près de son Gouvernement, dès le 26 près des Gouvernements Alliés réunis à *Doullens*, pour que les Armées Française et Britannique de *France* et des *Flandres* soient immédiatement placées sous un commandement unique, dût sa situation personnelle s'en trouver réduite? Et par la suite ne se montrait-il pas avant tout soucieux de marcher de l'avant et en parfait accord avec le plan général des Alliés tracé par ce nouveau Commandement Suprême."

Nothing could be fairer or more generous than this acknowledgment by Marshal Foch of the British Commander-in-Chief's share in the Allied victory. Nothing, so far as we are aware, could have been more happy and cordial than the relations which existed between the two great soldiers throughout the campaign.

It was unfortunate, therefore, to say the least of it, that Mr. Dewar,

* "Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December, 1915—April, 1919)," Edited by Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Boraston, O.B.E. (Private Secretary to Earl Haig). London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.

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in order to uphold the military skill of Earl Haig, should have considered it necessary to belittle that of Marshal Foch. We agree with our reviewer that " the general cause would have been served better by the publication of Colonel Boraston's narrative alone," for Mr. Dewar's combative style of advocacy does not assist his case.

During the course of the great Allied offensive, there were naturally and inevitably occasions when the two leaders did not see eye to eye with each other. Mr. Dewar cites two or three instances of such differences of opinion with regard to particular operations, and records how in each case Marshal Foch eventually gave up his own plan and acted upon that of the British Commander-in-Chief. But this does not necessarily imply, as Mr. Dewar apparently would have his readers believe, that the plans originally proposed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief were " defective " or " bad." There are almost invariably alternative methods of carrying out an attack, and it is unfair to argue that, because one has been tried and proved successful, the other must inevitably have ended in failure. The truth of the matter was that Marshal Foch, upon whom as the Allied Generalissimo rested the responsibility for the conduct of the whole campaign, was big enough and wise enough to listen to advice. He was ready to coordinate each phase of his operations in accord with the Commander who was actually in touch with the situation and whose troops were to carry it out.

* * * * *

We welcome the decision of His Majesty's Government to appoint another Committee to inquire into the whole subject of the cooperation and co-relation of the three fighting Services, from the point of view of national and Imperial defence. This is a subject to the importance of which allusion has been made from time to time in these notes and we hope profoundly that the recommendations of this new Committee may lead to the institution of an all-embracing Ministry of Defence with a Joint Imperial General Staff representing the Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force.

* * * * *

Naturally there are difficulties, as we realize, but we believe that a first step, which would do much to circumvent those difficulties, is immediately practicable. The institution of a true " Combined Staff " seems to us as important as the appointment of a Minister of Defence. A step towards the formation of the former would probably lead in the end to the latter. Why, therefore, should not the three Chiefs of Staff, Naval, Military and Air, be given certain joint

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functions immediately—acting together as a duly constituted body which, for instance, should advise *as a body* on the size of the Navy, Army and Air Force, including perhaps the proportions of each Service's demands on the available sources of supply of *personnel* and armaments? No Chief of Staff would have any responsibility for any details connected with any Service but his own; yet by this means all the Chiefs of Staff would assume responsibility for advising His Majesty's Government on the total size of, and the respective proportions between, the three interdependent fighting Services. Out of such an arrangement might well come the beginning of a true Combined Staff, advising a Defence Minister and coordinating with efficiency and economy the whole of our Imperial defence arrangements.

* * * * *

Lord Inchcape, the distinguished shipowner who, in India, has been playing the part of Sir Eric Geddes, has recently issued his report. He suggests a reduction in the Indian military expenditure amounting to 10 crores of rupees—a sum which represents about £7,000,000 at the present rate of exchange. In order to effect this saving, he proposes to reduce the peace establishment of British infantry battalions from 1012 to 884 men per battalion, and of Indian infantry battalions from 806 to 766 men per battalion. He also proposes to dispense with the services in India of three British cavalry regiments. In addition to these reductions in *personnel*, considerable reductions are to be made in mechanical transport, while the Supply Services are to be reorganized on a less expensive scale, stocks of stores—more especially ordnance stores—being much reduced. General Lord Rawlinson is said to be "in general agreement" with these recommendations. If this is really the case, there is nothing more to be said, for, if the Commander-in-Chief in India is satisfied that a reduction in the British garrison of India can be effected without danger to the community, the saving in expenditure is, of course, highly desirable. The essential is that the warning notice carried on every London omnibus should be borne in mind.

* * * * *

The tragic death of Lieut.-General Sir George Montague Harper, K.C.B., D.S.O., which took place last December, as the result of an accident to a motor car, has deprived the Army of one of its most capable and trusted leaders, whose loss will be deplored by a host of friends in all ranks. He was a close personal friend of the

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late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, under whom he served as an instructor at the Staff College, in the Military Operations Section at the War Office during the period of quiet preparation before August, 1914, and again at G.H.Q. in France in the early days of the Great War. He carried the insignia of his late chief at the murdered Field-Marshal's funeral, and it seems a curious trick of fate that so soon afterwards he, too, should have died a sudden and violent death.

* * * * *

General Harper was born in 1865, and joined the Royal Engineers in 1884. He was promoted Captain in 1892 and in the same year became an Adjutant of Volunteers, an appointment which he held until 1898, when he went to the Staff College. He served in the South African War and received the D.S.O. in recognition of his services. From 1902 to the end of 1906 he was employed in various capacities at the War Office, and in 1907 was appointed an instructor at the Staff College. In June, 1911, he again went back to the War Office as a G.S.O.1 in charge of the Operations Section, and it was in this capacity that he accompanied the B.E.F. to France in August, 1914. His career during the Great War was one of continuous and deserved success. He was in turn Brigadier-General, General Staff at G.H.Q., Brigadier-General commanding the 17th Infantry Brigade, Divisional Commander the 51st (Highland) Division, and Army Corps Commander the IV. Army Corps. He received the C.B. in 1915, and the K.C.B. in 1918, and also the Legion d'Honneur and various other foreign decorations. In June, 1919, he was appointed General Officer commanding-in-chief the Southern Command, and he was still holding that appointment at the time of his death.

* * * * *

General Harper was one of the most sympathetic and kindly of men, and his success as a commander was no doubt largely due to his personal popularity with those who served under him, but even more probably to the confidence which he inspired. All ranks knew that "Uncle"—the nickname by which he was affectionately known throughout the Army—not only watched over their material interests, but also that he could safely be depended upon not to demand of them an effort which was beyond their powers.

It was this implicit belief in its leader that did much to make the 51st Division the magnificent fighting machine which it became, and it is not the least tribute to General Harper's power of inspiring

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confidence among those who served under him that he—a mere Englishman—succeeded so completely in winning the respect and affection of a Highland Territorial Division. His quick grasp of the essential, his entire lack of fussiness, his invariable cheerfulness, his intimate knowledge of the most apparently trivial details of their daily routine, even of their regimental idiosyncrasies, endeared him to his men, and promoted, as nothing else could, the solidarity and *esprit de corps* of his Division.

* * * * *

But, in addition to his powers of leadership, General Harper was a soldier whose professional acquirements were of a very high order. He was a deep student of military history, and his views as to the training of men and the handling of troops in the field were formed only after careful thought and as a result of his own experience gained on active service.

He was a tremendous believer in the necessity for promoting in every way the resourcefulness of the private soldier, holding that in modern warfare the conditions are such that on the field of battle everything must depend upon the initiative and enterprise of the individual. He was apt, perhaps, in his advocacy of this point of view rather to underrate the value of steady drill in a soldier's training, and to give an impression to some people that he set little store by time-honoured methods of inculcating discipline. But such an impression was an erroneous one, due not a little to General Harper's characteristic habit, both in private conversation and even at official conferences, of expressing his opinions somewhat abruptly, often not troubling to carry his argument to its logical conclusion but rather leaving it to the intelligence of his listeners to follow out his train of thought. No man, however, realized more fully than he that without a good system of discipline no troops can be of any permanent value in the field; his object was to devise a form of training suitable to modern conditions of warfare by which the intelligence, and consequently the instinctive initiative, of each man in the ranks might be developed to the greatest possible extent.

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General Harper was a fine horseman, and his naturally quick eye for country made him a first-rate man to hounds. During the time he was at Salisbury he hunted regularly with the Blackmore Vale, where his loss is universally mourned by all with whom he came in contact. His instincts were decidedly gregarious, and he had the gift of making juniors as well as seniors feel entirely at their

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ease when in his company. Nothing delighted him more than to collect a few subalterns for a hard game of lawn tennis at Government House. With such a personality as this it can easily be understood that not only has the Army been deprived of a great leader, but that every individual with whom General Harper came in contact feels he has lost a personal friend. To those whose privilege it was to know him intimately, who worked with him for many years before, during and since the war, his loss is indeed irreparable.

* * * * *

We are requested by Lieut. G. R. Johnston, R.F.A., to state that his article, entitled "The Battle of Warsaw, August, 1920," which appeared in the January number of the *Army Quarterly*, was based on two articles published in the *Revue Militaire Française*. He was enabled to make use of the articles in question and to reproduce the maps by means of an arrangement with the publishers of that Review.

10th of March, 1923.

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A GERMAN ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE OF AUGUST, 1918

(Abbreviated from *Die Schlachten im Sommer*, 1918, by GENERAL VON ZWEHL,* which covers the period 15th of July–8th of September, 1918.)

(*With Map*)

CONTRIBUTED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH) C.I.D.

ON the 24th of July—according to General Mangin—General Foch assembled the Commanders-in-Chief of the Entente Armies: Pétain, Haig and Pershing, and communicated to them a memorandum explaining how he proposed to conduct his further operations. In view of the Allied successes on the Marne and on the Aisne, and the steady arrival of American reinforcements, he considered that the time had now come for a general offensive. Five separate operations, with short breaks between them, would, he hoped, bring disorder into the ranks of the enemy, upset the employment of his reserves, and deprive him of the time necessary to bring his units up to strength again. Separate objectives were assigned for each operation. The offensive on the Marne then in progress, which would be concluded in a few days and would free the Paris—Avricourt railway, was the first; the second would free the Paris—Amiens railway; the third would, by cutting off the St. Mihiel salient, gain possession of the railway Paris—Avricourt towards Commercy (thirty miles south of Verdun). The fourth operation would reconquer the northern coal area; and the fifth drive the enemy from the coast. The last two operations were assigned to the British.

"Perhaps," says Zwehl, "Mangin did not quite grasp the sense of General Foch's exposition: for it is incomprehensible that the badly damaged railways should play the rôle of strategic objectives under the above conditions. The point was to attack in certain areas and beat the Germans in them." †

* (Berlin: Mittler, 7.80 marks.) This writer is one of the most reliable of the German military authors; the mis-statements that he makes (which are pointed out in footnotes) are probably due to his acceptance of reports at their face value, forgetting the breakdown of the German Intelligence, and the minimizing of their failures by commanders at the front.

† Lord Haig's Despatches (Boraston edition, p. 256) confirm General Mangin's statement.

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The second of the five operations—to free the Paris—Amiens railway—was the most important, and the most difficult of the whole war. The attacks were to be directed against the German salient, towards Amiens—Albert—Villers Bretonneux—Montdidier. This salient did not project forward as much as did the Marne salient; but it did so sufficiently to permit of its being attacked on two sides, of crushing in the flanks, and of exploiting the success by widening any pocket that might be created. The immense resources at the disposal of the Allies enabled them to attack in succession on a total front of over one hundred miles.

"The decision was again brought about by tanks . . . our manufacturing powers, in consequence of so many other calls on them, were not in a position to produce a serviceable fighting vehicle in sufficient time. How far underestimation of the enemy's new machine played a rôle in the result will not be discussed here.

"Of considerable moral as well as material effect on the German defence also were the masses of low-flying aeroplanes which took part everywhere in the fight with bombs and machine-gun fire."

It is only possible here to describe the larger phases of the gigantic struggle.

On the first day of battle *—the 8th of August—there was a thick fog, which was considerably increased by the British at many places by means of artificial smoke clouds. These adversely affected the German anti-tank guns; indeed, made them useless. The best shock divisions of the Allies, the Australians and Canadians, led the attack on either side of the Amiens—St. Quentin road. The battlefield extended from the Ancre to the Avre, a front of eighteen miles, divided into three parts by the Somme and the Luce. In the centre sector, where there were no watercourses to stop the tanks, the attack struck the XI and LI Corps of the German Second Army, and here it proceeded quickest and farthest: to a depth, indeed, of nine to twelve miles, of which a German counter-attack recovered only a few kilometres.

North of the Somme, against the LIV Corps and XIV Reserve, the gain of ground was only 2,000 to 3,000 yards †; south of the Luce, against the III Corps, however, it was five to six miles.

General von Zwehl comments how easy it apparently was for the tanks to get up close to the LI Corps, south of the Amiens—St. Quentin road, without damage, and, having broken through, to wheel south and cut off large portions of the troops.

* The British name for this battle is the Battle of Amiens.

† North of the Somme the battle front on the 8th of August did not extend as far north as Albert, and only involved a small part of the LIV Corps.

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In the evening of the 8th of August, the Germans held the line Morlancourt—Chipilly—Rosières—Hangest.

In the forenoon of the 9th of August quiet reigned on the greater part of the battle front, as the British were regrouping their forces. There were attacks only at Le Quesnel and Hangest, and the Allies gained possession of these two places. The defence made here by the left of the LI and right of the III Corps, under the moral effect of the British successes on their right, was not very good. There was also a partial attack which progressed as far as Assainvillers. There appears to have been no special reason for this attack, and it may have been due to local circumstances, or the initiative of a subordinate.*

In the afternoon the British renewed their attack, again using most pressure between the Somme and the Luce; they compelled the Germans to retire to the line east of Morlancourt—Proyart—Meharicourt—Saulchoy. As the battle front north of the Somme was somewhat isolated by this retrograde movement, it was withdrawn about a thousand yards.

The British success in the two days' fighting was therefore considerable, and the penetration on either side of the St. Quentin road extended to over twelve miles.

"The greater part of the heavy artillery on this front had fallen into the enemy's hands. What was more important, the Allies had made the first step towards cutting off the German salient near Amiens."

The second phase of the great battle now began.

It was obvious that it would not be long before the other salient, south of Montdidier, was attacked. The proper course for the Germans was not to await the onset, but to retire voluntarily; and this was adopted, only, however, to the incomplete and hastily constructed rear position Etelfay—Orvillers—Marest. The French heard of this move comparatively late, so that their blow on the 10th of August was in the air.† On this and the following days there were partial actions with the German rear-guards. The voluntary retirement was a success. The question may well be asked whether this was not the moment to withdraw on the whole front between Arras and Noyon, and go back gradually without getting seriously engaged: first, to get behind the Somme, and then to disappear into the Hindenburg line. This question cannot be

* The attack was made by the French 169th Division, XXXV Corps. It was apparently part of a definite attack by the French Third Army, to widen the front driven in on the 8th of August by the British Fourth and French First Armies.

† The blow may have fallen in the air, but Montdidier and many other places fell into French hands on this day.

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answered without an estimate of the material, ammunition and supplies which necessarily would have been abandoned in the process. It should have been the business of the commanders, not later than the beginning of the great French offensive on the 18th of July between Soissons and Chateau Thierry (twenty-five miles south of Soissons), to have taken the eventuality of retirement into account, and to have made at least the most valuable portion of the guns and ammunition sufficiently mobile, in order that the whole, or at least the greater part, might have been got away in good time. If this was actually done, it was a great mistake to allow the troops to get continuously involved in serious and costly fighting. In short, the course followed should have been the same as that taken later on at Ypres. There was, however, a disastrous misunderstanding among the Germans in respect of their powers of resistance and the strength of the enemy :

" The strength of the Allies, indeed, was considerably augmented by the fact that it was unnecessary for them to consider losses, as they were using oversea (*fremdländische*) * divisions. On the front from Arras—Soissons, there were at the end of July, and involved in the August fighting, four Canadian, six American, four Australian, and one New Zealand, divisions : a total of fifteen † ; and it might be assumed that the Americans would bring over many more divisions for the final battle."

The French and British did not delay in following up their success, and in commencing the third main phase of the battle. There was not only continuous fighting at numerous places along the whole front, but on the 16th of August the enemy began a full-dress offensive against the Eighteenth Army, from south of Montdidier to the valley of the Oise. " It was, for all practical purposes, repulsed." ‡ As, however, on the 18th, the attack spread eastward against the Ninth Army as far as Soissons, and drove back the Germans three or four miles on the 19th and 20th, the adjoining Army, the Eighteenth, as well as the Second, had to retire towards Roye—Bray—Albert, though they did so fighting.

The extension of the great battle to the front of the Seventeenth Army on either side of Bucquoy, in the period 21st–29th of August,§ forms the fourth phase. Here again a front of some twenty miles

* To the native of one German State (say a Prussian) that of another (say a Bavarian) is a *Fremder*.

† There were five Australian divisions, but only three American divisions on this front ; between Soissons and Rheims were six more American.

‡ Hardly the case. On this day the French pressed back the Germans by a series of local attacks west of Roye, penetrated deeply into the Bois des Loges (south of Lassigny) and repulsed all German counter-attacks.

§ The British name for these operations is the Battle of Albert, 1918 (Second Battles of the Somme, 1918).

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was, as on the 21st, overwhelmed by a sudden and unexpected fire attack. Strong infantry attacks by ten British divisions, four tank battalions, and a light tank company followed. The battalions on the outpost zone retired about two to three thousand yards to the main line of resistance, the light railway Moyenneville—Miraumont. Here the attack collapsed before our machine-gun and artillery fire.* When the Allies gained ground at Courcelles and Achiet le Petit, they were thrown back again by counter-attacks. On the 22nd of August the Seventeenth Army ordered a counter-attack on a wide front: this certainly interfered with the enemy's preparation for continuing his offensive, but led to no gain of ground. It was, therefore, a failure, and had perhaps better have been omitted, for unsuccessful attacks invariably have a weakening effect. This seems to have been the case on this occasion; for when the British continued their attacks on the 23rd and 24th with heavy drum-fire, the Seventeenth Army gave ground on its whole front for two or three miles, and it was driven back as much as six miles behind its original position.

Simultaneously with these attacks, the fighting of the Second and Eighteenth Armies had been continued, with varying success for the enemy. The strongest pressure—except against the Seventeenth Army—was against the Ninth Army east of the Oise to the Aisne. "Whether the intention was to facilitate the attack in the centre of the German line by driving in both wings, or whether harder fighting troops were put in, is unknown."

On the 26th of August the enemy widened his battle front another nine miles on both sides of Arras,† against the right wing of the Seventeenth Army. Here he struck the I Bavarian Reserve Corps, north of the Scarpe, and the II Bavarian Corps, south of that stream. After several days' fighting, in which the British were supported by strong battalions of Tanks, the I Bavarian Reserve Corps had to go back two or three thousand yards, and the II Bavarian Corps three or four miles.

By the 30th of August the German battle front, partly through forced retirements and partly through voluntary withdrawals in order to keep in touch with the above formations, had been driven back to a practically straight line three miles west of Douai, east of Bapaume—Peronne—Noyon. From the last-named place the

* Not the case. The Third Army captured Moyenneville. Considerable progress was made, despite strong resistance, before the advance for the day was stopped. In more than one case the final objectives were reached. All positions gained were held in spite of counter-attacks.

† The Battle of the Scarpe, 1918 (Second Battles of Arras, 1918).

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front turned east along the north bank of the Oise to Chauny, and thence south to Soissons, where, east of the town, on the northern bank of the Aisne, was the junction of the Ninth and Seventh Armies.

There was no interruption of the fighting on the new line. In spite of the battle front having been reduced in length by retirement, it still covered seventy-eight miles. The enemy pressed most strongly, as before, on the two extremities: in the north at Arras and in the south between Oise and Aisne; but nevertheless he attacked at other points on the great battlefield, broke in at the most unexpected places, and thus compelled the defenders to retire from others where they had beaten off his attacks. The numerical superiority of the attackers was so great, that they could keep the battle continuously fed by bringing up more and more fresh troops. Against the Seventeenth Army, the British brought ten divisions, for the most part fresh troops, with which it was their purpose to make a great gap in our front.*

The German Armies, apart from the above-mentioned offensive strokes, were in general bound to conform to the enemy's initiative. There was a continuous struggle for ruins of single villages, tiny eminences, what once were woods, and miserable bits of trenches contrived out of shell holes. At midday on the 2nd of September the Supreme Command ordered the Seventeenth Army to begin the retreat to the Hindenburg line that night. The other Armies followed it successively, not, however, without fighting; but, although the enemy pressed after them stubbornly, it was not as in pursuit after a victory: in many places he first shelled lines already evacuated for hours before, until he made up his mind to come slowly forward. On the 7th and 8th of September the Armies were in the Hindenburg position, an approximately straight line Arleux—St. Quentin—La Fere; thence the front ran to Condé and Vailly, with little local bulges, which the Germans had held in the spring of 1917 and had lost in some places. It was, it may be added, a practically unbroken line.

The Seventh Army, of the Crown Prince's Group, withdrew its right wing, the XVII and VIII Corps, from the Vesle position behind the Aisne. This position of the Seventh Army had in the river and canal good protection against tanks, but otherwise it was not a good one: for it was overlooked from the great plateau Brenelle—Vauxceré—Blanzy les Fismes, which, besides, hid everything to the south of it.

* The only fresh divisions put in between Douai and Albert after the 6th of August were the 51st and 15th from G.H.Q. Reserve. All others had been holding the line from that date.

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KUT-UL-AMARAH

(*With Maps*)

By Major-General J. C. Rimington, C.B., C.S.I.

One of the greatest disasters that befell British arms during the war was the fall of Kut with the capture of its 9,000 brave defenders. It was not the number of men lost that made the magnitude of the disaster, since on many occasions in the great battles on the Western Front and on the Gallipoli Peninsula we lost more men in a single day; but it was the shock to British prestige throughout the East, caused by the news that General Townshend, with his gallant little force which a short time previously had been all-conquering, and only a few months before had been knocking at the gates of Baghdad, had been compelled to capitulate, despite the desperate efforts of an army of three splendid war-trained divisions to effect his relief.

The Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, cryptically called Force D by the Indian Authorities in the hope that its sphere of action should be kept shrouded from the enemy, had, from the later months of 1914 up to the time of its retreat from Ctesiphon in November, 1915, been consistently successful.

With the much more serious and deadly clash of arms reverberating just across the water, the War Office and the British Public had little inclination to pay attention to the doings of a small force of less than two divisions far away in the distant East, even though it was operating in the mystic land of Mesopotamia.

Force D consisted nominally of two (the 6th and 12th) Indian Divisions; but in its lack of various essential Services, it could not be deemed a complete well-found fighting force: it was deficient in heavy and light artillery, cavalry, machine guns, engineers, aeroplanes and transport; but the most important defects were the shortage of river transport, for which there was no excuse, and the lack of any line of communication troops.

In spite of all these drawbacks, the sturdy little force drove the Turks from Basrah, Kurna, Amarah and Nasiriyeh and won the more important battle of Kut.

After this, emboldened by the uniform success of its arms, the

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authorities, bent on bringing off a brilliant stroke against the Turks to counteract the failure of Gallipoli, sent it on a mission beyond its capacity; it was to capture Baghdad.

This was to give the one ray of light to dissipate the gloom of a year of appalling slaughter unrelieved by any tangible success.

In the usual irresponsible manner, ways and means were not considered; the weakness of the force and the enormous difficulties to be surmounted were overlooked; the British soldier, as ever, was to overcome all obstacles, and victory was confidently anticipated.

The brave little Army started off cheerily in its endeavour to justify the confidence placed in it, and, strange to say, it came within a measurable distance of achieving success. Had it not been for a fatal delay of a week in its concentration, due to the shortage of river transport, Nur-ud-Din's Army at Ctesiphon would have been wiped off the field before Khalil's reinforcing divisions had arrived, and the latter would have found Lieut.-General Sir John Nixon and his troops in occupation of Baghdad, ready to defend their prize in the palm groves covering its approach.

Alas for that delay! At Ctesiphon Nur-ud-Din's force was driven routed from the field, but Khalil's troops came up in a heavy counter-attack and forced our weary men back from the second line they had captured, while the heavy casualties we had sustained prohibited another dash to regain the lost position.

At the end of the day the whole Turkish force retired behind the Diala river, nine miles away, and only nine from Baghdad.

The next day, the 23rd of November, our Army lay like a wounded lion, licking its wounds, reconstructing formations and retrieving the wounded, but, after its great losses, unable to advance. In the evening the Turks, realizing that we had been badly mauled, took courage to advance again, and during the night made six desperate assaults. These were steadily met and defeated. And again, on the morning of the 24th, there was not a Turk on the left bank of the river between us and the Diala.

Next day was devoted to the consolidation of our position near the river, but already General Townshend doubted his ability to hold on where he was against the greatly increased strength of the enemy, and had decided to fall back on Lajj, where he would be in a position covering his communications. The retirement was hastened by a report, on the afternoon of the 25th, that the Turkish Army was advancing in three columns of about 5,000 men each, and that a fourth column was marching direct on Lajj with the intention of surrounding him in the bend of the river in which he lay.

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Then commenced the retreat which ended at Kut. On the night of the 31st of November the pursuing Turks came up with Townshend's force at Umm-ul-Tabl. Early next morning he made a dash at them, bit them grievously, then broke off the engagement, and before the surprised Turks had realized what had happened he had placed thirty miles between his troops and them. On the morning of the 3rd of December he marched into Kut.

The question whether Townshend should have held Kut or fallen back is one of great interest, and has been much discussed. As I, in the position I happened to be occupying in Kut, had suggested a further retirement, I may perhaps give my views on the subject.

On the afternoon of the 28th of November I was on the s.s. *Julnar*, waiting for the vessel to start on its way down the river in consort with the s.s. *Malamir*, carrying General Headquarters, when Major Julius rushed on board and told me verbally that I was to take command in Kut until the arrival of Major-General Gorringe from Amarah, and that he (Major Julius) was to be my Brigade-Major.

I asked him to get my kit off the ship, and dashed off to the *Malamir* to try and get my orders, but she had already cast off and was on her way down stream.

As I had not been on the same ship as the General Staff I had no knowledge of the local situation, and so had to rely on such information as Major Julius could give me.

The principal item of interest was that a Turkish force with guns were said to be at Jassan, near Badrai, about 30 miles due north of Kut.

I rode round the defences with Major Cox, 67th Punjabis, who had made excellent arrangements, and gave such orders as appeared necessary, including the arming of such convalescents and slightly wounded men in hospital as were capable of using rifles, if necessary, in the defence of the place.

On the morning of the 29th, information was received that the Turkish force with four guns had left Jassan two days before and had reached El Orah on the river, where they had entrenched. This was sent on at once by wireless to G.H.Q., and a reply was received that it was thought that the report was exaggerated. Very shortly after, however, at about 3.30 p.m., I received a message to the effect that G.H.Q. was being attacked, and directing that two double companies should be sent on a steamer at once to its assistance. I issued orders immediately, but there was necessarily some delay as the 67th Punjabis were distributed in posts and pickets throughout

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the defences. The steamer was dispatched soon after eight o'clock, but, at 10.30 p.m., I received another telegram to say that G.H.Q. was returning to Kut with the whole convoy of steamers carrying the wounded.

The good ship *Malamir* arrived at about 8 a.m. the next morning, and seldom have I seen a sadder-looking crowd than its passengers.

I heard the story later, that when they were travelling down the river, the water being very low and the channel in consequence having become very tortuous, a violent wind arose and made some of the ships unmanageable ; two or three—including H.M.S. *Butterfly*, a new river gun-boat—were blown on to the bank near Orah and the whole convoy had to stop. It was there that a large body of armed Arabs, but without any field-guns, advanced to the attack, encouraged, I fancy, principally by the prospect of loot. Then G.H.Q. officers, clerks, and everybody, commanded by the M.G.G.S. in person, shouldered rifles and sallied forth to do battle with the miscreants.

They drove off the invaders, but it was too dangerous with the ships crowded with wounded to remain there at night, so it was decided to return. Had it not been so extremely serious the incident would have been somewhat ludicrous ; but it shows what may result from an insufficiency of troops for the communications.

A conference was held on the morning of the 1st of December, on board the *Malamir*, and, whilst it was in progress, two important messages were received : the first, that General Townshend had been attacked " by overwhelming numbers " ; he had beaten off the Turks and was retreating as far as he could ; the second, that the Arabs, or Turks, at El Orah had moved off, afraid lest they should be caught between troops from Kut and the friendly tribes behind them. It was decided, therefore, that G.H.Q., with the convoy of wounded, should again proceed down the river, taking on this occasion an escort of a section of a mountain battery, a double company of the 1/4th Hants Regiment, and two double companies of the 67th Punjabis. This left a very weak garrison to hold Kut in case of an attack by Arabs, and to control the population in the town ; but, as Townshend would arrive very shortly, it was thought the risk would not be very great ; in fact, there was no alternative.

Just before leaving the M.G.G.S. told me that Townshend had wired and asked that a strong defensive position should be prepared at Kut, to which he had replied that a defensive position existed there. I remarked that such defences as existed hardly provided a defensive position at all.

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This gave me " furiously to think " ! I had previously prepared a rough scheme for a defensive position covering Kut for a force of two divisions ; but no orders for its construction had been given ; the paucity of troops and of Arab labour coupled with the shortage of Engineer officers would have precluded any possibility of an entrenched position being made. We had not even had the men to demolish the old Turkish position at Es Sinn. To make a strong position at Kut within the next two days before Townshend's arrival was obviously impracticable : further, it was equally impossible to make any defensive position at all covering Kut that could be held against " overwhelming numbers " by a division of 8,000 or 9,000 men.

If Kut was to be held, it could only be by holding the bend of the river in which the town is situated and entrenching across the neck of land to the north.

This appeared to me to be a fatal project, as a comparatively few troops in trenches outside this neck could " bottle up " the whole garrison without any possibility of its being able to extend a helping hand to the relieving force ; also with Turkish guns, served with high explosives, firing into the place from all sides, the whole interior would quickly become a shambles. Accordingly, I sent the following telegram to General Townshend :—

" I find it very difficult to make defensive position covering Kut that cannot be turned—enemy would certainly surround us in very confined position, would hold us with very small force, and would push on his main body and occupy Es Sinn position against our reinforcements—alternative would be to retire to Es Sinn—we have about thirty *mahelas* * here on which, if you decide to evacuate Kut, we could place wounded and supplies—please wire early orders as defensive position should be commenced immediately, if required."

Sir Percy Cox, the Chief Political Officer, to whom I showed this wire before dispatching it, was strongly averse to my proposal ; but that was only to be expected, as no political officer will ever consider the military exigencies of the situation.

The message was sent, and a copy of course was addressed to G.H.Q. ; unfortunately communication with the 6th Division could not be established until 8 a.m. the next morning (the 2nd), but, in the meanwhile, I got a wireless message from the M.G.G.S. saying that the Army Commander left the decision on the situation to General Townshend, but that reinforcements would be pushed forward as quickly as possible. There were only three Engineer

* Arab sailing dhows.

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officers in Kut, and I ordered them to get as many local men as possible next morning, and to start making three shelter trench redoubts—they were to be situated some distance out so as to give assistance to the troops marching in, in case they were being pressed, and to cover the retreat in case Townshend decided to leave the place.

Early on the 2nd, an aeroplane sent in word that Turkish troops were marching down the right bank towards the boat-bridge, so orders had to be given to have the bridge removed. The information was incorrect; but the aviator could hardly be blamed as, from the roof of the highest house in Kut, I and two or three other officers saw what we should all have sworn to be troops marching in ranks with mounted officers accompanying them. It was the mirage, and the troops were flocks and herds!

After breakfast I rode out with Major Cox about ten miles and met General Townshend. I told him that the Army Commander had sent a message leaving the decision whether or not to hold Kut to him (General Townshend). He told me that he had quite decided to hold the place, as it was of great political and strategical importance.

The next morning, the 3rd of December, Townshend and his men marched in. They were a hard-bitten, war-worn crowd, but they were not as tired out as might have been expected. This was evidenced by the fact that when a couple of battalions were ordered to cross the river to the liquorice factory village and drive out a body of Arabs, who had amused themselves by slaughtering some of the inhabitants and keeping up a desultory fusillade on our men in Kut, they went across, drove the enemy helter-skelter out of the place and pursued them for at least a mile.

Having handed over my charge to General Townshend, I left Kut, according to my orders, by the first ship: and never did I feel more downhearted than when I left, knowing that all these fine fellows were destined to undergo a rigorous siege, especially as, to my mind, the future looked very black.

On the evening of the 7th, I met the 28th (Brig.-General Younghusband's) Brigade: its ships had stuck on the mud-banks in the river just below Kala Sale; but the Brigade was on the move again early next morning.

I reached Basrah on the evening of the 8th, and rendered an account of my stewardship to the M.G.G.S.

In his book entitled "My Campaign in Mesopotamia," General Townshend gives his reasons for holding Kut as follows:—

"My force was too exhausted to move a yard farther at the moment. It was an impossibility to move all the supplies and munitions in time.

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Kut is a most important strategical point. To leave it would enable the enemy to dispatch troops down to Nasiryeh by utilizing the Hai river for the transport of munitions and supplies. If he moved his whole force there, Basrah would be menaced."

And again, later on, he says—

"By holding Kut I blocked the advance of the 6th Turkish Army, as it was dependent on water transport as the British were, I should give time for Sir John Nixon to assemble and unite in security the scattered packets of reinforcements which had begun to arrive, and give him liberty of action and manœuvre."

He had also evidently determined on the rôle he intended to play, which unfortunately was very different to the reality, as he says—

"I intended to use my entrenched camp (Kut) as a pivot of manœuvre, when by improvising a bridge and a fortified bridge-head, I should be able to throw the principal mass of my force on to either bank of the Tigris in an offensive against any isolated fraction of the enemy. In other words, I should manœuvre in battle just as if I were fighting a defensive-offensive battle."

He must either have had a very inaccurate recollection of the actual situation of Kut, or else he must have given the Turkish commander credit for singular military incapacity.

It seems almost inconceivable that any commander investing Kut would allow the defender, under his very guns, to erect and maintain a bridge across the river to give him power of manœuvring on both banks of the river: it would have shown criminal incompetence.

In the result, the view given in my telegram was amply justified, as the enemy closed the neck of the peninsula with a semicircle of trenches, held by a small portion of his Army, and from that time Townshend was sealed up as surely as the Geni in the jar of the Arabian Nights tales.

Politically the retention of Kut was perhaps of some importance, in that it had a salutary effect on the tribes, but it is very easy to overrate the importance of a small town of about 5,000 inhabitants in one of the most sparsely populated areas that could be found. In any case, in such a precarious situation the political view must give way at once before military exigencies, and these undoubtedly forbade the internment of the whole of our available force in a position in which its capacity for action was entirely destroyed.

Townshend himself says: "All history is at hand to show that a force should not shut itself up in an entrenchment camp unless the

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commander can reckon with certainty on approaching reinforcements." We have not to look further than the Great War where this principle was scrupulously followed. On every occasion (Maubeuge, Paris, Antwerp, Warsaw, etc.) the field armies of the Allies resolutely refused to be driven into fortified areas in which they could be beleaguered.

It appears to me to have been principally a mistaken belief in the strategical importance of Kut that led Townshend astray to his undoing. He thought that this position must be held because it controlled two lines of advance on Basrah, the main route down the Tigris, and the alternative one by the Shatt-ul-Hai (Hai river) to Nasiriyeh, and thence, *via* the Hamar Lake, to Kurna. The fallacy about this is that the river Hai is a flood *effluent* from the Tigris, and so is only a river during the flood season; it also does not go to Nasiriyeh, but turns off about thirty miles north of it, near Shatra, and proceeds in two or three branches into the Hamar Lake.

In December the Hai river consisted of a line of pools of standing water, and in places the bed was quite dry: it would have assisted the Turks by providing drinking water along this route, but they could not have used it for the transport of supplies and munitions; they were even worse off than we were in the matter of cart and animal transport, so they could not possibly have ventured along this line without much special preparation, which would have taken time.

Further, the Muntafik Arabs, who inhabit the hundred miles of country between Kut and Nasiriyeh, are one of the most turbulent and predatory of all the Arab tribes, so that our friend the enemy would have been pushing his head into a perfect hornets' nest. But, apart from all other reasons, was the more important and convincing one that had Townshend withdrawn from Kut and taken up his position at Es Sinn, only eight miles away, an advance down the Hai was not a practical proposition for the Turks. No sane commander could possibly have ignored the fact that a mobile undefeated force was lying within striking distance of his flanks and base, and have started off on a march to Nasiriyeh.

The solution of the problem, as it appeared to me, was to retire from Kut across the river and to take up a position in front of the Sinn banks, probably along the line of the Magasis canal. It would have been necessary to hold the end of the peninsula on the left banks opposite Magasis so as to deny the enemy the use of the river below this point for transport, and thus cover Townshend's communications; as it is nearly forty miles by river to Shaikb Saad and only eighteen miles direct by the desert, a battalion could have held the

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point of this peninsula, even as the liquorice factory on the opposite bank was held during the siege of Kut, and the Magasis peninsula was the more easily defensible of the two.

The Sinn position is naturally a strong one, especially if the Dujailah mound on the left flank is held and entrenched. Townshend's strength on the 4th of December was 10,398 men, including 1,500 cavalry, so that his force was rather weak for holding a position four miles long; but he was aware that he would very shortly be reinforced by the 28th (Younghusband's) Brigade, a magnificent body of men, which would raise his strength to 13,500.

On the 27th of November the M.G.G.S. had wired to him at Lajj: "We hope to have the leading troops of the 28th Indian Brigade up with you" (at Lajj) "by the 15th of December and to follow them up with the 24th and 25th Brigades," so, if he could hold on for a week, he could rely on receiving help. Could he have held the Turks back for this period? There really seems very little reason to doubt it.

After crossing to the right bank, the bridge from Mahomed Abdul Hassan would have been removed to the bend of the river below Magasis; then, in the face of an active opposition, the enemy would have had to force a crossing of the river, which would have taken some time.

The Turkish forces did not arrive in strength before Kut before the 7th of December, and the place was only invested about the 10th or 11th, so that it might very well have been that the 28th Brigade would have reinforced Townshend before the enemy had managed to cross the river and got to grips with him. Even had Khalil managed to cross the river and to attack the British before Younghusband arrived, there should have been little doubt as to the result of the encounter, as Turkish troops in the attack are a very different matter to Turks holding trenches; they have not the leading, the organization or the training for efficient mobile work, whilst British troops cannot be beaten on the defensive.

The last point for consideration is whether Townshend, had he desired to evacuate Kut, could have done so successfully. There can be only one answer to this—Yes.

The principal difficulty in the problem was the transport of sufficient supplies and munitions and the removal of the sick (most of the wounded, together with 1,200 prisoners, from Ctesiphon had already gone down the river). The 6th Division troops, as their commander says, were sorely spent after their hard marching, though the little action at the liquorice factory showed that some of

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them at least had a good deal of vigour remaining—still there were 400 or 500 men of the garrison and at least 400 or 500 inhabitants who could have been employed in loading up stores. The thirty *mahelas*, mentioned in my telegram, could have been loaded to carry 1,000 tons of stores, and the steamers and barges would probably have taken at least 200 or 300 tons more: the divisional transport carts after a day and a half's rest could have easily made the trip down to the Sinn banks and back on the 5th and 6th, and probably also on the 7th, carrying 100 tons on each occasion, so that a depôt of 1,500 to 1,800 tons of stores and munitions could have been formed at Es Sinn, which would have provided ample supplies for two or three weeks. The sick would of course have been transported on the decks of the steamers and barges. Also, the communications being open, supplies could have been brought up from Amarah.

It can never be sound to shut oneself up in a tight hole, when any other course is available, even though the most definite promise of relief has been received.

But, although I am strongly of opinion that Kut should not have been occupied, I do not think that the main fault can be justly attributed to General Townshend. The High Command is responsible for the strategy of a campaign, and it cannot be absolved from the blame of having delegated its responsibility to a subordinate commander who, wearied and harassed by a long retreat before a powerful enemy, could not be expected to look at the problem in the same cool and detached manner as the Army Commander and his General Staff; nor could he have the same full knowledge of the general situation or of the probability of reinforcements appearing in sufficient time to relieve him.

It is the High Command that must be held responsible for the loss of Kut and its garrison, and of the 15,000 men who fell during the vain attempts that were made to effect its relief.

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AN ASPECT OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE

ALTHOUGH it is now over four years since the conclusion of hostilities, yet the organization and command of anti-aircraft defences seems to be still a matter for discussion and argument. As it is generally considered, however, that the opening phases of any future war will consist of aerial attacks, it would appear essential that, during the years of peace, some kind of defensive organization should be decided upon. We must be prepared for such attacks in time of peace or we shall suffer considerably at the outbreak of another war, for presumably we shall be given no preliminary period for the improvization of our air defences.

In the following notes the author does not claim to set forth a perfect system of anti-aircraft defence; but he has attempted to grapple with some of the main difficulties which must be contended with, and believes that he has treated the problem in a reasonable manner.

In the first place, he submits that defence against aerial attack can, with profit, be compared with defence against attacks by land troops. With regard to the latter, the recent war has given us wide experience, from which we should be able to draw valuable deductions. In stationary warfare on land the commander of a corps or divisional sector of the line, when called upon to repel an attack, has at his disposal:

(*a*) Field artillery.
(*b*) Infantry.
(*c*) Heavy and medium artillery, as allotted to the sector.
(*d*) Subsidiary services, *e.g.* sound-ranging sections, survey sections, etc.

In comparison with these means of land defences in aerial warfare an anti-aircraft commander has at his disposal:

(*a*) Anti-aircraft batteries.
(*b*) Rifle and machine-gun fire.*

* This will normally be supplied by the fighting troops quartered in the sector; it is improbable that special units would be detailed for this purpose.

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(*c*) Heavy and medium artillery, which constitute the " long arm " of the defence, and may be compared with the aircraft usually allotted to a sector in land defences.

(*d*) Subsidiary services, *e.g.* searchlights, sound locators, etc.

Having now set out shortly the various arms which are available as defensive weapons against a land attack as well as those against an attack from the air, the author proposes to draw a parallel between the functions of these weapons in each kind of warfare.

Against an attack by land forces the fire of field artillery is employed :

(i) to break up and to disorganize the attacking troops ; and

(ii) to keep the enemy at such a distance from the garrison of the trenches that his infantry cannot make use of the grenade and bayonet.

Owing to the difficulties of observing fire and of detecting the movements of troops, a belt of ground is reserved over which an assurance is given to the gunners that the defending troops will not manœuvre.

The rôle assigned to the infantry garrison of the trenches in defensive warfare is to supplement, with rifle and machine-gun fire, the fire of the field artillery, and to deal with the attacking troops who may succeed in reaching the defensive line.

Heavy and medium artillery are not primarily intended for the actual defence of the trench system ; their fire is never reserved exclusively for this work, which for them should be purely a secondary one.

The primary rôle of these guns is of a far wider range, for their fire is employed against concentrations of troops in the enemy's rear, and against his camps, bivouacs, communications, etc.

It is only when the enemy attempts to push home an attack, that the offensive operations of the heavy and medium artillery have to be relinquished and their fire devoted to repelling an attack. In such a case the assistance afforded to the defence by these guns usually takes the form of :

(i) barrage fire beyond the range of the field artillery ;

(ii) the breaking up of the formations of attacking troops at distances beyond the range of the field artillery ;

(iii) long-range and medium-range fire on the probable lines of the enemy's approach ; and

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(iv) counter-battery work directed against the enemy's long-range guns, which are supporting the attack.

In land warfare the subsidiary services to which the writer has alluded, *e.g.* the sound-ranging sections, etc., are merely utilized as aids to the accuracy and precision of the defender's fire, and as such conform to the employment of the other arms.

It now remains to deal with the functions of the various defensive weapons against an attack from the air, and it will be found that there are some close resemblances between their employment in such warfare and their employment in land warfare. Thus the task of the anti-aircraft gunners is to devote their fire to breaking up the formations of attacking aircraft, and to keeping these airships and aeroplanes above the height at which they can carry out accurate bombing, and engage with machine-gun fire troops on the ground.

It will be observed that this rôle is almost identical with that which is allotted to the field artillery in land warfare, and just as in that form of warfare a belt of ground is kept clear from any movement on the part of the defending troops, so similarly, when darkness or fog render it dangerous for friendly aircraft to manœuvre in the field of fire of their own anti-aircraft guns, a belt must be reserved for the exclusive use of the defending anti-aircraft batteries, for when the visibility is bad the identification of aircraft, even with the aid of searchlights, cannot be reliable.

The rôle of troops armed with small arms in aerial warfare is also almost the same as that assigned to them in war on land. It is their task to supplement, with machine-gun fire, the fire of anti-aircraft batteries, and with the fire of the rifle and Lewis gun, to deal with such of the attacking aircraft as, having penetrated the anti-aircraft barrage, are endeavouring to operate at a low altitude with bombs and machine-gun fire.

Aircraft are not primarily intended for defence purposes and can never be reserved for this rôle, which for them is an entirely secondary one. Their primary function in warfare is of a much wider nature and consists of independent attacks upon the enemy's towns, aerodromes, ammunition depôts, etc., and the observation of fire for the artillery reconnaissance work, etc. It is only when the enemy himself attempts to make an aerial attack, that aircraft must temporarily abandon their offensive rôle and do all in their power to repel the invading machines.

On such occasions they must be utilized :

(i) to patrol and fight with the object of putting up a barrage outside the radius of fire of the anti-aircraft batteries ;

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(ii) to break up the formations of attacking aircraft before they come within range of the anti-aircraft batteries ; and

(iii) to bomb the enemy's advanced aerodromes.

On the defensive, therefore, aircraft are called upon to carry out work almost identical with that which is assigned to the heavy and medium artillery in land warfare. They form the " long arm " of the defence, and the value of the " long arm " must be continually kept in view by a commander, for it is as great in defence as in offence. No fighter recognizes this fact so fully as the boxer, for, if he can hold off his adversary, he is spared those telling body blows which come with the " in-fighting." Those blows, at close quarters, are met with in every kind of attack, and every effort must be made by the defender to hold off the attacker, and to prevent, or to postpone for as long as possible, the dangers consequent upon " in-fighting." And again, the fire of the heavy and medium artillery has always been regarded as supplementary to the defence of a trench system, not as a component and an essential part of it. These guns assist as circumstances permit, but the scheme of defence should be complete without their inclusion.

So, in the writer's opinion, should it be with aircraft ; schemes for aerial defence must be complete without the inclusion in them of operations by the defending aircraft.

As regards the subsidiary services used in air warfare, such as searchlights, they may be considered as merely aids to accuracy of the other arms. Their share in the scheme of defence is consequently similar to that of subsidiary services in land warfare.

It is possible that it may be considered that too close a comparison has been aimed at, and yet the writer hopes that the reader will recognize that there is a close resemblance between the principles of defence against a land attack, and the principles of defence against an aerial attack.

Encouraged by this hope, therefore, he proposes to go further and to endeavour to adapt the organization and command of land defences (which have been tested in war) to the defences against attacks from the air.

Now the first principle of defence on land is that every commander is responsible for the defence of his particular sector of the line or of his command.

In the case of a divisional sector, the commander has directly under his orders the field artillery and the infantry, but the heavy and medium artillery and the subsidiary services, both of which may be called upon to assist in the active defence of the sector, are

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not under his orders. Their radius of action is so wide that they cannot, with economy, be allotted to a sector as narrow as that of a division.

The assistance which they will give will be arranged, therefore, by the higher formation (*i.e.* the corps), but will, so far as circumstances permit, be in accordance with the divisional commander's wishes.

In the case of a corps sector the commander has directly under his orders (*a*) the field artillery, (*b*) the infantry, and also (*c*) the heavy and medium artillery, and probably also (*d*) the subsidiary services, but the actual allotment of (*c*) and (*d*) is determined by the Army or by G.H.Q., and varied as the situation may demand.

The rôle allotted to the field artillery demands accurate co-ordination as well as a certain degree of technical knowledge. For these reasons, a dependent commander of the field artillery has been found to be necessary. Thus in the case of a division, the C.R.A. advises his commander on artillery matters, and commands all artillery units which have been placed under the orders of the divisional commander; whilst, in the case of a corps, the colonel commandant, R.A., advises the corps commander on artillery matters and, without interfering with the functions of the divisional C.R.A.'s, coordinates the fire of the field artillery throughout the sector held by the corps.

The infantry defence of a sector is subdivided into brigade and battalion sectors, each with its own commander. Owing to this system of subdivision, corps and divisional commanders do not feel the need of any single intermediate commander of the infantry. Orders, etc., are passed down in the normal chain from corps to divisions, and so on to brigades and battalions.

There was, however, a time when commanders felt the necessity for having an officer whose special duty it was to coordinate the fire of their machine guns. When these weapons were included in the armament of each battalion (as is again the custom), it was found that their fire, to be really effective, required as much co-ordination as the fire of the field artillery. A machine-gun officer was accordingly added to the staffs both of corps and divisions, and this officer naturally worked in close cooperation with the gunners.

The rôle allotted in defence to the heavy and medium artillery demands a greater technical knowledge than that which is required in the case of the field artillery; the wide front covered by these long-range guns, and the diversity of tasks which they may be called upon to perform, also renders the coordinations of their fire more intricate.

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For these reasons, a colonel commandant of heavy artillery is required on a corps staff.

This officer is subordinate to the colonel commandant who is in charge of all artillery of the corps, but is in direct command of all the heavy and medium artillery which has been allotted to the corps.

Owing to his close contact with the operations of these guns, he is in a position to advise the C.C.R.A. on their employment; he is also responsible for advising divisional commanders as to the part which the heavy and medium artillery can play in the defence of their various sectors.

As the various subsidiary services have no independent rôle, it has been found best to affiliate them to the particular arm with which they are in the closest contact, and consequently they are generally placed under the control of the C.C.R.A. of the corps.

For defence against land attacks, therefore, the following table summarizes the kind of organization which has been proved by experience to be sound and effective.

(*a*) In the case of a *divisional sector* (which does not include heavy and medium artillery):

Divisional commander
(Responsible for the defence of his sector)

Machine-gun officer (to co-ordinate the fire of the machine guns).	C.R.A. (to advise the divisional commander on the work of the field artillery and to command the field artillery units in the division).

(*b*) In the case of a *corps sector* (which includes an allotment of heavy and medium artillery):

Corps commander
(Responsible for the defence of his sector)


Machine-gun officer (to co-ordinate the fire of the machine guns).	Colonel commandant, R.A. (to advise the corps commander on artillery matters; to coordinate the work of the field artillery; to direct the fire of the heavy and medium artillery; and to control the subsidiary services). Colonel commandant, heavy artillery (to advise the C.C.R.A. on heavy artillery matters and to command the heavy and medium artillery allotted to the corps, and to advise divisional commanders on the employment of heavy and medium artillery).*

* In many instances during the recent war, owing to the frequent reliefs of the infantry holding the line, it was found advisable to place the field artillery under the direct orders of the C.C.R.A. of the corps. This arrangement was conducive to continuity of policy in the scheme for the artillery defence.

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
The writer now proposes to adapt this form of defensive organization against an attack from the air.

Bearing in mind the close parallels to which allusion has already been drawn between the tasks of the various arms in the two kinds of warfare, it is reasonable to suggest that, with the necessary substitutions, the scheme of defensive command already given for defence against a land attack affords an organization suitable for defence against an attack from the air. Corresponding to a divisional sector, to which no heavy and medium artillery are allotted, there will be air sectors, to which no aircraft will be allotted, and thus, after making the necessary substitutions, the following defensive organization is arrived at :


Minor Sector
Sector commander
(Responsible for the defence of his sector)
Machine-gun officer (to co-ordinate the fire of the machine guns).
Commander of A.A. batteries (to advise the sector commander on matters concerning A.A. batteries and to command the A.A. batteries in the sector).

Corresponding to a corps sector, to which heavy and medium artillery have been allotted, there will be air sectors, to which aircraft will be allotted.

Again, after making the necessary substitutions, the following organization is arrived at. :


Major Sector
Sector commander
(Responsible for the defence of his sector)
Machine-gun officer (to co-ordinate the fire of the machine guns).
Commander of aircraft and A.A. batteries (to advise the sector commander on the operations of aircraft and A.A. batteries; to coordinate the fire of the A.A. batteries; to direct the operations of aircraft; and to control the subsidiary services.
Commander of aircraft (to advise the commander of aircraft upon aircraft matters; to command the aircraft allotted to the sector; and to advise commanders of minor sectors on the employment of aircraft).

In both the above organizations, it has been assumed that the normal chain of command will be sufficient to control the small-arm

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fire, exclusive of machine-gun fire. In support of this assumption, the writer would point out that the units which supply this fire will not be units that have been especially detailed for A.A. defence; they will belong to formations quartered in the area, and, as such, will have the normal organization.

He would also suggest that, in his opinion, the small-arm fire need not be coordinated with the operations of aircraft and A.A. batteries, as it will not come into effect until the hostile machines have passed through their zone of action.

It now only remains to decide from which Service and from which arm the commanders and subordinate commanders should be drawn.

The units under a commander of a sector will consist of:

(*a*) technical A.A. units, *i.e.* aircraft, A.A. batteries and subsidiary services; and

(*b*) non-technical A.A. units, *i.e.* troops quartered in the area, who will supply the small-arm defence.

As the suggested organization has provided commanders of sectors with technical subordinate commanders for the technical units, there is no reason for the commander himself to be a technical expert. The non-technical troops are under the command of the General or other officer commanding the area, they are in fact his units; why, therefore, should he not also assume command of the technical units, and become responsible for the defence of his area from aerial attack? If this system of command is adopted, it will of course, be necessary that aerial defence sectors should correspond with land defence areas; and, in the writer's opinion, little can be urged against this being the practice.

It is undoubtedly desirable that one commander should be responsible for the defence of an area, whether the attack comes by land or by air.


As regards the command of aircraft and A.A. batteries, the problem of a mixed force comprising two technical arms has to be considered. The functions of the arms are widely different, but as their operations are so closely allied the officers of one arm must have a thorough knowledge of the principles of the other, before they can be considered to be competent in their own particular branch. It would appear, therefore, that these commanders can be drawn either from R.F.A. officers or from officers who have commanded A.A. batteries. With a prospect of obtaining a command of this kind, officers of both Services will be encouraged to

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make a careful study of the combined operations of aircraft and also of anti-aircraft artillery.

The reader will remember that in a note on a previous page the writer pointed out that the C.C.R.A. of a corps may be called upon to take command of all the field artillery in the corps. If, then, corps and divisional commanders are to be responsible for the aerial protection of their areas, as has been suggested, there may be repeated changes in the control of the A.A. batteries, due to divisions in the corps changing. For this reason it will probably be advisable to place all the A.A. batteries directly under the control of the commander of aircraft and A.A. batteries. If this plan were adopted, the commander would require more detailed knowledge of anti-aircraft gunnery, and it would be necessary to give him a subordinate commander of A.A. batteries, parallel to the aircraft commander.

The organization of the corps or major sector would then be as follows :




As regards commanders of aircraft, commanders of anti-aircraft batteries, and machine-gun officers, these officers will naturally be drawn from their own arm, but the machine-gun officers will require special training in aircraft operations, as well as in the work of A.A. artillery.

In conclusion, the writer ventures to believe that the suggestions which he has put forward would produce an effective defensive organization against attacks from the air. It is based on the concrete experience of defence against land attacks, and, for this reason, the writer claims that he has faced the problem from an aspect, which should produce useful and profitable results, although its eventual solution may possibly differ in some respects from the one which he has himself given.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES OF A CORPS SECTOR •


Corps commander
(Responsible for the defence of his sector from land and aerial attacks)
Machine-gun officer
Commander of aircraft and A.A. batteries and controller of subsidiary services
Commander of aircraft
Commander of battteries
Divisional commander
Machine-gun officer
Commander of A.A. batteries
Divisional commander
Machine-gun officer
Commander of A.A. batteries

• A.A. batteries can either be commanded by the commander of A.A. batteries, or remain under the divisional commander in which case their fire would be coordinated by him.

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THE FORMER CROWN PRINCE'S MEMOIRS

THE former German Crown Prince has published his military reminiscences of the war under the title of "*Meine Erinnerungen aus Deutschlands Heldenkampf*" (*Berlin: Mittler*, 3200 *marks*).* As commander of an Army and a Group of Armies, he should have much of historical value to say; but though there are some statements in it of interest—which will be extracted—the book, as a whole, is disappointing and is hardly more than a précis of the operations in which his troops took part, punctuated with assertions that all the failures were due to his advice being neglected, and with criticism of other generals and of the Supreme Command. The whole gold reserve of Germany must have been released to provide the ornamentation on the binding of the book, which is royally gilded. Orders of battle, operation orders and other data which a military student requires are lacking; the maps are indifferent; they indicate, except in one case, only the general direction of movements without giving any dates. The Prince on his last page seems to have recognized his inability to write history, and says that he has neither the training nor material to do so; but, as he occasionally quotes war diaries, he seems to have had some documents at his disposal.

In the original mobilization appointments, the Crown Prince was put down as commander of the 1st Guard Division, but in August, 1914, General von Eichhorn, an Army Inspector, who should have commanded the Fifth Army, conveniently fell sick, and though the Prince had never commanded a division or a corps, the Kaiser nominated him to the vacant post. All was to be as in 1870, with a Moltke as Chief of the General Staff, and two Crown Princes and a Duke of Württemberg in command of Armies—victory was assured just as it had been 44 years before. The Kaiser, however, took the precaution to say to his son: "You will have Lieut.-General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf [the Prince's military tutor] as Chief of your General Staff. You must do what he tells you."

Moltke, who was present, endeavoured to cheer up the new

* The Crown Prince's personal Memoirs, "edited and supplemented" by Herr Rosner, were noticed under "Fiction" in the *Army Quarterly* of July, 1922.

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Army Commander by saying : " You have good military insight and sound judgment of men. You will do as well as the others. Never forget that the Army Commander is always responsible. The Chief of the Staff merely gives advice."

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army was, as events proved, wrong in every particular, and, when trouble came at Verdun in the autumn of 1916, it was Schmidt and other members of the staff who were " unstuck " ; the Prince remained.

In the opening operations, the Fifth Army after getting into position in line with the others, pivoting on Thionville, was ordered to stand on the defensive. The Prince immediately protested and obtained authority to advance. He thereby became involved in the battle of Longwy. In this encounter, after a slight advance-guard success on the first day, for which the Kaiser awarded him the Iron Cross, both II. and I. Class, the Prince adjudged the French beaten, wheeled his left forward to drive them away north-westward from Verdun, and was struck in flank by Maunoury's Reserve Divisions and compelled to retire. Only the accident that Maunoury was wanted elsewhere saved him in all probability from a serious disaster. The facts, which have already been made public in the official monograph on Longwy, are admitted in the text, but the rearward movements are omitted from the map of the operations. The capture of the old fort of Longwy served usefully to deceive the German public and to cover up the defeat in the field.

The Fifth Army, leaving one corps east of Verdun and masking the fortress with Landwehr troops, swung round the north of it as the French made their general retirement, and then moved southward in pursuit. Taken in flank by General Sarrail, who had disobeyed Joffre's orders to abandon Verdun and its forts, the Prince had to deploy south-eastward on the night of the 6th of September—the first day of the battle of the Marne. At this stage—although a cavalryman himself—he proceeds to damn his cavalry, which had not warned him. He adds :

" Experience taught us that the mobility of modern cavalry masses in the end is not greater than that of our excellently marching infantry ; the cavalry always remained behind, blocking the roads, directly things in front became serious."

During the succeeding days of the battle of the Marne, the 7th, 8th and 9th of September, the German Fifth Army lay under heavy artillery fire, and could not advance. The Prince became alarmed, and, on the 8th, wrote to his father, who replied, " The anxiety

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is needless," and assured him that the operations were going well, both East and West.

As a last desperate remedy, the Prince ordered two corps to make a night attack on the night of the 9th–10th of September, after the general retreat had been begun: they gained a little ground, and thus facilitated the subsequent retirement of the Army. When Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch arrived on the 10th of September with news of the Armies on the right, the Prince tells us he considered himself a victor, refused to take instructions from Hentsch and protested to the Supreme Command. He was then sent a formal order, beginning "His Majesty commands. . . ." Again he protested against the line he was ordered to occupy, and selected another. On the 11th of September, Moltke visited him and informed him "the right wing is beaten, and it is questionable where it will come to a stop."

The Prince attributes the German defeat at the Marne to Schlieffen's plan having been abandoned:

> "The strategic form in which German O.H.L. in 1914 attempted to execute this ingenious plan, was from the first so watered down from the original that one should scarcely mention it in connection with the name of its creator."

Cleverer soldiers than the Prince have shown that the fault was that Moltke stuck to the original too closely, ignoring that conditions were changed since Schlieffen drew it up; for Leopold of Belgium was dead, the Russians were more ready, the French were stronger and better prepared to take the offensive, and we now know that the demolition of Belgian railways prevented, until the 9th of September, any transfer of troops from left to right.

When the situation cleared a little during the battle of the Aisne, the Prince proposed a formal attack on Verdun, but, as Antwerp had not been taken, there were no technical troops and no heavy guns and ammunition available, and the attack had to be postponed.

In reward for his services, the Crown Prince, on the 26th of November, was promoted to command of the left Group of Armies, which held half of the whole front as far as length goes, from just west of Verdun to the Swiss frontier. He fixed his headquarters in Stenay on the extreme right of his command. During 1915 he had a quiet time of trench warfare.

In December, 1915, Supreme Headquarters decided to undertake an offensive at Verdun. The Prince states that he desired to make an attack on both sides of the Meuse, but for this the men and material

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available were insufficient; Falkenhayn informed him that O.H.L. had to keep "sufficient reserves at its disposal in case the British undertook an attack elsewhere to relieve Verdun."

While Falkenhayn favoured "attrition" and gradually "bleeding" the French by attracting their reserves to the fight near the fortress, the Prince felt sure that by "an accelerated and surprise attack with overwhelming force under protection of overwhelming artillery," it would be possible to drive a gap through the French, which could then be exploited by reserves.

"This confidence, truly, was not completely fulfilled at Verdun," he admits. When the attack by brute force failed, and sufficient men to continue it could not be supplied, he persistently, he avers, advised that the attack should be stopped, and protested against Falkenhayn's idea of bleeding France to death. In July the battle of the Somme began at once to affect Verdun, and the Prince was warned that he could have no further men or munitions. On the 15th of August he sent in a written protest against the using up of the few remaining reserves of his Group in continuing the attack, but was told in reply that "the situation as a whole required that the offensive should not be abandoned, but should be systematically pursued."

As he had constant differences with his Chief of the Staff, Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, whom he regarded as much too imbued with the views of Falkenhayn, he begged his father for another Chief of the Staff, and Lüttwitz from the command of the X. Corps was sent to him. Some other officers of the General Staff were also removed. The plain meaning is that von Knobelsdorf was made the scapegoat for the failures. In excuse for his ill-success, the Prince asserts that the French lost double the number of men that the Germans did.

The Somme fighting having taken the pressure off Verdun, when Hindenburg came into power there was a steady flow from Verdun to the Somme of divisions and special formations, "artillery, engineers, airmen, labour battalions, without replacement"—no figures are, however, given. On the 10th of September the Prince received orders for his Group of Armies "to remain quiet, that is the fighting must be gradually allowed to die down. All attacks are forbidden, unless they are absolutely necessary to recover parts of the position selected to be held as the best."

So now it was the turn of the French, whose success in regaining the lost ground is attributed "to the faulty centralization of command of the German artillery."

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On the 25th of November there was a reorganization of commands, and the Prince was allotted the front from Rheims to the Swiss frontier, with the Third and Fifth Armies and several Army Detachments to hold it. Colonel von der Schulenberg, who remained with him to the end, became his Chief of the Staff. In February, when the preparations for Nivelle's attack began to become evident, the Prince's command was extended westward to include the Seventh Army and the whole of the likely front of attack. On the 3rd of March Nivelle's preparatory orders were captured * and on the 5th of April his attack orders also. Reinforcements had been brought up and the First Army interpolated between the Seventh and Third Armies. Thus, the Germans were not only not surprised, but were fully prepared and were nearly as strong as the attackers (40 against 48 divisions). Little wonder that Nivelle failed. The Prince states definitely why no attempt was made to exploit the success of his Armies:

"When the crisis of the fight was over, my Group with heavy heart had to give up considerable forces for employment elsewhere. The Supreme Command demanded that I should hand over fresh large forces for Galicia and for the Flanders battle that was preparing against Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group. I had, therefore, to anticipate that in the event of another great French offensive the Supreme Command would not be in a position to beat it off."

His Armies were ordered, therefore, to give way gradually if attacked, and Pétain was able to carry out his reorganization undisturbed.

The Prince tries to explain his defeat at Malmaison in October, 1917, when Pétain recommenced operations by an attack to test his troops. He says:

"The mass employment of artillery, trench mortars and gas exceeded even Verdun. Favoured by dull, still weather, a thick gas blanket (literally 'marsh') formed in the Ailette valley between Vauxaillon and Bray behind the fighting front. In the day preceding the infantry attack all communication with it failed. Aeroplanes had to be used to drop ammunition and supplies." [Why not messages also?]

An offensive in March, 1918, met with the Prince's approval but, as already known, he favoured it being made against the French "in and east of the Argonne, with simultaneously a strong push in a westerly direction from the St. Mihiel area with the object of annihilating the foe in the Verdun sector."

* Ludendorff, "My War Memories," p. 410, says that this happened in the "middle of February."

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The decision having been taken to attack the British, the programme of his Group was confined to making arrangements for defence, for retiring and evacuating territory if necessary, and in preparation for false attacks. Labour was not lacking with the Germans, apparently, for he managed to get hold of " almost 200,000 men." On the 31st of January, 1918, there was a slight reorganization : the Fifth Army passed to Gallwitz's Group and the Eighteenth (Hutier) was inserted on the right of Crown Prince Group, ready to take part in the great offensive.

The Prince makes it quite clear that Hutier's Army was not intended to break through, but

" to reach the Somme and the Crozat Canal between the mouth of the Omignon and the Oise in one uninterrupted advance . . . if this were successful, it would be possible by wheeling strong reserves in a north-westerly direction to open the way for General von der Marwitz's Second Army through a particularly difficult district and widen the break-through. The attack south of the Somme had an even more limited object, the Crozat Canal. It was considered the flank guard of the main attack."

The Prince, of course, was not satisfied with this rôle for his Eighteenth Army, and he and his Chief of the Staff made perparations for going farther beyond the Somme. He advocated this course to the Supreme Command, which, however, declined for the moment to approve. The Prince apparently cannot see that the eventual advance of Hutier merely created a salient, and made a decisive success impossible ; for he says, " events proved the correctness of my idea." On the 23rd of March Hutier, after his easy victory over Gough, was permitted to press on.

" The reason for this far-reaching change of the plan of operations was to be found in the fact that the Seventeenth Army and the northern wing of the Second had not succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the enemy [Byng and Horne] as had been anticipated."

Only on the 26th of March did Ludendorff order an attempt to be made to separate the French and British. For this purpose, Hutier's Army (34 divisions) was to wheel to the left as far as the lower Avre and then to await the wheel of the left wing of Marwitz's Army past Amiens. The right of Hutier and the left of Marwitz could not, however, make progress. The Prince now thinks that Marwitz's force was too weak—it was, perhaps, but it was more than three times the strength of the forces opposing it.

Leaving the scene of one of the greatest failures of all time, he

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writes at length of the Chemin des Dames offensive, where 5 French and 3 British weak, resting, divisions were taken by surprise by 29 divisions [the Prince gives the figures], 18 in first line, after 3½ hours' bombardment by 1,158 attack batteries.

Then came the final unsuccessful offensive of Rheims—Chateau Thierry. The Prince attributes his failure to the plan being divulged by prisoners.

Scared by the Allies' successes in July, the Prince addressed a memorandum to his father, pointing out the desperate state of the Army. He argued that it must grow weaker, that the Allies would grow stronger with American aid, that the Germans would be forced to stand on the defensive, that a bad peace would bring trouble, and that "in a beaten Germany internal conditions would arise as they at present obtain in Russia." But he suggested no remedy.

Of his subsequent continuous defeats he says very little, but only insists again and again that his Group of Armies "was, and to the last remained, unconquered by the enemy." He omits to mention his flight into Holland.

With such a leader, the subordinate commanders and soldiers must have been stout-hearted indeed to hold out so long as they did.

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THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST*

AUGUST—NOVEMBER, 1918

(With Map)

PART II

THE great British blow against the immensely strong Hindenburg line which was described in Part I of this article, had proved the most immediate and the most striking of all the successes hitherto gained on the Western Front in the course of 1918. The Franco-American offensive in Champagne and the Argonne, after having made excellent headway in the initial stages, was at the end of September making but slow and costly progress, the Germans having put forward their utmost efforts to stave off this serious menace to the centre of their line. In Flanders the weather and the terrain had combined to put a term to the exploitation of the victory gained by King Albert's command and necessitated a pause before a further attack could be launched with hope of good success. In the intervals between the sectors of attack the Germans were indeed falling back by reason of the peril to their flanks, but voluntarily and in their own time. None the less, the situation had taken a definite turn in favour of the Allies, a fact which neither Ludendorff nor Foch was slow to recognize. The former lost no time from the first day of October in repeatedly and insistently urging his Government to make peace while yet the German Army remained in being; the latter henceforward set himself, by every means in his power, to bring the campaign to a victorious termination, before the coming of winter should preclude further large-scale operations.

THE ADVANCE IN OPEN COUNTRY

6TH OF OCTOBER—11TH OF NOVEMBER, 1918

1. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918, AND THE PURSUIT TO THE SELLE

(8th—12th of October)

The effect of the great successes gained during the battles for the Hindenburg line was not long in making itself felt. G.H.Q. was

* Part I of this article appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, Vol. V, No. 2, January, 1923.

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resolved to push the advantage gained to the utmost limit of the possible, and issued orders on the 5th of October for a renewed attack by the Fourth and Third Armies to take place on the 8th, before the enemy should have time to rally and reorganize in a fresh position.

On the Fourth Army front the operation was entirely successful and little serious resistance was met with. The enemy offered a certain amount of opposition in the early stages of the advance in the neighbourhood of Brancourt and Serain, but, before nightfall on the 8th of October, the British troops had established themselves some four miles to the east of the line they had left in the morning. When operations were resumed early on the 9th, it was clear that the Germans were everywhere in retreat, and the advance became more rapid. By the evening of the 10th, it had progressed as far as the general line of the Selle river from east of Bohain to just north of Le Cateau. The enemy had rallied behind this line of defence, and it was clear that a determined resistance was to be expected. Accordingly, the Fourth Army was halted and devoted the next few days to preparations for a renewal of the offensive on a large scale in concert with the French on its right and the Third Army on its left.

On the front of the Third Army, part of the Masnières—Beaurevoir line still remained to be captured, and these last prepared German defences were assaulted by the light of the moon on the early morning of the 8th of October along the whole front from north of Le Catelet to south of Cambrai. Serious fighting took place particularly on the fronts of the V Corps on the right and of the XVII Corps on the left, the latter being subjected to a powerful German counter-attack aided by tanks, which, for the time being, checked its progress. By nightfall, however, the whole of the Masnières—Beaurevoir line on the Third Army front had been captured, and the advanced troops had reached in general the line of the Cambrai—Bohain road and had occupied the southern suburbs of Cambrai. On the previous day the Canadian Corps of the First Army had advanced its line to the north of this town, which was thus enveloped on three sides. In the early hours of the 8th, the enemy withdrew from its ruins, and, by the morning of the 9th, the Canadians and XVII Corps were in possession.

The Germans, during the next few days, fell back rapidly to the line of the Selle which had been fixed upon by the High Command as the scene of their next stand. Strong rearguards, left behind to check the pursuit, were driven in by British cavalry and advanced

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troops, and, by the 12th of October, the Third Army was once more in contact with the enemy's main forces along the line of the Selle from the left of the Fourth Army north of Le Cateau to the Cambrai—Bavai road.

Meanwhile, to the north of the Scarpe, the left wing of the First Army and the right of the Fifth Army, which had, up to that date, been held back well to the rear of the British troops farther south, undertook a series of operations which, beginning on the 7th of October, forced the Germans to evacuate one after the other their powerful defences covering Douai and the line of the Sensée and Haute Deule canals. The unequal resistance put up by the enemy gave clear proof that the spirit of his troops had been seriously affected by the defeats suffered in the battles for the Hindenburg line already described, and by the rapid progress made by the new series of operations undertaken by the Allies in Flanders.

On the evening of the 13th of October the VIII Corps (Fifth Army) was closely menacing Douai and Arleux, while the XXII Corps (First Army), which had taken over from the Canadians south of the Scarpe, connected the right of that Corps on the north of the river with the left of the Third Army, which was preparing, in conjunction with the Fourth Army, for a deliberate offensive against the Selle line.

By this date the German Army's position had become serious in the extreme. Its right centre had been compelled to relinquish its hold on the wooded *massif* of St. Gobain, and to fall back through Laon towards Guise; and the steady advance of the French and Americans on either side of the Argonne had forced its centre back to a considerable depth between Rheims and Verdun. The further progress of this offensive and that now being so vigorously pushed by the British threatened to lead to the envelopment and destruction of all the German forces between the Meuse and the sea, and this catastrophe could be averted only by vigorous counter-measures. The melting away of the reserves at the disposal of the German High Command, however, precluded any such heroic remedy; and both the hope, faint as it was, of securing some effective general reserve, and the need of lessening the intolerable strain on the troops in the line, drove Ludendorff to a constant withdrawal and shortening of his front in every sector where such a course was feasible. It was for the Allies to forbid the enemy this final desperate resort by a resolute exploitation of all advantages, gained by constant pressure on the tired and weakened German divisions at every point, and by vigorous blows on a large scale delivered wherever possible and with

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the least delay compatible with adequate preparation and methodical execution.

2. The Battle of Courtrai

(*14th—19th of October*)

The bad weather, which reduced the Flemish roads to mere strips of bottomless mud and rendered the supply of the fighting troops so difficult as almost to exclude the possibility of making adequate preparations for a further advance, had necessitated a fortnight's pause in the exploitation of the successes gained at the end of September by the Allied troops under the command of King Albert. It was only on the 14th of October that the advance on this part of the front could be resumed. At 5.35 a.m. on that day seven British divisions (X, XIX and II Corps) pushed forward to the attack on a front of ten miles between Comines and a point south-east of Moorslede. The two first-named Corps on the right had as their objective the line of the Lys as far east as Wevelghem; this line was successfully secured and bridgeheads seized on the south bank of the river. Farther north, the II Corps broke its way into the enemy's positions to a depth of some four miles, but it was not until the 16th of October that this Corps was able to reach and to secure the Lys crossings on either side of Courtrai. Meanwhile, the French and Belgians on the left of the British had also made excellent progress, occupying Roulers and Thourout and forcing the German Sixth Army to relinquish its hold on the Belgian coast-line for fear of being pinned up against the frontier of Holland by the threatening Allied advance to the south. By the 20th of October, the Belgians had cleared the North Sea shore and their left had attained that frontier; 6,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been the British share of the booty in this battle of Courtrai.

The effects of this rapid progress both to the north and to the south of the salient held by the German Sixth Army in the Lille area were now such as to render impossible the longer retention of that town. The very day after the opening of the battle of Courtrai witnessed the beginning of a withdrawal, which rapidly extended from the Lys in the north to the Scheldt in the south. Lille fell into the hands of the XI Corps on the 18th of October; the VIII Corps on its right had occupied Douai on the previous day and crossed the line of the Sensée and Haute Deule canals along its whole front; while the XV Corps on the left cleared Roubaix and Tourcoing. Thus the whole of the Fifth Army was now engaged

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in a steady advance, which was only brought to an end about the 22nd of October before the line of the Scheldt between Valenciennes and Avelghem. Meanwhile, between the 20th and 31st of October, the right of the Second Army reached the latter place by means of a series of partial operations, which led to fierce fighting on the II Corps front, particularly on the 21st and 22nd of October for the passages over the Lys near Courtrai, and again on the 31st astride the railway from that town to Audenarde.

The Allied front in the north at this date ran along the line of the Scheldt and the Terneuzen canal from Valenciennes in the south to the Dutch frontier in the north, and before this line there ensued a renewed pause in the operations.

This large-scale retirement of the German Fourth and Sixth Armies in Flanders and Artois had barely begun before it was expedited by the important events in Picardy known as the battle of the Selle.

3. The Battle of the Selle

(*17th—25th of October*)

According to G.H.Q. orders, issued on the 11th of October, the tasks of the three southern British Armies in the forthcoming battle were: For the Fourth Army to occupy the line Wassigny—Le Cateau, with advanced guards pushed forward to the Sambre—Oise canal; for the Third Army to occupy the line of the Selle and its passages between Le Cateau and the Cambrai—Bavai road; and for the First Army to cover the left of the Third Army between that road and the Scheldt. Owing to the difficulty of securing an adequate supply of munitions and foodstuffs on the congested and ill-provided railways in the recently recovered area, the date of the offensive had been finally fixed for the 17th of October.

On the Fourth Army front artillery preparation was taken in hand from the 12th of October onwards. The passage of the river, which in this part of its course is from 15 to 20 feet wide and 3 to 4 feet deep, was commanded everywhere from the eastern bank, where the railway between Le Cateau and Wassigny afforded a strong defensive position, which was further reinforced by trench lines and wire. In spite of these obstacles the Army plan was ambitious and involved an advance to a depth of some four miles to the east of the river, and an exploitation, if possible, as far as the Sambre—Oise canal in the vicinity of Catillon. As in the operations against the Hindenburg line, the attack was to be carried out by the

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IX, II U.S., and XIII Corps in the order named from the right, a total of six divisions in line and two in support on a front of eleven miles. Against these forces, the Germans would, it was believed, be able to set not more than twelve tired and weak divisions.

Zero hour was at 5.20 a.m. On the right, preceding the attack, the IX Corps had a difficult task, as its right wing was faced by a large wood and an enveloping movement in a south-easterly direction had to be carried out by the troops in the centre and on the left. None the less, the advance took place in excellent order, and went strictly according to programme. By 10.30 a.m. the first objectives had been everywhere attained by the two divisions in the front line, and the reserve division was passing through to carry on the advance to the second line of objectives. This was reached before noon. The II U.S. Corps had a somewhat more straightforward task, but from the first encountered fierce resistance both during and after its passage of the Selle. It was unable to reach its second objective before nightfall. The main difficulties of the day, however, were met with on the XIII Corps front. Here the passage of the lower course of the Selle and the town of Le Cateau had to be negotiated; the right wing could only be got across the river at one point and from there had to spread out fanwise to cover all the ground as far as the southern outskirts of Le Cateau, which was to be turned by the left wing of the Corps passing the Selle on improvised bridges to the north of the town. Despite strong opposition on the part of the Germans, this complicated operation was carried out with brilliant success; by evening the whole of the XIII Corps was firmly established on the western bank of the river, and Le Cateau had been captured after fierce fighting.

General Rawlinson ordered the operations to be resumed on the next day, when, at 11.30 a.m. the IX Corps and the II U.S. Corps began a further attack, which, by the evening, carried their lines to within two miles of the Sambre—Oise canal. On the right the hostile resistance showed signs of weakening, but the Americans once more had to fight hard for their gains. On the XIII Corps front, the plan was for the right to swing forward as far as Bazuel in touch with the Americans, while the centre and left of the Corps remained more or less stationary, facing north-eastward, and in touch with the right of the Third Army. This operation was successfully carried out, and by nightfall the enemy, broken everywhere along the whole Army front, was falling back in haste behind the line of the canal. On the 19th of October British patrols were in touch with the new German position on the east bank of that obstacle.

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Over 5,000 prisoners and 60 guns had been secured by the Fourth Army during the recent fighting, during the course of which fourteen of the enemy's divisions had been engaged and defeated.

The general offensive of the Third Army did not take place until the 20th of October, three days after that of the Fourth Army. As early as the 12th of October, attempts has been made on the fronts of the V and IV Corps to secure bridgeheads on the east bank of the Selle between Le Cateau and Solesmes, but without any great success. On the 20th, the attack was resumed along the whole Army front of nine miles, the VI and XVII Corps, to the north of the V and IV, also taking part in the fighting. The front of advance, in which seven divisions were engaged, thus extended from north of Le Cateau to the Cambrai-Bavai road, and the task before the Army, involving as it did the passage of a wide river valley and the capture of high commanding ground, which had in parts been seriously prepared for defence, was no easy one. The day was rainy, and the mud deep; but, despite these adverse conditions, tanks succeeded in crossing the Selle and getting up to the assistance of the infantry, whose advance was in many places fiercely resisted. The V and IV Corps, which began moving forward, at 2 a.m., succeeded before daylight in establishing their lines firmly beyond the stream. By the evening the former had secured all its objectives, while the latter, in conjunction with the VI Corps on its left, enveloped and captured the village of Solesmes from three sides, and pushed on beyond it to its final objective on and beyond the line of the road from that place to Valenciennes. On the front of the VI Corps also the line of this road had been secured, despite repeated and fierce counter-attacks by strong hostile masses. The XVII Corps on the left flank of the Army had set foot on the crests to the east of the Selle, and was there in touch with the XXII Corps of the First Army, which had as its mission the securing of the Third Army's left in the area of the Scheldt canal. This task was successfully accomplished by the occupation to the south of that water line of the high ground overlooking the Ecaillon river, and of Denain to the north of it. Over 3,500 prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Third and First Armies during this day's operations.

After a pause of twenty-four hours, the general advance of the three British Armies was resumed on the 23rd of October, the general objective being the attainment of the line Sambre and Oise canal—Le Quesnoy—Valenciennes; a front of twenty-six miles from end to end.

In accordance with G.H.Q.'s instructions, the task of the Fourth

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Army was to secure and to hold a defensive front facing east to cover the continued advance of the Third and First Armies. General Rawlinson, therefore, determined to push forward to the general line Oisy—Englefontaine. The attack was carried out by the IX and XIII Corps, the II U.S. Corps having been withdrawn into reserve, thus leaving the Army with only four divisions in the front line and four in support. The wooded and enclosed nature of the country precluded any rapid advance, and two full days' strenuous fighting was found necessary for the passage of the seven miles which divided the starting place from the final objective. Fierce resistance was encountered and overcome at various points of the battlefield, particularly in the neighbourhood of Catillon and Bousies. At the end of the action another 1,000 prisoners and 66 guns were left in our hands.

The main blow on this day, however, was delivered by the Third and First Armies between the Forêt de Mormal and the Scheldt, of which front the former Army was engaged on a line of seven miles and the latter on the remaining five. Nine divisions of the Third Army took part in the advance, which continued during the whole of the 23rd and 24th of October; the remaining division of that Army and two divisions of the First Army came into action only on the second day between the Cambrai—Bavai road and the Scheldt. After the first stage of the attack on the 23rd, when the hostile artillery fire was heavy, causing serious casualties, particularly in the area of the IV and VI Corps, the infantry made good headway. The resistance encountered was uneven; around Vendegies, the advance of the XVII Corps was checked until the afternoon of the 24th, and a second line division had to be brought up to effect its capture; against the southern wing of the Army also, where the V and IV Corps were engaged, the enemy fought with great pertinacity; whereas in the centre the VI Corps made rapid progress, and, before nightfall on the 23rd, had advanced nearly five miles to the outskirts of Le Quesnoy, and the vicinity of the Avesnes—Valenciennes railway. Accordingly, a series of local operations were necessary during the last days of October, in order to secure the original objectives of the advance as laid down by G.H.Q. By the time these were completed, the western edge of Mormal Forest was in our hands, and also the whole of the Avesnes—Valenciennes railway from Le Quesnoy (exclusive) to within two miles of the suburbs of Valenciennes. In addition to this advance—a gain of ground some six miles in depth on a front of twenty-seven miles—the 26 Allied divisions engaged in the battle of the Selle had captured

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from the 31 German divisions opposed to them 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns. In the operations on the British front during October, the British casualties had been about 120,000 all told.

By the end of October the enemy's position on the Western Front from every point of view had become critical—it is not perhaps too much to say hopeless. Everywhere his battle front was falling back ; in many places it was not far from collapse. In the area where the French and the Americans were fighting and advancing successfully, the Germans were in full retreat to the line of the Meuse between Verdun and Mezières, having lost their last prepared defensive system along the Upper Aisne, while farther to the west they were also withdrawing over open country from the line of the Serre towards Avesnes and Hirson. It seemed clear that the inevitable result of the Allied plan of advance must be to pin the enemy up against the trackless forest of the Ardennes and so compel him to carry out any further retreat by two widely-separated routes, south of the forest by way of the narrow valley of the Upper Meuse and north of it through the defile of Liége. The former gateway would certainly be closed before long by the advance of the Allied right centre, and the attempt to pass all the northern German armies through the latter could only lead to inextricable confusion and irretrievable disaster. No doubt it was because Ludendorff so clearly realized all this that he decided on the 26th of October to relinquish his command in favour of a successor whose first and only thought was to bring the war to the earliest possible conclusion.

4. The Battle of Valenciennes

(*1st—2nd of November*)

By this time the growing weakness, both material and moral, of the enemy in front of the British had made it clear that only one more rapid and resolute effort would be needed to consummate his defeat and to force him to a widespread retirement which might well prove decisive of the campaign.

Orders were, therefore, given by the British Commander-in-Chief for a general advance by the Fourth, Third and First Armies in the direction of Maubeuge—Mons, subject to the success of a preliminary operation on the 2nd of November, against Valenciennes, with the object of securing the left flank of the main offensive.

This minor attack was delivered at 5.15 a.m. on the 1st of November by four divisions of the XVII, XXII and Canadian Corps.

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The front of these troops extended for about six miles to the south and inclusive of Valenciennes, and the objectives included that town and the high ground beyond the course of the lower Rhonelle river, a distance of some two to three miles to the east of the starting line. The operation was completely successful, although the enemy's resistance was so determined that it was not until the 2nd of November that all the objectives were finally reached and held. This operation resulted in the capture of 2,500 prisoners and successfully paved the way for the decisive advance of the Third and Fourth Armies two days later; it also rendered precarious the position of the Germans behind the line of the Scheldt northward from Valenciennes.

5. The Battle of the Sambre

(*4th of November*)

Preliminary operations were also necessary on the Fourth Army front, in order to clear the enemy from his last remaining positions on the western bank of the Sambre—Oise canal. This was only partially completed, however, by the 4th of November, the date proposed for the general attack. The Fourth Army operation orders enjoined an eastward advance on a front of fifteen miles to a depth of about two miles, and an exploitation to within three miles of the main Avesnes—Maubeuge road, the objective laid down by G.H.Q. This task involved the passage of the Sambre—Oise canal and the Sambre river line along the whole front, as well as a deep penetration, by the right flank into a rolling and enclosed country, and by the left into the depths of the dense Forêt de Mormal. Accordingly, most careful and detailed preparations were of the first importance; various means of crossing the water obstacle were employed, including temporary and floating bridges, rafts, boats and even life-belts; tanks were also employed where possible, but a preliminary bombardment was dispensed with in order to ensure surprise.

The IX Corps on the right started the attack at 5.45 a.m. under cover of a heavy mist; its right and left wings at first met with serious and sustained resistance on the canal line around Fesmy and Ors, but the troops in the centre had an easier task after clearing the village of Catillon, and were able to get well forward beyond the canal, thus facilitating the progress of their comrades, and by evening the Corps' front was roughly on the line Fesmy—south of Landrecies. The XIII Corps on the left of the Army achieved even more striking results; the passage of the Sambre was forced north and south of

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Landrecies and the town captured by an enveloping attack from three sides, while farther north the enemy was driven from his positions on the western edge of the Forêt de Mormal, and forced back some three miles into its depths. The day's operations had thus been brilliantly successful, the average progress made amounting to between two and four miles, and the captures to 4,000 prisoners and 80 guns.

On the Third Army front, the offensive was conducted by eight divisions in the front line and four in support. The objectives laid down for the V Corps on the right included the northern part of the Forêt de Mormal, which in actual fact turned out to be a less formidable obstacle than had been feared. None the less, stubborn resistance was met with, which necessitated a whole day's fighting before the right of the Corps reached the open ground beyond the eastern edge of the great woodland, and neither on the left of the V Corps sector nor on that of the IV Corps was the forest completely cleared until late on the 5th of November. Farther north, the New Zealand Division of the IV Corps accomplished a spectacular feat by scaling and storming the ramparts of the old fortified town of Le Quesnoy, after the garrison had been demoralized by out-flanking movements on either side of the place, which cut off all their possible lines of retreat. The VI Corps, on the left of the IV Corps, had perhaps the hardest fighting of the day in the vicinity of the Cambrai—Bavai road, and its progress was less rapid than that of its neighbours. None the less, by the end of the day all its objectives had been gained. On the XVII Corps' front the enemy fought only half-heartedly, and, despite difficulties which arose from the necessity of assembling the assaulting troops in the misty and rainy darkness of a November morning, the final line of objectives along the Upper Aunelle was reached early in the afternoon.

The XXII and Canadian Corps of the First Army were also in action on this day. On the right flank of the former Corps hostile counter-attacks compelled the relinquishment of some high ground west of the Aunelle which had been occupied early in the morning, but elsewhere the resistance was less serious and good progress was made.

The issue of the battle of the Sambre proved, as had been hoped by G.H.Q., decisive. Early on the 5th of November, it was clear that the Germans were retreating along the whole of the front from Valenciennes southward to the Forest of Nouvion, only resisting temporarily in the area just south of the Scheldt in order to secure the pivot of their rearward movements. By nightfall on that day the

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whole of the Forêt de Mormal was in the hands of the British; Bavai was only a few miles beyond the line reached by the foremost troops, while the British cavalry and airmen were following up along all the roads leading east and north-east the trail of the enemy's broken armies falling back towards Germany.

The battle of the Sambre, in which twenty-six British and thirty-two German divisions were engaged, had resulted in the complete defeat of the latter with a loss of 19,000 prisoners and over 450 guns.

6. The End of the Campaign

(5th—11th of November)

The clearing of the Forêt de Mormal having been completed, no large-scale engagements remain to be recorded. The Fourth Army, on the 9th of November, organized a mixed detachment known as "Bethell's Force" to follow up the defeated enemy, the main body of the Army, owing to supply difficulties, being halted on the general line of the La Capelle—Maubeuge road on either side of Avesnes. Bethell's force, on the 10th of November, came into contact with German rearguards around Sivry, and the cessation of fighting at 11 a.m. the next day found its leading troops at the most easterly point reached by the British during the campaign in France—just across the Belgian frontier south of Beaumont. The Third and First Armies, after having on the 5th and 6th of November finally broken the German resistance south-east of Valenciennes, advanced with their left flank astride the Mons—Condé canal and their right in the general direction of Maubeuge—a town which was occupied on the 9th of November. The effect of this advance soon made itself felt farther northward, where, on the night of the 7th of November, the Germans abandoned the line of the Scheldt, which was passed next morning by the First and Fifth Armies on a wide front south of Tournai. This town itself fell into our hands on the 9th, and on the same day the Second Army in its turn set foot on the eastern bank of the Scheldt farther north near Renaix. During the last two days of the war the advance of the whole British line continued uninterrupted by any serious resistance, though here and there obstinate rearguards delayed its progress for short spaces of time. The only noteworthy action, however, took place early on the morning of the 11th of November at Mons, where a German garrison put up a hard fight, only to end in the loss of the town and its own annihilation. At 11 a.m. hostilities ceased and the British Armies stood fast along their whole front. This front at that moment ran from Sivry by

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way of Merbes-le-Chateau, Mons, Lens-sur-Dendre, and Lessines to Grammont, practically everywhere to the east of the Franco-Belgian frontier. Our casualties during the period the 1st–11th of November amounted to some 20,000.

Elsewhere along the front the Allies had reached the general line Chimay—Rocroi—Mezières—the Meuse to Stenay—Damvilliers—Frèsnes—Pont à Mousson. The line of the Meuse, the last German defence, had already been forced by the Americans near Sedan; a final offensive, to be conducted by twenty-six French and American divisions in Lorraine against the German forces covering Metz, was timed to begin on the 14th of November. The German High Command had available, for the purpose of meeting this offensive and of checking the advance of the Allied Armies along the remainder of the front, only seventeen divisions in general reserve, and of these only two could be regarded as fresh or fit for fighting. On the British front the enemy's strength had been completely broken by the last four months of incessant fighting, and on the rest of the line it would seem that his condition was but little better. All evidence goes to show that the German Army by the 11th of November was in no fit condition to continue the struggle any longer, and that the conclusion of hostilities came none too soon to avert a military catastrophe to which history could have afforded no parallel.

7. Conclusion

The British share in this great campaign may be briefly summed up. 59 of our divisions had in the period from the 8th of August to the 11th of November, encountered and defeated 99 German divisions. An area of France and Belgium 80 miles by 70 miles had been freed from the clutch of the invaders; and 187,000 prisoners, 2,850 guns, 29,000 machine guns and 3,000 trench mortars had fallen into our hands, besides other captures of every sort and variety and in vast numbers.

The above statement, however, gives but an insufficient idea of the great efforts and sacrifices of the British Armies during these fateful three months of constant battle. The latter may be exemplified in concise form by the figures of British casualties, which totalled no less than 363,000 between the 8th of August and the 11th of November, and of these close on 18,000 were officers. Of the former it is more difficult to give an accurate idea without undue prolixity. The magnitude of the mere task of supplying, maintaining and feeding the armies during the advance can be gathered from the

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following data: 700 road bridges were constructed by the R.E. during the advance; 14,000 German mines and traps discovered and removed; 400 pumping plants installed, 3,500 miles of road repaired, and 500 craters filled in. By the end of the advance 1,050 miles of railway had been brought into use for the armies; 4,412 miles of roads were being maintained and 464 miles of canals. Not only had the millions of men composing the armies to be supplied with all the necessities of existence, but in addition many thousands of civilians, living in the reoccupied zones, had to be fed and maintained. The work was greatly complicated by the destructions carried out by the enemy in their retreat and by the fear of others, which might be caused by delay-action mines and fuses. The victorious result of the campaign proves how thoroughly and effectively these colossal difficulties were dealt with and overcome. It will be well understood, however, that the strain imposed on both the fighting troops and administrative services was most severe and increased with every mile of advance and every day of hostilities. At the date of the armistice our railheads had been pushed forward to the general line Le Cateau—Valenciennes—Lille—Courtrai, and the forward troops, which were at an average distance of some thirty miles to the east of these places, depended for their supplies entirely on road transport. Under these circumstances, the continuance of the advance could only have been carried out under conditions of serious difficulty, which must before long have become insuperable. Fortunately, the position of the enemy was even more critical and left him no issue from the toils save an unconditional surrender to the Allied demands. In bringing about this happy issue of the greatest armed conflict of all time the part played by the British Armies was—as Lord Haig has said, and as history will confirm—" overwhelmingly decisive."

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MILITARY TRAINING TO-DAY

By Captain H. Meredith Logan, The Royal Canadian Regiment

The termination of every great military conflict gives an opportunity to the prophets of future peace. A nation, made sad by the losses which have been the price of victory or of defeat, as the case may be, eagerly listens to the tales of a Utopia which vivid imaginations are always ready to picture. Steeped in the emotion of sorrow, the people cast aside reason and historical teaching, and turn their gaze towards any pleasing mirage of peace. Yet war in the future is as inevitable as disease and crime, and until the Golden Rule has been adopted, not as international law, but as the real method of international intercourse, every nation which does not wish to face the perils of defeat must guard against armed attack. In the years which lie before us no words could be more appropriate for the guidance of the Empire than those spoken by the Earl of Cromer to the International Free Trade Congress at Antwerp in 1910: "... it is the imperative duty of every self-respecting nation to provide adequately for its own defence."

From a geographical and commercial point of view future wars of aggression on the part of the British Empire are more unthinkable than the seeking of war by any other great nation. The desire for world peace and prosperity has been demonstrated by the Governments of the Empire, even at the expense of almost any sacrifice except that which entails national honour. It should be apparent to the whole world that the British Empire wishes to avoid war because its people fully realize that no real gain can accrue from the promotion of strife. Only for the defence, either of the Empire itself, its Allies, or oppressed nationalities, will British public opinion ever again sanction a recourse to arms.

But as the Empire has enlarged, so have its responsibilities increased throughout the world. The huge extension of its boundaries, the constant contact into which it is thrown with many diverse countries, its unsought acquisition of new territories, and other causes, have rendered the British Empire, either in whole or in part, constantly

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subject to attack, molestation, or internal strife. Apart from this, the responsibilities which it has assumed in international affairs have made force essential to ensure peace, for the strength to which it may be opposed will inevitably lead to war if there is no threat of superior force. Laws alone have no effect unless they can be enforced by power. Still less can international order be maintained by conferences and conventions unaccompanied by the means to enforce their decisions. An adequate force must be maintained, therefore, for the preservation of peace, and the financial situation as a result of the late war is such that efficiency must be obtained at the least possible cost. In the consideration of such a subject, however, it should never be forgotten that undue peace economy not only will increase the cost of a war, but will also add to the possibilities of war, and the losses resultant therefrom.

The foreseeing of future military requirements is often obscured by a slavish adherence to an immediate past which is unlikely ever to be paralleled in the future. In General Hamley's " Operations of War " (1914 edition) it is said that " There is a natural tendency in every age to consider the lessons of the past as out of date, and to take the most recent experience as the only guide to follow, without pausing to weigh the special conditions which may have exercised an influence. . . . Every war has its special local conditions ; and deductions hurriedly drawn, without due allowance for these conditions, are generally exaggerated, if not altogether wrong." Some modern writers, consequently, are led to believe that " Except for purposes of a glorified kind of police work in time of peace, or for operations against small and weak powers or entirely uncivilized races, the professional army has ceased to have any *raison d'etre*." Thus, the lessons of Chæronea, Breitenfeld, Sedan and Mons are treated with contempt, the possibilities of training in the future are ignored, and the use of mechanical devices to economize men in battle seems to call for no consideration from many contemporary writers, who have saved a horde of fallacies from the devastations of the Great War. Yet Hamley has not been successfully refuted in his contention that " A regular army is immeasurably superior to an armed population."

It may safely be inferred that as Lewis and machine guns have economized the number of men necessary to hold a position, so have modern engines of war decreased the numbers of combatant troops essential to success, provided that the fighting forces have been subjected to a rigid and thorough training. Such a preparation requires time, the length of which increases as the intricacies of military science become more profound. To-day no training is sufficient if

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it does not occupy a man's full time for a long period. "As the instruments of warfare become more intricate," said Homer Lea, "the discipline and *esprit de corps* must be increased accordingly. Because of this fact volunteer forces become more and more useless as the science of warfare progresses." So also may it be said, in a lesser degree, of short-term conscript armies.

War never has been, nor will it ever be, purely mechanical. Machines alone are incapable of engaging in battle, but, nevertheless, they alter the methods of waging war. The evolution of tactics has been largely dependent upon the introduction and evolution of ordnance, as is seen in the increase of the battle-front resulting from the improvements in firearms. To-day a British platoon covers a wider front than a French battalion of 600 men was allotted in the days of Turenne. But this increase in frontage has enlarged the scope of the knowledge necessary to be acquired by the private soldier, as well as by his leaders, both high and low.

The German Army of 1914, in practice, adhered to the ancient shoulder-to-shoulder tactics. It has been stated that this was done in accordance with the teachings of Meckel, who maintained that the volume of fire from a dense formation compensated for the losses thus incurred. It would appear more probable, however, that Prussian training excluded the possibility of exercising that initiative which extension demands. Even the French Army, in the early stages of the late war, suffered from the density of its formations in attack. There is a feeling of security when *en masse* for which it requires years of training to substitute a true confidence in isolation.

Position warfare, with its opportunities for training in the theatre of operations, its stereotyped conduct, its wastage of life, and its lack of mobility, produced a suitable occasion for the employment of men until then little versed in the science of war. But it was the peace-trained "Contemptibles" who made the employment of their gallant successors possible, and had the steel of Sir John French's sword not been tempered by the process of care and time, had the French Army not learned the necessity for preparation, taught by its bitter experience of 1870, then would the German hosts have swept on to European domination.

Neither side, however, had the necessary force to avoid a conflict of resources. To accompany success with the greatest possible economy of lives and *matériel*, the squandering of position warfare must be avoided, and a rapid decision sought. "Not *numbers* decide, but *force*," said Bernhardi, and by force alone will a rapid and successful decision be gained. Apart from the qualities of the

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commander, force is dependent upon the armament and training of the requisite numbers, perfection in which gives mobility, an attribute essential to effect surprise. Accepting as indisputable premises that surprise is one of the most important factors in the conduct of war, and that surprise may be gained by a sudden, rapidly developed attack, it is obvious that a nation which is unprepared to seize its opportunity on the first day of war, loses its chance of securing the initiative.

Too many men may prove as fatal as too few, and the weight of numbers can never be brought to bear without a correspondingly large amount of time and space. It is essential, therefore, to deny these factors to the enemy. In the earliest stages of a war comparatively few men need be wasted upon containing forces, and the whole strength of a regular army can be utilized at once. That this may be possible it is essential, in the writer's opinion, that reservists should not be required to fill up the ranks on mobilization, for the greatest efficiency can be secured only when units are maintained continually at war strength. The completing of units by reservists returned from, in many cases, sedentary civil occupations, discounts their usefulness, until the men have again become hardened to endure fatigue.

By a rapid advance not only is the enemy denied the time and space which he requires for mobilizing the nation, but his area of operations is limited, and his opportunities for strategical manœuvre are restricted, while the superior mobility of the better trained troops gives the power to defeat the enemy in detail. Apart from the advantages of battle which result from such an onslaught, the closing in upon masses of semi-equipped, unprepared men, will demoralize those already under arms—a demoralization which tanks, aeroplanes and other mechanical agencies will soon confirm by a rout or an ignoble capitulation. The forces upon the frontier, which the enemy will employ to cover his mobilization, will be but chaff before the wind of such a rapid and sudden attack, for the nation in arms is educated to think and act in numbers, and without the support of numbers it fails.

Peace strategy and organization, therefore, should aim at victory in the shortest possible time, that the national life may continue with the least interruption. The elements essential for sufficient force are alone capable of attaining this end. It is needless to enlarge upon the advantages of rapid decisions in war.

"An army of 100,000 taken in flank can be beaten by 30,000 men," said Frederick the Great. With the aid of mechanical superiority

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even 30,000 combatant troops would be unnecessary, in the writer's opinion, to achieve this success to-day. Rarely can such tactics be accomplished without excellence in mobility, and certainly never can such a victory be achieved without the attributes which accrue from a greater training. Never before was the standard of marching higher in its requirements than it is to-day. Outflanking movements must be longer, night marching with its greater fatigue is of prime importance for the concealment of intentions, and it is extremely probable that armies may even be required to parallel Schwerin's advance to the battle of Prague, and move for miles across country. Without a long and arduous training these feats are impossible, and it is only by such a careful course of preparation, applied to modern requirements, as Sir John Moore adopted in the training of his troops at Shorncliffe, before the Peninsular War, that efficiency may be maintained. To march long distances with a minimum of fatigue, a training in self-discipline is required, as thorough as the physical training entailed.

A study of the achievements to which good training can lead, and of the duration of service necessary to obtain the requisite amount of training, leads unmistakably to the conclusion that the day of the nation in arms passed with the end of the last great world struggle. National interests should be guarded by professionals as the legal rights of the individual are upheld by those learned in the law. Skilfully led, thoroughly trained, properly equipped, a regular army of a few hundred thousand men will defeat any nation in arms, the cost in peace being far more than compensated for by a swift and cheap victory.

Washington's words to his countrymen were, " No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. . . . The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service." Nor had training reached the importance and complexity in his day which modern tactics have rendered obligatory.

In defence of conscription a dictum of Napoleon's is continually cited. . . . " Victory falls in the final event to the biggest battalions." The logical conclusion is not that conscription is essential to success, for the dictum must be viewed in the light of its modern application. Napoleon had little time to devote to the training of his units, and, apart from his own unparalleled brilliance as a leader, he sought to counteract his deficiencies by numbers. A country now can curtail its fighting forces by means of scientific and mechanical inventions, and superior training. When it was possible mentally and physically

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to equip a man for war during the period allotted by the laws of conscription, there was much to be said in favour of the adoption of universal service. Such days have passed, for no country will endure the length of time which each man would have to serve in order to obtain the necessary military education.

Although present requirements eliminate the justification for the employment of militia and conscripts as fighting forces, and hence their enlistment in time of peace, there are yet many tasks on which irregulars could be employed in war. The increase of *personnel* required in non-combatant services during war could well be supplied by militia. Many of the administrative services necessary to maintain an army in peace must inevitably be expanded during a war, and could be undertaken by partially trained men.

A careful selection of *personnel* can be carried out in a regular army—service in which is made sufficiently attractive to the youth of the country—and this means the ensuring of the strength of each link in the military chain, the power of which is dependent upon the strength of its weakest link. The interest, energy, military knowledge, *esprit de corps* and moral of a professional army, will be greater than in a conscript or irregular army. A nation in arms, in order to ensure the submission of its troops, must adopt a harsh form of discipline, which may not gain their moral support. Conscription calls many an unwilling man who spreads dissatisfaction in the ranks and so breaks the spiritual accord.

Due to their lack of the necessary force, the employment of semi-trained combatant troops only prolongs war, and brings financial ruin upon their country. In no better way can national unselfishness and patriotism be shown than by an acquiescence in those military measures in peace, which are best suited to the maintenance of the country's life and integrity in war ; but this does not imply that it is desirable to maintain part-time soldiers, at a cost for which there will be no future returns. Rather should a sane patriotism be exemplified in giving the necessary support to professional soldiers who, with their knowledge seek not war, but by their strength avert it.

It is during the first few years succeeding the advent of peace that a professional army has the greatest dangers to fear. Its *personnel* has become war-weary and its keenness has deteriorated, while the country, groaning under its financial burdens, grudgingly spares of its gold. Yet it is precisely at this time that the forecasting of future war is required. Military reorganization is taking place, and the army is being remoulded. The knowledge gained in the last conflict influences the entire reorganization and training, to the exclusion of

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the other lessons of history. The fact that an instructor has been on active service lends moral strength to his instruction, and his personal experiences will be a source from which to draw illustrations of the success, in practice, of accepted theories. The value, however, of all teaching is entirely dependent upon its future utility.

There is no branch of national endeavour in which the necessity for modernism is more apparent than in naval and military training. Each new scientific discovery, each new mechanical device, each new step in the naval or military progress of other nations must be carefully watched, weighed, and the lessons for the future deduced therefrom, for the laurels of yesterday will be retained only through the medium of the training to-day. By being modern in its methods an army will alone maintain its true worth as a national insurance. All the great captains of the past were the modern leaders of their times. Often they utilized old theories, but they changed them to conform with the new conditions under which war was waged. Nor should the higher ranks in an army alone be influenced by the evolutions of life, for, unless their subordinates are also influenced by them, no army can act in complete accord with the will of its commander.

Napoleon considered that " tactics should be changed every ten years," and he expressed this opinion before the quick developments in military science caused by modern discoveries and inventions. Although the principles of war may remain constant, their methods of execution vary with the times, and with the means available. Therefore, even although all wars contain lessons, no particular strife of nations summarizes the total of the rules for future guidance. It is by the study of history and close attention to existing conditions that the foreseeing of the future may be attempted. " Experience of former wars," said Moltke, " must not be neglected, but it is no safe guide for our days." As science, mechanical inventions and national education evolve, so do the methods of waging war, and so should the training of an army be revolutionized to meet the varying conditions.

The aeroplane, the tank, and divers other features of attack and defence, the use of which was developed during the Great War, are now as certain weapons with which to be reckoned as are the rifle and the bayonet. And as the rifle and the bayonet are necessary for the training of an infantry soldier, so are the other weapons of war essential for the training of an army as a whole. The private soldier is no longer an automaton to be moved like a pawn on the chess-board, without taking an intelligent part in the game. Junior commanders and their men desire to understand the capabilities of the other arms with whose aid they will fight. Their successful training

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demands a visualization of the battlefield in so far as it is possible to be obtained.

For the efficient training of the humblest private, therefore, the organization must be complete, not only in the section, but in the larger formations. Unless money is spent on producing the requisite *matériel*, unless adequate training manœuvres are arranged, then the necessary steps in the education of officers and men have not been taken. If the public niggardliness does not permit of this, military training becomes a farce, and, as a consequence, the untold suffering of the Crimean War will recur in history for the same cause—a distorted idea of economy.

Within the platoon much importance is concentrated in the distribution of *personnel*. The mixing of the new with the old, the keen with the less zealous, the quick with the slow, are measures which efficiency demands. Any platoon, containing picked men, may achieve the best results, but these are gained at the expense of the remaining platoons in a battalion, thereby breeding discontent, and lowering moral. No one unit should be allowed to displace the even distribution of *matériel*, numbers, or general quality of *personnel* throughout a battalion. " The development of the necessary moral qualities is . . . the first object to be attained in the training of an army," and careful platoon organization does much towards the accomplishing of this aim.

Year by year the importance of the officer in the training of his men has become more apparent. Long service in the past kept this idea suppressed, but an extended term of service in the future is extremely unlikely to be productive of the same errors, because of the diversity and intricacy of present-day instruction. For many years, however, the evil was rife throughout Europe, except in the Prussian Army. The system of paid substitutes, introduced in France towards the end of the eighteenth century, quickly spread, and the long service thus obtained gave officers an opportunity of indulging their lazy propensities to their professional detriment, and the glorification of the non-commissioned ranks. That Prussia did not fall into these slothful ways may have had an appreciable effect in producing her later successes. Certain it is that the best results to-day are obtained only where the officer takes a full share in, and complete supervision of, the training of the men whom he will lead in war. The day of the sergeant-major " carrying on " for his officers has passed. No person in the world is more critical of an officer's capabilities than the man in the ranks. In proportion to the knowledge of his profession which an officer demonstrates as an instructor,

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will be the confidence which his men have in him. For the officer who is unable successfully to accomplish his mission of instruction, a modern army can find no justifiable place. Knowledge, however, must precede instruction, and the more extensive his knowledge, the more interest will the officer arouse, and without interest no instruction of real value may be carried on. Training must be up-to-date, and this implies continual study by the instructor. "Nine-tenths of your work as a trainer consists in *Preparation*," was a formula which every British officer was expected, during the war, to follow, and which will always apply. The officer whose keenness flags is asleep at his post, and morally is just as guilty as a sentry in that condition. An officer who neglects his work, who fails in the duty of training his men, whose pleasure takes first place, whose other interests supersede his work with his command, is a swindle on the public, and a living disgrace to the uniform which he wears. There must be fidelity to duty as much in peace as in war, for it is during the days of peace that the only real preparation for battle can take place.

The acquisition of the necessary knowledge to pass promotion examinations never was, and never will be, a sufficient course of study for an officer, nor do examinations necessarily determine those who are the greatest students or those who have accumulated the greatest fund of military knowledge. "Educational Training," Part I., says that "Modern educational opinion regards with disfavour the attachment of excessive importance to examinations and to their results as expressed by certificates." But there are officers who cram for their promotion examinations, and then let the dust collect on their books until their next mental effort falls due. Knowledge gained by such methods is soon lost, and has really served little towards increasing the competence of the officer, for mental cramming meets only the limited needs of an immediate situation. In this connection Marshal Foch has summarized the requirements by stating that "The truth is, no study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one *can* in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to *do* even a little, one has already to *know* a great deal and to know it well."

Nor is the training of, and the knowledge to be possessed by, the non-commissioned officer less important. He commands the largest body of men which, under normal circumstances, can be directly controlled in action; and, as he is left alone to apply the principles which he has learned in peace, much depends upon the powers of initiative which he displays. Never before has he been

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required to know so much ; never before has he aspired to such an exalted position of command ; never before has he been so continuously alone, responsible not only for the leading of his six men, but responsible for making the first break in the enemy's lines through which the platoon, company, battalion, brigade and division will pour. Upon the education of its section commanders, present and prospective, rests in a large measure the fate of an army. In the war of the future one chevron may well be a big stone in the Empire edifice.

The employment of specialists finds little or no justification in the training of the unit. They train the trainer, and that should be the extent of their task. A keen and efficient bombing instructor, for example, who is allowed to train a company, will soon convince the men that any battle may be won with Mills' grenades. This was discovered during one period of the last war, when the bomb was promoted to a position of military importance far above that to which it was entitled, while the rifle and bayonet almost ceased to be recognized as the weapons of decision. There were also fanatical Lewis gunners, worshippers of gas, smoke fiends, and disciples of the many other instruments which endeavoured to supplant the only true arm of the infantry soldier. There must be specialists, but specialists must not be employed in the actual training of the men. Not only do they unbalance the instruction, but their employment, in part, at any rate, tends to produce the evils which prevailed during the days of long service. When instructional duties are relegated to specialists, the officers and section commanders miss their greatest opportunity of getting to know their men ; they thus fail to recognize the limitations of individuals, and they do not gain the confidence which their personal teaching would bring.

The demands for efficiency made upon an army to-day require a careful selection in recruiting. Apart from the prospective recruit's physical development, past record, and other requirements already demanded, there are two psychological considerations which are of great importance, namely age and parentage. With regard to the latter, it is not always possible to ascertain information, and yet the laws of heredity are too strong to be entirely ignored. The right type of man is essential, and consequently psychological tests are just as necessary as physical ones ; efficiency and economy demand that these should be carried out among recruits to-day.

The regulations may set an age limit, but the psychological bearing of age upon the future of the recruit is often forgotten. Soldiers' sons start a military career with advantages which other

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men do not possess, for their early life has developed certain military habits and ideas. But the many others have to acquire those habits and methods of living which are required in their new walk of life. If they start after a certain age, it is much more difficult for them to become real soldiers in spirit. With few exceptions, character has been completely formed by the age of thirty years, and, as it is essential to have the character of the soldier moulded to military requirements, he must be trained before this age has been reached. He must be taken at an age when habits are easily formed, when his mind is plastic, for experiences will make a deep impression at that time. What is learned last is forgotten first, while that which has been learned first remains through life.

Professor William James said that " Outside of their own business, the ideas gained by men before they are twenty-five are practically the only ideas they shall have in their lives. . . . If by chance we ever do learn anything about some entirely new topic, we are afflicted with a strange sense of insecurity, and we fear to advance a resolute opinion." Thus is seen the immense mental impediment with which a soldier starts if he becomes one when he is nearing thirty. Provided that a man has never before been in the Regular Army, if he has reached the age of twenty-six years, he should stand no more chance of acceptance than he would were he a hunchback, for by that age he has formed habits which cannot be effaced, and which will prevent his reaching a high standard of efficiency.

As the examination of a prospective recruit should be psychological as well as physical, so should his future training be based upon psychological principles. The development of those properties of mind and spirit essential to military vigour are more important, by far, than the producing of Herculean physical strength and endurance. " *Mens sana in corpore sano* " is the objective sought, but in the development of the moral qualities lies the greatest strength to surmount difficulties and to endure fatigue. " There is nothing great in the world but man, and nothing great in man but his mind." It is, therefore, towards the mind of the recruit that the greatest attention must be directed, for, while physical development becomes a routine, mental expansion is a study peculiar to each individual concerned.

No man can learn unless he attends, nor can he attend unless his mind be cultivated, while the greater the mental amplification, the greater is the receptivity to the efforts of training. During the mechanical lessons of the barrack-square the training of the mind begins, the order and method of military life being the foundation

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upon which to build. The first effort is in the direction of mental control, the development of the power of attention, which may be accomplished by teaching the recruit to observe. An uneducated man is a poor observer because he mixes that which he sees with his bias and his unintelligent opinions, selecting those trivial things which his previous narrow mental existence has caused him to note. But a careful education in this direction will teach him to see a thing as it is, in its proper place, and separated from other things, and he has thereby greatly developed his power of concentration. Such training, if gradual and accompanied by interest, will prevent the mental fatigue which kills success.

The faults of past training have existed largely in an over attention to bodily submission and a neglect of the development of the mind. Modern aims, however, are directed towards a cultivation of the mind so that it may move in the groove of the general trend of purpose, yet at the same time to maintain an individual latitude of action which is called initiative. By this increase in mentality not only is the field of individual action increased, but the power to withstand the increased terrors of modern battle has been strengthened. The Great War conclusively proved that the relinquishment of superstition, and the superior mental cultivation of the period, gave a moral strength to the civilized man to withstand those terrors of battle to which the semi-savage was more susceptible.

To consider training psychologically the action of the subconscious mind must be recognized. Although to all outward appearances it is with the conscious mind alone that man deals, in reality the subconscious mind has a greater significance.

It is entirely erroneous to imagine that the soldier retains in his mind only that which he can recall, for the limits of memory would thus be comparatively small and restricted to such facts as are actually used in mental life. "There is evidence," said Dr. Hyslop, "that the compass of retention extends far beyond what we actually recall and use. In fact, the probability is that absolutely every impression ever made upon the sensorium is recorded available for conscious or unconscious recall."

Life in general is largely, even although unconsciously, influenced by those impressions which the subconscious mind has acquired, and many misdemeanours are the reactions therefrom. Often this external influence has acted upon the mind during youth. To obliterate the reactions it is necessary to bring the offending impression to the conscious mind, and to prove the absurdity of its

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application to the existing conditions. Men may be punished to the full extent of the law, yet no improvement in them will take place, for it is only by a careful and analytical investigation of the individual's past experiences that he may be freed from such unintentional lapses in discipline. The causes of such impressions are, as a rule, forgotten or unknown to the individual concerned, and can be brought to light only by following back all probable clues until the solution is found. It is not asserted that this method is infallible, but it has been tested with success, and it is very strongly maintained that the more the officer studies the idiosyncrasies of his men, and the more he attempts to discipline by mental methods and moral appeals rather than by physical fear, the fewer will be the failures and the greater will be the results. Some men are mules whilst others are sensitive children, and each type requires a different method in its handling. Crime should not go unpunished, and this should be thoroughly understood, but there are psychological methods of preventing crime which, if adhered to, will rob the detention barracks of many of their frequent inmates.

The conditions under which a soldier may find himself are, as a rule, so various that his instruction should give him certain guiding principles, which should assist him at any time and under any circumstances. For this, the soldier requires memory—the making of the subconscious knowledge available to the conscious mind—in order that he may be able to avail himself of these principles in any emergency. Memory requires physical fitness, logical connection, and repetition. The necessary physical fitness is attained by the ordinary routine instruction in drill and physical training, and the observation of the laws of hygiene. Logical connection demands order in instruction. Every lesson taught must constitute the foundation for the next one, and, if a stage is passed without a thorough knowledge of the work being obtained by every individual in the class, then the chain is broken, the following lessons achieve no true results, and memory ceases to function in this direction. But memory is impossible if too much mental effort is attempted. The class should proceed only as fast as the aptitude of its dullest pupil allows. Too rapid progression tires the mind and renders it unable to absorb knowledge, while too many subjects at one time diminish the power of concentration, without which knowledge cannot be obtained. Finally, although with concentration all lessons may be retained in the memory, still, without repetition, they have no utility. The greater the repetition, the more certain is the

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available knowledge, provided that the repetition is presented in such a way as to continue to incite interest.

Memory without thought is mere parrot-knowledge which is of little value. Indeed, the true end of all learning is the perfection of thought, which is often forgotten by those who blindly read, content to accept any theories which find their way into print, however fallacious they may be. The soldier of to-day must be taught to think for himself along the lines of accepted principles. His thinking must be guided, and by its careful training he will gain the power of initiative whenever the occasion arises.

In view of the power of the subconscious mind to influence the actions of the body without the aid of the conscious mind, military efficiency demands not only the suppression of undesirable subconscious impressions, but the substitution of those which will unconsciously react to meet the military requirements. The cultivation of the necessary habits for the military competency of a soldier are extremely important, and it is in his early service that correct habits are moulded. Any path of action which the recruit is to follow should be pursued at once, and to this there should be no exceptions allowed. The acquisition of habits common to an army are not for any ostentatious purpose, but that there may be a unity of effort, a simplification of movement, an increase in accuracy, and by the unconscious action accompanying habit, a smaller amount of fatigue. Not only does it minimize physical fatigue, but, what is even more important, it decreases mental fatigue. This is one reason why regular troops maintain a high standard of moral in the most trying conditions, when irregular troops are incapable of doing so. In habitual action each muscular contraction takes place in its proper order, not on account of thought or perception, but owing to the sensation occasioned by the muscular contraction just finished, and by its reflex action leaves the mind unburdened for other occupations. The absence of thought in habits thus acquired is well illustrated by the story told by Professor Huxley. A discharged soldier, on being called to attention by a practical joker, dropped the dinner which he was carrying, in order to conform to the command, thereby losing his meal.

A man can be taught so successfully that his course of action will be invariable even under the strain and excitement of battle. So well has he learned, that he acts without thought. He parries a point, or selects the best cover without any conscious mental effort, and automatically carries out the fire orders, reserving his thought for the situations in which automatic action will no longer apply. Such

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action is commonly said to be instinctive. Yet the untrained man is unable to accomplish any of these things, and they must, therefore, be due to habits formed by training. In fact there is nothing taught to a man during his life, which in him can become either an instinct or an instinctive course of action.

Entirely to eliminate undesirable emotions in the soldier is beyond the power of any training, and all that the best discipline and instruction can hope to accomplish is to subordinate them to such an extent that they will cease to have any uncontrollable physical reactions, and will fail to shatter the virtue of self-control.

There was a system of training prevalent during the Great War which aimed at the acquisition of energy by the inciting of hatred against the enemy. It was erroneously considered by many people that the offensive spirit was a species of battle ferocity which led to victory. The truth is that the offensive spirit consists in a moral determination to succeed, combined with confidence in the capability to attack successfully.

Many a bayonet fighting instructor taught a lust for blood, thereby trying to awaken savage instincts and encourage the strongest emotions of violence. But such methods have no psychological justification in the training of men. The hate and ferocity which these instructors tried to stimulate are emotions as strong as fear, and as their development or encouragement is always at the expense of self-control, no true discipline can allow them to exert sufficient force to govern action. At all times their expression dwarfs reason, and tends towards the nullification of any habits formed along scientific lines. Discipline thus ceases to govern, unnecessary excitement and fatigue are experienced, and men who were soldiers a moment before become little better than an armed mob. The inducing of anger, hate and ferocity has no place in the scientific training of an army to-day, nor is any regular army in need of vocal clamours to sustain its determination to succeed.*

Irregular volunteers, with their lack of real discipline, are subject to the emotions of fury, ferocity and hate. Both they and conscript armies imbibe to a greater extent than do regular troops, the stimuli to emotions produced by a nation-wide system of propaganda, which is of the greatest utility in increasing national endeavour, but decreases moral as soon as fallacies are discovered by the personal experience of the soldier. Whatever immediately good results

* In an actual engagement, of course, men are influenced by a definite hostile feeling against the enemy, which increases their strength of purpose. This, however, is a different thing from being trained to have such a feeling; it is a spontaneous sensation with which discipline can deal.

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followed the illusionary German propaganda, the shattering of confidence in the veracity of the higher officers was one of the chief causes for the final collapse of the moral of the rank and file.

The most important emotion with which military training has to deal is fear. It is aroused by the same objects or causes which arouse ferocity, and having an extremely energetic instinctive bodily expression, it is classed as one of the three most exciting emotions to which human nature is susceptible. Although war always has aroused this emotion, the noise of modern battle has increased the terrors to which the soldier is subjected. The instinctive tendency produced by fear is to run away from the danger. Courage does not consist in being devoid of the emotion of fear, but in the power to overcome the instinctive reactions. It is self-control, the power of the mind over the body, produced by a discipline hereditarily and individually acquired, and maintained for all times by that effacement of self which places duty and honour above the sordid instincts and desires of the body.

The increased importance of moral in modern war, then, still further indicates the supreme necessity for mental development. The great inspiration of moral is a high ideal, and high ideals do not flourish among the weeds of low mentality. No leader has ever laid more emphasis upon the value of moral qualities than did Napoleon. That the mental ground upon which he laboured was not of the highest type is a truth which would have applied to any army of his period. He was obliged to appeal, therefore, to the emotions of his army as well. But the higher the mental training of the private soldier, the stronger should be his moral, for he will be taught an ideal which he will see in the light of thought and reason, and his actions will be governed by this ideal, and not by his emotions.

It was stated, after the war, that " . . . an army is governed by ' catch words ' (soul stirrers), and not by reasons (mind awakeners)." It may be admitted that " catch words " will always govern an undisciplined mob, as " *á bas le Roi* " swayed the Parisian proletariat. But such words appeal really to the emotions, not to the soul, and the arousing of emotions is unjustifiable in the training of an army. " Catch words " may indeed serve as an aid to memory or assist in the powers of visualization, but a soul is beyond the reach of mere phrases or stirring terms. Moral will save an army against the enemy's numerical and strategical advantages as it saved the Japanese in July and August, 1904, but emotions aroused by a verbal bubble can never withstand the inflexible onslaught of a high ideal.

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" Discipline must precede instruction," said Kant, and well did the German militarists apply their philosopher's theory. That they applied an educational aphorism without a proper consideration of the human element, was an error which led to failure, but could not disprove the undeniable truth of the dictum itself.

Addison has told his readers of the degeneracy of man which resulted from a despot's rule, and such is the result of tyranny in an army. The discipline thus obtained breeds a discontent which is the companion of inefficiency. Discipline must be absolute, not only in the body but also in the mind, and the mind is rebellious, when confronted by injustice and when compelled to live in a state of discontent. Fear may compel bodily submission, but that alone constitutes but a small part of the discipline required. " Many pass their lives," said Lord Wolseley, " without discovering that the military career has any higher aim than that of moving men on parade, and that of keeping order amongst them at all times by a system of severe punishment and rigid espionage, which is believed to be discipline."

Plutarch's opinion was that " The greatest talent of a general is to secure obedience through the affection he inspires." Although not referring to military leaders, Pope Gregory's " Pastoral Charge " contained instructions no less useful. " He, therefore, who is over others ought to study to be loved, that he may be heard ; and yet not to seek his own popularity for itself, lest he be found by a secret usurpation in thought to oppose him whom by his office he appeareth to serve." This affection, in military life, is that which is produced by fairness, loyalty and confidence. But, however important this may be, it is of no greater importance than the cultivation of those faculties which will produce that reasoning obedience essential to initiative. Thus the soldier will obey mentally and physically, not because of any fear of physical punishment, but because his mind is developed to a realization of the consequences of disobedience in destroying the attainment of the high ideals, which his moral training has made his purpose in life. Discipline still requires the agency of fear in its purchase, but it is mental rather than physical fear ; a fear of not having done that which present and future life demand for the good of the home and the nation. It is also inspired by patriotism—devotion to King, country and home—which places the desires of self far in the background of the field of human effort.

Physical fear will produce a form of submission which in itself is not discipline. A man so trained, or receptive to that form of

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training alone, has no true place in an army. He is untrustworthy, and some day he will fail. Unless the moral qualities are developed, proper discipline cannot exist, and he who is without these is a useless burden upon the public in peace, and a traitor to the interests of his country in war.

Drill is not the foundation of discipline, but it is an indispensable aid to its attainment, and as such has been recognized by the great commanders of history. Stonewall Jackson, provided the day was not the Sabbath, never wasted a moment which might be spent in such a form of training. The virtue of drill lies in a realization of its purpose, and a recognition of the fact that true discipline does not necessarily accompany parade-ground efficiency, while thoroughly disciplined troops are unrivalled in their drill.

When the object of training is easily comprehensible, and where the immediate need for such training is continually cast before the mind, a stimulus to endeavour is obtained. Every man in the ranks, during the Great War, was able to understand the utility of his efforts, and this knowledge sustained his interest. But as the object of training is not so apparent to-day, the instructor finds a greater difficulty in the awakening of attention. By demonstrations and by the development of professional keenness he should obtain earnestness in the preparation for war, always keeping before his mind the words of Emerson: "Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm." A man's deepest interest is normally centred in his life's work, but monotony and dull repetition end by killing the desire for knowledge.

Although the primary object of his educational training is the preparation for war, the soldier will return to civil life far better trained for his new tasks than he has ever done in the past. His mind will be developed, his physique improved, his initiative strengthened, and with his self-discipline he will be a vast asset in the national life. Educational training will make an army a university for the people, and a good discharge certificate will signify the possession of moral qualities which no other seat of learning can engender. The soldier will not be versed in the classics, nor will his mind revel in the perplexities of scientific theories, but his intellect will be fitted to lead and to be led, and he will be enabled to reach a sphere of existence far above that into which he was born. His military experiences will give him a breadth of perception which will elevate him from his obscurity, and in his civil life he will view his place in the Empire nationally rather than individually.

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Although a regular army is not the nation in arms, it is still an army born of the nation, and fostered by the consent of the nation for the protection and welfare of the people. The more, therefore, such an army is brought into accord with national life, the more its endeavours are made known to the public, the more it may expect the cooperation, sympathy and confident reliance of the public, without which no war can be successfully carried out, or preparation for Empire defence be accomplished. In the China-Japan War of 1894–5, the Japanese forces were trained, well equipped, and filled with patriotic zeal. The Chinese Army came from an anti-military nation where soldiers were looked upon with contempt, and the result was inevitable. "The strength of Japan," said Kuropatkin, "was in the complete union of her people, army and government, and it was this union that gave her the victory." Wealth, commercial enterprise, or mental progress, will not in themselves save a nation from destruction. There must be self-sacrifice, moral strength, and a patriotism which finds expression in determination to make adequate preparations during the days of peace for the defence of the national honour and interests during the days of unavoidable war.

"The profession of arms must not stand apart from the stream of current thought and everyday life." Although he is a soldier, the man is still a citizen, who trains himself to defend the State of which he is a part, and into whose throbbing civil life he will return, a more useful citizen by reason of his military service. Divorce the soldier from the civilian and a bond of patriotism is severed. He should be a foreigner to none of the general interests of the State, and the more he is educated to uphold his rights as a citizen, the more the ties of patriotism will be strengthened. In his power to exercise the franchise, the soldier will see an interest of great importance, and realize that in it there is the diploma of citizenship. Nor has the soldier fewer interests at stake than the civilian. The latter may have the greater financial concerns, but he is indeed debased whose monetary affairs supplant his earnest desire to preserve his country's liberty. Both are of one soil, to both the flag is the symbol of home, and if a man is a man, that home to him is holy, even if it is the kraal of a Kaffir or the ice-walled hut of an Esquimau.

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THE SANDHURST OF FRANCE

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE ÉCOLE SPÉCIALE MILITAIRE DE SAINT-CYR

(With Diagram)

By Lieut. A. G. Salisbury-Jones, M.C., Coldstream Guards

In 1921, the writer had the good fortune to spend a year as a cadet at Saint-Cyr, the French equivalent to our Royal Military College. Though in all military circles on the Continent Saint-Cyr is renowned for its thorough and scientific military education, it is doubtful whether more than a limited knowledge of the place exists on this side of the Channel. An attempt, therefore, has been made in this article to throw some light on the work and daily life of the cadets there.

If the sequence of that which follows may strike the reader as somewhat disjointed or illogical, it may be pointed out that it has not been the intention of the writer to give a detailed description of the school and syllabus of instruction, but rather to set down a few personal impressions of those customs and methods of instruction, which struck him as being fundamentally different from our own. For example, although principles of training in the French Army are beyond the scope of this article, it will be noticed that defence has been treated at some length, as being typical of the methods adopted in all training at the school.

Brief History and Description

The village of Saint-Cyr, in which the school is situated, lies three miles to the west of Versailles, to which it is connected by a frequent tramway service. Although bordering so closely on the suburbs of Paris, Saint-Cyr is a typical French country village, and the surrounding district is quite rural, bearing little trace of its proximity to a large city.

The school was originally an academy of learning for young ladies of the aristocracy, who were privileged to have as first headmistress a woman destined in later years to play an important part

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in the affairs of State. This lady was Madame de Maintenon, who afterwards married Louis XIV. Under her guidance, "*les demoiselles de Saint-Cyr apprirent l'art de trouver le bonheur dans le renoncement aux vanités du monde et le culte des nobles sentiments.*" It was not until 1808 that Napoleon converted the place into the training ground of the French officer. "Gentlemen cadets" replaced the young ladies, but, although the refined and peaceful learning which had continued since the days of Madame de Maintenon gave place to the harder and less peaceful learning of the art of war, "*le culte des nobles sentiments*" continued none the less.

The buildings, which like those of Sandhurst are arranged in such a manner as to form several three-sided courtyards, are typical of most French barracks. Though massive and bare, their white-washed exterior lends them a not unattractive appearance.

The visitor, however unemotional, cannot fail to be impressed, the very moment he enters the school, by the fact that he is in the midst of a nation that is justly proud of a glorious military history. Every room, every passage and every stairway is named after some general famous in French history, ranging from the earliest times to the days of Foch. Wherever his eyes may turn, they will notice such words as *Etude Napoléon*, *Etude Foch*, *Escalier Turenne*, written up in large black letters. Similarly, every courtyard is named after some equally famous battle, and as the visitor wanders through the buildings and out into these courtyards, his eyes will fall upon such words as *Cour Wagram*, *Cour d'Austerlitz*, *Cour de Verdun*, written up in still larger letters. Indeed, such is the impression first made upon the young cadet upon entering the school, that he is immediately imbued with that magnificent *esprit de corps* which characterizes the whole life of the place.

The interior of the buildings is remarkable for its lack of comfort. Cold, long corridors lead into still colder rooms, containing no furniture beyond that which is absolutely essential. The ante-room, where luxurious armchairs provide the height of comfort to the cadet during his leisure hours at Sandhurst, is unknown to the Saint-Cyrien. Unknown to him also is the private room where he can read and work undisturbed, for long barrack-room dormitories constitute his sleeping quarters.

If, therefore, it be intentional that the first impression made upon the cadet shall imbue him with the required *esprit de corps*, it appears no less intentional that the second impression shall make him realize that the career, upon which he is about to embark, is *bien dur*.

The ground attached to the school is not extensive. There is

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one large field, known as the *Terrain d'Jéna*, equal in size to about three association football fields, where inspections, drill, physical training and other outdoor exercises take place. This scene of daily activity is overlooked by an imposing equestrian statue of Marshal Kléber, who seems ever to be exhorting the cadets to carry on those glorious traditions of Napoleonic days. The remainder of the ground is occupied by two large lecture halls, two indoor and two excellent outdoor riding schools, the miniature range and the hospital, appropriately known as *le Paradis* from the degree of comfort provided there, which contrasts so favourably with that of the school.

Organization

The Staff.—The Commandant of the school is a *Général de Brigade*, who is assisted by a *Lieutenant-Colonel commandant-en-second*, and a certain number of *officiers-professeurs* and *officiers-instructeurs*, whose different functions will be discussed later.

The staff is completed by a comparatively small number of non-commissioned officers, for as in the regiments, so at Saint-Cyr, instruction of every kind is carried out directly by the officer to a far greater extent than in England, where so much is done by the non-commissioned officer under the supervision of the officer. Even drill, which plays a far less important part in military training in France than in England, is chiefly taught by the officer. Consequently, the non-commissioned officer, who at Sandhurst is almost the life and soul of the training, is not nearly so prominent at Saint-Cyr.

The Cadets.—The cadets, whose entry to Saint-Cyr is solely the result of a competitive examination, remain there for two years. Since a new batch of cadets arrives once a year, in November, there are always two categories of cadets undergoing instruction at the same time—those undergoing their first and those undergoing their second year's instruction. They are classified, therefore, as *élèves de première* and *élèves de deuxième année*. The latter category are also known as *les anciens*, and there is a great gulf fixed between them and the *élèves de première année*, from whom they demand great respect.

Since the war, a special company has been in existence for officers who went through the war without having previously been to Saint-Cyr. It was to this company, which completes only a shortened course of ten months, that the writer was attached.

For the purpose of instruction, the cadets are organized into

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companies and sections, the company commander being the chief instructor, while the section commander, usually a lieutenant, instructs in the more elementary subjects.

The cadets are destined for the infantry, with the exception of a squadron of cavalry cadets who complete their training later at the Cavalry School of Saumur.

Instruction

The instruction is classified under two main headings, (*a*) general instruction, and (*b*) military instruction. The aim of the whole may best be summarized in the words of the opening address given to the cadets on arrival :—

" On leaving Saint-Cyr, the officer should have received—

1. A solid general instruction which will enable him to live up to his position in the army and society.

2. A solid military instruction, technical and practical, which will enable him immediately to take command of a platoon or company, and to fulfil the rôle of an instructor of recruits and non-commissioned officers.

3. A professional education which will ensure that his conduct at all times shall reach that high standard which his duty to the Army and the nation require of him.

This education, which is most important, should be given by the instructor not in the form of lectures, but by his own personal example on all occasions.

4. Certain general knowledge, which will enable him to take into account the numerous factors which modern warfare brings into play. His mind must be resolutely trained to appreciate the great political, social and economic problems, the influence of which has been and will be considerable on the conduct of war."

(*a*) *General Instruction.*—This is given in the form of daily general lectures by the *officiers-professeurs* mentioned above. These officers are all specialists in their subjects, which include : military history, geography, topography, science, gunnery, engineering, law and administration, hygiene and modern languages.

Of these subjects, military history is made intensely interesting, and the campaigns of Napoleon are treated in a manner that cannot fail to rouse the interest of the most apathetic. Geography is concerned chiefly with a detailed study of the French colonial possessions. Owing to the increasingly important part played by science in modern warfare, great importance is attached to the teaching

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of this subject. The lectures on gunnery, engineering, law and administration are all supplemented by practical exercises. Copies of all lectures are issued to the cadets in book form, for their own private study, and examinations dealing with all the subjects treated in the lectures are held at the end of each year. Marks obtained for such examinations are all included in the final " passing out " marks. Of the modern languages, English and German are compulsory, while Arabic is learned by those officers who intend to proceed to the French North African Colonies.

These lectures, without exception, were excellent, though frequently they appealed unwittingly to the sense of humour of the foreign officers attached to the school. The writer can well remember the first lecture he attended, and his subsequent dismay when the lecturer was greeted by loud and prolonged hissing on the part of the audience. His dismay did not diminish, when these preliminaries were followed by one of the best lectures it has ever been his privilege to hear. The explanation was forthcoming afterwards. Far from indicating the unpopularity of the lecturer, this hissing on the part of the audience was a method of expressing extreme approval. The clapping of hands is forbidden, and its place has been taken in consequence by this most unusual form of applause, which at least has the merit of being tolerated by the authorities. It was most fascinating to watch the lecturer remonstrating with his applauding audience. " *Messieurs, pas de demonstrations !* " " *Un peu de silence !* " and similar rebukes lost much of their weight owing to the ill-concealed expression of delight on the countenance of the lecturer.

(*b*) *Military Instruction.*—This instruction, which is concerned principally with the tactical and technical training of the cadets, is carried out by the *officiers-instructeurs*, to which category belong the captain commanding the company, and the lieutenant commanding the section. It is this latter officer who is the chief instructor in all work that comes under the heading of military instruction, for since all such work is carried out on the principle of each section working together, the cadets are constantly under the direct and personal supervision of their section commander.

During his first year, the cadet is trained simply as a private soldier, and is never called upon to exercise command. The programme of instruction lays down that he shall only be trained *comme exécutant*. It is not until his second year that he is taught to be an instructor, when he is given frequent opportunities of teaching and commanding the *élèves de première année*.

Since the methods of technical instruction, including such

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subjects as the use of the rifle, light gun and bomb, differ but little materially from our own, they will not be touched upon in this article, in which the writer will confine himself to a brief discussion of the methods of tactical training adopted.

Without entering into the detailed organization of the French infantry battalion, it will be necessary to understand the rough organization of the infantry company in order to follow clearly the general sequence adopted throughout training.

1 *Compagnie* .. = { 1 *Section de commandement* (*H.Q.*) / 4 *Sections*
1 *Section* .. = 3 *Groupes de Combat*
1 *Groupe de Combat* = { 1 *équipe fusil-mitrailleurs* (L.G. Section) / 1 *équipe grenadiers-voltigeurs* (Rifle Section)

The interesting unit to note in the above organization is the *groupe de combat*, wherein lies the essential difference between the French organization and our own. Our training is based on the fact that the platoon is the tactical unit of the infantry. The French maintain that owing to the effect of modern artillery fire, the consequent extension of the infantry, both in attack and defence, is so wide that a unit equal in strength to that of the platoon is too large for the satisfactory control of one leader in action. They have therefore adopted the *groupe de combat* as the tactical unit of the infantry. This unit consists of a leader, one light gun section (*équipe*) and one rifle section : both these sections consist of a leader and five men.

The whole training of the *groupe de combat* centres round the light gun, and every man is trained to regard himself first and foremost as having a direct connection with the light gun. Every man of the *équipe fusil-mitrailleurs* must understand that he is there either to fire or feed the gun, while every man of the *équipe grenadiers-voltigeurs* must understand that he is there to protect the gun. So strongly is this principle insisted upon, that efficiency in the use of the rifle has much deteriorated.

Based on these principles, the training of the cadet, similarly to that of the recruit in the regiment, proceeds on the following lines :—

1st year:
- *1st Period* (10 weeks)—General adaptation to military surroundings —individual training in use of ground, etc.
- *2nd Period* (8 weeks)—*Équipe* training—training in specialist duties, such as hand-grenades, rifle-grenades and light gun.
- *3rd Period* (8 weeks)—*Groupe de combat* training.
- *4th Period* (14 weeks)—*Section* training.

Before starting his second year, the cadet is attached for two months to a battalion in order to gain a general knowledge of the


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working of an actual unit. On returning to Saint-Cyr, he completes his training according to the following programme :—

2nd year
- *1st Period* (7 weeks)—Revision of individual training.
- *2nd Period* (15 weeks)—*Groupe de combat* and *section* training.
- *3rd Period* (10 weeks)—Company training.

Since French methods of training for the attack differ little fundamentally from our own, and since more importance is attached to a thorough defence training by the French than by us, defence only will be touched upon here, in order to typify French method and sequence in training.

At the beginning of the course, maps are issued to each cadet showing the normal dispositions of a division in defence, marked out on a definite area of ground in the vicinity of the School. It will be noticed that ground for defence is normally organized into three main positions (1) *La position de sûreté ;* (2) *La position principale de résistance ;* (3) *La position de barrage* (reserve position). Each of these main positionsin turn is divided into (1) *La zône de surveillance ;* (2) *La zône de résistance ;* (3) *La zône des réduits* (supports).



Normal disposition of a division in defence
(1 division = 3 regiments. — 1 regiment = 3 battalions)

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Upon these maps, most of the subsequent defence training throughout the course is based, and the general sequence followed will be briefly explained.

The *groupe de combat* will first be considered in relation to its employment in the *zône de surveillance* of the *position de sûreté*. On the first day the *groupe* is taken out on to the ground and the situation is briefly explained. The exercise then takes the form of simple questions and answers, dealing with the position of the light gun, the position of the rifle section, the position occupied by each individual, digging in, etc. At the conclusion of the exercise, the cadets take down in their note-books two or three of the main lessons learned—*e.g.* the rôle of the *groupe de combat* in this position is (1) observation; (2) resistance.

At the next exercise the *groupe* actually occupies its position, placing the light gun and digging in. Finally, actual exercises are carried out in this position, and an attack is delivered against the *groupe* by other cadets.

As soon as the *groupe* has definitely mastered its various rôles in the *zône de surveillance*, it will be considered in relation to its employment in the various other positions of the defence, in each of which the sequence and methods of instruction are identical. The section and the company are treated in exactly the same manner.

As a general remark applicable to all outdoor training, every effort is invariably made to make the training ground a life-like representation of the actual battlefield. Artillery and tanks co-operate on every possible occasion, and the difficulty of maintaining direction is invariably present owing to the lavish distribution of smoke-bombs and other equally effective means of representing the various forms of barrage. No demands are made upon the imagination such as the familiar and frantic efforts of the rattle to imitate a machine gun, and the extra value imparted to all exercises by the trouble expended on these "firework displays" is incalculable.

With regard to indoor military instruction, two points only will be touched upon—the teaching of the manuals and the indoor preparation of outdoor exercises.

A most thorough study of all the important manuals is exacted from the cadets, and fortnightly examinations are held. The procedure adopted at these examinations is interesting and instructive. The question having been put to the cadet, he is given five minutes to think. He then writes down his answer on the blackboard very shortly in the form of notes. Finally, he will give his answer orally in the form of a lecture, expanded from his blackboard notes, to the

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instructor and the remainder of the class. Apart from the test of knowledge, these examinations form the most useful practice in delivering short " impromptu " lectures.

One of the most useful exercises carried out indoors is the detailed preparation of an exercise to be carried out with the *groupe* or *section* out of doors on the following day. Such preparation is most minute and includes the following details :—

1. Nature of the exercise.
2. Training area.
3. Hour of leaving barracks.
4. Hour of arrival on training ground.
5. Detailed orders to " skeleton " enemy, including his hour of leaving barracks and his action during the various phases of the exercise (great importance is attached to the action of the " skeleton " enemy, since it is chiefly by means of his action that the intended lessons of the exercise are brought out).
6. Procedure of the exercise.
7. Hour of " cease fire."
8. Final conference—three or four main lessons to be learnt.
9. Hour of leaving training ground.
10. Hour of return to barracks.

These indoor exercises are completed as often as possible, by the cadet actually carrying out his own exercise with the *groupe* or *section* on the following day.

Typical Day's Programme during Winter

" *Ils s'instruisent pour vaincre* " are the words which adorn the main entrance to the school, and a glance at the amount of work done during the day will prove that these words are no mere motto.

" Reveille " is at 6 a.m. The cadet is then given a bare half-hour in which to rise from his bed, dress himself and eat his *petit déjeuner*, consisting of a piece of dry bread and a cup of black coffee, for first parade is at 6.30 a.m. It is not until later in the day that a special period is set apart to enable him to complete his morning toilet.

At 6.30 a.m. he parades in the riding school. Though the writer retains the most vivid recollections of these early morning parades in mid-winter, he finds it hard to describe accurately their unpleasantness : a squad of cadets, barely roused from their slumber, with fingers almost too frozen to hold their reins, cantering round a dimly-lighted school (for it is still dark) to the fierce bellows of the instructor, conveys but a very incomplete picture of the reality : nor does their plight appear the less miserable when the inadequate

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sustenance of the dry bread and black coffee is taken into consideration. But one of the main principles underlying all the training at Saint-Cyr is that the cadet should be taught early to accustom himself to those hardships which later his profession will so often call upon him to endure. Nowhere is this principle more effectually carried out than on these riding parades on a dark winter morning.

The riding parade is followed without any break by a musketry parade lasting until 8.30 a.m. After a break of a quarter of an hour, there follows one of the daily general lectures given by an *officier-professeur*. This lasts until 9.45 a.m., and the following hour is devoted to private study of the ground covered by the lecture. This private study, made possible by the issue to each cadet of a copy of the lecture, is carried out under conditions of the greatest difficulty. Having no private room of his own, each cadet is merely given a desk in a large public room, where he keeps all his books and carries out all private work of this nature. The mental concentration required to sit down and work in this atmosphere of chattering neighbours can well be imagined.

The time from 11 a.m. until 11.30 a.m. is set apart for *travaux de propreté*, when the sadly neglected morning toilet is completed. At 11.30 a.m. is served the mid-day meal, and seldom has a meal been better earned. The food is good and plentiful, but however numerous the courses, one plate, one knife and one fork only are allowed.

Work is resumed at 1 o'clock, and the afternoon is occupied in company training, which lasts until 4 o'clock, when bread and coffee take the place of tea. From 5 p.m. to 6 p.m. is devoted to the study of modern languages, and the following hour to private study. Though work nominally ends at 7 p.m., cadets may still be seen after the evening meal, which takes place at 7.30, sitting at their desks, at work on some unfinished task. " Lights out " are at 9.30 p.m., by which time the cadet is ready for little else but sleep.

Such is the arduous programme which continues throughout the week with the exception of Wednesday afternoon, which is set apart for sports. During the week, no cadet is allowed outside the precincts of the school, and it is only on Sunday morning that he is given leave, when he usually proceeds to Paris, whence he returns the same evening by the special train leaving at 10.30 p.m.

Camp

In July every year, the cadets spend three weeks at Mailly, a military camp near Châlons-sur-Marne, situated in the heart of one

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of the most barren districts of France, where scarcely a tree or habitation of any kind breaks the landscape for miles. In short, the ground is admirably suited for military manœuvres on a large scale, and allows guns of the longest range to pour forth shells to their hearts' content.

Owing to these facilities and to the co-operation of a division of troops, complete in all arms, the training is carried out under conditions which fall little short of those prevailing on active service. Severe as may have appeared the work carried out at Saint-Cyr itself, it is almost eclipsed by the severity of the training at Mailly. " Reveille " is never later than 5 a.m., and at least once a week the merciless blast of the bugle calls the unfortunate cadet from his bed as early as 2.30 a.m. On such a morning, an attack is due to take place. Since this attack, in order to represent faithfully the conditions of an attack in war, must be made at dawn, and the position of assembly is often six or seven miles from the camp, the reason for this early rising may be understood.

Numerous demonstrations by all branches of the Army take place during camp. The most interesting is the fire of a complete divisional artillery covering an imaginary attack. From a high observation post, an excellent view is obtained of the whole zone swept by the guns. In the foreground may be seen the slow, methodical advance of the creeping barrage, while in the distance the various forms of harassing and counter-battery fire are easily discernible.

Excellent as the training at Mailly is, it may well be imagined that the cadets do not look upon these three weeks as a " Paradise." The general conditions prevailing are simply told in the words of their marching song—

C'est le mois de Mailly,
C'est le mois le plus chaud.
La première compagnie
Est en tenue d'assaut (in fighting order).

Indeed, the heat is intolerable, for not a particle of shade is to be found on this treeless waste, and it is not a gross exaggeration of the truth to say that the " company is always in fighting order."

Sport

Though at present sport plays but a comparatively minor part in the training of the Saint-Cyrien, and facilities for games are most inadequate, ideas are changing rapidly, and each year sees an increased interest on the part of the authorities attached to this form of training.

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Fencing alone is compulsory, and though excellent exercise, it would hardly by itself come under the English category of sport.

Rugby football is the most popular of the non-compulsory sports, and it is common knowledge that the yearly improvement of the French at this game is remarkable. Association football has equal support, though proficiency in this game is less marked.

Rowing of a primitive form takes place on the lake in the park of Versailles, and an annual race is rowed on the Seine against Saint-Cyr's chief rival at sport, the famous *Ecole Polytechnique* of Paris. Excellent material is at hand, and the writer can personally testify that the heart and capacity to row a " ding-dong " race and lose by a few feet are not lacking. Unfortunately, owing to lack of good coaching and inadequate training facilities, rowing has not yet reached a high standard of proficiency.

Traditions and Customs

Of the many interesting traditions and customs observed, only two of the most striking will be described—*le Baptême de la Promotion*, and the celebration of Napoleon's great victory at Austerlitz on the 2nd of December.

Before describing the ceremony of *le Baptême de la Promotion*, it will first be necessary to explain the word *promotion*, which has no connection in this sense with military rank. *Promotion* is the name given to the whole batch of cadets arriving in any particular year, and each *Promotion* is named after some topical event of importance. For example, the cadets arriving at Saint-Cyr in the autumn of 1914 were named *La Promotion de la Grande Revanche*, while those arriving in the autumn of 1919 were called *La Promotion de la Victoire*. In later years, when one old Saint-Cyrien meets another, he will not ask him when he was at Saint-Cyr, but will say, " *De quelle Promotion êtes-vous ?* " And the other, if he went to Saint-Cyr in 1919, will reply, " *Je suis de la Promotion de la Victoire.*"

No cadet is entitled to call himself a true Saint-Cyrien until he has been baptized, and on the appointed day, the cadets of the newly-arrived *Promotion* parade on the *Terrain d'Jéna*, under the shadow of Marshal Kléber's statue, for the ceremony of baptism. This is conducted by a representative of the *Promotion* which " passed out " in the preceding year. On his command, " Men, kneel down," they sink to their knees. After he has pronounced an eloquent discourse over their heads, they rise, no longer mere " men," but fully baptized Saint-Cyriens, imbued with that magnificent *esprit de corps* which the name inspires.

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This *esprit de Saint-Cyr* clings to them throughout life, and may be said to take the place of our "Regimental spirit," so much less marked in France owing to the regiments being merely numbered.

The celebration of the battle of Austerlitz is most impressive, and shows how the great spirit of Napoleon is still ever present in the background as a source of inspiration to the French Army of to-day.

It may be remembered that on the eve of the battle, when returning from a visit to the outposts, Napoleon was acclaimed in the most enthusiastic manner by his soldiers, who made bonfires of their straw bedding in his honour.

This scene is most faithfully reproduced by the cadets of Saint-Cyr on the anniversary of the battle. One company is dressed, equipped and armed after the exact manner of the period, while one cadet has the great honour of representing the Emperor. About eight o'clock in the evening the company parades in one of the large courtyards adjoining the school. Arms are piled and bonfires lit. The soldiers then start walking up and down in small groups, chatting and warming themselves by the fires. Suddenly there is a hush, and all eyes are turned in one direction, where the form of Napoleon may be dimly discerned emerging from the darkness. As he draws near and the well-known figure is lit up by the glare of the bonfires, the cry is taken up by all, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and the Emperor passes on his way.

So realistic is the scene that a thrill passes through the least imaginative of the spectators, and he feels himself alive in those glorious days of French military history.

It is the observance of such traditions that contributes in no small degree to keep alive that *esprit de corps* and love of country, so strong in the heart of every Saint-Cyrien and true Frenchman.

* * * * *

These impressions cannot be concluded without reference to the almost excessive kindness shown to the writer by all, from the Commandants downwards. When he was beset by difficulties, the instructors were only too willing to help by granting him some of their precious spare moments: nor were the still more precious spare moments of the cadets themselves less grudgingly given, in order that these difficulties might be solved. The memory of these months at Saint-Cyr, every day of which was filled with intense interest, will be the more deeply cherished owing to the *bonne camaraderie* of these excellent fellows.

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TANK MINOR TACTICS

By Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Croft, C.M.G., D.S.O., The Cameronians (atttached Tank Corps)

The following article has been written with a view to clearing up certain misunderstandings which appear to exist regarding the employment of a section of tanks.

As a result of lecturing it has been found by the writer that many officers in the British Army at home know very little, if anything, about the employment of tanks, as few of them have had the opportunity of seeing them during training.

"Tank Training," in common with other training manuals, is mainly concerned with principles, and deals for the most part with a slow type of tank.

It must also be remembered that the tank training manuals are the first and not the last word in tank training; and there is little doubt that the revision of these manuals will shortly become necessary.

Obviously, any one who had not seen infantry in barracks or in the field would have a very hazy notion of its capabilities and of its limitations; yet this is the situation of infantry officers regarding tanks, except those who have trained with the Experimental Brigade; even war experience will not help much when dealing with the rôle of Medium C Tanks in open warfare.

It is with Medium C Tanks that this article is concerned; and the views expressed therein are based on the assumption that a battalion of tanks will form part of a division; that a company will normally work with an infantry brigade; and that the brigade commander will, in certain circumstances, attach a section of tanks to a battalion either in attack, in the defensive, or in a rear-guard action.

The use of tanks in such large numbers on the Western Front during 1917–18 has left a strong impression on those who witnessed tank actions that such numbers will be available in future wars; the consequence is that there is a large section of military opinon which holds the belief that the primary rôle of tanks is to save life, *e.g.* that odd tanks should work with the vanguard or with single

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platoons, ready to act on the spur of the moment in the event of a burst of hostile machine-gun fire.

Such a state of affairs may arise after six months of war—it is unsafe to prophesy; but it is perfectly safe to assure those who hold this view that, for the first six months at any rate of a war in which the British Army may be involved, such a use of tanks will be out of the question.

What then is the smallest number of tanks which can be employed as a fighting unit? The answer is a section of four tanks.

This does not imply that in no circumstances must a tank sub-section be detached, but it does imply that such detachment must be of a very temporary nature.

The section of tanks is like the platoon of infantry, the section of R.F.A. and the troop of cavalry—and this perhaps is the shortest way of explaining the reason for not making detachments.

Owing to the restricted view from four steel walls, combined with the multifarious cares and worries within the tank itself, the danger from surprise is a real one, especially when the tank is not actually under fire.

Tanks when halted are particularly liable to surprise.

They must provide, therefore, for their own local protection by sending out scouts or sentries. These scouts or sentries—one from each tank—must be thoroughly trained as observers and their posting, whenever a section of tanks is halted for any reason, must be automatic. It is advisable that their posting should be coordinated by the section commander in order to ensure all-round protection, the essentials being that each scout or sentry should be within sight of his tank and that he should, at the same time, command as good a view as possible of the surrounding country.

When on the move the tank driver is driving in blinkers, and for the efficient protection of the tank it is consequently necessary that a look-out should be kept to port, starboard and aft. If this is not done, fleeting targets will be lost, in addition to which, there is always the danger of good infantry boarding the tank. Two members of the crew of a tank act as gunners or look-out men, the other two being the commander and the driver.

At present these duties of observation are liable to be neglected—and during training they can, of course, be neglected with impunity—but, when war comes, the neglect of these precautions will lead to heavy losses if not to disaster.

During the time while the tank is waiting to play its part in the

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fight, it must, as far as possible, be concealed from air and ground observation.

The best form of concealment from the air is camouflage, and the best kind of camouflage is the shelter of a tree; to obtain concealment from ground observation, branches, heather or sods are all useful; in this connection, too, there are great possibilities in background and paint of different colours.

When once the tanks are launched to the attack by daylight, they will usually require the assistance of smoke as a protection against anti-tank weapons—whatever the type of gun may be which is employed against them. In "Tank Training" the need for smoke in a tank attack is frequently emphasized.

This insistence on smoke has called forth some criticism; for it is argued that smoke will not be available in anything like sufficient quantities, and that the use of smoke, even if available, can be overdone to an extent that will prevent the air and ground observers from watching the progress of the fight.

Now, ever since the introduction of smoke on the battlefield, troops on the defensive when unsuccessful have attributed their defeat to the cover it has afforded to the attackers. In March, 1918, for example, the initial German break-through was largely attributed to the presence of natural and artificial fog which enabled the German machine gunners, the spear-head of the enemy's assault troops, to get through the British forward zone without the defending troops being aware of the fact until they found themselves under effective flanking fire.

Later on, the Germans, when on the defensive, complained bitterly of our smoke, which prevented them from dealing with our infantry until too late.

The truth must be faced; the defender cannot find an antidote to smoke because there is no antidote, provided it is used with discretion. Surely, then, it is better to put the servants of the assaulting troops—the F.O.O. and the airman—to some inconvenience, when, at the same time, the defender's means of protecting himself are completely jammed.

Obviously, artillery fire alone, especially the modified form of it which must be expected in moving warfare, will achieve little or nothing if the infantry advance has been definitely checked.

There is but one arm which can help in such circumstances—the tanks.

Most officers have experienced the unpleasant sensation of an hour's bombardment by every kind of missile ranging from light

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field guns to 8-in. howitzers. But, even during a bombardment, the anxiety which was uppermost in their minds was this, namely, when must they prepare for the infantry attack which would probably follow? With good troops the leaders would be constantly on the prowl, their main thought being to make sure that ammunition was handy, that bayonets were fixed and that, the moment there was a lull or a lift, the men should man their fire positions.

But when smoke was being used by the attackers this anxiety was increased 100 per cent., for then it became a night assault in daylight conditions, the scales being heavily weighted against the defenders. So the experienced commander would prefer, every time he was called upon to launch his tanks and infantry to the assault, a little smoke to a little shrapnel or H.E.

Tanks must use every known method for producing such a screen, and it is essential that the smoke be put down well away from the tank.

The following are some of the methods in their order of importance which have been suggested for the use of smoke to assist a tank attack :—

1. Smoke produced by a shell fired from the cannon of the tank :—So far the smoke produced by the six-pounder has not proved very effective, but it can probably be improved. Failing this, rifle grenades fired from a tank would be much better than nothing, and the rifle grenade would be excellent for training purposes. The overwhelming advantage of a tank producing its own smoke by means of a cannon must not be lost sight of.

2. Smoke produced by field or pack artillery :—This is not so effective as smoke produced by the tank itself owing to the difficulties of putting it down at the right time and place.

3. Smoke produced by means of bombs from the air :—This will only be effective when tanks can transmit a wireless message to the aeroplane calling for smoke on definite localities.

The method of producing smoke from the exhaust of a tank has little to recommend it in the attack, since its use would probably involve the sacrifice of a tank—a very bad principle even with unlimited tanks.

It is not suggested that a lot of smoke is either necessary or desirable; the smoke of a locomotive can be extremely annoying to the passengers of a train when the smoke is blown over on that side of the train from which they are trying to observe the country through which they pass; yet this smoke is in reality a mere wisp. That is all that is required to help tanks, so long as the wisp is applied

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in the right place after making due allowances for wind and for atmospheric conditions. The ideal anti-tank weapon will be particularly susceptible to smoke, telescopic sights and cross-lines demanding for their use a clear and uninterrupted view.

It is necessary now to consider shortly the action of a section of tanks during an advance.

The advisability or otherwise of employing tanks in a small advanced guard depends on circumstances outside the scope of this article, but, for the sake of argument, let it be assumed that a section of tanks has been detailed to cooperate with the leading battalion of an advanced guard.

The first task of the section commander is to make a careful study of the map and air photographs of the route to be followed. From this study he will be able to determine the probable points where he is likely to be employed and whether it will be possible for his section to move off the road—it is always preferable to work off the road provided the " going " is reasonably good.

Supposing the section commander decides to move off the road, his next problem is one of time and space ; taking it that his tanks will move across country at an average rate of five miles an hour, he must now determine the " bounds " he can make in order to keep within cooperating distance of the battalion with which he may be called upon to act.

But the road may have to be used, in which case he must ascertain what space can be allotted to him in which to time his " bounds." With a good plan thus worked out and approved by the advanced guard commander, the section commander, who is a mounted officer and who will ride with the battalion commander with whom he is to act, will know at any time the exact position of his tanks.

When contact has been gained with the enemy, and the leading battalion commander, with probably two companies deployed on a wide front, has decided upon his objective, the time for the employment of the section of tanks has arrived.

The circumstances may be such as to make it necessary for the tanks to pass through the whole of the advanced guard ; and, if this is the case—a very extreme case in war—so long as the horses are not facing the tanks and are allowed to graze, there will be little difficulty in bringing the tanks through, even on a road where there is barely room to pass.*

* This manœuvre was tried with the Experimental Brigade and it worked quite satisfactorily.

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In nine cases out of ten, however, the section will leave the road for a sweep round one of the flanks, and in situations of this nature, where the fighting may be very fluid, a flank attack by tanks will produce the best results.

Before the section crosses the starting line—indicated by some reasonably prominent feature such as a road, lane, track, hedgerow, bank or line of rails, it does not matter what, so long as it is something definite—it is essential for the battery commander, if in close support, the machine-gun officer and the commander of the supporting company to assist to make a plan in which each and every one will play his part for the support of the whole.

Let us now consider the cooperation between tanks and infantry in the attack.

With the present type of tank the cooperation between the two arms must be of the closest, and, in order to ensure such cooperation, it is essential that both the infantry and tank crews should frequently confer with each other ; for instance, the infantry must communicate at once to the crew of the tank any information which affects the tank in any way ; similarly, a member of the crew, preferably the tank commander, should get out when in the vicinity of infantry, and when the situation warrants it, in order to give any information to the nearest infantry commander which he thinks might be valuable.

When training there is a marked tendency to work in watertight compartments and to assume that the tank crews know as much as the infantry, whereas the reverse is usually the case.

In the preliminary work before the actual assault, it is often possible for the infantry to give most valuable information about the suitability of assembly positions selected in the first instance off the map, thus saving valuable time, which can be devoted to the personal reconnaissance of the enemy's position.

It may be said that the primary rôle of tanks is to place the infantry on its objective, the ideal state of affairs being when the infantry reaches the objective shortly after the tanks.

This does not mean that infantry must follow the tanks closely on the way to the objective ; it does not mean that infantry should follow tanks at all.

It is in fact much better that they should not do so when it can be otherwise arranged, since, by following in the " wash " of the tanks, the infantry are liable to get all the " overs " meant for the tanks as soon as they disclose their presence.

It may often happen that the tanks can utilize their speed in

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order to make a detour and come in on the enemy's flank, while the infantry, by taking the shortest route, will arrive on the objective in time to cooperate.

The great advantage of a flank attack by tanks is the effect produced by the enfilade fire from their guns and Hotchkiss rifles, in addition to which, in a case where there has already been a failure on the part of the infantry, there is less chance of crushing the wounded who may be lying out in front of the objective.

There is, of course, the danger that the supporting infantry, by taking a short cut, may be called upon to pass through troops already checked, and may suffer heavily until the presence of the tanks is felt, or that the tanks may be unduly exposed to the enemy's anti-tank weapons, but these difficulties can be largely eliminated by a proper system of signals to ensure cooperation and by a judicious use of smoke to cover the movements involved.

Should it, however, be impossible for the tanks to carry out the flank attack, then the tank section will have to lead the infantry into action; but even then it does not follow that the infantry should move exactly in rear of the tanks.

The method of advance to be adopted by the infantry will depend on the terrain and the use made of it by its leaders. It cannot be too often repeated that cooperation between tanks and infantry will vary according to the ground and according to the situation; an intelligent use must be made of the ground, and anything in the nature of too rigid formations must be avoided.

As soon as the infantry has been seen to reach its objective, the section of tanks will go back to a rallying point under cover, which has been previously selected and communicated to all tank commanders, but not before it is quite obvious that the whole objective is in the hands of the infantry with whom the section is working.

It must be impressed upon infantry troops as part of their training that the sooner tanks rally the sooner will they be available for a fresh operation.

The launching of a tank section to the assault is not unlike a charge of cavalry: when once the commander has slipped them he has no further control over their movements until they have rallied.

Though primarily an offensive weapon, the tank is capable of playing a most important part in defence, particularly in the immediate counter-attack.

Let it be assumed that in the defence an infantry battalion commander has been allotted a tank section to work under his orders.

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" Infantry Training," vol. ii. para. 62, says, " As the distance will usually amount to four or five miles, infantry cannot normally expect assistance from tanks in carrying out an immediate counter-attack." Doubtless the writer of this paragraph had in mind attacks such as those delivered by the Germans in 1918—attacks preceded by heavy gas bombardments, which inflicted severe casualties among the tank *personnel* owing to the tanks being placed too far forward.

But in cases where heavy bombardments of this kind are not anticipated, it is submitted that a section of tanks in position behind battalion headquarters—about a mile from the front line—will render possible a genuine immediate counter-attack for the recapture of a battle position which has just been lost; for no counter-attack, even by a company of infantry, can be launched in less than thirty minutes with any real prospect of success.

If tanks are to be employed successfully in an immediate counter-attack, however, the ground over which they would be called upon to operate must be carefully reconnoitred beforehand by the tank crews, and the actual operation must also be fully rehearsed. It will not be possible to make use of smoke in a tank counter-attack because the smoke would deprive the defending troops of their greatest asset—visibility. Nor will it be possible to detail infantry specially to support the tanks, for the tank section will move so quickly that no infantry would be able to keep up with it. The only infantry support that might be available would be from units already broken, and from infantry whose flanks had been exposed by the rupture.

Picture the situation: the line has given way at a certain point. The defenders are retiring in despair, bordering on panic; at least one hundred yards separate the hostile forces; those who have not given way—they would be good troops—are trying to refuse their exposed flanks by means of their local reserves, when suddenly, in the very nick of time—literally the " fleeting moment "—the section of tanks which has done that mile in five minutes, appears and dashes into the advancing enemy.

The first quarter of an hour after a successful assault is the time when the attackers are most out of hand; some of their leaders have become casualties, and those who are left have temporarily lost control of their men. After fifteen minutes order and cohesion will begin to assert themselves, not before; but in that time the tanks will have arrived, and they are perfectly safe for the moment from hostile artillery fire.

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For such defenders as may still be holding out on the flanks the MOMENT has arrived; it is obvious to all of them that the safety of the line depends on their closing in to support the tanks.

But one thing must be impressed upon the defending infantry; it is essential for the tanks to get back immediately after they have dislodged the enemy; and that is why it is vital for the infantry to support tank counter-attacks by MOVEMENT, the tanks supplying the fire; the infantry must take over the ground regained and hold it after the tanks have gone back to rally.

The immediate counter-attack is a case where it may be inadvisable to wait for the battalion commander's order to go; the section may possibly get direct news by wireless from the air; and if the section commander receives the news of a break-through in the area in which he is working, he will be justified in anticipating his commander's orders, since his *raison d'être* for the moment is the launching of an immediate counter-attack.

The most difficult and anxious period in the conduct of a rear-guard is the actual breaking off of the action in order to withdraw to the next position.

Tanks are highly suitable for covering such withdrawals, because their superior speed and invulnerability from small-arm fire enables them to remain on the position long after the infantry has withdrawn; they can be so well hidden that when they disclose their presence they come as a complete surprise to the enemy.

The writer suggests, therefore, that in a rear-guard action tanks should only be employed at the most difficult period—that is, to cover the actual withdrawal—and that they should not be used, if it can possibly be helped, for local counter-attacks before the withdrawal is due to take place.

In situations, however, where the enemy is pressing a rear-guard so hard that a premature withdrawal is likely, it is clear that the tanks may have to be used for an immediate counter-attack; after such a counter-attack their employment to cover the final withdrawal is likely to expose them to great risk of being knocked out.

Unquestionably an ambush is the soul of a rear-guard action, and the tank is the ideal arm for an ambush. When the hostile infantry is pushing forward on all sides, a concealed section of tanks can suddenly disclose its presence, and, momentarily safe from hostile artillery, can hurl back the enemy, and then withdraw by a previously reconnoitred route under cover, where necessary, of a smoke screen to the next position.

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RECOLLECTIONS OF THE R.F.C. DURING THE GREAT WAR

By Rothesay Stuart Wortley, M.C. (late Major, Hampshire Yeomanry and R.A.F.)

No. I

Life in the R.F.C. during the Great War was a very good life indeed. Existence was as pleasant as it well could be under active service conditions, but the atmosphere of romance with which the more imaginative section of the press has enveloped the "prodigious deeds of valour performed by our intrepid airmen" should be toned down and brought within the more genuine compass of reality. "Proportion, gentlemen, proportion!" Let us compare, for instance, the life of the pilot with that of the infantryman, the gunner, or the sapper. Any of these latter might be called upon to spend ten days or more in the front-line trenches, where, during every minute out of the twenty-four hours of the day, he was in imminent risk of being either shot or blown up; he eked out his existence in a dirty ditch or dug-out; he might or might not get anything to eat, smoke, or drink; he was constantly tormented by flies; he was subjected to a series of the most nauseating smells; he might be gassed at any moment. He had to endure the incessant roar and racket of the guns, which is far more jarring to the nervous system than any other attribute of warfare, whilst every night his rest was apt to be disturbed by bombs, no matter whether in the front line or in reserve.

The airman, on the other hand, lived perhaps fifty miles behind the lines in a high degree of comfort; a good bed to sleep in every night; his food and drink were assured; mechanical transport at his disposal to scour the countryside for luxuries and to take him off for joy-rides when off duty. He did three hours' work a day in flying weather; in rain or fog he did no work at all. When on duty in the air the two sources of danger with which he had to contend were hostile aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. The fire of the latter, if approaching uncomfortable accuracy, was easily avoided by turn or dive, and, though admittedly at times alarming,

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beyond tearing a few holes in the fabric of the wings or fuselage, it effected little material damage, while the casualties incurred from "Archie's" efforts were extraordinarily few. Aerial warfare, too, was a clean straight-forward business. Hun-hunting was looked upon more as a new exhilarating game of chance or skill, while the speed at which actual fighting took place was such as to eliminate any thoughts of personal danger. There was no time to be frightened in the air!

That the casualties in the R.F.C. were heavy is not to be disputed, but a very large percentage of those casualties might have been avoided. They were for the most part due to lack of experience and, in some cases, to disobedience of orders on the part of individual pilots.

In aerial combat there were two golden rules: the first, "Never leave your leader, wherever he may go or whatever he may do"; the second, "If you get a Hun on your tail, never go straight on. Conquer your instinct to push down your nose and go faster and faster. You are only making yourself an easier target for your adversary to shoot at."

It was the disregard of these maxims which caused the loss of many lives. The dispatch to the front of partially-trained or insufficiently experienced pilots not only resulted in casualties, but it was also a cause of continual anxiety to squadron and flight commanders. The latter would often ask permission to cross the lines on patrol with fewer machines manned by competent pilots, rather than with a larger formation partly made up of unreliable novices whose presence served only to throw a heavier responsibility on their leaders and—a far more serious drawback—to diminish their freedom of action in the air.

Those wretched half-fledged aviators! If no worse fate befell them, they were generally sent back to England, recommended "for further instruction," a polite formula for returning them to store labelled "N.B.G."—for reissue—later on, perhaps!

The fault, of course, did not lie with the unfortunate pilots themselves; they did their best. The fault was in the system. The idea of the Higher Command was Numbers! Numbers! Numbers! The R.F.C. must be expanded as rapidly as possible. The Army, the Navy, Home Defence were all crying for more squadrons and still more squadrons. The difficulty of raising and equipping the new units was, of course, stupendous. Yet notwithstanding, more and more squadrons were formed and sent out to the front, but the result was that the actual success obtained and

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the numbers of enemy shot down were due to the courage and skill displayed by a small minority of pilots, the remainder fulfilling the rôle of " passengers." It is an open question whether fewer units and a higher standard of efficiency would not have achieved an equal success at a lesser cost.

But when all is said and done, we have only to judge by the final results—the complete and absolute defeat of the enemy in the air.

* * * * *

The first stage in the training of a pupil in the R.F.C. was a course of instruction at the School of Military Aeronautics, and it was to this school that David Montagu was ordered to report himself in the early spring of 1917. Here he was to be initiated into the mysteries of the theory of flight, introduced to the idiosyncrasies of the aero-engine, both rotary and stationary; bullied by a tyrannical sergeant-instructor into repeating parrot-like each morning the exact functions of each and every part of the Vickers and Lewis gun; baffled by the complexity of the various strains capable of being sustained by woods and wires, as comprised in the science of " rigging "; nearly driven crazy by an hour's " buzzing " at the Morse code; but amply repaid by the enjoyment of a delightful game, in which, seated in a gallery overlooking a model of the trenches, he vied with his fellow pupils in pin-pointing shell-bursts cleverly represented by flashes from electric bulbs which blinked out from different points in the countryside.

The school was established in a university town. The quarters were provided mainly by the college buildings, the overflow being billeted in the town. The standing orders were drawn up for the benefit of newly-joined cadets, youths drawn from every walk of life, now wearing His Majesty's uniform for the first time, entirely ignorant of military code or regimental tradition, but nevertheless the type from which the R.F.C. was now being chiefly recruited. The remainder of the pupils consisted of officers with from one to five or six years' service who had volunteered from other branches of the Army, but who were obliged to fall into line with all the irksome and petty rules and regulations which had been framed to regulate the over-exuberant activities of some of the newly-commissioned cadets.

To David it was like returning to a private school. He was marched about, pushed about, ordered about from morning to night—made to parade at 7 a.m. and form-fours for half an hour every morning. There was no getting out of it, the commanding officer was adamant—but he himself, it must be admitted, appeared every day on the parade ground, snow, frost or rain—coatless and

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blue, but determined—in order to watch those miserable evolutions. Oh! the difference between the atmosphere of France and that of a Home Station. All the *joie-de-vivre*, the laughter, the freedom, the *camaraderie*, so prevalent abroad, would seem unknown at home. In England nobody appeared to care a damn about one—one was treated as a number, as a pawn, and for the first time David met with that which shall be christened, for lack of a better name, the "Great Principle of the Staff and Hun," a system which was allowed to take root and flourish in the R.F.C. with the most regrettable results.

David's reception was hardly encouraging. The afternoon in question must have been a bad one for the staff of the School of Military Aeronautics, whose tempers seemed somehow all awry. He drove up to the orderly room and duly reported himself. The orderly-room clerk glared at him with ill-concealed hostility, curtly demanded his papers and disappeared. After an absence of about twenty minutes he reappeared and with a barely civil grunt indicated the adjutant's door. David bowed his acknowledgments and entered. Apparently an assistant-adjutant (2nd Lieutenant, ætat. circ. ann. 18) was holding the fort that afternoon. The officer was reclining in an arm-chair with his feet, encased in muddy boots, upon the table. Standing with his back against the fire another officer of about the same age and calibre was engaged in retailing a rather sordid adventure with a member of the fair sex, which he had enjoyed in the local cinema the evening before.

As his entrance appeared entirely to escape these young gentlemen's notice, David (a captain of six years' service in the Army, just back from two years' active service and straight from an appointment as staff captain of an infantry brigade) felt constrained to interrupt their conversation.

David: "Good-evening."

Ass.-Adjt. (without removing his legs from the table or his pipe from his mouth): "Hullo. What do you want?"

David: "I have come to report myself and I should like a billet."

Ass.-Adjt.: "Oh yes! I think you will find accommodation in one of the College Halls; here is a note to the corporal in charge." Upon which, without further ceremony, he turned away and resumed his conversation with his friend.

Controlling his temper as best he could, David left the office and set out for the College Hall. The corporal showed him the "accommodation." A room about 10 feet by 10 feet—in three corners, spread out on a hard wooden floor, three brand-new

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sleeping-bags. Whose? "Three cadets, sir, but you'll find plenty of room in this corner. Where's your flea-bag, sir?"

This after two years in France was really too much. David paid another visit to the assistant-adjutant, to whom he expressed himself in such a way as to secure an excellent billet under the hospitable roof of a kindly burgess of the town. Nor did the orderly-room sergeant escape retribution. David demanded a billet for his servant. "Officers don't have servants here, sir," he snorted. But proof was forthcoming from the Territorial Force Regulations, chapter and verse, proving the sergeant to be entirely in the wrong. He was forced to concede the point, but almost burst with anger in so doing. This was the first encounter with the "Staff and Hun Principle"—PUPILS ARE TO BE TREATED AS DIRT.

The School Staff messed under their own arrangements while meals were provided for the pupils in the College Halls. The ante-room existed in name only, and no effort was made to instil into the minds of the cadets even the most elementary military traditions or standard of behaviour required of the members of a regimental mess, a very serious omission, which, owing to the fact that it was tacitly ignored by the authorities, had a most detrimental effect on the whole tone of the R.F.C. The joys of the town, therefore, provided the only distraction. There, for those to whom these things appealed, could be found a number of diversions. There were bar-parlours of inns wherein it was a delight to consume indifferent port in an atmosphere of stale beer; there were cinemas and occasional theatrical touring companies; but, above all, there were countless opportunities for the pursuit of the "flapper," and, as fruits of victory, the triumphant invasion of the local "Thé Dansant," there to indulge in the supreme delights of bunny-hugging and all that bunny-hugging stands for.

For those like David who cared not for these things—well, time hung heavily on their hands.

After some four or five weeks the course, culminating in a passing-out examination, drew to an end and the pupils dispersed, posted to elementary training squadrons. As a general rule two of these squadrons, with the addition, perhaps, of a higher instructional squadron, were stationed on an aerodrome. When David received his orders, and reported himself for his new duties, it was with rising spirits and a pleasant sense of elation at being on the verge of the "real thing" at last that he settled down in his fresh surroundings.

The times best suited to instruction were the very early morning hours or those of the late evening, when the atmosphere was undis-

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turbed by sun or wind, though given really good conditions flying was carried on all day.

The type of machine then universally in use in elementary squadrons was the Maurice Farman Shorthorn, a contraption which, to our modern ideas, might verily be dubbed a "fearful and wonderful thing." Clumsy and awkward to look upon, its wings, tail and rudder held together by a maze of interlacing wires, its engine emitting an extraordinary variety of noises and pouring forth clouds of black-and-white smoke, it really *was* very like the dragon in the fairy story.

Morning after morning, full of zeal and positively itching for his first flight, David left his bed at 5 a.m. and hurried down to the hangars in eager expectation. But, alas, morning after morning, and evening after evening, his appearance was greeted with the same blightingly laconic pronouncement on the part of his instructor, "Afraid there's nothing doing for you to-day, better get on with your ground work." Many pupils and few machines was the order of the day and each pupil had to wait his turn. Of machines, indeed, there were quantities, but the treatment meeted out to them by the beginners reduced them nearly all to a state of being constantly in hospital, with the result that only very few could be maintained serviceable for use at the same time. Poor old dragons! The aerodrome, towards breakfast time, indeed afforded a truly funny sight. As many as fifteen to twenty machines could be seen scattered all over the ground, some resting on their crumpled tails, some upon their battered noses, according to their late pilot's particular method of regaining terra firma; others, lop-sided, a broken wing cocked up at a rakish angle or pathetically dragging some part of their scattered anatomy behind them, being slowly pushed back to the sheds on trollies, there to be patched up once more, only to be smashed again the following week until at last, beyond all repair, they found a final resting-place on the rubbish heap behind the hangars.

But David's turn came at last. The squadron commander maybe had noticed his disconsolate expression as he sat outside the sheds one early morning, still hoping for a flight. Ordering out a machine he beckoned him into the front seat, with orders to put his hands on the auxiliary controls, but on no account to use any force, and to let go at once if touched on the back of the head.

David took his place in the machine. Let his own words describe the flight. "Oh! the delight of the first flight! At a wave of the hand from the pilot the mechanics pulled away the

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chocks—the engine roared out behind us; the 'dragon' began to move slowly forward. Gathering speed we rushed through the air in the glorious spring morning, faster and faster. Had we left the ground yet? Gingerly I turned my head, looking downwards and behind me. I had a dreadful feeling that any violent movement on my part might upset the balance of the machine. The sheds were getting smaller and further away. Yes! We were in mid-air now! The little silver stream that skirted the aerodrome caught my eye; how jolly it looked glittering in the sun! I grew braver; I turned my head freely this way and that; I actually moved my shoulders! The panorama increased, I began to pick out the surrounding features in the landscape—woods, railways, villages—and all the time my hands were on the controls feeling little movements up and down and sideways. I was beginning to enjoy myself hugely; I began to laugh with sheer delight. Bang! Oh! Heavens! What was that? My heart jumped into my mouth. Something had hit me on the back of the head. What on earth had happened? Something surely broken. Idiot! Fool. . . . I cursed myself. I realized, of course. My hands flew off the controls. I turned and met an encouraging smile from my squadron commander. His left hand indicated he was going to turn. Down went the left wing, lower and lower. Oh, Lord! How much farther? Instinctively, I crammed my body over to the right. I must surely slip out of the machine. Then gradually the great wing started to readjust itself and we drew level once more. The first 'bank.' Now the engine was shut off and we were gliding back to earth. The panorama gradually disappeared. The sheds and huts grew larger once again. The ground seemed to be surging rapidly towards us like a great green wave. Now we were almost touching it; a few little bump-bumps. We had landed and were taxi-ing back to the sheds. Oh, what fun that had been! I walked back to the mess with the squadron commander bubbling over with enthusiasm and sat down to the heartiest breakfast of my life."

Training now went on apace. Gradually becoming more proficient in handling his dragon, and realizing that it was not such a very alarming dragon after all, David successfully emerged from the ordeal of the first "Solo" or flight without an instructor. With daily increasing confidence enabling him to enlarge the scope and range of his activities and finally to achieve the goal of his ambition, the triumph of obtaining his "ticket" [certificate of a qualified pilot], he was soon ready to pass on to a higher instructional squadron. By a great stroke of luck he was posted to one of the very few training

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squadrons then in existence equipped with Bristol Fighters, one of the finest fighting machines ever produced. With this type his fortunes were destined to be linked throughout his career in the R.F.C.

With the modification of a real aeroplane now taking the place of a Maurice Farman, the pupils' training in a higher instructional squadron was a repetition of that already gone through in the elementary stage, namely, dual control with an instructor, the " first solo " over again, and so many hours of flying practice, until considered fit for instruction in the higher arts of " stunting," cross-country flying, photography, bomb-dropping and all other tests laid down as the standard of efficiency required of a war pilot. Having passed out in flying, he was dispatched for a course of aerial gunnery at a special school established on the sea coast, where arrangements were made for firing from the air with live ammunition. Here he underwent a fortnight's intensive training in field-firing. The targets were composed of imitation aircraft anchored out to sea, large flags suspended from observation balloons, and even little gas balloons, such as can be bought for a penny in the streets, let up on the end of a string from the ground.

It was here, incidentally, that in his inaugural address to a newly arrived contingent of Huns (as the pupils were still designated by the Staff), while enumerating the various recreations provided for their leisure hours, the Commandant remarked that permission would be granted for officers to proceed on Saturdays and Sundays to the local town, but on condition only that they refrained from taking as their companions the chambermaids of the hotel in which they were billeted ! There was something wrong in that !

The course ended, and it was a case of back to the old aerodrome once more. A few more days, or perhaps weeks, of assiduous flying and the pupil was ready to take his place at the front. He was now a full-blown Service pilot, in possession of a pair of " wings " of which he was inordinately proud, and " pending his disposal by the Air Ministry," off on leave, hoping no doubt to be greeted as a little tin god by a host of admiring ladies !

In the station officers' mess the same pernicious principle of attempting to separate the permanent staff from the pupils was once more in evidence. The mess president furnished an excellent example of one of those gentlemen portrayed on the stage by Mr. George Grossmith as " Men you have often heard of but never seen." The mess committee no less so. The actual messing, as well as a species of bar, were run by a caterer under the supervision

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of the Equipment Officer. Again, two of the squadron commanders lived out and, being married men, rarely came into the mess, with the result that the conduct of the ante-room, in the absence of the senior officers, was deprived of that authority, order, tradition or standard of example, from which the cadets, or, rather, regular officers as they now were to all intents and purposes, could have learnt mess-discipline. As it was, they were afforded no opportunity of learning anything at all, and this important side of their training was as completely neglected in the second stage of their career as it had been in the first. All this should have been realized and remedied by the authorities. The appointment, perhaps, to each station of a " dug-out " colonel or major, whose sole duty it would have been to run the mess and to instil a proper spirit into the young idea would have solved the situation.

If some such system had been introduced on the formation of the R.F.C., it would have had an incalculable influence for good on the conduct of all young officers. They themselves would have appreciated it enormously, and many unpleasant incidents, discreditable to the fair name of the Corps, would have been avoided.

And the old " dug-out " colonel (one can see him in one's mind's eye), relaxing under the influence of his after-dinner glass of port—standing there in the ante-room, his back to the fire, his legs apart, bald, blue-nosed, his eye-glass fixed under his great grey eyebrows, his moustache bristling with excitement as he held forth to a circle of admiring and awe-struck youths. " Yes ! By Jove ! India was the place for the subaltern ! Ponies for thirty rupees ; all the sport you could want. Why, I remember, yes, it was in '81, the regiment was at X—damn good station—Gad, it was, I can tell you, boys ! It was at the Governor-General's garden party ! . . ." etc. How he would have loved it, and how the boys would have loved him !

But, as it was, there were three tables in the dining-room, one of which was " understood " to be reserved for the staff. The situation was accepted by the majority of the pupils who, being cadets, neither knew nor cared anything about the matter ; but the ex-regimental officers were not unnaturally irritated, more especially as the same system was applied to the ante-rooms (of which there were two), one being regarded as " private."

Furthermore, the efforts of the mess waiters (totally inadequate in numbers) were concentrated on the " top " table, whereas the pupils were mostly left to forage for themselves—which they did, with a vengeance ! The inner ante-room was well furnished and decorated, while that of the pupils resembled a bear-garden rather

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than a human habitation, littered, as it invariably was, with newspapers and periodicals in all stages of disruption; the floor covered with empty packets of W. D. and H. O. Wills's Virginia cigarettes and the butt-ends of their contents; and the chairs and tables, battered out of all recognition, forlornly scattered about the room.

The permanent staff consisted not only of the flying *personnel*, *i.e.* the squadron and flight commanders and their assistant instructors, but also of a certain number of ground officers, more generally recognized under the initial letters denoting their functions than by their own particular names. These gentry (and the same may be said of the majority of assistant instructors) had for the most part fought the war in England, and had every intention of continuing to do so, but, curiously enough, it was they who most ardently supported the separatist principle. Among the pupils, on the other hand, there were officers whose record could show very distinguished service in the front line, some of them, indeed, had already been decorated for valour in the field. There were Canadians, Australians, and South Africans whose democratic notions failed to admit the theory that 2nd Lieutenant A. was a totally superior being to 2nd Lieutenant B. merely owing to the fact that he was a member of the staff.

One evening's proceedings, however, served to settle the point, at any rate for the time being. Some one had perpetrated a practical joke which was not in the very best of taste. The station commander had invited the culprit to own up. Nobody did so. The station commander saw fit to stop all leave. At dinner one of the ground officers, a particularly objectionable little worm, was heard to remark in Olympian tones—" I really don't see why we (the staff) should suffer for what these blasted Huns do."

After dinner a party of " blasted Huns," headed by a burly Australian, fell upon him. They dealt with him. What exactly they did to him is immaterial—but his manners from that time onwards became egregiously polite. At the same time the " principle " received its *coup-de-grâce*, for when the pupils complacently invaded the inner ante-room and the " private " table, not a word of protest was forthcoming.

* * * * *

In those days the organization for Home defence had not reached the high standard to which it afterwards attained. Under the existing scheme, training stations supplied with the latest types of fighting aeroplanes, *e.g.* the Bristol Fighter, were under orders to have two pilots, observers and machines in constant readiness to take

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the air immediately on receipt of the alarm signal, the names of the officers qualified for air-raid duty being kept on a daily roster.

But German daylight raids were few and far between, and Bristol Fighters were scarce. Six only were allotted to the squadron to which David belonged, and of these there were seldom more than three available for use, the remainder being under repair or overhaul. In these circumstances it was obviously impossible to keep the aeroplanes, engines, or guns in a proper state of war efficiency; in addition to which, training had always to be carried on, and consequently all serviceable machines were constantly in the air.

But one day in July, 1917, the great test came.*

The morning of the day in question was unfit for training. Flying had been " washed out " for the rest of the day and the aerodrome was practically deserted. David and " Captain Douglas " [a senior flight commander in the R.F.C., posted to the squadron on a temporary course of instruction in Bristol Fighters], detailed for air-raid duty as pilot and observer respectively, were sitting dozing in the ante-room in gloomy anticipation of a long and dreary day, which might have brought forth better things, when the sudden shriek of the Klaxon horn burst upon their slumbering senses, and brought them staggering to their feet from the depths of their arm-chairs. With the simultaneous exclamation of—" Air-raid by Jove ! " they snatched up their flying clothes and raced down to the sheds, outside which, as luck would have it, two Bristol Fighters were standing. It was a matter of but a few minutes to start up the machine with the better reputation of the two. Feverish excitement prevailed amongst officers and men. They tumbled over each other in their eagerness to get the patrol away. Douglas was busy testing his engine and his gun. David was up to his ears in drums of Lewis ammunition which were being pressed on him from all sides. A final shake down in their seats, a glance round the cockpits and all was ready. The pilot waved his hand to signal " all clear," taxied quickly in the open and, amidst wild yells, whistles and cat-calls from enthusiastic comrades, threw open his throttle. Like an arrow from a bow he shot across the ground, narrowly missed scraping the paint off the roof of the officers' mess, as he rose quickly into the air and shaped his course for London.

The rendezvous given them was 17,000 feet over Greenwich, with orders to patrol a line between that town and New Barnet;

* The account which follows is the actual experience of an officer of the R.F.C. in the German air raid on London on the 7th of July, 1917.

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further, to intercept and attack any enemy aircraft attempting to approach the metropolitan area.

Upwards and onwards they pursued their way. The earth and its creatures dwindled away beneath them. It was a glorious day—cloudless and clear. David could distinguish almost every detail of the picture spread out in miniature below. There in front lay London, a huge, black, smoke-enshrouded monster scored down the back by a long, thin, white winding scar (as the river appeared to his imagination) its feelers, formed by the straggling suburbs, tapering off into the great main roads and railways radiating in all directions.

Higher and higher they climbed—wider and wider grew the range of vision. The green countryside with its clustering villages nestling cosily into their warm groups of trees, the larger towns, be-churched and be-spired, St. Albans, Watford, Chingford, Rickmansworth, and, farther afield, Luton, Bedford, Hatfield and Hertford, until even Oxford's pinnacles and domes loomed up mysterious, could be dimly discerned in the distant haze. David turned and gazed over the other side. There the line of the East Coast pencilled itself out clear and precise, the yellow sandy coast of Suffolk and Essex, the Thames Estuary with its banks and shoals, the whole coast of Kent, down to the point where it turns back to the West—Dover, Folkestone, as far perhaps as Newhaven. Beyond, again, a silver sea gradually yielding to a shadowy grey horizon.

But he was brought back to life by a violent shiver. He was cold. Never having yet surpassed the modest altitude of 3,000 feet, and in the heat of the moment having given no thought to all that he had been told about the low temperature of the upper air, he had started off clad, as usual, in a mackintosh and a pair of washleather gloves. He leant forward over the pilot's shoulder and looked at the instrument board. They were just over 17,000 feet and now practically on their patrol line. He gazed around for signs of any approaching raid, but there was nothing to be seen. All was calm and serene. Up and down they flew—now and then over London. It was amusing to pick out the well-known buildings of the town —St. Paul's, the Tower and other conspicuous points—and to try to trace one's way down Piccadilly or other familiar streets. He wished he'd brought his Baedeker. Far below appeared a B.E. 2c., a British machine of an old type, and later on two Sopwith "Camels," evidently climbing up towards them.

For half an hour or more they had been circling round their appointed area—the cold had become intense. David sat on his

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hands, rocking from one side to the other in his efforts to keep warm. And still no signs of life in the sky. He was beginning to think that a book in front of the ante-room fire (much as the thought had disgusted him a few hours ago) was after all a preferable occupation to that of circumnavigating the heavens on a fool's errand due to a false alarm and that, damn it! it was time to go home—when, taking a turn to the north, suddenly, like Caius of ancient Roman fame, he "saw an evil sight."

From the direction of Harwich, from the midst of a mass of white woolly puffs, occasioned by the bursts of anti-aircraft shell, there sailed into view a large group of aeroplanes. David touched Douglas on the shoulder and pointed due ahead. The pilot leant out of the cockpit, remained watching motionless for a few seconds, then throttling back his engine, turned and shouted "Gothas." So they had come at last, those much-vaunted German Gothas. The daylight air-raid had materialized. The observer looked again; Yes! there they were, much nearer now; twenty-two he counted; great white machines flying all together, like huge birds, moving rapidly towards them, as they made direct for London. What were David's feelings? Thrilled and slightly awestruck, he watched the Germans coming on—it was the first time he had ever seen one of the enemy's machines from the air, and this looked rather a formidable array! "Planté" up there at a giddy height with nothing but a few flimsy bits of wood and a scrap of linen—well—to get his back up against—as he had a feeling he might want to do a little later on—he experienced a momentary dismay. He had another look for any other British machines which might be coming to their support, but none were in sight.

"What do we do now?" he shouted to Douglas.

"God knows!" came the reply, "but as we are here, I suppose we had better do something."

In the meantime the Gothas were abreast of them and just over the outskirts of London. The home defences had opened fire. The Germans were flying at an altitude of 15,000–16,000 feet. The British anti-aircraft ranging cannot be said to have been the essence of accuracy—shells were bursting with glorious profusion 2,000 feet above and below the mark. The Germans sailed on, exasperatingly unperturbed, every pilot keeping his place in the formation, and dropping his bombs at will upon the town below.

But the Bristol Fighter was now within striking distance of the enemy. Immediately beneath the British airmen two enemy machines were flying, slightly lagging behind the rest. These two

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they decided to attack. Without warning Douglas dived. A sudden rush of wind hurled David backwards. He fell sprawling on his seat. A few seconds later, through the predominant sensation of being whirled over a steep switchback, he became aware that Douglas was firing off his gun. Fifty yards in front of him was a broad expanse of yellow fabric, the under covering of the wings and fuselage of a Gotha into which Douglas was pumping lead as hard as he could. Suddenly, David was conscious of another machine on his right. Instinctively he swung round his gun and opened fire. " Tracer " bullets were flying in all directions. Prrr. Prrr. Click ! His gun had jambed. He swore and cursed, and grabbed at his jamb clearer. Douglas's gun had also stopped. Crash ! His body struck the side of the fuselage. Something had thrown him off his feet. For a second he hung in mid-air. Frantically he clutched at the gun-mounting—his feet touched the floor again. Oh ! Lord, what had happened ? Douglas had made a sharp steep bank and nearly thrown him out of the machine ! They were racing downward now and eastward. The Gothas above and behind them were steering the same course. Two " Camels " streaked across the heavens and disappeared. Douglas was saying something—" Guns," " Eastchurch," were the only words he caught. They were following the river. A few minutes later Eastchurch aerodrome appeared in front of them. They landed and drew up before the sheds, where officers and mechanics crowded round them. Douglas explained, could they clear the guns at once, if not sooner ? They wanted to get off again and catch the raiders on their homeward journey.

But it was not to be—the machine had apparently been severely peppered by the Germans, and a partially severed main-spar put the good Bristol Fighter out of action for the time. There was nothing for it but to leave it where it was and to betake themselves to London in order to see and hear the result of the raid. They had a feeling, too, that after their morning's efforts, " Another little drink would not do them any harm." The squadron in the meanwhile, having had no news of the aviators, and the adjutant being evidently bored with sitting in his office, had " written them off " as missing and shut up the shop.

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THE OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES IN THE CAUCASUS, 1853–1855

(With Map)

By W. E. D. Allen, F.R.G.S.

***The Russian Position in the Caucasus*, 1853.**—To obtain an accurate perspective of the strategy of the Allies in the Caucasus during the Crimean War, a brief review is necessary of the history of the Russian absorption of those regions.

The Caucasus mountain system extends for a distance of 650 miles in a south-east direction from the Taman Peninsula on the Sea of Azov to the neighbourhood of Baku on the Caspian. It may be divided into three sectors: a western sector, 150 miles in length from Taman to Pitsunda, forming the difficult coast of Circassia and Abkhasia; a central sector of impassable mountain wall, through which the Pass of Darial—Dar-i-Alan or Gate of the Alans—alone gives access from the north to the south; and an eastern sector comprising the hills of Chechnia and Daghestan, which stretch to within two miles of the Caspian, leaving a n arrow coast strip, the historical Gap of Derbend, which gives easy passage from the Steppe to the valley of the Kur.

During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the Russians, based on the Cossack Line, which followed, roughly, the courses of the Terek and the Kuban, had pushed into Trans-Caucasia by the two gaps of Darial and Derbend. Leaving the difficult mountain regions on either flank unattacked, they had conquered the fertile valleys of the Rion and Kur, and fixed their outposts on the rims of the Iranian and Armenian Plateaux. Finally, in 1827, the Persians had surrendered Erivan and Nakhichevan, and, the following year, the Turks had lost Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki.

For half-a-century the Russians had been fighting with the mountaineers, but it was not until 1830, when Trans-Caucasia had been finally conquered and was in process of organization as a Russian province, that they undertook a campaign definitely aimed at their final submission. On the outbreak of the Crimean War, the struggle

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between the Russians and the mountaineers had already endured for nearly a quarter of a century, with but little permanent success to the invaders. The Russians during that period had effectually reduced the Kabards and Ossets of the Central Caucasus, and the Tater Khans of the Caspian littoral. But, on the east, the Chechens and Daghestanli tribes had successfully resisted several formidable invasions, culminating, in 1845, in the severe defeat of 10,000 Russian troops at Dargo in Chechnia, with a loss of half their number in killed. In the following year, Shamil, the celebrated Imam or religious head of the Mussulman tribes, had threatened Temir-Khan-Shura, Kisliar, and Grozni, and had made a lightning cavalry raid into the Kabardan country, which had momentarily imperilled communications between Vladikavkass and Tiflis. After Dargo, the Russians made no further attempt to reduce the tribes by open warfare, but confined themselves to blockading tactics. On the north, they gradually pushed the Cossack Line farther into Chechnia; on the south, they built a line of forts to prevent Shamil from breaking into the valleys of the Alazan and Jora. Among the western tribes, chief of whom were the various Cherkess clans, a parallel struggle against the Russians was in progress, but the area was there isolated, and the tribes, being in a less favourable position to threaten Russian communications with Trans-Caucasia, were not attacked with such vigour. Here again the Russians pursued the blockade system, by building forts on all the accessible points along the Black Sea coast, thus severing the tribes from all direct communication with the Turks, upon whose commerce the former prosperity of these coastal peoples had always depended.

Thus, when in the summer of 1853 war between Russia and Turkey became imminent, a number of dangerous eventualities arose. Russian rule in the Caucasus was scarcely twenty-five years old, and the Russian administration had reason to fear the revival of all the racial and religious hatreds of the heterogeneous and barbarous populations under their control.

In South-western Georgia a Turkish invasion might raise a rebellion among the Mussulman populations of the newly conquered province of Akhaltsikh, and a combination of the Mussulman tribes of the south-west and the Turks with Shamil could threaten Tiflis. In the east, an attempt by the Persians to invade the sympathetic Mussulman Tartar districts, ceded to Russia in 1827, was to be expected.

Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1853.—In the summer of 1853, Muhammad Emin, the chief of the Cherkess tribes and the official

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Naib or representative of Shamil in the west, repaired to Constantinople to concert measures with the Porte, while, in August, Shamil invaded the districts of Djaro and Bielokani, bordering on Kakhetia and the Upper Alazan. On the 5th of October, war between Russia and Turkey was declared. About 40,000 Turkish troops were concentrated at Ardaghan and Kars, under the command of Ali Pasha and Ahmed Pasha; another 30,000, already decimated by fever, generated in the unhealthy climate of the Black Sea littoral, were stationed at Batum under the command of Abdi Pasha. To oppose these, the Russian commander, Count Vorontsov, could not dispose of more than 20,000 men and a few thousand Georgian militiamen.

The Turks immediately started a double offensive along the Mingrelian coast, and into the Mussulman districts round Akhaltsikh. On the 28th of October, Abdi Pasha drove the Russians from the frontier-post of Shakvatil (Nikholævsk) and, after an action at Beyendir (3rd of November), occupied Redut-Kaleh. But against Akhaltsikh the Turks were less fortunate. During November, Ali Pasha was defeated successively in actions near Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki and Ateskhur, and fell back on Ardaghan with a loss of twelve field pieces. Finally, on the 19th of November, the Turks, 37,000 strong, were severely defeated by an inferior Russian force of 10,000 men, under Prince Bebutov, at Bash-Kadiklyar, a village on the road from Alexandropal to Kars. A fortnight earlier (3rd of November) the Russians had destroyed a Turkish squadron at Sinope, and secured temporary command of the Black Sea, thus cutting communication from Constantinople to Batum and Trebizond, the supply depôts of the Turkish Armies. The Russian forces in Trans-Caucasia, however, were too weak to pursue their advantage, and the intervention of the Franco-British Fleet soon invalidated their supremacy at sea.

The Circassian Expedition and the Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1854.—At the end of March, 1854, Great Britain and France joined in the war against Russia; while measures were taken to assist the Turkish Armies in Bulgaria, a combined Franco-British Fleet under Admirals Hamelin and Dundas began a blockade of the South Russian ports. The Turkish Government now considered the moment opportune to open an offensive against the Russians in the Caucasus, and proposals were made for an expedition to the Circassian coast. A Turko-Egyptian fleet under Admirals Ahmed Pasha and Hassan Pasha received on board at Constantinople a large number of Cherkess *émigrés*, including Sefir Pasha, of Anapa, and

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Behchit Pasha. The plan of action was that the Turko-Egyptian fleet should unite with an Anglo-French squadron off the Circassian coast, and, having occupied the Russian ports from Anapa to Sukhum Kaleh, land the *émigré* leaders together with a large supply of arms and ammunition. It was hoped thus to revive the fighting spirit of the western tribes, and that their later action would react favourably on the situation in Daghestan and the Trans-Caucasus.

The Turks, however, were alone in advocating the expedition. The British Government was intent on restricting or destroying Russian naval power in the Black Sea, and failed to realize the importance of the Asiatic front, and the political results of the possible expulsion of the Russians from the Caucasus. The French Government had little interest in the situation in the Caucasus; to Napoleon III. the war was merely a question of religious prestige, and of vindicating the diplomatic defeats suffered by France fifteen years before, in the suppression of Muhammad Ali of Egypt. Hence, while the allied admirals delayed the Turko-Egyptian Fleet at Kavarna throughout the month of May, the commander of the small allied squadron, dispatched to reconnoitre the Circassian coast, arrived at Varna with an unfavourable report as to the temper of the tribes, and as to the possibility of organizing them into an effective fighting force.

The preparations for the Crimean campaign were already beginning to engage the energies of the Allies, and further operations on the Circassian coast were definitely vetoed. The Turkish Fleet, acting independently, paid a hurried visit to the Circassian coast, where the *émigré* Pashas were landed as well as a small proportion of the stores originally intended for the tribes. These latter, among whom a naval demonstration in force might have raised unmeasurable enthusiasm, were bitterly disappointed, and received the Turkish *protégés* with scant welcome. Sefir at Tuapse found that the fame of his former deeds was forgotten, and that a younger generation of Naibs were jealous of him: Behchit at Sukhum became involved in difficulties with Prince Michael Shahvashidze, the chief landowner in Abkhasia, and antagonistic Mussulman and Christian parties, equally hostile to Turks, Russians and to each other, were soon formed.

The Cherkess expedition had proved abortive, but the situation of the Russians remained precarious. In April, General Read, temporary Viceroy of the Caucasus, fearing a Persian attack, had proposed the evacuation of all territory beyond the Sulak, a measure subsequently vetoed by the new Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief,

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Muraviev. And in September all danger of Persian intervention was averted by a secret convention which purchased neutrality by relieving the Shah of the obligation of paying the balance of the indemnity promised to Russia in 1828.

In May, Selim Pasha, the new Commandant of Batum, whose malaria-ridden forces had been reinforced by a Tunisian contingent, and by two battalions of Georgian and Polish deserters, advanced from Chorokh-Su against Ozurgeti, the capital of Guria and a Russian garrison town on the road to Kutais. A few weeks later, Shamil descended from Daghestan into the valley of the Alazan. Selim, however, fell into an ambush, and was defeated with a loss of fourteen guns, by a greatly inferior force under Prince Andronikov (4th of June).

A month later (3rd of July) Shamil was routed at Shildi in Kakhetia, by a local force under Prince Chavchavadze. He retired into the hills and, during the rest of the war, failed to make any attempt to cooperate further with the Turks. Meanwhile, a new Commander, Zarif Mustafa Pasha, had been reorganizing the Turkish Army at Kars, demoralized by the defeats of 1853, and by want and neglect. Fifty men a day were dying in the hospital at Kars. Nevertheless, reinforcements were continually arriving, and by the late summer the Turks could put 50,000 men in the field. A Russian force under Bebutov, 18,000 strong, advancing from Alexandropol was brought to action at Kuriuk-dar, twenty miles north-east of Kars. The Turks were defeated, but the Russians were too weak to advance. In September, the Russian occupation of Bayazid, on the main road from Erzrum to Tabriz, closed the campaign for the year. The Turks, in greatly superior numbers and in command of the sea, had failed to gain a single advantage, and their troops, both in Mingrelia and at Kars, were being decimated by disease. The Russians had succeeded in checking both Shamil and the Turks, but they were too weak to pursue any advantages.

The Kars and Ingur Campaigns, 1855.—The summer of 1855, which saw the most difficult phase of the Crimean campaign, found the Turkish Asiatic Army in a desperate condition. The difficulties of supply, ordinarily serious enough, were accentuated by the proverbial incompetence and dishonesty of the Turkish officers, who were more interested in personal intrigues than in their respective duties. Consequently, the Turkish Armies, both along the Mingrelian coast and in Kars, were in want of every necessary and suffering from malaria, cholera, and famine. The situation was made still worse by the differences of the Porte, of the Seraskier Omar Pasha

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and of the allied commanders as to war policy. The best Turkish troops had been transferred from the Balkans to the Crimea, where, in position at Eupatoria, they watched the road from Perehof to Sevastopol and threatened the Russian rear. Omar wished to transfer these troops to the Asiatic front, where they might have had a decisive influence, while the allied commanders insisted on their remaining in the Crimea. There was also, on all fronts, friction between the allied and the Turkish general officers. Many of the latter were renegade Hungarian or Polish officers, who resented the assumed superiority of the French and British. This position was particularly marked at Kars, where Ismail Pasha, the Chief-of-Staff, was a Hungarian (Kmety), while Arslan and Shakhin Pashas were Poles (Generals Bystrzonski and Brianski). On the other hand, the British High Commissioner, Major-General Fenwick Williams, a most excellent and courageous officer, was both tactless and short-tempered, and, whilst he failed to overlook certain venial peculations of officers whose pay was some months in arrears, he listened to all the malicious canards of his Armenian and Greek clerical staff.* The Turkish failure at Bash-Kadiklyar in the previous September has been attributed to the strained relations between the British and Turkish officers.

At the beginning of 1855, Zarif Mustafa, together with his two feriks, Hussian and Shukri Pashas, had been recalled, and Wassif Pasha had assumed command at Kars.

Thus with a faulty supply, and a divided command, the Turkish Army was in no state to assume the offensive against the Russians. For an offensive against Trans-Caucasia, Kars was an excellent advanced base, threatening the communications from Tiflis to Alexandropol and Erivan. But as the camp of an army, acting on the defensive, it was untenable, and its defence by the whole army was a cardinal blunder. It was situated in a barren country, incapable of supporting a large number of men during a long period, and distant 100 miles from the nearest base, Erzrum, and 300 miles from the nearest port, Trebizond.

The correct strategy for the Turks was a withdrawal of their main Army to the line of the Sughanli Dagh—covering the roads converging at Erzrum from Kars and Bayazid—and the evacuation or temporary defence by a small force of Kars. Kars forms only an outpost of the mountainous system on which the defence of Anatolia should be based, while the Sughanli Dagh is the key position to Erzrum. The above was the strategy successfully

* *See* Slade, "Turkey and the Crimean War," page 415.

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adopted by Ahmed Muktar Pasha in 1877, and disastrously neglected by him in 1878. Kars was retained, however, as the base of the Turkish Army, in opposition it is said to the plans of the Turkish Staff, and at the instance of the British Commissioner, who received support from Constantinople. 15,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, 14 batteries, and 70 siege-guns were shut up in Kars, while a further 10,000 men were scattered between Erzrum, Kopri Koi and Hassan Kaleh. In June, Muraviev moved across the Arpa Chai (Barley river) with 20,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 10 batteries. He appeared before Kars on the 16th, whilst his cavalry swept as far as Yeni-Koi, fifty miles on the road to Erzrum, and captured a depôt containing six weeks' supply for the Turkish Army. He proceeded to invest Kars with half the forces at his disposal, whilst he drove the weak Turkish detachments from the Sughanli Dagh (Onion Mountains) and advanced to Hassan-Kaleh, eighteen miles from Erzrum.

On the 17th of July, Omar at Eupatoria, having failed to persuade the allied commanders to sanction the departure of his troops to Asia Minor, went to Constantinople on his own initiative in order to discuss the situation at Kars and to formulate plans for relief. In the meantime, shortage of forage had again caused the evacuation of Kars to be discussed, but the suggestion was vetoed both by the Commissioner and by Wassif, who was further encouraged in this decision by a letter from Omar promising relief in twenty days. Omar might either have attempted relief by a landing at Trebizond and a march to Erzrum and Kars, or by a blow at the Russian communications by landing on the Mingrelian coast and a march on Kutais and Tiflis. The bad state of the road from Trebizond to Erzrum and the scarcity of supplies in Armenia, induced him to choose the bolder alternative, " to strike the serpent at the tail, so that the head will recoil."

On the 21st of September, Omar Pasha arrived off Batum and Redut Kaleh, where he began to reorganize the malaria-stricken forces of Mustafa Pasha, and to prepare for the arrival of the divisions from Rumelia and the Crimea.

The news of Omar's arrival on the Mingrelian coast and of the fall of Sebastopol (8th of September) reached Muraviev in the second week of September, and he determined by a bold move to anticipate Omar's relief and to make some attempt to re-establish Russian military prestige, by a sudden storming of Kars.

On the night of the 28th of September the Russians made a surprise attack on the Tahmas heights to the east of Kars. A

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sanguinary struggle for the possession of the heights endured seven hours, at the end of which the Russians were repulsed with an estimated loss of over 7,000. The repulse was disastrous to the whole Russian position in Asia. "There he (Muraviev) stood, with a shattered army, the fortress he was bent on taking intact before him, its defenders refreshed by victory and the *élite* of the Turkish Armies gathering in his rear."

The Russians retired to Chivili, leaving a small force at Ainali, and for a few days the siege of Kars was raised. But Wassif was too weak to pursue his victory, while the Mingrelian defensive was unduly delayed. Omar, an old Croat renegade from the Austrian Army, had received his military training in Turkey, mostly in block-house operations against the Montenegrins, and was not the man to press a swift advance, while Mustafa at Batum proved utterly incapable. Omar, who had decided to advance from Sukhum, which offered a better base than Redut Kaleh, spent six valuable weeks in ineffectual preparations, and in empty intrigues with Behchit and the princes of Abkhasia and Mingrelia whom he wished to compromise with the Russians.

Meanwhile Muraviev, with diminished forces and leaving Trans-Caucasia practically without defence, had re-established the investment of Kars, whose garrison was in the last straits of famine.

At last, in the first week of November, Omar, with about 20,000 men, including four battalions of Turkish Rifles commanded by British officers, began a leisurely advance from Sukhum. He outflanked and defeated a small Russian force near the ancient castle of Ruki on the Ingur, and, on the 21st of November, occupied Sughdidi, the seat of the Dadians of Mingrelia. The Dadian, a minor, had fled to the mountainous district of Svanetia, in charge of his mother and uncles, and the Turks found the town and villages utterly deserted by the inhabitants, in fear of Omar's Abkhasian irregulars. Omar still intrigued for a Georgian revolt, but the cautious Dadianie merely sent her favourite, a French archæologist, to watch her interests in the Turkish camp. Omar continued to advance slowly across the swampy Mingrelian plain, which is intersected by numerous streams, making progress difficult. On the 21st of November he reached the Tshkanis-Khaleh, and his out-posts entered Sinakia, the second town of Mingrelia, while to the west he established communication with Redut Kaleh.

On the 26th of November, Kars at last capitulated to Muraviev —"the garrison being on the verge of inanition" with 70 position guns, 84 field-pieces, and 24,000 stands of arms. The news reached

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Omar three days later with the first of the autumn floods. He immediately retired to Khopi, and proceeded to canton his troops at Redut Kaleh. In the following summer the Treaty of Paris restored the territorial *status quo* in Asia Minor, and tacitly confirmed the Russian annexation of the Caucasus.

From a contemporary point of view the Asiatic campaigns of 1853–55 demonstrated, on the part of the allied command, both lack of political imagination and also of strategic conception. It was due principally to the individualist policy of Napoleon III. that the Allies completely neglected the Asiatic front, and confined themselves to the temporary solution of the questions involved in Russian ambition in the Balkans and the Black Sea—Mediterranean. From the British point of view, it was a grave strategic mistake to have neglected the opportunity of expelling the Russians from the Caucasus—a consummation which might have been possible had a double offensive been made against Tiflis from Kars and Sukhum, and had a landing in the Kuban followed the allied occupation of the Sea of Azov in May, 1855.

It is interesting to speculate as to the results of a withdrawal of the Russians to the line of the Terek and the Kuban by the Treaty of Paris. Their aggressive Imperial policy in Central Asia and Persia might have been hindered if not interrupted. On the other hand, the effects in the Georgian principalities and on the future economic development of Trans-Caucasia might have been disastrous. For no stable elements existed in the Caucasus on which to build a state, and even had the Allies stipulated for the independence of the Trans-Caucasian peoples, Turkey and Persia would inevitably have established their hegemony in the western and eastern areas, and the old triangular struggle between Russia and the two Mussulman Powers must eventually have been renewed.

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TRAINING BY SAND MODELS

(With Diagrams)

ON page 30 of " Infantry Training," vol. i., are found these words :—

" The two main channels of instruction are by the eye and by the ear. . . . The brain retains more readily and firmly what it sees with the eye than what it hears with the ear."

No one is likely to dispute these assertions—indeed they are the basis of all modern " Kindergarten " methods of teaching, and the writer only makes use of them as an introduction to a little propaganda about training young officers and other ranks by sand models.

Quickly let it be said that it is not suggested for an instant that the young officer, non-commissioned officer or private is such a child as to need Kindergarten methods. What an insult ! But even so, many " grown-ups " are not above playing with mechanical toys !

Look at " Infantry Training," vol. i. page 24. Here is found the definition of individual training, and it can be easily seen that by far the most important part is the training of junior officers and other ranks to be leaders and in their most elementary duties in the field.

At home, individual training is practically always carried out in the winter. Unfortunately this is just the season when the English climate is at its worst. From its very nature this sort of training entails hanging about—" explanation, demonstration, execution, repetition." Only the instructor and one or two others are on the move, the remainder are spectators. No joke on a muddy hill-side with the wind N.E. ! Many days are too wet to go out at all, and even a drizzle is not conducive to concentration of thought.

Why not do a great deal of this training in a room in barracks where there is a fire ? There will be forms on which to sit ; notes can be made with fingers that are not frozen ; papers do not get blown about ; and instructor and instructed are all warm and comfortable.

A sand model is all that is required, and it is in the hope that this very useful form of training will be taken more generally into use that these notes are written.

A sand model is cheap and needs but little ingenuity to construct.

Get the Pioneer Sergeant to make a wooden tray. A convenient size is 5 feet long by 3½ feet wide, and with sides 3 or 4 inches deep. Ask him to paint the floor of the tray blue.

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Collect sufficient sand to cover the bottom to a depth of two inches. Sea-shore sand is best, but that from any sandpit is nearly as good. Buy from a chemist one or two "loofahs" (for the benefit of the ignorant, these are the dried insides of Egyptian gourds and one uses them to scrub oneself with in a bath). Get these dyed green. Go to a toy-shop and expend about 5*s*. in some models of houses, windmills, churches, etc. It is a help if these are of different sizes to suit different scales. Buy also about 30 "Halma" men, and, if you like, some model tanks at Gamage's at 1*s*. each. Get some cotton-wool, and pick a bunch of heather. All this should not cost more than £1, and surely battalion funds could run to that. It not, training grants should be able to help.

All that is necessary now is to paint your "Halma" men in different colours—say 12 blue to represent men in rifle sections, 12 red for men of Lewis gun sections, 4 yellow for the four section commanders, and 1 black as platoon commander. This done, you are ready to make your model.

Put the tray on a barrack-room table and pour in sand until it has covered the floor to the depth of about an inch, not more. It is just as well to ensure first that the bottom has no cracks in it, if there are, your tray becomes a magnified hour-glass and most of the sand is deposited on the floor.

Cut your green "loofah" into long narrow strips. If carefully done they make the most perfect little cut and laid hedges imaginable.

Before anything else is done, it will be necessary to decide what are the first lessons you are going to teach, because on this rather depends the scale of your model. It is convenient to imagine that the width of your tray is a multiple of 250 yards. *E.g.* if a platoon or section demonstration is contemplated, call it 250 yards; if you want to show company formations, call it 500 yards; if a battalion, call it a 1,000 yards.

Suppose, for the sake of an illustration, you have some promising private soldiers whom you wish to train as section leaders, and you decide to teach them section formations. You want then, to construct a model of a piece of ground which will illustrate the few formations adopted by infantry sections under various conditions and the reason for them.

Now a word of warning—don't try to be too elaborate. It is a temptation to construct a very pretty picture with shells bursting, green fields and plough, blue streams, yellow roads, aeroplanes and all sorts of things, but all that takes time, and when it is done it is so pretty that the artist does not like it being played with. All the

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same, what is put in should be as realistic as possible; the young private has not very much imagination, and it is just as easy to have a little model house as it is to use a stone or piece of wood to represent it.

Now make your bit of country, the features being put in on the scale of the width of the table being 250 yards. In this case 1 inch is about 6 yards.

Streams appear when you draw your finger along the bottom and expose the blue floor of the table; hills or undulations are made by adding more sand. Damp it a little and pat it all down firm. Use your strip of "loofah" for the hedges, just lay them on the sand. To keep them in place they can be pegged down with some pieces of bent wire. A road can be outlined in the same way. Woods are bits of heather stuck in the sand and twigs of yew easily resemble bigger trees. A village is built of your little model houses and, of course, can be put where you like.

As you want to teach infantry formations, you should include certain definite features on the model, *e.g.* open, exposed fields, a narrow ride in a wood, a sunken road or the bed of a stream.

Again, for the sake of illustration, let us assume that the model is now complete and has been made as shown in Fig. 1. Now we are ready.

Call up four of your budding lance-corporals and tell them that each is in command of a section of the platoon. Tell them off actually to a section. "You, Jones, are section leader of No. 5 section," "Smith is leader of No. 7 section," and so on.

If there are others, let them watch for a moment.

Give each of the section leaders 7 "Halma" men (6 coloured and 1 black; the six coloured are his men, the black one is himself).

"Now, Smith, do you know what arrowhead formation is?"

"Yes, sir."

"Well, put you men in arrowhead on the table."

Let him do it—anywhere for the moment.

Then make Jones put his men in line and Robinson in file. It does not matter where they put them as a start, it is only to make sure that they know the formations; if they are wrong, of course they can be corrected, or, better still, let one of the others correct them.

"Jones, your section is advancing across country and has reached this point."

Here let the instructor show the point (Pt. A), and tell Jones to place his men there in "arrowhead" formation.

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" As you reach the bank on top of the rise, you are shot at by shrapnel and heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from the village."

(Here it is not a bad plan to have some balls of cotton-wool on wires ready and stick them in the sand above the section—they look just like shrapnel.)

" What command do you give ? " If he does not know, ask Jones or Robinson.

He should say, " On my right and left extend, line the bank."

" There you are, that is one reason for line formation. Now put your men there."

" Smith, while Jones is held up and having a bad time along the bank, you have managed to get forward and are in arrowhead formation at the quarry (Pt. B). You want to get on through the wood ; what command do you give ? "

" Behind me in file."

" Why ? "

" So as to get cover in the sunken road."

" Good—now show how it looks."

Smith is made to put his men in file or single file up the sunken road.

" Will you have any scouts out ? "

" Yes."

" Show where they would be ? "—and so you can go on through all the formations (there are only three or four), and it will not take many minutes, but it is long odds that Smith, Jones and Robinson will not forget them.

This is only the simplest and most elementary demonstration, but is sufficient to show the sort of training that can be carried out.

The work of scouts, ground scouts to each leading section, patrols, are other section lessons which can be taught.

On this same scale, platoon formations can be shown—diamond, square, outposts, all sorts of things. In every case the pupil should be actually made to put the little men in their places.

For the Lewis guns section it is invaluable. Each number can be a different coloured " Halma " man, and the corresponding man of the section can be made to move his own model.*

It can be used, too, for showing the tactics of mountain warfare. With the help of some clay and a few broken bricks very realistic

* In the November number of the *R.U.S.I. Journal* there was an extraordinarily interesting account of some patrol operations by an Australian Battalion in 1918. The writer of the article suggested that it might form the basis of a lecture with the aid of a large-scale map, but the whole operation could be demonstrated still better if set out on a sand model.

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"nullahs" and "khuds" can be quickly made. Heights can be picketted, sangars built, retirements carried out, all with the little "Halma" men.

There is no end to the tactical situations which can be created. It is indeed a fascinating toy to play with on a wet day in winter, and a godsend to those who are not gifted lecturers.

Two illustrations of simple exercises are given. Dozens more could be thought of, and no doubt the solutions could be criticized, but they may be a help to any one using a sand model for the first time.

A Few Dont's

1. Don't make the model too elaborate.
2. Don't try to teach too many lessons at once.
3. Don't make the scale too small, it becomes unreal.
4. Don't keep the same model for more than a few days, the men get to know it too well. A new model can be made in half an hour.
5. Don't despise toys, an overturned lorry or a dead horse amuses the men and helps them to remember.
6. Don't *necessarily* try to make an actual piece of country, it is a great labour and often you cannot get the features you want to illustrate your lessons.
7. Don't try to be too accurate in scale, that also takes time, and it is quite good enough if the models and features are approximately correct.

Illustration No. 1.—Fire and Movement. (Ref. Fig. 1)

A platoon has been advancing in square formation.

For the moment we are only concerned with the two leading sections, Nos. 5 and 7, both of which are rifle sections.

The instructor places the sections in position in arrowhead formation—No. 5 at A and No. 7 at C. He then says to the section leader of No. 5 section:

"As you get to the top of the rise you are received with heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the village (place some cotton-wool shrapnel bursts over the section); you line the bank in front of you, but cannot get on. Two of your men are casualties (here knock down two of the 'Halma' men). What are you going to do?"

Answer adjudged correct: "Watch for any opportunity to advance, and in the meantime open fire on the village and do my best to occupy the enemy's attention."

Question to section leader of No. 7:

"You see what is happening, you have not yet been fired at, as you are still below the crest. What are *you* going to do?

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Answer adjudged incorrect: "Go up to the top and help No. 5 section!"

Answer adjudged correct: "Take advantage of the enemy being occupied with No. 5 section to push on under cover and try to attack him from the flank."

"Show how." No. 7 section leader than shows with his men exactly the route and formation he will adopt to get forward.

"You have got to here in the wood (Pt. D); you line the edge of the wood and open fire on the enemy whom you see in the village. They at once switch their fire from off No. 5 section on to you" (move the cotton-wool shrapnel from No. 5 to No. 7 section).

"Now, No. 5 section, you are not being fired at; what are you going to do? Show with the little men."

Answer: "At once take advantage of the lull to push forward."

Watch both sections to see that they adopt suitable formations to the ground, put out ground scouts, etc.

ILLUSTRATION No. 2.—PATROLLING. (Ref. Fig. 2)

(Notice that the width of the table is now representing 500 yards instead of 250.)

The company is holding this ridge (A). No. 5 section now consists of the section leader and four men. The platoon commander calls you (the section leader of No. 5) and says:

"I want you to take your section out as a patrol and find out for me definitely whether those houses you see at the cross-roads are, or are not, held by the enemy. You will start in half an hour. No troops of ours are farther forward than this point. Do not be away more than one hour. Report to me here when you come back."

"Now what are you going to do about it?"


The man has first to think out his plan of action, route he will take out and back, formation he will adopt, and the points to which he thinks he will make bounds. Give him a few minutes to think this out, then let him tell you the instructions he will give to his men before starting. (I.T., page 168.)

Suppose that his plan is to work down the hedges to the wood "B," from there to get round at the back of the houses, and after going into them to come back under cover of the hedges on the left of the road. Let him show with the men. Make him put the men out, say, along the hedge "C." Two men in front, one man and himself covering them and one man behind to get away if anything happens. He should show with the "Halma" men exactly how each man moves.

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When he gets to the wood, how will he go through it? altogether,

Fig 1.




or two men to go forward with two covering them, and one back to get away with the news. How will he examine the houses? Where will this latter man stop while the houses are being examined? (Point E would not be a bad place.) Make the man actually place

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the men in their positions. Will he come back the same way? What about that copse just by the bridge? Will he examine that; if so, how? and so on.

Fig. 2.



The exercise can be varied by telling him that fire is opened on him from the wood or from the houses, or anywhere, and asking him what he will do, but DON'T make it too difficult.

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SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ENCOURAGING POLO IN THE ARMY

By Brevet Major R. L. Sherbrooke, D.S.O., The Sherwood Foresters

There are certain facts in connection with this subject which it would be as well to enumerate before attempting to lay my proposals before the reader.

1. Polo is about as good a training for a young officer as it is possible to have, and has been officially adopted in the French and American Armies. It teaches him to ride, to play unselfishly for his team, to disregard danger, to think quickly, to anticipate intelligently and to ride hard in order to seize a fleeting chance; further, it fosters *esprit de corps*, encourages horse-mastership and occupies time which might be much less profitably employed, besides being an inducement to the officer to keep himself fit.

2. Polo could be played in England from May to October, and goes on during nine or ten months in the year in practically every foreign station.

3. Out of the season a weight-carrying pony can be hunted in a mild sort of way, and makes a good parade horse at any time.

4. In England the price of a sound, untrained, five-year-old pony likely to play polo well enough for *station games* is from £40 to £50, and, if bought in big lots, the average price should not exceed £38 to £40. With a couple of years' schooling and steady play the best of these ponies should certainly be worth double what was paid for them and the less valuable would always be worth their purchase price.

5. The type of remount which will make a polo pony is suitable for limber-draught, pack and saddle work on mobilization or manœuvres.

6. A reserve of this description would obviate the necessity in time of war of buying in a hurry high-priced and frequently unsuitable horses.

7. Polo as at present organized in England and in some foreign

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stations is too expensive for the average subaltern in a dismounted corps.

8. No scheme that is likely to cause any additional expense to the public is, at present, worth considering.

It will, therefore, be necessary to evolve a solution, the practical application of which will cost the country nothing, and which will enable a subaltern living on his pay in a dismounted unit which has no polo fund to obtain a reasonably suitable untrained pony, keep it and eventually play it three times a week in the garrison polo club station games.

To obtain this result three things are necessary: benevolent and practical cooperation on the part of the War Office; active combina- on the part of the officers of the various units comprising the garrison; and an enthusiastic hardworking club secretary with a gift for organization.

In an inexpensive unit an economical unmarried subaltern can pay the whole of his year's expenses, dress and subscriptions, etc., and still have £70 or £80 per annum left over from his pay to spend on his amusements.

I am given to understand that the Government could reduce slightly the present charge for forage per horse per diem without losing over the deal, and I presume that Government contracts are like other contracts and that the more forage is contracted for, the cheaper is the rate, so that, if a large number of officers contracted with the Government to feed their horses, it might be possible for the latter to supply the forage at less than 1*s.* 9*d.* a day.

Let us assume that a year's forage for one pony will cost £36, that a half-share of a soldier groom's wages and cleaning kit will be another £6, and that saddlery upkeep and polo club subscription will be 30*s.* each: total £45 per annum.

To those who have never had to study economy or keep horses on the cheap these last three assumptions may appear optimistic, but they *are* just within the bounds of practical politics, as some of my readers will know from personal experience.

Suggestions

(*a*) That the Government should buy at once and lease out to officers on demand potential polo ponies at a charge of not more than £4 per annum per pony.

(*b*) That the Government should have the right temporarily to recall and use, both for manœuvres and for active service, all ponies hired out under this scheme.

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(*c*) That an officer should be allowed to buy a pony outright after one year's hire, and that a week's trial should be allowed when an officer visits the remounts to select a pony.

(*d*) The original cost of the pony (if not bought outright) would be recovered by the Government in nine or ten years, after which the charge for hire should be reduced to £1 per annum.

(*e*) That the Government should provide free stabling wherever Government horse lines exist and standings are available, and free vetting, and should give authority for the employment of one soldier-groom per every two ponies bought or hired by officers on the active list under this scheme.

(*f*) That the Government should insure *en bloc* against accident causing death or casting the whole of the ponies hired out under this scheme, the officer being in turn charged by the Government with his personal share of the inclusive premium. The great advantage of this would be that instead of having to pay about £2 10*s*. per pony, as at present, the officer would certainly not be asked for more than 10*s*. per pony per annum; the greater the number of ponies insured the smaller the premium per pony.

(*g*) That to promote interest in the scheme the following tournaments should be organized :—

A challenge cup and championship open to the whole Army.

A challenge cup and championship open to dismounted corps only.

A challenge cup and championship open to all units in the Command.

The conditions to be the same in each championship, and as follows :—

(1) teams to play on a special army handicap list (as in America);
(2) teams to be composed of officers actually serving in the same unit;
(3) number of ponies per team to be limited to ten;
(4) ponies hired or bought outright under this scheme only to be played;
(5) each match to be of four chukkers;
(6) the draw in each case to be arranged so as to allow neighbouring units to play off in the first rounds.

As the number of ponies on hire (or purchased) under the scheme increased it would be possible to modify conditions (3) and (5) to approximate more nearly to the Hurlingham match rules.

The foregoing is the general outline of my scheme, which envisages an inclusive cost of £49 10*s*. per annum per pony; add 20½ per cent.

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for shoeing and unforeseen expenses, and you get a total of £60, which is within the reach of almost any one, and the average infantry subaltern with £100 a year of his own could keep two ponies and have something left out of his pay as well.

Now for some details, the first and most important of which is that the Government should supply as many ponies as are asked for, and of a reasonably good stamp. Something between 14.2 and 15.2, sound and not too cobby, and costing not more than £40, is what is wanted, and, if the Government cannot find it at the price in England, it can do so in France at an average of 2,000 francs per pony, Anglo-Arabs and good ones, bred in the country between Toulouse and Biarritz.

The French have gone in for breeding this type of pony on a big scale, and are using them for their light cavalry with most successful results; at the present moment hundreds of them are being trained for polo, to which game they seem to take naturally. The president of the standing remount purchase committee of the French Army tells me that buying a lot of a hundred or more one would get at an average of 2,000 francs per animal a very good five or six-year-old type of sound Anglo-Arab pony averaging fifteen hands and up to weight. At the Cavalry School at Saumur we play almost entirely on these ponies, and I have always found that with a few months' schooling they become very handy and, being naturally fast, make really good polo ponies. With the exchange at seventy the Government has a wonderful opportunity of buying for £28 apiece ponies that in England would certainly cost £50 or more, and which after a year's steady schooling can scarcely fail to be worth less than £100 each. The sea journey from Bordeaux should not add more than a sovereign or two to the price of the pony.

Next in importance comes the question of distribution and allotment, and hard-and-fast regulations would, of course, be necessary; in addition, I would suggest that every officer should be allowed to choose his own pony, and that dismounted corps should, if possible, have first pick, because my scheme is intended primarily to help those units that have few Government chargers or cobs on their strength. Then as regards kit it is obvious that those who are hard up must avoid Savile Row and Jermyn Street, and should buy a second-hand saddle and support each other in wearing khaki drill breeches for ordinary practice games. Sticks from Aldershot at 11*s.* 6*d.* a time are also a luxury, and although Peel's boots are very nice they do not make you play any better; field boots do well enough and are infinitely less bother after playing on a hot afternoon.

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An original outlay of £20 should suffice for the first year, with perhaps another £5 or £10 in the second season.

Finally, I should like to touch on the position of the secretary of the Garrison Polo Club, and to offer a few suggestions in the hope that they may be of use.

The Garrison Club will probably comprise good players and beginners, rich men and poor, and good-class private ponies as well as partially-made Government cobs, and it will be the secretary's business to see that the good players get some good chukkers every polo day, and that in the beginners' games there is at least one experienced player on each side to skipper the team and coach the young players.

If he has to hire a field to make into a polo ground, the secretary should remember that seven or eight acres is amply large enough, and instead of talking about polo let it be known that he wants the field for "military sports of all sorts." He should not select the best pasture land in the neighbourhood, and, if possible, should select a field easily accessible to traps and people on foot and one that is well drained; he should also try to get a long lease. If the garrison happens to be short of hockey and football grounds, it is worth while asking the Central Army Sports Board to help with the rent, promising in return to allow both games to be played from October to May; incidentally, it can serve as a garrison parade ground and athletic stadium the whole year without interfering with the polo. There are quite a few garrisons where the town and the local hunting people might become interested in a garrison polo club, which would, of course, mean more players and more subscriptions. Finally, I would advise getting both sticks and balls in big lots direct from India, as they will cost about half what they do at home.

As a garrison institution the club will have the right to a share of the existing rolling and mowing plant, but I should suggest buying a good new golf fair-way mower, and that the secretary should make a point of asking for the same pair of draught horses and driver for the mower every day, or he will have it continually breaking down. As ground staff I should try to get two permanent men *who would like the job*, but the secretary must remember that during the season he will have to put in several hours' personal supervision per diem, and that economy with efficiency should be his watchword. I should strongly recommend any new club to put up a wooden horse in a cage, and, if the services of the garrison gym. staff, the various pioneers' shops and the D.O.R.E. are enlisted, the whole thing

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should not cost more than £10 or £15. Ground-boards, pavilions and sheltered pony lines are very nice, but are not necessary at first, because a few flags, a couple of bell-tents, plus a mess-cart and some picket-lines, will suffice.

Last, but not least, it must not be forgotten that the beginner with his raw pony will need both encouragement and advice, and that the slowest and most boring of chukkers is probably perfect bliss to him.

In England to-day polo is the most expensive amusement that one can have, for which reason the number of players is comparatively small; but if the game is approached from an economical and common-sense standpoint and with the cooperation of the War Office, there is no reason why it should not be brought within the reach of, literally, thousands of officers. To beat America and the Argentine we need a bigger field of selection, both of men and ponies and younger players, or enough money to buy the best ponies in the world, and as 7,500 dollars was paid in September, 1922, for one of the Argentine ponies in America it seems to me that it will be easier to realize the first of the two alternatives.

In the American Army polo is taught at Westpoint, and every officer is encouraged to play throughout his service and free of all expense, with the result that in 1922 the American Junior Open Cup (limited to teams with a total handicap of twenty goals) was won by an Army Team playing on Government ponies, and another Army team reached the semi-final of the Open Cup.

In France the officers of the cavalry have been ordered to play polo, and the game is making tremendous headway and becoming very popular. At Saumur there are some sixty or seventy more or less made ponies, Anglo-Arabs, with an average height of 15.1 hands, and by this time next year there will be as many again. The game as played in France is very fast, and, when they have learned a little more about combination and team work, the French Army will be able to put up half a dozen teams that will give our best regiments a first-class game, and that at no distant date.

In both the American and French Armies officers are encouraged to select horses from the ranks that look as if they might make polo ponies, and no charge whatsoever is made for hire or insurance.

With a view to encouraging Army Polo various committees have from time to time considered various schemes, but none of these propositions has been put forward with the specific purpose of enabling dismounted officers to play, and in this, as well as in two other respects, my suggestion touches new ground. I refer to the idea of buying Anglo-Arabs in France, and to the fact that under

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my scheme the country is not asked to pay a penny that will not be recoverable. There are, however, two sides to every question, and people who are interested in horse-breeding at home may have something to say about importing good cheap horses at prices that may under-cut the home market and discourage breeding.

Others again may ask who is going to be bothered with teaching a lot of young officers how to play polo, and, what is more important, who is going to tell them how to make their ponies and how to avoid doing the said ponies more harm than good? Finally, there is the pessimist who wonders whether there really is any demand for polo ponies in dismounted corps.

With regard to the first criticism my reply is that my object is to encourage polo in the Army, and, incidentally, to improve the general standard of play as well as to provide a greater number of trained ponies; and so long as our breeders continue to ask £70 or £80 for unmade *good-class ponies* they should not complain if potential purchasers go elsewhere to buy. In a word, it is the old business of Free Trade *versus* Protection.

The two last queries are more difficult to answer, but only in the case of regiments in which officers are not encouraged to ride, or which are unfortunate in not having some sporting senior officer who has the requisite knowledge and the time to help his brother officers with example and advice. At Saumur I have seen over seventy ponies trained, and in most cases well trained, by men who knew very little about polo, but who were good riders and who were willing to learn from others and from books on polo, and who in less than a year were able to play their ponies successfully in ordinary games. If this can be done in France, I presume it can be done in England, and there are hundreds of infantry officers who are perfectly capable of making a polo pony with a little help from books or experienced players. Although I have spoken almost entirely of subalterns, it must not be forgotten that my scheme would benefit equally many captains and majors who, while unable perhaps to buy a likely pony or two, are quite able to pay for their keep at 1*s*. 9*s*. per day per animal. That infantry officers should be officially encouraged to play polo is a new idea, and, as such will, I suppose, be regarded with suspicion; but at least, could it not be given a trial?

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THE HUMOUR OF THE SOLDIER

By Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Irvine, C.I.E.

The main charm of the humour of the soldier lies in its spontaneity. There is nothing laboured about it: there are no carefully-thought-out quips: and when the soldier-man—be he G.O.C. or Private Thomas Atkins—exercises his wit, his jests, though they often convey a very shrewd appreciation of men and things, are rarely such as will leave any sting.

Accustomed more than most men are to the ups and downs of life, the soldier possesses more than most of his fellow-creatures the ability to see matters in a quaint light. *Le mot juste* comes readily to his tongue. His is the gift of expressing what strikes him as amusing in a few words, a concise sentence, which at once appeals to his hearers as the most apt and fitting remark that could have been made.

Undoubtedly, this great gift of humour has done much to sustain the soldier's unvarying cheerfulness under the most adverse circumstances. Every company in every regiment possesses one or more licensed jesters; and many an officer could tell how often a sudden inspiration on the part of the company Mark Twain or Mark Tapley had helped him and the company through an unpleasant situation. In this article the writer has endeavoured to "present" specimens of soldier humour collected from different portions of the globe during more than thirty years of service; and to avoid repeating, as far as may be possible, well-known "chestnuts."

The Atkins who several years ago, standing in a crowd to watch some volunteers march past, delivered himself of the sententious remark: "Thank Gawd for the Navy!" was a wit: and my collection includes two more examples dating from the time when Lord Haldane was Secretary of State for War. It was *consule* Haldane that the idea originated of granting twopence a day extra pay to men who succeeded in passing a shooting test; and on one occasion a Tommy, who had hitherto failed to pass, had got close enough to the required score to need only an "outer" in order

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to attain to the coveted rank. He fired his last shot, and—the hateful shriek was heard of a *ricochet* speeding on its way! "There goes my little tuppence," he remarked more in sorrow than in anger as he rose from the ground, "'oppin', 'oppin', 'oppin' all the way to 'ell!" The corollary to this anecdote is the story of the first-class shot who, having rapidly put on a succession of "bulls," arose, wiped his knees, blew the smoke out of his rifle, and observed complacently: "Mister 'Aldane—loses!"

During the South African War the mounted infantry at first came in for a certain amount of good-natured chaff; and probably the most sarcastic remark made about one of their number was the answer to a question concerning one "Nobby Clark's" powers as an equestrian. "Can 'e ride?" was the answer; "why, 'e couldn't ride in a railway carriage with the door shut!"—"Put old Nobby on a 'orse," continued his detractor, "and 'e'd 'ave no more chance than a flea in 'Yde Park!"

From the same period dates the story of the smart young staff officer, who rode up to a party of dusty warriors weary with "foot-slogging" many miles over the Veldt with the query: "Are you the West Riding?" "No, me lord," came a cheery voice from the rear, "we ain't! We're the blinkin' Buffs—walkin'!"

India, naturally, has been for many years a fruitful hunting-ground for soldier stories: and it was an officer of very exalted rank who provided the following specimen. To his lot it fell to peruse the scholarly report of a member of the Indian Civil Service, holding, for special reasons, temporary military rank. It was a report written in the best style of the Civil Secretariat, and was somewhat profusely sprinkled with Latin quotations. However, one comment only was indited upon its margin: "I know some Latin, too. *Nil sanguineum bonum.*"

The remark of a Tommy at the taking of the Malakand Pass during the Chitral campaign of 1895 is worthy of record. "You go 'ome," he observed, as he poked his bayonet into a truculent tribesman flourishing a *jezail*. "You go 'ome—yer face worries me!" From the Frontier, too, came the news item sent to a newspaper at a time when the well-known *Mullah* Syed Akbar was making a particular nuisance of himself. It ran: "The Revd. S. A. K. Bar's mule bolted with him into the hills at the sound of the firing: since which nothing has been heard of the reverend gentleman."

One of the strangest requests ever made to me was that of a braw Scots piper at a St. Andrew's Dinner in Lahore, at which I had the honour of being the chairman. On such occasions it is

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usual to refresh the musicians with occasional tots of usquebaugh; and the piper in question explained that, as his brother performer was by persuasion a "Pussyfoot," he should only be regaled during the evening with "some temperance drink, such as port."

To revert for a moment to personages in high places, there is a good story concerning a certain General when a Moplah regiment had the honour of being inspected by His Majesty the King-Emperor during his Indian tour. The day was hot, and the distinguished General's temper was not at its brightest, so, much to His Majesty's amusement, the following dialogue took place:—

"Aren't they rather like Soudanese?"

"No, begorra, a Soudanese would eat a regiment of them!"

"Don't they ever get sunstroke with those small caps?"

"No, begorra, I wish they would!"

Another story of a somewhat short-tempered officer is that of the Colonel to whom a youthful subaltern, acting as A.D.C. to his father, the General, communicated an order: "Please, sir, father says will you take your regiment over there?" The Colonel turned towards him an empurpled visage, and barked out: "Oh, does he? And what does mother say?"

As illustrative of Atkins's readiness of reply may be related a scrap of conversation between two men stretched on the ground at the end of a field-day. It was a Monday; and presumably in the mind of the first speaker there still lingered fragments of the scriptural language he had heard in church the previous day, for he suddenly observed: "And the Lord said unto Moses 'Arf right turn!'" Without a moment's hesitation his pal lying next him added: "And Moses, not knowin' 'is drill, turned 'arf left!"

The Coronation Durbar at Delhi furnished one gem for my collection. His Majesty being present in person, the Viceroy, of course, occupied a lowlier position than was usual in ceremonial functions. "Ar," murmured a Tommy, as the procession passed slowly through the lines of troops standing at the present, "Ar, we used ter know them 'Ardinges—*onst!*"

Atkins, being the best-hearted fellow in the world, is always anxious to hearten any one in affliction. Outside the Pasteur Institute at Kasauli in the north of India may be seen at midday a motley crowd of persons waiting to be inoculated against rabies from the bites of dogs, jackals and the like. On one occasion the new arrivals included an officer who seemed anything but comfortable as to the effect the inoculations might have on him; and to him spake a Tommy with words of cheer. "Don't you worry, sir!" he said. "This

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inoculation ain't anythink! Why, *a friend o' mine bit me;* and I said it was a dog; and I've been 'avin' a 'oliday 'ere for a week!"

The scene of the next little yarn was an Indian up-country railway-station where, amid the jostling crowd of Indians, an English official saw to his regret upon the platform a corporal and a private of a certain regiment somewhat the worse for liquor and inclined to be noisy. Close by on a bench, taking no notice whatever, sat two more men of the same regiment looking as quiet and respectable as it was possible for men to be.

"Can't you get hold of those noisy comrades of yours, and keep them quiet?" asked the official; and the reply was: "Very sorry, sir, but we can't do nothing." "But it will bring discredit on the regiment," he persisted; "why can't you do anything?" Then came the amazing answer: "Beg pardon, sir, but yer see, it's like this. *We're two loo-natics, and them's the escort.*"

India suffers a good deal from the amateur actor; but Tommy at a "Gaff" is usually very kind to him or her (especially her) except when the performance is so distressingly bad as to make him regret his eight annas wasted on a seat. The present writer remembers a musical show at which a lady, very much in the sere and yellow, with a voice like a cracked tin kettle, burst forth into Gilbert and Sullivan's

"At last, I am a bride. . . "

and a sympathetic voice from the gallery remarked: "*At last*, old gal!" At another "Gaff," when a dismal play was dragging to its very bitter end, the feelings of an entire audience were expressed by an individual who arose, with a clatter of ammunition boots, at the back of the auditorium, and ejaculated with much *empressement*, "Well, good night all!"

When utterly bored by such well-meant dramatic efforts, Tommy sometimes relieves his feelings by pulling the legs of his mates; as in the case of the spectator who suddenly called out, "Well, I'm off 'ome. Who'll 'ave a glars with me?" Great enthusiasm on the part of the audience!—which changed into something else, as the voice of the retreating philanthropist floated back: "Glars o' milk!"

My Indian collection includes one more specimen not too well known, being the reply of No. 72065, Private Alfred Jones, questioned in orderly-room as to whether Private William Smith had struck Private Gilbert Robinson upon the nose? With a hazy recollection of the methods of the M.P. answering troublesome questions he gave his bit of evidence: "The answer is in the infirmary."

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Gallipoli yields one example. Hearing a comrade boast of the extremely quick passage he had made, the listener quietly remarked: "Ar! the Mediterranean runs down'ill—so I've 'eard."

Most of the Near East stories, collected during the war, are probably too well known to bear repetition; but we may note the injunction of Mr. Atkins to a gang of reluctant prisoners whom he was escorting: "You believes in the *Sheikh* of Mohamerah. Well, I believes in the *shake* of *lakri*—so, come along!" And there is the comment of the disgusted gentleman who observed: "Well, if this 'ere's the Garden of Eden, no wonder the Twelve Apostles got themselves flung out of it!"

Taking a passing glance at Egypt on the way to France, we have the story of the subaltern at a well-known hotel. Noticing a telephone-receiver off its hook, he picked it up out of idle curiosity, and was delighted to recognize the voice of a great "Brass Hat" at the other end of Cairo demanding angrily instant information as to the whereabouts of one Captain Brown. Very politely, the subaltern spoke into the telephone: "If you will wait for a moment, sir, I will inquire": and, taking a seat, pursued for a space his studies of the French language through the medium of *La Vie*. When he took up the receiver again, a voice as of one in torment was raging: "Hullo! where is Captain Brown? *Where the devil is he?* Here have I been calling for the last half hour. . . ." With extreme politeness spoke the subaltern: "Captain Brown at present, sir, is out in the garden shampooing the goat. Good morning!"—and rang off.

Coming to France—the B.E.F. was, of course, prolific in the production of examples of Tommy's peculiar humour. One story concerns a Divisional General who was a particularly early bird in the matter of his inspections. His predecessor had been accustomed to take a look at the remounts occasionally after breakfast; and the arrival of the "new broom" at 6 Ack Emma was followed by considerable "strafing" because things were not ready for him. His departure was welcomed by all ranks; and a burly trooper summed up his impressions in the following words of scorn: "'Im a Divisional General! Why, lumme, 'e oughtn't to command not even a regiment, nor nothink! All 'e's fit for is to be a blinkin' mushroom-picker!"

Tommy and Jock held no very high opinion of the wines of sunny France; and it is related of a stalwart Highlander that after a draught of *vin ordinaire* he returned the bottle to its owner, a friendly *poilu*, with the remark: "Weel, thank ye for the drap—but it's for

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a' the wurrld like washin' yer innards wi' salad-dressin ! " A very similar opinion was held by a mossy old warrior in a Labour Battalion who was called on to explain his reasons for helping himself and his friends from a barrel of white wine, the property of our gallant French Allies.

" Beg your pardon, sir," ran his speech for the defence, " but yer see, it was a very 'ot day ; and *at first* we quite thought it was water."

Going round the trenches with a General given to asking questions was a good method of adding to one's store of anecdotes.

" What would you do," asked a General of a sentry, " if you saw thirty Germans coming over that rise ? "

" Wot should I do ? " was the reply, " why, 'oller ! "

Sometimes one met in the trenches a man who, before joining up, had trod the boards of small provincial theatres ; and it was such an one who, after a highly theatrical description of the ground to his front, concluded (giving a dramatic sweep of the arm over the trench in which he and his fellow troglodytes were dwelling in the mire) with these words : " And these, sir, I am led to believe, are the British lines ! "

On another occasion a General came upon a sentry who had obviously just scuttled back to his post. The sentry was very muddy and sodden with rain, and he had a drip on the end of his nose. The following dialogue took place :—

General : " Did you leave your post just now ? "

Sentry : " Yus, sir—only for a minute."

General : " Oh. Was it properly guarded during your absence ? "

Sentry : " Yus, sir "—(pointing to another object sitting in the mud of the fire-step, also with a drip on the end of his nose)—" by that gentleman there."

The digging of trenches is not a very enlivening pursuit ; but some people seemed able to extract amusement from it. For instance, the burly Atkins who, in the middle of his own delving, exhorted his companions to take note of the exertions of little Jimmy, his own great chum, a bantam of a man with a stout heart. " Look at little Jimmy ! " he cried. " Ain't he a fine figure of a man ? Why, you can see the muscles a-swellin' on 'im like the knee-caps on a sparrer ! "

Wounds, cold, hunger and want of sleep were powerless to depress such men. When the —th Division was moving to fresh quarters, the Graves Registration officer was detailed, as knowing the road, to

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lead the way to the next camp. That worthy, however, proved an indifferent guide in the wet darkness of an April night; and the Division wandered about in the mud for some hours. At a time when it appeared probable that the road was irretrievably lost for the night, and when prospects of food and rest seemed remote, a voice was heard plaintively inquiring in the gloom: "Who's leadin' this Division?"—and the men rocked with laughter when another voice answered in mock solemn tones: "'Im wot buries the dead."

My next three stories are probably, as the ice-cream merchants would say, *ben trovato*. One concerns the Atkins who was discovered shouting at the top of his voice whilst he danced about with a bayonet in front of a particularly corpulent Hun.

"I was callin' old Bill, sir," the kind-hearted fellow explained. "Old Bill, *'e ain't stuck one yet.*"

A grim humour pervades the story about the German spy, sentenced to be shot, who had to walk some distance to the place where the sentence was to be carried out. It was a cold rainy morning; and the German grumbled considerably at having to walk so far. His escort bore with him for some time; but, at last, wearied by the prisoner's interminable (and, as it seemed, unreasonable) complaints about the weather, one of them burst out with: "'Ere, wot 'ave *you* to grouse about? *We've* got to walk back!"

The third story is that of the seven Tommies who, after a raid, returned with only six prisoners. The absence of the seventh prisoner was accounted for thus: "On the way back, sir, we got talkin'; and 'e told me 'ow 'e'd got an old mother, and I said as 'ow I'd got an old mother, too. Then 'e told me about 'is little boy of five; and I said as 'ow *I'd* got a little boy of five. Then 'e started tellin' me about 'is little farm, and—well, sir, *'e made me feel so miserable that I shot 'im!*"

Censoring of letters naturally provided a few gems: "I am sending you ten shillings. But not this month." "Please find enclosed a pound note. I can't." And, of course, there was the little joke of certain subalterns in the early stages of the war, who took to sending to their tailors Service postcards with all the lettering scratched out except the words: "I have not heard from you lately."

In a letter written from a particularly pestilential bog of a camp an incurable optimist wrote: "There is always some excitement here—even if it's only going over your shirt"; whilst another informed his sweetheart that "there were trucks for 'Ommes' and trucks for 'Chevoos,' which means men and horses in French.

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I went in one of the 'Ommes' trucks; but we was packed so close we hadn't even room to change our minds."

No one, unfortunately, has preserved for us the comments of the warrior who did a lengthy march in a pair of new socks sent him by an anonymous benefactor. When he had at last got them off and examined the appalling blister which had developed, he discovered that his agony had been caused by a small hard knob at the extremity of one of the toes. It proved to be a wad of paper on which loving fingers had printed: "God bless the wearer of these socks!"

Tommy's powers of description are sometimes picturesque. Asked how he felt during his first experience of a barrage, with the ground quivering under him, his answer was: "It's like bein' on a bit of 'ot fat! Enough ter make yer blood stand on end!"

An amusing telephone story was one told the present writer by an officer who bore the name of COFFIN. For some time he had worked away at the instrument: "Hullo! hullo!—What?—It's Coffin speaking.—What?—I say, I'm Coffin—I'm COFFIN!!" At last from the bowels of the earth there issued a voice: "Ho! *coughin'*, are yer? Well, I'm larfin'!"

It is related that on one occasion in France the Chief inquired from an astonished soldier whether he was aware that he was the left-hand man of the extreme left of the British Line? This interesting piece of information left the man singularly unimpressed; and later on a sergeant took upon himself to explain: "You 'eard what 'Aig said? Well, it means that if 'e gave the order 'Right Wheel,' you'd go on runnin' for the rest of yer blinkin' life!"

Atkins carried his humour with him into the hospitals. In one of them the ward humorist used to go through the following performance, which, though it never varied, never failed to bring down the house. Seated upon his bed, with a penny stuck in his eye by way of an eye-glass, he would personate a pompous visitor to the hospital. "And, where did the *pore* bullet 'it you, me man?" he would inquire: and then came the reply in the husky whisper of a sufferer, "Well, sir, yer see, it was like this. The bullet 'it me in the 'ead; but the bandage slipped, and now it's round me ankle."

When Lord and Lady X. paid a visit, they took particular interest in a patient who, along with their son, had been wounded at Ypres. Lord X., in conversation, always alluded to the place as "Wipers," and his lady invariably corrected his pronunciation: "Wipers"—"*Ypres!*" "Wipers"—"*Ypres!!*" After the visit the patient told his nurse of his interesting talk with Lord X. "And what

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did Lady X. say?" she asked. "Oh, she didn't say nothing," was the reply. "She 'ad 'iccups."

As a conclusion to this article, the writer would ask leave to mention an example of soldier humour which will always remain fresh in his memory. In November, 1916, it was his good fortune to stand with some twelve hundred others upon a "butterfly" boat bound for Havre; and, as the vessel left Southampton, his farewell from England, uttered by a stentorian voice bawling from the quay-side as to adventurers setting forth for far Cathay, was: "Bring us back a PARROT!"

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NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

Western Front

For eight years the Germans have hidden their defeat by General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien at Le Cateau by including the fight in the "Battle of St. Quentin," 25th–30th of August, during which period they certainly gained some ground. Now, however, that the *Reichsarchiv*, the substitute for the Historical Sections of the Great General Staff, has issued a monograph entitled *Die Schlacht bei St. Quentin*, 1914, *Part I. (Oldenburg: Stalling*, 800 *marks*), it has to begin with an explanation that Le Cateau is not included. The battle of the 26th of August, the opening paragraph says—

"became firmly connected in everybody's mind with the name of St. Quentin . . . in consequence of the telegram sent by the Deputy Chief of the Staff on the 28th of August, 'The British Army has been completely beaten north of St. Quentin'":

a message containing actual errors rather than mere vagueness as to name.

"The present volume," the preface continues, "deals solely with the battle of St. Quentin proper, on the 29th and 30th of August, the victory of the German Second Army under Colonel-General von Bülow over the French Army . . . a battle which developed as the immediate consequence of the day of Le Cateau, so unlucky for the British."

The book, however, turns out not to be a complete account of what we know as the battle of Guise, in which the German left (east) wing, the Guard Corps and X Corps, was driven back over the Oise, but only of the operations on the western wing. Here, though Lanrezac intended, by Joffre's orders, to take the offensive, and five of his divisions actually crossed the Oise to advance towards St. Quentin, he abandoned the plan early on the 29th, in consequence of the presence of strong German forces opposite his right. The Historique of the French I Corps—reviewed last quarter *—gives his order to break off the operations—

"In view of the strength of the German forces debouching east of Guise, no further attention will be given to the attack against St. Quentin.

* *See* the *Army Quarterly*, Vol. V. No. 2, p. 368.

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. . . The XVII Corps and Valabrègue's group of Reserve divisions [which were across the Oise and separated by that river from the rest of the Fifth Army] will mask St. Quentin, whilst the mass of the Army, the III, X, and I Corps, will attack vigorously northwards."

It pleases the German *Reichsarchiv*, however, to describe the French action as a desperate attempt to break through to St. Quentin, and it claims an entirely fictitious victory because the French did not succeed in what they never attempted to do. It would seem from the admissions in the German account, which does not spare von Bülow, that had the French persevered, a considerable success might have been achieved on the left as well as on the right wing.

On the evening of the 27th of August, Bülow—

" was confronted by a most difficult situation. Touch with the Army [Third] on his left was lost. In front the extensive woodlands prevented him obtaining accurate information as to the whereabouts of the French Fifth Army, his opponent at Charleroi. It was clear that it must be south of the Oise in the section Hirson—Guise. How close it was to the river could not be ascertained."

For the 28th, therefore, Bülow decided to let his right, the VII and X Reserve Corps, make only a seven- or eight-mile march to get abreast of his left, the X and Guard Corps, which were to halt, and to try to get in touch with the Third Army. Richthofen's Cavalry Corps, then in rear of his right, was to push on through St. Quentin and to endeavour to cut off the British, whom Bülow supposed were in retreat south-westwards. The author admits that Bülow was too cautious, yet in peace time—

" he had been one of the strongest advocates of the relentless offensive . . . the bloody losses and unpleasant experiences at the battle of Charleroi [a somewhat new view of the famous German ' victory '], where his left wing was sent prematurely over the Sambre, may, as the same wing now had the Oise in front of it, have caused this holding back."

The Cavalry Corps sent after the British failed to effect anything, and was easily held off by Chetwode's 5th Cavalry Brigade. The sequel is somewhat interesting : soon after the German 5th Cavalry Division had gone into bivouac in Urvillers and Itancourt, for the night, a sentry mistook a returning patrol for the enemy, and—

" rushed through Urvillers with the cry, ' The English are coming.' This seemed to be confirmed by shots, for the guard, under the same misapprehension, fired on the patrol. A panic ensued in the village, and every one blazed blindly into the darkness. Horses broke loose and galloped down the village street, and many men were knocked over."

There were a number of casualties, including a brigade commander,

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we are told. " The 14th Infantry Division was held up practically the whole afternoon of the 28th of August by a British rearguard at Lesdins [5 miles north of St. Quentin] on the Canal, and therefore stopped its march on St. Quentin." This so-called rearguard must have been stragglers, for the B.E.F. was more than a march to the southward at the time.

Bülow was quite puzzled as to the situation ; his four aeroplane squadrons brought him no information and his cavalry were unable to get across the Oise. With all the French Fifth Army in front of him—as at the Sambre near Charleroi—he assumed—as he did at Charleroi—that there was only a light rearguard before him. He decided for the 29th that only the I Cavalry Corps should cross the Somme ; that he would renounce the pursuit of the British ; employ two divisions—of the right centre—to attack the obsolete fortress of La Fère, which stood in his way, and " whose powers for resistance and offensive he very much over-estimated," and halt the rest of his force in a position of readiness, just short of La Fère on the very ground on which Lanrezac's Army was waiting. Owing to grave delays in forwarding messages—one important one taking four hours to come four miles—General Bülow and his Staff went to rest in sublime unconsciousness that, owing to French resistance, the German Second Army at nightfall was " in two groups, twelve miles apart, and separated by the river Oise," the Guard and X Corps being near Guise, the rest away to the south-west about St. Quentin. The monograph, with some truth, says, " the results of the 28th were practically the equivalent of winning a battle to the French." Had Lanrezac persisted in his plan of attacking towards St. Quentin, he would have had the greater part of eight divisions against four. Finding, however, that there was a strong German force at Guise on his right flank, he changed his plans on the morning of the 29th, as we have mentioned, but the German author leaves us to imagine that he went on with his original plan. Even as it was, the appearance of a few French troops—the advanced guard of the III Corps and Valabrègue's Group of Reserve divisions—across the Oise moving on St. Quentin, came as a complete surprise to Bülow's scattered right wing. Their camp fires had been mistaken for those of the German left wing. General Graf von Kirchbach, commanding the X Reserve Corps, and five of his Staff, actually motored up to a village occupied by the French, and were all wounded : Bülow ordered a conference at 11.30 a.m. at Essigny, which at that hour was in the fighting line ; Richthofen's Cavalry Corps thought the firing in the first encounter was the bombardment of La Fère.

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Seldom has there been such a complete misapprehension of a situation by trained soldiers. And it still continues in the minds of the German historians; for they assert, though the St. Quentin offensive was stopped about 9 a.m., that "the enemy obviously was fighting the battle to a decision." A little bit of firing had completely rattled the "victorious" pursuers, and they imagined themselves heavily attacked. The real attack was, of course, on the east wing. The peroration of the monograph will bring broad smiles to the faces of those who know the real situation, for it is a piteous appeal to the world to call St. Quentin a German victory, though a small one.

"Unquestionably," it says, "the battle of St. Quentin was a German victory. . . . Nevertheless, it was only an 'ordinary' victory, without far-reaching results. Yet the troops might rejoice in the fruits of their bravery and the encouraging impression of a great success. The prize gained by the sacrifice of the X Reserve Corps in beating a few enemy regiments was truly small. Lanrezac's Army got away without losing prisoners or war material in any great quantity."

This is an inartistic way of trying to disguise a poor day's work and a very nasty setback that kept Bülow's Army halted for three days. Its advance between the nights of the 27th and 31st of August was only just over ten miles, as shown by the maps in the volume.

The book contains an excellent portrait of Bülow and of a number of other officers, good maps, and some photographs of the battlefield.

In *Kaiser und Revolution* (*Berlin: Scherl*, 198 *marks*), *Lieut.-Colonel Alfred Niemann* gives, mixed up with his own views on the causes of the German revolution, a very intimate account of the ex-Kaiser during the last three months of the war. On the 1st of August, 1918, Colonel Niemann was selected to be representative of the General Staff with the Kaiser, and remained in this appointment until the flight into Holland. He had previously held a great variety of staff jobs. In August, 1914, he was G.S.O.1 with the Guard Cavalry Division; in February, 1915, he passed to the 43rd Reserve Infantry Division; in the autumn of 1915, to the XXII Corps. In March, 1917, he went temporarily as Plenipotentiary to Constantinople, and then from November, 1917, to February, 1918, was at G.H.Q., going from it to be Deputy Chief of the Staff to Duke Albrecht of Württemberg's Army Group. He had served at Ypres and Verdun, and in France, Russia, Serbia and

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Turkey. He was thus well equipped for his new post. His duties, in addition to keeping the Kaiser informed of events, were " to strengthen confidence in the leading men of the Supreme Command and to explain their decisions and proposals."

Personally he thought the military and political situation was far from good. In spite of " marvellous success in detail, there was no longer hope of compelling the enemy to sue for peace by offensive operations on land." The Army was gradually getting weaker. His idea was to draw back to a shorter line, arrange a defence in depth, and hang on " until the politicians found a way to the conference table," where the *status quo ante* was to be offered. These were not at all Ludendorff's ideas, and when at a parting interview Niemann asked him—

" ' May I prepare His Majesty for Your Excellency proceeding to shorten the front ? It seems to me that the lines occupied as a result of our abortive attacks are little suitable for defence and require an excessive number of troops,' the First Quartermaster-General replied, ' Defence ? I hope we shall continue the attack on Amiens directly the troops have been rested a bit.' "

The author then saw Colonel Bauer, Ludendorff's right-hand man, who said that he thought his master was overworked, the military situation " had developed so unfavourably for us, that conclusion of peace could not long be postponed."

Almost the first of Colonel Niemann's tasks was to break the news of the British attack on the 8th of August, 1918, the " black day " for Germany.

" I hurried to the Kaiser and pitilessly described the whole seriousness of the crisis. The Supreme War Lord heard me without interruption. His countenance was rigid, as if sculptured, his steely eyes flickered unsteadily, and he gnawed nervously the corners of his mouth. As I ended, he broke silence in spasmodic sentences, ' I saw this misfortune coming ! ' —' I have no use for such a defeat, just at this moment ! '—' It cuts right across a possibility of peace just opened out, on which I was justified in placing great hopes '—' We must try, as in 1917 at Cambrai, to wipe it out by a double flanking counter-attack. Tell the Field-Marshal that ! ' "

Two days later he went to the Supreme Command at Avesnes. Ludendorff admitted " we have suffered a serious defeat," and ascribed it to lack of warlike spirit in some of the divisions. When the Kaiser suggested that he expected too much of the troops, Ludendorff replied that the Allied divisions " had been at least as long in the battle positions as our own. The last enemy attacks had been made, as could be shown, by troops who could by no means be

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called fresh and rested." He proposed to contest every foot of ground. Just at this moment a telegram was brought in from General von Cramon, the German military plenipotentiary at the Austrian Supreme Command. "The telegram described the unfavourable impression that the events of the previous days had evoked among our Allies. The Kaiser then said, 'I understand we must close the account. We are at the end of our powers of resistance. The war must be ended.' His words remained uncontradicted." Little, however, seems to have been done at the subsequent meeting of the Chancellor and the Supreme Command, except to establish a special office for "enlightenment and propaganda" at home and abroad. The authorities "did not seem to regard the situation as hopeless, but reckoned on a temporary weakening of the enemy counter-attacks within a short time."

The Germans were now thrown completely on the defensive, but "it was exceedingly difficult to give the Kaiser a true picture of the situation, without upsetting his mental equilibrium," and on the 21st of August he retired to Wilhelmshöhe. On the 2nd of September, whilst Colonel Niemann was on a day's leave, the crushing defeat of the Seventeenth Army by the British, which involved the retirement of the Second and Eighteenth, their three old opponents of the 21st of March, had to be broken to the Kaiser by Captain von Ilsemann, and the sovereign at once took to his bed. His physician prescribed absolute rest, and refused next day to permit Niemann to see him, and he had to approach his master through the Empress. Herr Ballin was allowed to pay him a visit three days later, but the author denies the truth of the statements given about it in the *Life of Albert Ballin*, particularly that the Kaiser had been intentionally deceived, and had gradually come to regard a serious defeat as a great success. He further denies that the Kaiser could not tolerate men of the highest ability and deliberately chose second-class men; there were, he avers, no first-class men in Germany, and points to what has happened since the revolution as proof of this.

As the military situation went from bad to worse, the Kaiser was persuaded that nothing but the gift of greater political freedom—"the revolution from above"—could save Germany. It was hoped to present to the Allies "the alternative of a cheap understanding or of continued attacks on a nation determined to resist to the last, with the prospect of heavy losses and doubtful success." Max of Baden now became Chancellor; but the political chiefs, instead of turning all their energies to defence, devoted themselves to tinkering with the

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Constitution, the powers of the generals, the military oath, the position of officers and other trifles. Max of Baden refused to remain in office if Ludendorff was not dismissed. The Kaiser said that—

" for weeks he had been working to restore peace and present a united front to the enemy. Now the whole edifice was threatening to collapse. . . . He had no course except to comply with the demand of the Chancellor."

In his final interview with Ludendorff he made it clear to him that " the serious political situation was, after all, created by the military "—that is, defeat brought about revolution, not revolution defeat, as Ludendorff and his followers now try to pretend. A failure at home, the Kaiser went back to the Army and visited Prince Rupprecht; his train was bombed, but nothing is hinted to show that he ever proposed to go nearer to the front than Army Group Headquarters; there is nothing about his thinking of heading a last attack, as Herr Rosner told us in *Der König*.

It has frequently been stated that Hindenburg was not one of those who advised the flight into Holland. Colonel Niemann, however, gives this the lie. He was present, and at the discussion the Field-Marshal said earnestly: " I cannot be responsible that Your Majesty will not be dragged to Berlin by mutinous troops and delivered as a prisoner to the Revolutionary Government." The Kaiser was further informed that the 2nd Guard Division, which had been brought to Spa to protect him, could no longer be relied on. Finally, it was decided that: " the Secretary of State may take the preparatory steps for a retirement into Holland "; but these apparently had been already—before the 7th of November—arranged by the Berlin authorities.

La Bataille de Verdun. 21 février—18 décembre, 1916 (*Paris: Chiron*, 15 *francs*), by the well-known military writer, *M. Jules Poirier*, is the first attempt at a military account of the Verdun operations, written, the author states in his preface, " pending the publications written with the aid of the official documents." Its three hundred pages are very easy to follow, and there are twenty-four sketch maps which greatly aid the text. The work accomplished by Marshal Pétain, when, from being G. O. C. XXXIII Corps, he took over command of the troops in the Verdun area on the 25th of February, 1916, is very clearly brought out. " He established a continuous line connecting the forts, a line baptized by the *poilus*

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with the name 'the panic line.'" He had a number of back lines dug, and numerous bridges constructed over the Meuse; he organized an extensive telephone system, and put all the heavy guns that he could lay hands on into position. The roads had not been kept in repair and were unfit for intensive motor traffic. Pétain employed thirteen infantry battalions on getting them into order and maintaining them.

One learns for the first time that ferro-concrete had been used in the reconstruction of the forts from the year 1900 onwards, and that all the roofs of the casemates, etc., were built of it. The Germans, as we know, had found 1·50 metres (5 feet) practically heavy-shell-proof. The dimensions at Verdun were between 1·20 and 1·80 metres for batteries, 1·20 and 1·25 for communications, and 1·50 to 1·80 for everything else—magazines, shelters, and counter-scarp galleries, etc. The protection, therefore, was good. Unfortunately, there were no long-range guns, "as it was considered absurd to wish to shoot at 15,000 yards, at which range the enemy could not be seen." There are interesting sketches of the careers of Pétain and Nivelle. Both were colonels, the former in the infantry and the latter in the artillery, when war was declared, and both reached the age of sixty in the Verdun year. Pétain became a Corps Commander on the 14th of September, 1914, Nivelle in December, 1915.

The sub-title of *Nieuport*, 1914–1918, by *Commandent R. Thys* (*British Publishers, Constable & Co., price* 25*s.*), which is *Les Inundations de l'Yser et la Compagnie des Sapeurs-Pontonniers du Génie Belge*, indicates its contents. It is a beautifully-printed large octavo volume, illustrated by 551 photographs, dealing with the formation and maintenance of the Yser inundations by the Pontoon Company of the Belgian Engineers. It contains lists of the killed, wounded and decorated of that unit, and is to some extent a war history of the company; but, as will be seen, it has an interest for us.

In popular histories there have been vivid accounts of the cutting of the dykes by order of King Albert to let in the sea in order to stop the German advance. Professor Pollard says, "the Yser was dammed at Nieuport, the sluices were opened above Dixmude," imagining an inundation by fresh water. The facts are otherwise. A first inundation was begun as early as 9.15 a.m. on the 21st of October, 1914, east of Nieuport, to cover the triangular patch between the straight 3-kilometre-long reach of the canalized Yser and the Passchendaele canal north of it. It was formed by merely opening

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the Old Yser lock and letting in the sea. The inundation was complete by 12.30 p.m. next day.

The order to form the great inundation from Dixmude to Nieuport, between the Yser and the railway embankment, was given on the afternoon of the 26th, that is four days later. The blocking of the culverts in the embankment had been begun on the previous evening. The inundation was formed by opening the lock of the Old Furnes canal to let in the sea at high tide. The water passed by the Koolhof syphon, west of Nieuport (about four foot square in section), under the new Furnes canal, and thence on to the land. The Germans seem to have been totally ignorant of the hydraulic conditions on the coast, for they never attempted to interfere by bombardment with the Belgian water-control operations. The first attempt to get the sea gates of the lock open on the night of the 26th–27th of October failed "*faute de câbles d'attache.*" But a second, made next night, was successful, and the opening was repeated at high tide twice every twenty-four hours for the next four days. To increase the speed of the flow of water, the fans of the Noordvaart, by which the Beverdyck creek (between the Yser and the railway embankment) communicates direct with the sea, were opened on the night of the 29th–30th of October. This manœuvre had not been ventured on before, for fear of attracting the enemy's notice by a rapid submersion of the land.

From October, 1914, until the arrival of the British in June, 1917, there was comparative peace at Nieuport. Colonel Thys regrets that no attempt was made to camouflage the change of garrison. He writes of the attack on Westende as follows :—

"The British revealed themselves as admirable soldiers, bold to excess and a little fatalistic. They were troops of the greatest bravery, equipped regardless of expense, but perhaps insufficiently prepared from the military point of view, and led by chiefs, who, in spite of their courage, only too often lacked experience in the art of war. Great was our surprise, for example, when the infantry of this Army marched into Nieuport on the 25th of June, in column of fours in broad daylight, when we forbade men to move about in larger groups than four or five at the most."

He supports his description by a photograph of a cheery crowd of British infantry standing in a Nieuport street. The result of this nonchalance was that the British lost the Nieuport bridgehead.

Those who are studying the 1918 campaign for examination purposes, or who know the details of it, will read *La Bataille de Montdidier* (*Paris : Berger-Levrault, 15 francs*), by *Commandant M. Daille*, with much interest. It deals with the French share in the

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great offensive of the 8th, 9th and 10th of August, 1918. The author is an instructor at the French Staff College, and his book may be taken to be an expression of the latest French doctrine and opinion. It is divided into two parts: the first is a semi-philosophical consideration of the situation, the plan and its elaboration, the means available and their application to the object, with excursions into the subjects of will-power and initiative, intellectual and moral preparation, surprise, the importance of manœuvre in battle and similar matters, all dear to professors, but like *projets* of little service to the practical soldier. The second part is historical and was published in the *Revue Militaire Française* in 1921; it describes in great detail the operations of the French First Army under General Debeney, with hardly a mention of the British Fourth Army on its left.

Though both these Armies were under Sir Douglas Haig, not a *directive* or paper from him is printed or mentioned, except a note apologizing for not visiting General Debeney personally, on the ground that such a meeting might arouse suspicion that a conjoint attack was on hand. The British Commander is certainly given credit for combatting Marshal Foch's proposal, made on the 12th of July, for an offensive from the front Robecq—Festubert in order to liberate the Bruay mines, and for suggesting on the 17th of July that greater results might be expected from Franco-British action in the region east and south-east of Amiens. This led to Foch issuing his *directive* of the 24th of July for the freeing of the Paris—Amiens railway; but we are left to believe that the plan of operations itself was devised by General Debeney and communicated by him to General Sir H. Rawlinson.

Further, the three days' operations are described as if the French First Army had a determined enemy in front of it and played the main part, though we are told that "the task of the [French] IX Corps, delicate at the beginning, was greatly facilitated in the execution by the withdrawal of the Germans." We are now certain from German published sources, that, in consequence of the successful attack by the British Fourth Army farther north, and because General Debeney began his attack methodically by first enlarging his bridgehead across the junction of the Luce and the Avre on his extreme left, next the British, the German forces opposite the French First Army drew back, and General Debeney made his stroke in the air. As a set piece, carried out without much interference from the enemy, the operations present many points of interest, especially the movements of the artillery, but the novelty claimed for them is not apparent. Perhaps the most instructive statement in the book

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is that to ensure secrecy Foch's orders to Haig and Pétain were carried to them personally by General Weygand and Colonel Desticker, the Chief and Deputy Chief of his Staff.

There are a number of interesting divisional orders and good sketch maps.

In *Gedenkschriften van Generaal von Moltke* 1877–1916 (*Amsterdam : Maatschappij Voor Goede en Goedekoope Lectuur* (no price)), Lieut.-General W. G. F. Snijders has done good service by explaining to his countrymen the German plan of campaign as made known to the world in the Moltke correspondence. He tells them of Schlieffen's unscrupulous scheme for marching the German right wing across the southern part of Holland, and how it was abandoned by Moltke, not for moral reasons, but because it was not expedient for Germany to have another foe on her hands. He indignantly says :—

" We Netherlanders may account ourselves fortunate that the German Supreme Command of 1914 had a better idea of the character, nature and the history of the Hollander than existed under Count Schlieffen. The latter's appreciation [that Holland would merely protest] shows not only an utter absence of morality, but also of historical knowledge. How could he think of our people with its glorious past, in which it maintained its freedom and independence, should behave like a defenceless lamb towards a German invader ? Schlieffen seems to us a barbarian, a dangerous savage, who sticks at nothing, who does not trouble about feelings of right or wrong, but strikes wildly when he thinks an advantage for his country is to be gained."

This appreciation of the strategist whom every German looks up to as a transcendent genius deserves to be widely known.

La Marche à la Victoire (*Paris : Chiron, 5 francs*), by *Commandant B. de Lamotte, breveté d'état-major*, with its twenty-eight maps, many in two colours, is a wonderful production for the money. It can be commended to all who want a clear account, in 125 pages, of the events on the whole of the Western Front from the 15th of July, 1918, the date of the fifth and last German offensive, until the Armistice. It is useful as showing the place of the British in the operations as a whole. Its defects are that it does not give the distribution of the German forces in such a manner as to show where the bulk of the divisions were employed—opposite Sir Douglas Haig—nor does it provide the directives of Marshal Foch. The slowness of the advance of General Debeney's Army, on the right of the B.E.F. is attributed to " the furious assaults of the enemy,"

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" the very great difficulties encountered from the very beginning " and " the solid defence of the German Armies " ; otherwise the narrative appears a fair and conscientious one.

In conclusion, the author makes some remarks on the German leading, and sums up its faults as—

(1) conceiving that an advance could be made by making a succession of pockets and joining them together ;
(2) beginning the 21st of March offensive too late : it should, in view of the American help in sight, have been started two months earlier [but troops could hardly have been withdrawn from Russia in time] ;
(3) making pauses between the offensives ;
(4) not retiring to a chosen position as in 1917 when immediate success was obviously out of the question.

In fact, all notion of " time " was forgotten.

The Germans have made many different claims in their war literature, but probably *Sabotage des Wiederaufbaus durch die französische Regierung* (" Sabotage of the restoration of the devastated areas by the French Government "), written by *Dr. J. A. Loeser*, contains the most impudent. Sold for 15 marks, price to foreigners 2*s*., with 48 good reproductions of photographs thrown in, it is obviously a piece of propaganda financed by some Governmental or trade authority. Its object is to inquire why the devastated areas in France have not been restored, and it contrasts French ineptitude in dealing with the huge areas where war raged for over four years, with German energy in rebuilding a few houses burnt in East Prussia during the Russian invasion in 1914 ! It is to enforce this point that the photographs are reproduced.

The pamphlet begins with the usual whine that Germany, after loss of territory in Europe, her Colonies [over which she was annually out of pocket] and her merchant fleet [which her Government subsidized], is not in a position to pay ; that the French claims are inflated ; and that the utmost Germany can do is to make payments in kind or supply labour. It goes on to relate how France refused German offers to restore the devastated areas through the influence of French contractors and business men who saw their hopes of profit dwindling. She refused to allow Germany to deal even with a portion of the area, well knowing that the contrast between what the Germans would do in it compared with the other section in which France would work, would be too much of an eye-opener. Though seemingly prepared to accept assistance in manufactured

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material from Germany, France declined to give her facilities to obtain the raw material required. Finally, as regards such articles as Germany could manufacture from the raw material available, France was so absurd as to insist that she would only accept what she ordered, and to refuse to take over and to credit Germany with any quantities the latter might choose to send.

These statements are backed up by quotations from unknown French newspapers—one cannot help thinking some of them were founded for the purpose of providing the matter.

The pamphlet is the clearest proof that Germany will not keep her word to pay up, unless methods are applied which she herself would have used, had she, as she expected, been the conqueror.

GERMANY

General von Wrisberg, the head of the General War Department of the Prussian War Office, has in two books (reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, July, 1922) dealt with man-power and the internal condition of Germany during the war. His third, and concluding, volume, *Wehr und Waffen*, 1914–1915 (*Leipzig: Koehler*, 225 *marks*), is concerned with material. It contains chapters on hand-firearms, machine guns and *armes blanches*; field artillery and anti-aircraft weapons; heavy and super-heavy artillery; trench mortars and hand-grenades; ammunition; engineer and trench stores and equipment; inventions, inspection and manufacture; protection of war industries; the Supreme War Authority (*Kriegsamt*); transport; tanks; petrol; gas; and the material assistance given to Germany's Allies. The history and development of each of these subjects—except gas, which gets only two pages—are dealt with at length, and the general's claim is: "Germany did not lose the war from want of munitions," and it seems fully justified in the book.

The monthly delivery of new rifles rose gradually to 206,457 in July, 1916, when the manufacture was reduced in favour of machine guns. Of these we are only told that the total rose from 26,000 heavy and 3,500 light in June, 1917, to 40,000 and 16,000 four months later. There was a huge reserve of field artillery at the outbreak of war, amounting to 67 field-gun batteries, 17 field howitzer batteries and 67 ammunition columns; of heavy artillery, there were 4,200 guns and howitzers, apart from those on fixed mountings in fortress and coast defences: "There was never, not even temporarily, a serious want of guns and artillery stores which had any injurious effect on the front or on operations." On mobilization,

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arrangements were made for the manufacture of 15 field guns a month, but by the end of 1914 it was about 100; by the end of 1915 it was 480; in 1917 it reached 2,000.

Prussia started with a thousand million rounds of small-arm ammunition. "There was never any shortage." In July, 1916, for instance, there were 185 train-loads, each of 2,738,400 rounds, sent to the Armies, and of these only 110 were used.

Gun ammunition is discussed in considerable detail. It will be sufficient to take the field artillery supply as an example. In the mobilization plan, the monthly expenditure was put at 200,000 shells for guns, and 70,000 for howitzers; but on mobilization being declared, the War Ministry directed that "all factories selected to make munitions should at once work up to their highest output, and as regards ammunition the highest possible." A minimum production was fixed, but no upper limit. All the State factories erected additional buildings and installed additional plant. By the 12th of October, 1914, the output was 460,000, instead of 200,000 field-gun shells per month, and 310,000, instead of 70,000 field-howitzer shells. By the 21st of December the figures were 1,250,000 and 360,000. The Supreme Command made no complaint to the Ministry of War and, in fact, did not communicate with it on the subject; so the alleged shortage of ammunition at Ypres, 1914, seems a somewhat feeble excuse for failure. To show that there was never any lack of ammunition, the author gives the amount available in train-loads at various periods, and the amount expended, a field-gun ammunition train carrying 26,880 shells :—

	Available Trains.	Expended Trains.
July, 1916	490	318
April, 1917	1,090	389
October, 1917	971	382
March, 1918	1,768	578
October, 1918	1,337	614

The "Hindenburg programme" of August, 1918, drafted without the concurrence of the Minister of War, demanded that the supply of guns and machine guns should be trebled, and the ammunition and trench mortars doubled. At the same time, the Supreme Command demanded more men, which at once made the execution of the programme impossible.

"Ludendorff's representative, Colonel Bauer, declared officially in the Ministry of War, that the Supreme Command had no interest in ammunition delivered after May and June, 1917; it believed that the

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war would be over, a forecast that was repeated later for the autumn of 1917, and the summer of 1918."

This hardly agrees with the desperate state of the situation which Ludendorff has depicted, in his reminiscences, as existing when he took over control in August, 1916.

Ludendorff further upset the plans of the Ministry of War, which he regarded as too bureaucratic, by instituting a new Supreme Authority, the Kriegsamt, to control the offices dealing with the supply of arms and ammunition, man-power and raw material. The output of war material at once began to fall off, the author states, but Ludendorff stuck to his system, merely changing the head of it, General Gröner, who, as fate would have it, eventually succeeded him as First Quartermaster-General.

General von Wrisberg has a further charge against Ludendorff. It is that he would not take up the question of tanks until the British had used them, and would not allow them to be put in the " urgent " class with submarines and aircraft until August, 1918. It is claimed that a German inventor suggested a war car, with caterpillar draught in 1913, and others brought forward the idea in 1914 and 1915. The Supreme Command expected to repeat against the French and British its successes against the Russians, Serbs and Rumanians, without the aid of such apparatus.

The first German tank was not ready for trial before the 14th of May, 1917, and then it was found to have serious defects. The first five were delivered with great difficulty in March, 1918, and only twenty were completed before the armistice. Besides these, some twenty-five to thirty captured tanks were repaired and taken into use. When the war ended 900 tanks were on order.

The author is at great pains to show that inspection of war material was thoroughly done by experts. The Engineer Committee alone employed 522 officers in this way ; the figures for the Artillery and Transport committees are not given, but in addition to officers, they employed, respectively, 375 and 48 engineers, chemists, mathematicians, etc., with the rank of officer.

Under protection of war industries we find that of 25,133 political meetings only 291 were forbidden, the Pacifists having the highest percentage with three out of nine.

The later part of the book is devoted to the assistance rendered to Germany's Allies. Besides subsidies, Turkey is said to owe the Prussian War Ministry 847 million marks for war material delivered. There was great difficulty, it is said, in getting receipts from the Turks. For work and railways a further 360 millions is put down

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and 35 millions for coal. Bulgaria is a debtor for 1,073 million marks; Austria for 4,206 millions, but against this sum there are 796 million marks on the credit side.

Russia

La défense d'Ivangorod en 1914–1915, *Extraits des Mémoires du Lieutenant-Général de Schwarz, gouverneur de la place. Traduit du manuscrit russe par Th. Goutchkoff* (*Paris: Berger-Levrault*, 6 *francs*), is not only a most interesting historical account of the two defences of Ivangorod, an ancient fortress on the Vistula about sixty miles above Warsaw, but it contains much practical instruction on the preparation and defence of fortified positions.

General de Schwarz, an engineer officer, born in 1874, was in engineer charge of a sector of the defences of Port Arthur, and from 1905 to 1914 professor at the Higher Engineer School, during which period he wrote freely on engineer subjects and was engaged in the consideration of defence schemes. On outbreak of war he was sent as Colonel of Engineers to Ivangorod, a fortress constructed in 1845 to defend the passage of the Vistula at its junction with the Weprz, and later an important railway centre. In 1880 seven small detached forts were built round it, and in 1890 some concrete shelters were substituted for the original brick ones. In 1909, in accordance with the policy of the Chief of the General Staff, Sukhomlinov, Ivangorod and the other western fortresses were declassed, as it was intended to rely on field troops.

On arrival in August, 1914, Colonel de Schwarz found no garrison, except a single battalion, and no armament, and at first could get no answers to his written and telegraphic appeals. Nevertheless, he collected labourers and set to work to construct "centres of resistance" about 2,000 yards outside the forts, to form a sandbag parapet between them, and to improve the shelters by adding layers of rails and timber. His energy appears to have impressed General Alexeiev, the Chief of the Staff of the South-West Group, for on the 24th of August he was appointed Governor of Ivangorod, and sufficient means were placed at his disposal. His scheme of defence was to hold the principal line with one-third of the infantry, keeping the rest in reserve; to use a great number of machine guns and light field guns in and near the old front line; to keep the bulk of the heavy artillery on the far bank of the Vistula in two main groups, but to retain the mobile heavy artillery and field artillery in reserve for use as the fighting developed.

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He had two attack exercises carried out with troops to discover the weak points of the defences, and the screens, shelter and dead ground useful to the enemy, and then took measures to obviate such disadvantages. Among other things, he disguised with brushwood the dome of the cathedral, which was visible from afar. The result was that when Hindenburg's troops appeared on the 7th and 8th of October, their assaults were easily beaten off and they sat down before the place. After another futile assault on the 16th of October, the Germans gave place to the Austrians. The garrison and field troops near by then took the offensive, drove off the enemy, and captured 15,000 prisoners. The garrison had 3,500 casualties.

General de Schwarz now proceeded to elaborate his defences, constructing a ring of defended localities outside his former line, and then an outer line nine miles out from the centre of Ivangorod. He was then informed that the place had ceased to be a fortress and was a *région fortifiée*, depending for its defenders on the field army. De Schwarz objected to this, as he held that Russian troops would defend a field position less vigorously than a fortress. In combination with the field troops, a position about a hundred miles long was prepared thirty miles out from Ivangorod, covering the passage of the Vistula from Annopol up to Warsaw. But when the great German advance came in June, 1915, this great position was abandoned, from lack of ammunition, without a fight. Field troops were detailed to hold the Ivangorod defences, but there was much confusion and difficulty, as the field army commanders were all indisposed to detach troops, and the units when they did arrive, just in the nick of time, were entirely unacquainted with the defences and the ground. Then as Evert's whole Army was withdrawn on account of lack of ammunition, orders were issued for the evacuation of Ivangorod. It was held long enough against Woyrsch's Army Group—from which it took 1,500 prisoners—for the whole of the armament and stores to be removed, the forts blown up, the buildings, except the cathedral, burned, and, finally, the bridges destroyed. Then, though the enemy had crossed the Vistula above and below the fortress, and were closing round it, the entire garrison was got away, just as the circle round it was being completed. It was a most notable performance, for which de Schwarz was rewarded by being made Director-General of Engineers.

Fortification

The connection between field armies and permanent fortifications having become very close during the war, *La fortification permanente*

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pendant la guerre, by *General Benoit* (*Nancy : Berger-Levrault*, 3.50 *francs*), is of considerable general interest. The book does not go into details of design or construction. After tracing the evolution of fortification and sketching the defensive systems of France, Belgium, Russia and Germany, the author gives the opinions held on the subject in France and Germany before the war.

What was thought in France may be given in the words of the député of Lille, spoken in 1911—

"The fate of the nations which will come into collision in the next conflict will be decided in the open field. The war will be short, the battle will be long, and enormous masses of combatants will be in action. Their mobilization must be secured by a curtain of troops supported by fortresses and detached or isolated forts; but outside certain exceptional points, there is no reason to maintain in our country fortifications which have no rôle to play during mobilization."

General Benoit then describes shortly the part taken by permanent fortifications—a sufficiently unsatisfactory one—and shows the modifications introduced as the result of the experience of the early part of the war. The change of view is well summed up by the instruction issued by the French G.Q.G.—

"The time that a fortress can hold out should not be bound up with the existence of its permanent works; it depends on the care with which the advanced lines and the intervals have been organized, as well as the energy with which their positions are defended. . . . The rôle played by fortresses during the present war shows that they can participate in the operations of the field armies with all their means of action. It is therefore necessary that fortresses situated in the Army zone should be entirely under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and that he should be able to employ their resources without restriction."

Before this instruction, by French law, commanders of fortresses were independent and responsible to the Government alone.

General Benoit deduces from the experiences of the war that the future fortress will be an immense fortified area, of which only the principal points will have permanent constructions. It will have deeply tunnelled forward and lateral communications, with shell-proof shelters, vast magazines, gas-proof keeps, obstacles against infantry and tanks, and a complete anti-aircraft defence.

General

In *Die Psyche der Heere* (*Berlin : Mittler*, 650 *marks*)—"The Soul of Armies"—*General Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven*, once the head of the Historical Sections of the Prussian Great General Staff,

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writes a learned treatise to prove that the officer corps was the soul of the German Army. With the thoroughness and aridity of the Teutonic bookworm, he commences with the Army of Alexander the Great, and traces through the ages the causes of success in war. It is only his remarks on the British Army that enliven an otherwise pedantic and truly Prussian compilation. The victories of Alexander, Hannibal and Cæsar he ascribes to the personalities of those conquerors and to the faith of their armies in them. Passing to the Middle Ages, he traces the growth of chivalrous customs, but is of opinion that the special importance of officers only became marked under Louis XIV. The first great step upwards was when Frederic the Great began to replace enlisted men by contingents raised by conscription. When universal service was introduced in Prussia in 1813 the whole status of the soldier was changed, and it became an honour, instead of very nearly a disgrace, to serve in the National Army. The first trouble arose when, as the German Armies increased in size, it proved increasingly difficult to find sufficient officers of the suitable class.

Nevertheless, so firm set were the traditions of the Prussian service " that gradually an almost uniform German officer corps was trained." Yet the recruits for it had to be sought lower and lower down in society, and they were by no means equal in anything except general education to the scions of the nobility from whom alone the officers had originally been drawn. Every effort was therefore made to ensure that " in origin, training and opinions " the new class, " if not noble in birth, were noble in ideals." Thus " chivalrous ideals were held high in our Army [says the author], and we sought them in vain among our enemies." It is to be regretted that General Loringhoven does not give a list of these ideals, he only goes on to show the heavy percentage of losses among the officers in the Great War, and he says that " the principle that war is synonymous with attack was so ingrained with us, that it often led to excessive employment of the offensive and to ill-considered and expensive assaults." He attributes the decadence of the German Armies, so that " in course of time the considerable difference between them and the French and British disappeared," to the decay of discipline consequent on the heavy loss of officers. The general defeat of Germany he ascribes to the will-to-victory being weakened by want of food : but he does not pretend that the British blockade of Germany was contrary to International Law, and places it on a par with the U-Boat war on commerce, as a legitimate action " directed against the whole population of the hostile states."

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Of the British Army he has to tell us that in 1916 the " new divisions were not sufficiently consolidated, and entered only unwillingly (*sic*) into the battle of the Somme on the 1st of July." Forgetting Passchendaele and other events of 1916 and 1917, he writes : " England until 1918 left to her Allies the chief burden of the war." Whilst admitting the bravery and calm of the British, he says : " The Army was never fit for anything more than the simplest tasks of position warfare, it had no strategic mobility, and in view of the defective training of its leaders, never could have it." He thinks that " only the stopping of the German attack in March, 1918 [why did it stop ?], before it had made a complete break through, saved the British Army from ruin." The success of the British in August, 1918, was only due to " the situation on the German side and the powerful increase of force brought by the Americans. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the Armistice the British were at the end of their powers." Of the American Army he shows similar misapprehension, finishing up by alleging that " towards the end of the war a certain objection to being slaughtered made itself observed."

It is curious to find how little even educated Germans know about the war and understand their late foes.

Translations

The book of *General von Cramon*, German plenipotentiary at Austro-Hungarian Great Headquarters, has been translated into French under the title of *Quatre ans au G.Q.G. Austro-hongrois (Paris : Payot, 5 francs)*.

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REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

Moltke's Military Correspondence, 1870–71. Published by the Prussian General Staff Department for Military History. First Section, The War to the Battle of Sedan. Précis by SPENSER WILKINSON. Clarendon Press. 6*s*. net.

Professor Wilkinson has done good service to military students by printing his précis of the elder Moltke's military correspondence during the first phase of the Franco-Prussian War. Few have or will trouble to search through the original volumes, and there is more than a chance of British soldiers continuing to accept the Field-Marshal as a brilliant strategist and clever organizer on the strength of that great work of German propaganda—and fiction—the German official account of 1870–71. Unfortunately, on the basis of this practically all books of the war in the English language have been compiled. The late Colonel G. F. R. Henderson was the first publicly to prick the Moltke bladder; one or two Germans and a few Frenchmen have followed him; and now the précis of his correspondence tears his reputation to shreds. One sees the reason for General Dupont's contention that the uncle Moltke was the cause of his nephew's failure in 1914. In 1870–71 mistakes and omissions mattered little, as the Germans were in numbers and guns as compared with their opponents at least two to one.

The first thing that strikes the reader of the précis is that Great Headquarters in 1870, as in 1914, stayed too far behind the front, and that little had been done, again as in 1914, to organize a reliable communication service. The result was that Moltke was frequently without news. There are pathetic telegrams from him at Mayence: "What happened yesterday at Saarbrücken? Here only rumours"; "Till now not the smallest detail of the action at Weissenburg [two days before] has reached the King, nor any approximate statement of our losses, while French newspaper accounts are already known here." Without any knowledge of the fight at Spicheren on the 6th of August, at 5.45 p.m. on that day Moltke sent

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General Steinmetz permission to cross the frontier! At 8.15 a.m. on the 7th of August, he telegraphs: "Only just learned that after Crown Prince's victory yesterday at Wörth, MacMahon retreated towards Bitsch," and sends Prince Frederick Charles's staff officer some logistics to help him to catch the retreating French that any tyro could have worked out for himself. In the next telegram he wires to Blumenthal: "When the battle? In what direction enemy retreat? . . . learned only of your victory early this morning." Four days later we find: "During the whole of yesterday His Majesty was without knowledge of the position of the H.-Qrs. and of the Corps of the First Army, and to-day until this hour [10 a.m.] it is unknown what movements are intended." Even on the 25th of August, he telegraphs to the officer commanding before Metz: "Since the day before yesterday no news from you."

No wonder his direction of the Armies was halting and belated.

We find not only Steinmetz, Commander of the First Army, doing just as he liked and disobeying orders, as Kluck, his successor, did in 1914, but the other Army Commanders acting like him. After the first move the control of the Armies, as in 1914, was very slight indeed. This go-as-you-please method was successful against the unprepared French and their inefficient commanders in 1870, but the Moltke tradition brought ruin in 1914.

It may be fairly said that in 1870, the strategic plan consisted of no more than to go for the enemy, and make use of superior numbers. This is embodied in Moltke's memorandum, which we will quote as it stands in the Professor's précis:—

"The operation against France will consist simply in our advancing in as dense a formation as possible for a few marches on French soil till we meet the French Army and then fight a battle.

"The general direction of the advance is towards Paris, because in that direction we are most certain to hit the mark we are aiming at, the enemy's army.

"On the straight road from the Palatinate to the French capital lies Metz. This fortress we shall pass on the left and merely observe."

And on to Paris the old man would have gone, even after Gravelotte—for he started to do so—had not "a telegram from London, with report taken from the *Temps* of the 23rd, of the sudden decision of MacMahon to hasten to Bazaine's aid," which was received on the evening of the 25th of August, induced Moltke to send cavalry northward to confirm the rumour and then turn the Armies that way.

The clumsy bludgeon methods of Moltke in his battles, clumsy indeed as compared with Wellington's conception of Vittoria, do not

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receive much elucidation in his correspondence, but we now understand why when Schlieffen preached Cannæ and total envelopment, the German of the Twentieth Century thought him a genius. Compared with Moltke he was one.

Professor Wilkinson sometimes follows the German text too closely. For instance, in " Direct orders of His Majesty are to be expected to-day, also on the battle-field." He clings to *Etappen*, for which the English is " Line of Communication," and will use " advance-guard," when the F.S.R. spelling is " advanced guard." But the précis is an excellent one ; important messages being given in full, while others are shortened in proportion to their value, and we should be duly grateful to him for lightening the labours of the rising generation.

Historical Records of the Buffs, 1914–1919. By Colonel R. S. H. Moody, C.B. London : The Medici Society, 1922. *7s. 6d.*

It is easy enough to understand why, while nearly a score of divisions and about double that number of battalions have already published accounts of their achievements in the late war, the Buffs should be practically the first regiment of the line to do so. The infantry regiment occupies a place in the organization of the British Army which has no parallel in Continental armies: it is not a tactical unit but an administrative one, and even on that side regiments differ considerably. When war broke out in 1914, some regiments had as many as ten battalions, others only four ; the war accentuated these differences ; before the Armistice came some regiments had expanded to forty battalions or more, one or two had not added more than two or three new ones. It was a mere accident in what theatres of war a regiment happened to be represented; nor did this in the least correspond to the number of battalions it put into the field. Thus the Buffs, who had in all eight battalions on active service, fought in France and Flanders, in Macedonia, in Mesopotamia, in Palestine and at Aden, though one or two regiments with twice their battalions saw no theatres of war save the Western Front. To tell a regiment's history involves, as a rule, telling a great many fractions of a bigger story. In the great offensives like the Somme, battalions came and went, fought themselves to a standstill, retired to a " quiet " front to replenish their depleted ranks, and returned to the battle front to renew the struggle at another point. Thus the 7th Buffs helped to break the German lines between

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Montauban and Fricourt on the 1st of July, fought at Trones Wood from the 12th to the 14th of July, at the Schwaben Redoubt in September and October, and at Desire Trench near Grandcourt in November. Between these dates the 1st Buffs had taken part in two major attacks, the 6th had been engaged three times and the 8th had had nearly a month in the line at Delville Wood and Guillemont. It is easy to realize the difficulty of welding into a consecutive story these disconnected episodes.

The regiment's record is a fine one, of great variety and interest. The list of rewards and distinctions earned by officers and men fills some forty closely printed pages, the dead, 230 officers and over 5,000 " other ranks," take up eighty, every name being given. The " battle honours " to which the regiment is entitled will run a round fifty and the task which will confront the Regimental Committee, charged with selecting from among so many names of such outstanding merit the ten to be shown on the colours, will be one of extreme difficulty—to attempt it might well convince even the Battle Honours Committee of the fatuity and unfairness of the flat rate which they have laid down.

But to those who have no special connection with the regiment, the book's special interest lies in two things, the arrangement adopted by Colonel Moody and the extraordinary cheapness with which such a substantial and handsome volume has been produced. To bring such a book out for *7s. 6d.* would have been a notable achievement in 1914, in 1922 it amounts to a miracle. No doubt the price represents something below cost price, for it is clear that a great deal of unpaid work must have been put in, not only in collecting material to supplement the war diaries and other sources, but in obtaining subscriptions and orders for the volume; 1,400 were obtained before publication, and in that lies the secret of the volume's cheapness. Regiments which are contemplating producing their histories should be encouraged by the success of the Buffs' experiment in fixing the price within the reach of the rank and file, for it has proved that such a demand does exist.

One feature well worthy of imitation is the care which has been taken to show on each page what front and what battalion are being dealt with and what is the date of the particular events under description, a simple thing but too often overlooked. Colonel Moody would, perhaps, have done better in some cases to take the shares of the different battalions in the same battle in more exact chronological sequence, and it is a little awkward to have the story of the 10th Battalion in the advance on Jerusalem narrated before the events

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of the winter of 1916–17 in France; he is also occasionally rather inaccurate on points not strictly affecting the Buffs, as when he states that the bulk of the Territorials went to India in 1914; still he has described the episodes in which the Buffs took part clearly, and has brought out their connection with the main story, of which they form a portion. The volume is well provided with maps and plans and it was a happy thought to utilize the pages just inside the covers for sketch-maps, one showing the battlefields of the Western Front, with Canterbury inserted on the edge, the other marking in the Eastern theatres of war places like Sevastopol and Chitral already famous in the regiment's annals.

The Operations of War: Explained and Illustrated. By General Sir G. B. HAMLEY. A new edition, brought up to the latest requirements by Major-General Sir G. ASTON. London and Edinburgh: Wm. Blackwood and Sons. 1923. 30s. net.

Sir Edward Hamley's great work has a well-established position in English military literature, but it has not been without its detractors. It has been criticized as being too much under the influence of the "geometrical" school of strategical thought, as paying undue attention to the shapes of frontiers and similar considerations, and consequently neglecting other factors of more vital and permanent importance. But its enduring vitality and value as a military classic was to some extent vindicated by the issue, some few years before the outbreak of war in 1914, of a new edition, the sixth, edited by an officer of the authority and position of Sir L. E. Kiggell, and now yet another edition has made its appearance with Sir George Aston as its editor.

To bring "Hamley" really up to date would be a formidable task, and one may fairly feel some doubts as to the desirability of attempting to do so. It would be simpler to write an entirely new volume, taking Hamley's methods as a model, and seeing how far the principles he enunciates can be illustrated and confirmed by the experiences of the war of 1914–18. But the time to do this is hardly ripe yet. Much has indeed been written on the war, but a good deal of it is premature and based on partial or inaccurate information, much is too partisan or propagandist to provide safe data on which to construct conclusions of real value. All that Sir George Aston seems to have done with the greater part of the book is to supply a number of minor interpolations and comments, usually quite pertinent and helpful, giving modern examples which elucidate

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some of Hamley's arguments or showing where economic or other changes have rendered his descriptions or deductions out of date, as for instance, the development of large industrial areas in Belgium and France which prevents those regions being described as "rolling plains in which streams and ditches are the only impediments" (p. 224). But altogether, these notes do not amount to more than minor alterations, and it is claiming too much for this new edition when it is described as "brought up to the latest requirements." If there may have been new features in the late war, whose importance has been exaggerated, there have been many which have effected changes not in degree, but in kind. It could hardly be maintained, for example, that such references as General Aston has made to the work of aircraft are an adequate treatment of the influence exercised over strategical problems and conditions by the conquest of the air. That he might have produced a work which dealt systematically with the changes produced by the development of aircraft, of motor transport, and of similar inventions, with the way in which the increase in the size of modern armies has affected the possibilities of obtaining decisive success by a single stroke or in a single campaign, or with the strategical importance of the tremendous development of the powers of the defence, of which the Western Front gave such examples in 1915, is not to be denied. But what he has done in annotating the earlier parts of Hamley's volume falls a good deal short of the requirements of the modern student of war.

While Parts I—V of Hamley remain substantially unchanged, Part VI, which in the original editions was devoted to Tactics, has undergone a good deal more modification. The chapters on "Detachments" and "Tactics" which General Kiggell contributed to the Sixth Edition are retained with a few comments and references to recent examples of their arguments. To these chapters have been added one on the "amphibious wars" of the period 1866–1905, and a short and decidedly inadequate summary of the war of 1914–18. Of these, the first is the more valuable. General Aston had made "amphibious war" his special province, and his comments are lucid and to the point. On 1914–18 he is less happy. Thirty pages do not afford much room for a discussion of the strategy of such a war, and the chances are not improved by the attempt to supply a summary of the principal operations in which the Somme is not as much as mentioned, though the Murmansk and Hedjaz operations are. Some good points are made, as when the unsuitability of Salonica as a base for a great offensive is brought out, or when the

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success with which the Germans used the intervention of Turkey is emphasized to show how, " with little expenditure of their own man-power " they were able to " divert from the main operations a vast amount of British man-power, material, and merchant shipping." But the chapter is not very well balanced or distributed. He hardly discusses the strategy of the Allies on the Western Front in 1915–17, he does not bring out the influence on the fortunes of the war on that front of the absence of flanks which could be turned or menaced—once the trench front from the North Sea to Switzerland had been set up—and which consequently restricted and handicapped manœuvring. Further, though he deals with the subsidiary operations at some length, he fails to bring out adequately the two things which so very much diminished the practical advantage of " sea-power," the submarine, which made it so very hard to secure sea communications, and the enormous increase in the impedimenta by which a modern army is encumbered, the influence of which is seen in the absolute necessity of securing a well-equipped harbour as a base for an invading army. This was a factor of vital importance at the Dardanelles. A modern army landed on an open beach, as was Wellington's at the mouth of the Mondego in 1808, is practically immobile and likely to remain so for weeks. Wellington, with his far simpler requirements, could get on the move at once, because he only needed about as much transport as would nowadays be insufficient to carry the Army Forms needed for one brigade.

The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine. By Lieut.-Colonel C. GUY POWLES, C.M.G., D.S.O. Auckland, N.Z.: Whitcombe & Tombs, Ltd.

This is the third volume of the official history of the New Zealand forces in the Great War published under the authority of the New Zealand Government, and is fully up to the high standard set by the two previous parts, dealing with France and Gallipoli. The contingent in Palestine, consisted of the Mounted Brigade under Brig.-General Chaytor, which arrived in Egypt from the Peninsula on the 26th of December, 1915, 1,391 strong of all ranks. On the 15th of March, 1916, this force was ordered to form part of the newly-formed Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, under Major-General Chauvel, with which it remained throughout the whole of the ensuing campaigns up to the Armistice. At the battle of Romani, in August, and in the subsequent advance to the Palestine frontier, which included the actions of El Arish, Magdhaba and Rafa, the New Zealand horsemen played a prominent and creditable part,

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and the Turks more than once met them to their discomfiture and loss. The Brigade was heavily engaged at both the first and second battles of Gaza, and subsequent to these unsuccessful engagements took up a position covering the right flank of the British lines, from which a very bold and effective raid was carried out against the Aslus bridge on the Ramleh—Beersheba railway.

In Gen. Allenby's brilliant operations in the autumn and winter of 1917, the Brigade once more distinguished itself. It formed part of the force detailed to turn and capture Beersheba from the north-east, and was then swung across from the extreme right to the extreme left of the Army, arriving after a forced march just in time to take part in the fighting for Jaffa. Then, after the capture of Jerusalem, it once more passed from one wing of the line to the other, and took a vigorous and successful part in the operations which ended in the occupation of Jericho. Here, in the Jordan valley, the Brigade remained uncomfortably quartered for the rest of the campaign. It took part in all three attempts upon Amman, the two partially successful raids in March and April, 1918, and the brilliant final blow of September, which made an end of the Eighth and Fourth Turkish Armies. In this last offensive, the New Zealand Mounted Brigade captured over 3,000 prisoners, 15 guns, and 48 machine guns, together with large quantities of stores and *matériel* of war. This brilliant episode concluded the New Zealanders' part in the Palestine campaign. The Brigade returned to Egypt in March, 1919, to assist in restoring order in the Delta, which had been the scene of disturbances. On the 30th of June, the formation was disbanded and on the 23rd of July, the few remaining *personnel* sailed for their homeland.

Lieut.-Colonel Powles, in his small and beautifully got-up volume of 284 pages, has recounted at length and in a most picturesque and entertaining style, the fortunes of the New Zealand cavalry during their arduous and glorious campaign in Palestine. The work is additionally attractive by reason of the excellent maps and photographs which accompany and illustrate the narrative. The New Zealand Government and New Zealanders all the world over have every reason for pride in their official historians and their official history.

The Reformation of War. By Colonel J. F. C. FULLER, D.S.O. Hutchinson & Co., 16*s*.

Colonel Fuller is our one and only military prophet, and like most prophets has little enough honour in his own country—save that of

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being misunderstood. It seems to the present reviewer that most of his fellow reviewers have completely missed the main point of "The Reformation of War"—but he charitably supposes this to be due to the fact that they have not read it completely or carefully—a common failing among the class.

To read the notices of the present work in the popular press—including the *Times Literary Supplement*—one would gather that it is but one more example of that too common type of work, which dilates on the horror and bestiality of the last war, and foretells—with cheerfulness or gloom, according to the point of view of the writer—that the next war is going to be much more horrible and bestial. Colonel Fuller is quite prepared to admit the possibility and even the probability of such a development, particularly if the next war is to be directed by "Trappist monks fat on mental indolence"—by which, it may be noted, he does not mean the War Office, or the General Staff, those notorious monstrosities of ineffable stupidity (according to Fleet Street), but the political department of the Government concerned with the management of the Army. He maintains, however, that the true and logical developments of war in the immediate future should trend not towards increased slaughter and destruction, but towards greater humanity, and security both of human lives and of economic resources. He avers that the true purpose of a general in the field should be, not the battering to pieces of the troops of the army opposed to him, or the devastation of hundreds of square miles of hostile territory, but the subjection of the enemy's will by the most effective and rapid means available.

This Colonel Fuller believes can be done by the lavish and extensive use of gases, not necessarily or even advisedly lethal, but gases capable of temporarily incapacitating the enemy's army, and particularly his commanders, or of frightening into surrender the hostile civilian population and government. This gas is to be discharged from rapid-moving, long-range amphibious tanks, or from high-flying aeroplanes; our author also foresees, for the special case of an attack on an island enemy such as Great Britain, the use of submarine tank carriers. These new weapons will tend to drive altogether from the battlefield cavalry, infantry and guns; their adoption will necessitate the introduction of cross-country transport to facilitate supply; and their correct use in the next war will "compel an entire nation to throw up its hands and crave peace within a few days, possibly hours, of a war being declared."

It may seem curious to call these ideas humanitarian and to regard their adoption as tending to lessen the horrors of war; but

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Colonel Fuller considers that the substitution of gas for bullets and shells would tend to diminish suffering and fatality among the casualties of the future battlefield; he also believes, oddly enough, that a wounded soldier suffers as much as a wounded civilian; that drowning is no less unpleasant for a sailor than for a woman; and that to bring one's adversary to his knees, shortly and sharply, by air attacks on his great cities, thus causing insurrection and demands for peace among his stay-at-home workers, is no more brutal than to bleed his armies to death in a series of long-drawn and indecisive battles.

This apocalyptic vision of the warfare of the future, which is the core, and to many will no doubt prove the main interest of the book, is followed by a discussion on the problem of small wars, and the effect on their conduct of the mechanicalization of the British Army. A scheme for this mechanicalization is then sketched; a commencement, it is suggested, should be made with the introduction of cross-country transport; then should follow the conversion of artillery from horse-drawn to tractor-drawn; and, finally, infantry and cavalry regiments should be turned into heavy and light tank battalions. In order to equip, maintain and handle this "new model" army the whole system of command and staff organization must also be radically recast. Colonel Fuller suggests the institution of a generalissimo, a combined General Staff (Army, Navy and Air Force), and a subordinate General Staff with administrative departments for each of the three Services. The organization and functioning of this great war machine is discussed in detail, but for this we must refer the reader to the book itself.

All these weighty matters are sandwiched in between two halves of a dissertation which ranges over the whole history of mankind, and of armed conflict, past, present and future, as regards which it can only be said that every one of its 100 pages affords material for many hours of profound and useful meditation—too often in the present reviewer's case, it must be admitted, directed towards discovering the author's exact meaning. For Colonel Fuller is not an easy writer to read or an easy thinker to follow; like all prophets, he is often obscure, not seldom inconsequent, too often biased. But what would you? We have only one military prophet; and inasmuch as the time has not yet come to build his sepulchre, it is perhaps ungracious to cast too many stones at him.

The reviewer is himself too completely in agreement with Colonel Fuller's main theses to be able to appraise them dispassionately. He must therefore content himself with urging all readers of the

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Army Quarterly to buy the book, read it, mark it—and then judge for themselves. The comparatively small sum thus expended will, if the proceeds be rightly used, be more fertile in professional and intellectual benefit than will the many times greater outlay necessary for the acquirement of the works of the dry and pedantic Clausewitz, the somewhat geometrically minded Hamley, or even of the brilliant and suggestive (but pre-war) Foch.

The Heart of Arabia : A Record of Travel and Exploration. By H. St. J. B. Philby, C.I.E., I.C.S. Two Volumes. London : Constable & Co., Ltd., £3 3*s*. net.

This narrative of the author's experiences in Central Arabia from November, 1917, to June, 1918, is of exceptional interest. He was sent by Sir Percy Cox from Baghdad on a mission to Ibn Sa'ud, the ruler of the *Wahhabi* State of Najd. The purpose of the mission was to re-enlist the cooperation of that ruler against the Turks and their ally, Ibn Rashid of Haïl, and to bring about more friendly relations between him and the King of the Hijaz. At the start the mission only consisted of three persons, the author as political officer, Lieut.-Colonel Cunliffe Owen as military expert and the latter's batman. Landing on the 15th of November at 'Uguair on the Hasa coast, they reached Riyadh, the *Wahhabi* capital, on the 30th, where they met the fourth member of the mission, Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton (now Lord Belhaven and Stenton), Political Agent at Kuwait. It has been expected that they would also find at Riyadh a representative of the Egyptian Government, who was to come by sea to Jidda and thence overland through the Hijaz. But as the King of that territory refused to allow any British officer to pass through his dominions into Najd, on the ground that he could not guarantee his safety, Mr. Philby conceived the brilliant idea of persuading Ibn Sa'ud, with whom he had established very friendly relations, to demonstrate the inadequacy of this plea by sending him with an escort to confer with the King in his own country. He left Riyadh on the 9th of December and reached Jidda on the 31st. The mission was not a success, as it failed to promote good feeling between the two rulers. At the final interview " the King expressed the hope that we would come in due course to accept his view of Ibn Sa'ud's unworthiness. ' I was sent to Najd,' I replied, ' by the British Government to see things there with my own eyes, and it is my misfortune that I have arrived at conclusions widely differing from those of your Majesty.' " King Husain was determined that his territories should not be crossed a second time, and

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the adventurous Mr. Philby found himself practically deported to Egypt.

He left Jidda on the 14th of January and after a brief stay in Egypt and a visit to Jerusalem got back to Basra *via* Bombay on the 24th of March. Four days later he left Basra for the " Hinterland of Euphrates," to concert measures with the friendly shaikhs of that region for a more rigorous blockade of Turkish territory. On the 11th of April he rejoined Ibn Sa'ud, whom he found in camp with part of his forces. He was now the sole British representative, as his two colleagues had left Riyadh some months ago. He immediately resumed the discussion of a plan of campaign against Haïl. Before leaving Riyadh, Mr. Philby had communicated to the British Government a programme on behalf of Ibn Sa'ud, but he had now to inform him that the Government had considerably reduced that programme. Though disappointed at the change of plan, Ibn Sa'ud could not resist the other's cogent reasoning to the effect that now or never was the time to effect the conquest of Haïl.

" ' You know,' I replied, ' that " Cokas " (Sir Percy Cox) and I have done our utmost for you, but in the eyes of the British Government Haïl is but a small pawn in the Great War. For you it is a different thing ; war conditions enable you, with British assistance in money and material, to seize it and make yourself master of all Central Arabia, but if you miss the present opportunity and the war comes to an end with the Arabian situation unaltered, you will not be able to count further on British aid.' "

Ibn Sa'ud accepted the proposed conditions and undertook to open the campaign against Haïl in the following June.

Unfortunately the reader will have to wait for the publication of a third volume before he learns what these conditions were. For Mr. Philby has not included in his present book any account of the military operations conducted during the latter half of the year.

It was thought desirable that, during the two months required for military preparations, Mr. Philby should not remain at Riyadh. The more fanatical section of the population would have preferred an invasion of the Hijaz and was likely to resent the continued presence in their capital of the foreigner, to whose influence they would attribute the choice of the other objective. Ibn Sa'ud suggested that he should go and stay at Kuwait, till the *Wahhabi* forces were ready to take the field. But Mr. Philby, whose taste for exploration had been stimulated by his journey across Arabia from sea to sea, proposed that he should utilize the interval by paying a visit to the southern provinces of Najd.

This excursion lasted fifty days and as a result of his observations

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the author has been enabled to enlarge the boundaries of our knowledge of Arabian geography. Leaving Riyadh on the 6th of May (he had been detained there for over a fortnight, as Ibn Sa'ud came to repent of his too ready consent to the expedition, and only by threatening a hungerstrike did he get away at all), he traversed the provinces of the Kharj and the Aflaj and at last reached his goal, "the great mysterious valley of the Dawasir, on which no white man has ever yet set eyes." In the oasis of Sulaiyil he was within two days' journey of the Great Desert, in whose sands the *Wadi* itself finds its grave. He would fain have pushed on thus far, but his companions, on the plea that bands of marauders were rumoured to be in the neighbourhood, decided against so barren a venture. The next move accordingly was westward to Dam, the chief town of the province of Wadi Dawasir. Having explored the oasis they returned over the uplands of the Tuwaig plateau and re-entered Riyadh on the 24th of June, the return journey having occupied eighteen days.

The geographical discoveries made during this tour of exploration are of high scientific value and Mr. Philby has well deserved the honour bestowed upon him by the Royal Geographical Society. The two maps at the end of the second volume, constructed by the Society upon data supplied by him, constitute an important contribution to our knowledge of Southern Arabia.

Mr. Philby has also rendered a real service to the cause of truth by exposing the fictitious claims set up by the explorer, W. H. Palgrave. With trenchant logic he proves that the "discoveries" of his predecessor are a shameless imposture. Palgrave claimed that in 1862 he made a two days' excursion from Riyadh to the Aflaj. But our author advances convincing reasons (*pace* Mr. D. G. Hogarth) for believing that Palgrave never set foot in the Aflaj.

"(1) Kharfa is about 170 miles distant from Riyadh in a direct line, but Palgrave represents himself as having travelled between these two points in two days of ordinary riding. (2) He failed to notice on the way any of the features, which existed then as they do still, but made up for that omission by creating two non-existent villages out of his own imagination or adopting their names from some map accessible to him. (3) He failed to notice the many other oases of the Aflaj or the lake and other reservoirs and the irrigation channels, which constitute its outstanding features; and (4) almost without exception the information gleaned by him at first or second hand with regard to the country between Riyadh and Kharfa, the Aflaj province, Wadi Dawasir, and the country beyond it, is at variance with the facts."

Mr. Philby goes even further than this; he puts forward good

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reasons for doubting whether Palgrave ever visited the Hasa or perhaps even Riyadh, where he claimed to have spent forty-two days.

Important as these two volumes are for their scientific value, they are even more interesting from a political and historical standpoint. The author in a short introduction sketches the history of the Najd state. As a religious sect, dating from the middle of the eighteenth century, the *Wahhabis* are the puritans of the Moslem faith, who have gone back to the essential articles of their creed, rejecting all the extraneous elements which have attached themselves to it in the course of time. By the beginning of the nineteenth century they had founded an Arabian empire. Mecca and Madina were in their hands, and they had plundered the Shia' shrine of Karbala on the Mesopotamian border. But in 1818 the Turkish Viceroy of Egypt overthrew them and destroyed their capital at Dara'iyya. Within a dozen years a new capital was created at Riyadh, and Faisal threw off the Turkish overlordship about 1842 and in a reign of some twenty-five years restored something of the old *Wahhabi* power. But he was unable to re-establish the suzerainty over Haïl, and about 1885 internal dissensions in the royal house of Najd enabled the ruler of Haïl to make himself master of the *Wahhabi* state. In 1900 Ibn Sa'ud, then twenty years of age, with fifteen devoted followers, by a daring stroke recaptured Riyadh and set himself to rebuild once more the power of Najd. That he has succeeded in his task to a large extent, this narrative bears ample testimony. When Turkey came into the Great War, it was to him that the British Government first looked for assistance. But the unfortunate battle of Jarrab (January, 1915), in which Captain Shakespear, the British representative with Ibn Sa'ud, was killed, caused the collapse of the attack on Haïl. Consequently, it fell to King Husain and Lawrence "to accomplish what in other circumstances might have been accomplished by Ibn Sa'ud and Shakespear." It is fairly plain that in the author's opinion the work would have had more chance of permanent success, if it had been conducted by the latter pair. These volumes, which contain a wealth of information of every sort about the Najd state, are eminently readable. The author has a story to tell, and he tells it in straightforward and simple style. He has, too, a real sense of humour. He has drawn a most attractive picture of a great Arab ruler, who may yet live to found an Arab Empire. The reader of these pages will be certain to hope that Mr. Philby, whether he returns to Arabia to continue his work of exploration or not, will at any rate complete the story of his Arabian year and of the campaign against Haïl at no distant date.

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Select Naval Documents. Edited by H. W. HODGES and E A. HUGHES. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1922. 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

This little volume embodies an excellent idea and has also the merit that the execution of the idea has been no less excellent. There is nothing like giving historical students access to original sources to stimulate interest and to give some idea of the materials on which the text-books are ultimately based. The special character of the subject which these documents illustrate, moreover, makes contact with originals all the more valuable to those who are beginning to study it. Naval history is so full of technical pitfalls for the unwary that what the editors of this volume, who are masters at the R.N. College, Dartmouth, call "concrete illustrations of the limiting conditions of sea warfare" are very helpful. It is characteristic of the judicious spirit in which the editors have approached their problem that they have given a large share of their space to those administrative and technical difficulties which are so apt to be overlooked and yet were so vital. Questions of victualling, of navigation, of ship-building, of the sea-keeping capacities of ships, of armament, of pay, of punishments, obtain their share of importance along with illustrations of tactical methods, of the improvement in signalling and the controlling of fleets and of strategical ideas and principles. One has a long letter from an admiral in the West Indies on the defects of the design and construction of his battleships to balance a passage from Knox's "Journal of the Campaign in North America," illustrating the difficulties of taking Wolfe's Army up the St. Lawrence on its way to Quebec and Hawke's Quiberon despatch. A good measure of space goes to Kempenfeldt, a really great reformer and scientific student of tactics who deserves to be remembered far more for these things than for his connection with the tragedy of the *Royal George*; and the only thing for which the book may be criticized seems to be that the proportion of space allotted to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars seems a little scanty, barely 30 pages out of over 200. But the editors have good reason for their choice, for usually one hears too much of the Nelson era and not enough of earlier times. The editors have made their selection with judgment and discrimination: they have drawn largely on the volumes of the invaluable *Navy Records Society*, but they have also laid under contribution the State Papers in the Record Office, unpublished papers from the British Museum, besides better known authorities like Pepys and Evelyn. They have supplied an

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admirable set of notes to connect up and to explain the different documents, and they are much to be congratulated on a book which is at once useful, interesting and original.

A Chapter of Misfortunes. By Major-General W. D. BIRD, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Forster, Groom & Co. 8*s.* 6*d.*

This aptly named volume treats of that disastrous period in the Mesopotamian theatre of war which followed General Townshend's successful action near Kut-al-Amarah on the 28th of September, 1915. The narrative ends at the point when the repeated failure of the Tigris Corps to break through to Kut-al-Amarah rendered the fall of that town inevitable.

General Bird has drawn for his information upon the report of the Mesopotamian Commission; such war diaries and other official documents as were not destroyed before the surrender; General Townshend's well-known volume; and several other personal narratives and experiences, among which is a book of war history written by a Turkish staff officer.

After a brief summary of the successful operations during 1914 and 1915, which resulted in the occupation of the Basra vilayat, the author devotes the first of his five solid chapters to an informative account of the events and decisions which led up to General Townshend's attack upon the Turks at Ctesiphon. The arguments for and against the decision to reach and hold Baghdad are set forth at length, together with the varying views on the subject held by General Sir John Nixon, Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia; the General Staff at Simla; Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief in India; and the Home Government.

Then follows a description of the battle of Ctesiphon which was to "open the road to Baghdad." While careful to express no opinion on political strategy, General Bird brings keen professional criticism to bear on the conduct of this and of subsequent military operations. It would appear that Ctesiphon was a more desperate venture than even General Townshend expected. A footnote to the text gives the enemy strength as nearly 36,000, of whom 23,000 were combatant Turkish troops and the balance Arab auxiliaries and administrative units. Presumably these figures are those of the Turkish staff officer. Such increase in the forces opposed to him was not known to the British commander who, we are told, computed the Turkish strength at 10,000 to 11,000. Arab reports of the arrival of enemy reinforcements had been received but were unconfirmed.

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Coming to the events which followed the battle of Ctesiphon, the retreat of the 6th Division from Lajj to Aziziyah, Umm-al-Tumal and —eventually—to Kut-al-Amarah is described. The advantages and disadvantages of holding this town are fully discussed. General Bird comes to the conclusion that Kut-al-Amarah was, on the whole, unsuitable for the purpose with which it was occupied, both from the strategical and tactical point of view. It is, however, recorded that the state of General Townshend's men demanded instant rest, which seems to have made imperative the halt at Kut-al-Amarah. The siege of the town began on the 7th of December, 1915, and thenceforward the great problem was how and when the relief of General Townshend could be effected. The formation of the Tigris Corps under General Aylmer took time and the Turks were likewise receiving reinforcements. It was urgently necessary that sufficient land and river transport should be organized before the advance began, but the authorities in London were anxious for urgent action. Too much delay involved the risk of the arrival of the snow flood which would render operations impossible; and there were always the powers of endurance of the Kut garrison to be considered. Here it is pointed out that Sir John Nixon had other responsibilities. His communications had to be preserved and the security of the oil-fields of Karun could not be endangered. It was deemed necessary to reinforce the small garrison at Nasiriyah before the end of December; but General Bird questions whether it would not have been better to have sent these troops to the Tigris Corps.

Preparations for the relief were pushed on, and now we come to three unsuccessful actions of which little is told. On the 6th, 7th and 8th of January, 1916, General Younghusband—who disposed of more men than were with Townshend at Ctesiphon—was heavily engaged with the enemy at Shaik Saad. The British sustained about 4,000 casualties and accomplished nothing, although the Turks fell back next day to Hannah. On the 13th of January an attempt was made to envelop the Turks, who had come forward again and were entrenched along the Wadi and also along the right bank of the Tigris. All the forces at General Aylmer's disposal were used in this operation, but the enemy made good his retreat during the night to his prepared positions at Hannah. Then, on the 21st of January, there was an assault upon the Turkish trenches at Hannah which was repulsed with heavy casualties. The check was so serious that the British commander was constrained to ask for a six hours' armistice in order to bury his dead and to collect his wounded. These three actions might well have been described in detail. They involved

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serious loss and must have lowered the moral of General Aylmer's hastily organized force—important factors when subsequent events are considered.

The enemy's positions at Es Sinn were the next objective of the Tigris Corps. The strength of this line of defence is fully explained and the plan of attack, as set forth and discussed, appears to offer as good a solution as could be found for a rather desperate problem.

General Bird's closing chapter describes the battle of the Dujailah Redoubt. He allows himself some criticism of the orders for the attack and also of the formation adopted by the six infantry brigades for their long night march towards the Es Sinn line. In suggesting that General Aylmer left too little to the discretion of his chief subordinates, a reference is made to " what had occurred at the battles of Shaik Saad, Wadi and Hannah." What had occurred the reader is not permitted to know. Each phase of the battle is carefully described, but the absence of situation maps makes it somewhat difficult to follow the progress of a fight which continued for quite twenty-four hours.

The story comes to a close with the retreat to Wadi after the battle. This failure, combined with the coming of the snow flood later in March, made the fall of Kut-al-Amarah inevitable.

At the end of the book are tables showing the composition and distribution of the British forces in Mesopotamia at different times during the period under review. These tables would be much more informative if the approximate strength of each combatant unit were given. There is a copious index and the maps are of great use.

Maps and Survey. By A. R. HINKS, C.B.E., M.A., F.R.S., Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. 1923. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

The first edition of this book appeared in 1913 and the second edition, now under review, includes without alteration the matter of the first edition. Corrections and amendments to previous matter are given in a special chapter, and three additional, and new, chapters deal with the developments of the subject which have occurred since 1913. These new developments are largely due to the war, and Mr. Hinks has had special facilities for dealing with them by virtue of his personal and valuable share in the preparation of certain war maps and of his intimate personal relations with the Geographical Section.

There are already two official books—the " Textbook of Topo-

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graphical Surveying," and the " Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching "—which deal with surveys and sketches from a military point of view. None the less, " Maps and Survey " makes its own special appeal to soldiers. It would be a good thing if more of us understood broadly the sort of problems, extra to surveying proper, from the construction of geodetic tables to modern colour printing, which confront the military surveyor. It is, however, quite unnecessary to delve into the mathematics, chemistry and technique of the subject in order to acquire that understanding. Officers on service are frequently in the position of requiring for their special needs maps to illustrate a tactical manœuvre, an administrative order, etc., and it should be possible for them, without being masters of the subject, to realize the limitations and possibilities of different scales and how the matter in hand could best be illustrated in colour. " Maps and Survey" deals lucidly and in an interesting way with these subjects, as a whole, without the detail which is essential only to the craftsman. It is a book, then, which should find a place in military libraries.

The " Map Analysis," a useful guide to topographical maps generally, was a great feature of the first edition, and is brought up to date in a new Chapter X. The chapter of most interest to soldiers will be No. XI, although it will not be universally concurred in. On page 233, Mr. Hinks argues that the introduction of a system of coordinates, dependent directly on the triangulation, was necessitated because the map detail was never really good enough for the needs of the artillery. The underlying idea of this sentence is no doubt correct, but it is put in a form which is slightly misleading. Many of our 1/20,000 and 1/10,000 war maps will bear comparison as regards their accuracy with any continental survey of the same scale, but it is impossible to measure from even the best maps at this scale position and bearing with the accuracy which it is both possible, and desirable, to attain with certain types of modern ordnance. Chapter XII deals with photographic surveying and is all the more valuable because the stereoscopic side of this subject is nowhere else described in British works on survey. The stereo-comparator of Pulfrich and the stereo-autograph of Von Orel are instruments the possibilities of which are very great. In describing these comparators, Mr. Hinks notes the facts that stereoscopic methods are best suited to surveying at medium scales but seldom avoid gaps in the topography, and that it is necessary to employ the ground suveyor to fill these gaps. These remarks apply equally to all methods of photographic surveying, and are as applicable in the case of air photographs as they are in respect to those taken

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from the ground. The theory of rectification by the enlarging camera dealt with in this chapter is of value for large-scale surveys, and also during military operations, when the navigation of the aeroplane suffers from enemy interference. For the topographical mapping of the Empire it is of more importance to prevent errors of tilt and of difference of flying height than it is to correct them.

Mr. Hinks's style is as pleasant as it is lucid, and the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press present his book in the most attractive form.

The Gold Coast Survey—Sheets Accra and Koforidua, 1/125,000 (1st Edition, 1922). Price 9*s.* 6*d.* each. (Reproduced and printed by Messrs. W. & A. K. Johnston, Ltd., Edinburgh.) Issued by authority of Brigadier-General Sir F. G. Guggisberg, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Governor of the Colony.

If these maps do something to remind the average British tax-payer that there still are self-supporting British colonies, they will achieve something, although this was not their intention. This survey of the Gold Coast will be useful to all who have direct dealings with the Colony, and all soldiers, Government officials, and traders who move about the bush will welcome the appearance of these clearly printed, detailed, and authoritative maps.

Twenty-five years ago such maps of British West Africa were unknown. The official map of Sierra Leone (issued in 1895) was the only one available for the use of officers engaged in the Hut Tax Operations in that Colony in 1898–99; and it is no exaggeration to dub that publication a disgrace. The map referred to made no attempt to show the configuration of the country and in many particulars it was flagrantly inaccurate: Waima (where there had been an encounter with the French) was carefully shown both in British as well as in French territory—an admirably impartial and diplomatic attitude, possibly, but exasperating and worthless as a geographical guide. In many cases it was quite impossible from the map to find one's way in the bush, and in any case the scale at which it was drawn was absurdly small, being eight miles to one inch.

Fortunately, twenty-five years have seen a great change for the better, and Sir F. Guggisberg is to be heartily congratulated on realizing the necessity for having his Colony well mapped. The two sheets under review cover a belt of country to the north of Accra some 60 miles long by 30 miles broad. They are well reproduced in colours and the form lines being drawn at a reasonable

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vertical interval—50 feet—a very adequate idea can be formed of the configuration of the ground. Each sheet is also supplied with a full table of the various conventional signs, a very necessary addition. Although the maps are actually reproduced in the United Kingdom, yet the originals are no mere drawing-office compilations, for the maps are all carefully drawn in the field with the actual ground before the eyes of the surveyor.

Those officers who have never visited West Africa may consider that the extraordinary improvement in its local survey work is largely due to the improved conditions of life in that part of the world. This is far from being the case, and the bush itself, with all its peculiar charms, is hardly more of a health resort to-day than it was last century. The sanitary improvements in West Africa are chiefly noticeable in the large and important centres and the coast towns.

The area covered by these two sheets consists, to a large extent, of a dense, trackless, tropical forest; and the surveyor cutting his way through the tangle, or working along a narrow bush path, has to camp for the night wherever his traverse happens to finish, irrespective of whether the spot is healthy or not. The climate, too, is enough by itself to try the strongest constitution. The rainfall is prodigious, and for three out of the five wet months there are torrential rains, when all out-of-door work has to cease, and tiny streams soon swell into rivers. Soon after the rains have finished the " harmattan " blows, and the distant view that was blotted out by the rain is now obscured by a dusty mist. Other trials, too, are always present in the form of snakes and reptiles. Further, the surveyor must be adept at handling the delightful but feckless African negro, or he will soon fall behind his time-table. Thus, apart from the considerable scientific skill required to overcome the close and intricate nature of the wild country to be surveyed, there are many other difficulties to face and surmount.

If all the future maps of the Gold Coast Colony reach the standard set by these two sheets, then it will be impossible to urge that the future rapid devlopment of this part of the British Empire has been hindered for lack of sufficiently good maps.

The Gold Coast Survey Section have undoubtedly set before themselves a high ideal, namely, to turn out maps of their Colony that will bear comparison with the fine ½-inch Ordnance Survey Maps of England. If the very different conditions existing in the two countries are remembered, and the length of time the two survey departments have been in existence, then it is clear that this ideal of accuracy, beauty, and price will not be easily or rapidly attained.

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Nevertheless, the present maps are excellent, and they make the map of Sierra Leone, compiled in the Intelligence Division of the War Office in 1895, look like a mere explorer's sketch.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The Contemporary Review, January, 1923. "The Employment of the Ex-Service Man: an irredeemable pledge," by Danus.

The Cornhill Magazine, January, 1923. "The Legion's Road to Rimini," by Major-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

An attractive account of the memories which the chapel at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, recalled to the writer's mind.

The Edinburgh Review, January, 1923. "The Higher Command in 1914," [Anonymous].

This article forms a review of the "Official History of the War" (Vol. I.), and of Mr. John Buchan's "History of the Great War." In the case of the former the writer takes exception to the fact that the work has been written by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, "a body wholly divorced from any responsibility for training the army"; for, in his opinion, it should have been prepared by the General Staff of the Army. "Once more an opportunity has been let slip to teach the British Army British war." This view of the writer does not, however, detract from the congratulations which he offers to General Edmonds and his assistants.

The Quarterly Review, January, 1923. "Turkey and the Powers," [Anonymous].

A description of events, political and military, between 1919 and the Lausanne Conference.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

Aldershot Military Society, CXIX. "Use of Aircraft in Naval Warfare." By Commander R. B. Davies, V.C., D.S.O., A.F.C., R.N. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd., London.

Aldershot Military Society, CXX. "Military Situation on the N.W. Frontier of India." By Col. S. F. Muspratt, C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd., London.

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"The Maintenance of the Agricultural Labour Supply in England and Wales during the War." By J. K. Montgomery. Published by Printing Office of the International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

"History of Jahangir." By Beni Prasad, M.A. Published by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 17*s*. 6*d*. net.

"Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy." Vol. I., 1750–1858. Edited by Professor A. Bevriedale Keith, D.C.L., D.Litt. Published by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. Ditto, ditto, Vol. II., 1858–1921. 2*s*. net each; leather, 4*s*. net.

"Historical Records of The Buffs (E. Kent Regt.) 3rd Foot, 1914–1919." By Colonel R. H. S. Moody, C.B., P.S.C. Published by The Medici Society, Ltd. 7*s*. 6*d*.

Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research. Printed by Sir W. C. Leng & Co., Ltd., Sheffield. 3*s*.

"Moltke's Military Correspondence, 1870–71." Published by The Prussian General Staff Dept. for Military History. First Section, The War to the Battle of Sedan. The Clarendon Press, Oxford. 6*s*. net.

"The Operations of War." Explained and Illustrated by General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Published by Messrs. Wm. Blackwood & Sons. 30*s*. net.

"The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine." By Lieut.-Col. C. Guy Powles, C.M.G., D.S.O. Published by Messrs. Whitcombe & Tombs, Ltd.

"Nieuport, 1914–1918." By Commandant Robert Thys. Published by Constable & Co. 21*s*. net.

"A Chapter of Misfortunes." By Major-Gen. W. D. Bird, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Published by Forster, Groom & Co., Ltd. 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

"Gedenkschriften van Generaal von Moltke." Prijs 0.60 Mij. voor Goede en Goedk Lectur. Admiraal de Ruyterweg 416, Amsterdam.

"Maps and Survey." Second Edition. By Arthur R. Hinks. Published by The Cambridge University Press. 12*s*. 6*d*. net.

"La Bataille de Montdidier." By Commandant M. Daille. Published by Berger-Levrault, Paris. 15 francs net.

"The Reformation of War." By Col. J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O. Published by Hutchinson & Co. 16*s*. net.

"The History of the R.G.H.Y., 1898–1922. The Great Cavalry Campaign in Palestine." By Frank Fox. Published by Philip Allan & Co. 21*s*. net.

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PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

House of Commons

British Army of Occupation, Germany.—On the 15th of February *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Commander O. Locker-Lampson*, said that the present strength of the force was about 8,600 all ranks. The cost during 1922 was about £2,070,000, excluding accommodation and other services provided free by the German Government.

Army Service Corps (Officers' Pay).—On the 15th of February *the Financial Secretary to the War Office*, in reply to a question by Sir A. Holbrook, stated that the Army Council had not so far found itself able to give effect to any recommendations of the Committee appointed to inquire into corps pay for officers of the R.A.S.C.

Military Hospitals.—On the 15th of February *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Commander Bellairs*, stated that the Military Hospital at Chatham was closed in June last, and all military sick of that garrison are now treated in the Naval hospital there. In other stations where similar arrangements are practicable the use of one hospital only was being considered.

Aldershot Command.—On the 19th of February *the Financial Secretary to the War Office*, in reply to a question by Brigadier-General Spears, gave the following figures :—

	Staff.	Total Strength.	
1913	26	25,517	
1923	34	16,725	(excluding 4,000 to 5,000 troops temporarily detached from the command).

Cavalry Barracks.—On the 20th of February *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Major Waring*, stated that the five cavalry depôts, of which Dunbar was one, were being replaced by a Central Cavalry Depôt at Canterbury, and the cavalry at Dunbar were being moved to Canterbury accordingly.

Small-arms Ammunition.—On the 20th of February *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel*

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Sir Philip Richardson, stated that about 992 million rounds had been thrown up for destruction since the Armistice, either because they were unserviceable or because (in the case of a small proportion) the cost of transport was prohibitive.

CONTINENTAL ARMIES.—On the 20th of February *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Mr. A. Herbert*, gave the following army-strengths :—

France	713,000
Jugo-Slavia	109,000
Rumania	160,000
Bulgaria	33,000

CADET CORPS.—On the 27th of February, *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to several questions, said that he could hold out no expectation that the decision to abolish the cadet grant would be varied. A loan of Army camp equipment would, however, be made to a limited number of units for the camping season of 1923. On the abolition of the grant a saving of over £40,000 would be made.

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APPENDIX

[*Supplied from official sources with the permission of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.*]

I. THE ARMY

1. ARMY COUNCIL

Rt. Hon. The Earl of Derby, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., *Secretary of State for War* (*President of the Army Council*).

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. W. E. Guinness, D.S.O., T.D., M.P., T.A. Res., *Under Secretary of State for War* (*Vice-President of the Army Council*).

General F. R., Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., *Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Adjutant-General to the Forces.*

Lieutenant-General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Quarter-Master General to the Forces.*

Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master General of the Ordnance.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. F. S. Jackson, M.P., T.A. Res., *Parliamentary and Financial Secretary* (*Finance Member*).

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.; Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B., *Secretaries and Members of Council.*

2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

Secretary of State for War

Rt. Hon. The Earl of Derby, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War.	Lieutenant-General Sir W. E. Peyton, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Judge Advocate-General.	Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

General F. R., Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.

Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.	Major-General J. T. Burnett-Stuart, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Staff Duties.	Major-General C. F. Romer, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
Director of Military Training	Major-General Hon. J. F. Gathorne-Hardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

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Adjutant General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Organisation.	Colonel (temp. Major-Gen.) I. L. B. Vesey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Personal Services.	Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director-General Army Medical Service.	Lieutenant-General Sir T. H. J. C. Goodwin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Quarter-Master General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Movements and Quartering.	Colonel (temp. Major-Gen.) R. S. May, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Remounts.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. E. G. Norton, C.S.I., A.D.C.
Director of Supplies and Transport.	Major-General P. O. Hazelton, C.B., C.M.G.
Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.	Major-General Sir H. D. E. Parsons, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Director-General Army Veterinary Service.	Major-General W. D. Smith, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Master General of the Ordnance

Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Commdt. R.A.

Director of Artillery.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) B. R. Kirwan, C.B., C.M.G.
Director of Fortifications and Works.	Major-General Sir W. A. Liddell, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Director General of Factories.	H. Mensforth, Esq., C.B.E.

Under Secretary of State for War

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. W. E. Guinness, D.S.O., T.D., M.P., T.A. Res.

Director-General of Territorial and Volunteer Forces.	Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. N. Birch, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt. R.A.
Director-General of Lands.	Sir Howard Frank, Bt., K.C.B.

Finance Member

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. F. S. Jackson, M.P.

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Joint Secretary of the War Office and Accounting Officer

Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B.

Directors of Finance.	H. H. Fawcett, Esq., C.B.; J. B. Crosland, Esq., C.B.; N. F. B. Osborne, Esq., C.B.
Director of Army Contracts.	J. A. Corcoran, Esq., C.B.

Joint Secretary of the War Office

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.

Principal Assistant-Secretary.	Sir B. B. Cubitt, K.C.B.
Chaplain-General.	Rt. Rev. Bishop J. Taylor-Smith, C.B., C.V.O., D.D.

3. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME

A.—Aldershot Command

General Officer Commanding.	Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) W. M. St. G. Kirke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General B. F. Burnett-Hitchcock, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
1st Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O.
1st Division.	Major-General Sir E. G. T. Bainbridge, K.C.B., *p.s.c.*, *q.s.*
1st Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant J. McC. Steele, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant H. W. Higginson, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
3rd Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant A. C. Daly, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 1st Division.	Colonel Commandant W. H. Kay, C.B., D.S.O.
2nd Division.	Major-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
5th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant H. C. Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
6th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant F. W. Ramsay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 2nd Division.	Colonel Commandant H. D. O. Ward, C.B., C.M.G.

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B.—Eastern Command

General Officer Commanding.	General The Lord Horne, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt., R.A., A.D.C.
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. W. Gwynn, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General Sir A. F. Sillem, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*, *q.s.*
4th Division.	Major-General Sir C. D. Shute, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
10th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant W. J. Dugan, C.M.G., D.S.O.
11th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant C. H. T. Lucas, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
12th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant A. H. Marindin, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 4th Division.	Colonel Commandant S. F. Metcalfe, C.M.G., D.S.O.
54th (East Anglian) Division.	Major-General Sir S. W. Hare, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Essex Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. C. Da Costa, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. J. Farmar, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
East Midland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel T. W. the Visct. Hampden, K.C.B., C.M.G.
C.R.A. 54th Division.	Colonel H. C. Stanley-Clarke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
44th (Home Counties) Division.	Major-General Sir J. R. Longley, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Surrey Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. H. Mangles, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Kent and Sussex Infantry Brigade.	Colonel P. M. Robinson, C.B., C.M.G.
Middlesex and Sussex Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. J. Maxwell-Scott, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 44th Division.	Colonel F. A. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O.

C.—Northern Ireland District

General Officer Commanding.	Major-General A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.	Bt. Lieut.-Colonel R. T. Hammick, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
15th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant Sir P. C. B. Skinner, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
16th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., *p.s.c.*
17th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant C. Yatman, C.M.G., D.S.O.
18th Infantry Brigade.	Major-General A. G. Wauchope, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.

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D.—London District

General Officer Commanding.	Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.B., C.M.G.
General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.	Major A. F. A. N. Thorne, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
56th (The London) Division.	Major-General Sir C. E. Pereira, K.C.B., C.M.G.
1st London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. C. Hamilton, C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. Maxwell, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
3rd London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. W. Studd, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 56th (The London) Division.	Colonel F. W. H. Walshe, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., *p.s.c.*
47th (The London) Division.	Major-General Sir N. M. Smyth, V.C., K.C.B.
4th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. C. A. McCalmont, D.S.O.
5th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. B. Hubback, C.M.G., D.S.O.
6th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Hon. A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 47th (The London) Division.	Colonel H. E. T. Kelly, C.B., C.M.G.

E.—Northern Command

General Officer Commanding.	Lieutenant-General Sir F. I. Maxse, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., *q.s.*
General Staff Officer 1st Grade.	Colonel W. W. Seymour, *p.s.c.*
Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
5th (Yorkshire and Notts) Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel H. F. Wickham, C.I.E.
6th (Midland) Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel D'A. Legard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
50th (the Northumbrian Division).	Major-General Sir P. S. Wilkinson, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Durham Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. O. Spence, C.B., D.S.O., T.D.
Northumberland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. P. A. Riddell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
York and Durham Infantry Brigade.	Colonel B. G. Price, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 50th (Northumbrian) Division.	Colonel J. W. F. Lamont, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
49th (West Riding) Division.	Major-General H. R. Davies, C.B.
1st West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. H. L. Allgood, C.M.G., D.S.O.

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E.—NORTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. E. Sugden, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
3rd West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. M. Withycombe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 49th (West Riding) Division.	Colonel Sir E. N. Whitley, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
46th (North Midland) Division.	Major-General Sir A. R. Hoskins, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Lincolnshire and Leicestershire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. Gordon, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Staffordshire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. C. Onslow, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
The Sherwood Foresters (Notts and Derby) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G D. Goodman, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.
C.R.A. 46th (North Midland) Division.	Colonel Sir S. H. Child, Bt., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

General Officer Commanding.	Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer 1st Grade.	Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. St. John, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. A. Strick, C.B., D.S.O.
51st (Highland) Division.	Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Argyll and Sutherland Infantry Brigade.	
Seaforth and Cameron Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. W. Sandilands, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Black Watch and Gordon Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. S. G. Crauford, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.
C.R.A. 51st (Highland) Division.	Colonel H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O.
52nd (Lowland Division).	Major-General Sir P. R. Robertson, K.C.B., C.M.G.
Highland Light Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. M. Findlay, D.S.O., T.D.
West Scottish Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. S. Murray-White, D.S.O.
East Scottish Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. B. Lesslie, C.B., C.M.G.
C.R.A. 52nd (Lowland) Division.	Colonel G. N. Johnston, C.M.G., D.S.O.

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G.—Southern Command

General Officer Commanding.	General Sir W. N. Congreve, V.C., K.C.B., M.V.O.
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. P. Deedes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General Hon. Sir A. R. Montagu-Stuart Wortley, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
2nd Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.
3rd Division.	Major-General Sir W. C. G. Heneker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
7th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant G. V. Hordern, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
8th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant S. E. Hollond, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
9th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant E. S. Girdwood, C.B., C.M.G.
C.R.A. 3rd Division.	Colonel Commandant L. C. L. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
48th (South Midland) Division.	Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Warwickshire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. Mudge, C.M.G.
Gloucestershire and Worcs. Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
South Midland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. J. F. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 48th (South Midland) Division.	Colonel A. T. Anderson, C.M.G.
43rd (Wessex) Division.	Major-General Sir L. J. Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Devon and Cornwall Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. T. Humphreys, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
South Wessex Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. Bonham-Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Hampshire Infantry Bgde.	Colonel L. F. Philips, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. (Wessex) Division.	Colonel G. H. W. Nicholson, C.B., C.M.G.

H.—Western Command

General Officer Commanding.	Lieutenant-General Sir H. de B. De Lisle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.	Colonel R. J. F. Hayter, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) Sir C. C. M. Maynard, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

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WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

53rd (Welsh) Division.	Major-General Sir A. A. Montgomery, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*
North Wales Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. R. N. Madocks, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Welsh Border Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. G. Dill, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
South Wales Infantry Brigade.	Colonel N. A. Thomson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 53rd (Welsh) Division.	Colonel L. A. Smith, D.S.O.
55th (West Lancashire) Division.	Major-General Sir C. L. Nicholson, K.C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
North Lancashire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. G. Parker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Liverpool Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
South Lancashire and Cheshire Infantry Bgde.	Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 55th (West Lancashire) Division.	Brevet-Colonel C. E. G. G. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O.
42nd (East Lancashire) Division.	Major-General T. H. Shoubridge, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Manchester Infantry Bgde.	Colonel H. C. Darlington, C.B., C.M.G., T.D.
East Lancashire and Border Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. J. Woulfe-Flanagan, D.S.O.
Lancashire Fusiliers Bgde.	Colonel M. L. Hornby, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 42nd (East Lancashire) Division.	Colonel E. M. Birch, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS

Guernsey and Alderney District:	
Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.	Major-General Sir J. E. Capper, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
Jersey District:	
Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.	Major-General Sir W. D. Smith, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

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4. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

A.—Cavalry Regiments

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
The Life Guards (1st and 2nd)	Regent's Park	Lt.-Col. Hon. E. S. Wyndham, D.S.O. Lt.-Col. H. C. S. Ashton.	For Windsor
Royal Horse Guards (The Blues)	Windsor	R. G. H. Howard-Vyse, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	For Regent's Park
1st King's Dragoon Guards	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. A. C. Little, D.S.O.	For Rhine
The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards)	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. C. S. Rome, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
3rd–6th Dragoon Guards	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. C. L. Rome, D.S.O.	
4th–7th Dragoon Guards	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. C. F. Hunter, D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Dragoons	Hounslow	Lt.-Col. H. A. Tomkinson, D.S.O.	
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	Risalpur	Lt.-Col. W. M. Duguid-McCombie, D.S.O.	
3rd The King's Own Hussars	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th Queen's Own Hussars	Muttra	Lt.-Col. T. W. Pragnell, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
5th–6th Dragoons	Egypt	Lt.-Col. C. R. Terrot, D.S.O.	
7th Queen's Own Hussars	Mhow	Lt.-Col. H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For U.K.
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	Egypt	Lt.-Col. J. Van der Byl, D.S.O.	
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. W. L. S. H. Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. A. G. Seymour, M.V.O., D.S.O.	
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	Meerut	Lt.-Col. W. J. Lockett, D.S.O.	
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. O. W. Brinton.	
13th–18th Hussars	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. E. F. Twist.	
14th–20th Hussars	Rhine	Lt.-Col. J. G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	For Tidworth
15th–19th Hussars	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. F. C. Pilkington, D.S.O.	For Abroad
16th–5th Lancers	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
17th–21st Lancers	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. T. P. Melvill, D.S.O.	

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B.—Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery

Stations of Units.

Royal Horse Artillery.

Brig.	Battery.	—	Brig.	Battery.	—
1	H.-Q.	Exeter	3 (std.)	J	Egypt
	B			F	Egypt
	M				
	A	Trowbridge	5	H.-Q., E, G	Aldershot
2	H.-Q.	Lucknow		O	Aldershot(for St. John's Wood)
	K	Delhi			
	C	Meerut		N	St. John's Wood (for Aldershot)
	H	Sialkot			
3	H.-Q.	Egypt		I	Risalpur
	D	Egypt		L	Secunderabad

Royal Field Artillery.

1	11, 111 (H), 98, 109	Larkhill	18	H.-Q. 59 (H) 93, 95 (H) 94	Kirkee (for Colchester) Belgaum
2	53, 87 (H) 35 (H) 42	Lahore Ferozepore Jullundur	19	39, 96, 97, 29 (H)	Constantinople
3	18, 62, 75, 65 (H)	Rhine (for Deepcut)	20	H.-Q. 67, 45 (H) 99, 41	Bangalore Secunderabad
4	66, 14 4 (H), 7	Shorncliffe Newtownards	21	H.-Q. 101, 21, 102 108 (H)	Meerut
5	63, 64, 73, 81 (H)	Bordon (for Bulford)	22	H.-Q 32 55 (H)	Agra Jhansi
6	69, 74, 77, 79 (H)	Bordon		33	Cawnpore (for Nowgong)
7	9, 43 (H), 17 16	Jubbulpore Kamptee		36	Nasirabad
8	103, 106, 107 82 (H)	Deepcut (for Rhine)	23	H.-Q. 89, 90 60, 100 (H)	Neemuch Mhow
9	19, 20, 28, 76 (H)	Deepcut	24	H.-Q. 22, 50, 56 (H) 70 (H)	Rawalpindi Campbellpore
10	46, 54, 30 (H), 51	Sheffield York	25	25, 58, 31 (H) 12	Bulford (for Aldershot) Porton
11	H.-Q. 83, 84 78 (H), 85	Ipswich Norwich	26	H.-Q. 40 (H) 15 71 48 (H)	Fyzabad Lucknow Bareilly Allahabad
12	6, 23, 49, 91 (H)	Aldershot	27	24, 105, 47 (H) 37 (H)	Nowshera Peshawar
13	2, 8, 44, 104 (H)	Woolwich	28	1, 3, 5, 57 (H)	Aldershot (for Bordon)
14	38, 68, 88 61 (H)	Colchester (for Abroad)			
15	52, 80, 112, 110 (H)	Bulford			
16	H.-Q. 27 (H), 72 86 (H), 34	Hyderabad (Sind) Quetta			
17	H.-Q. 13, 92, 26 10 (H)	Egypt Iraq (for Egypt)			

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Allotment of Batteries to Brigades.

Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.
1	28th	18	3rd	35	2nd	52	15th	69	6th	86	16th	103	8th
2	13th	19	9th	36	22nd	53	2nd	70	24th	87	2nd	104	13th
3	28th	20	,,	37	27th	54	10th	71	26th	88	14th	105	27th
4	4th	21	21st	38	14th	55	22nd	72	25th	89	23rd	106	8th
5	28th	22	24th	39	19th	56	24th	73	5th	90	,,	107	,,
6	12th	23	12th	40	26th	57	28th	74	6th	91	12th	108	21st
7	4th	24	27th	41	20th	58	25th	75	3rd	92	17th	109	1st
8	13th	25	25th	42	2nd	59	18th	76	9th	93	18th	110	15th
9	7th	26	17th	43	7th	60	23rd	77	6th	94	,,	111	1st
10	17th	27	16th	44	13th	61	14th	78	11th	95	,,	112	15th
11	1st	28	9th	45	20th	62	3rd	79	6th	96	19th		
12	25th	29	19th	46	10th	63	5th	80	15th	97	,,		
13	17th	30	10th	47	27th	64	,,	81	5th	98	1st		
14	4th	31	25th	48	26th	65	3rd	82	8th	99	20th		
15	26th	32	22nd	49	12th	66	4th	83	11th	100	23rd		
16	7th	33	,,	50	24th	67	20th	84	,,	101	21st		
17	,,	34	16th	51	10th	68	14th	85	,,	102	,,		

C.—Royal Garrison Artillery Pack Brigades

Brigades.	British Pack Batteries.	—
I.	2, 3, 4, 15	Bulford
II.	5, 7, 9	Ewshott
V.	18	Longmoor
	1, 14	Constantinople
	13	Aden
	16	Egypt
20th (Indian)	10	Jutogh
21st (Indian)	12	Waziristan
22nd (Indian)	8	Nowshera
23rd (Indian)	17	Quetta
24th (Indian)	11	Dardoni
25th (Indian)	6	Rawalpindi

Royal Garrison Artillery Medium Brigades.

Brig.	H.A. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.A. and Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q.	Shoeburyness	4	H.-Q. 13, 14 (H)	Roorkee
	1.	Woolwich		15 (H)	Nowgong (for Roorkee)
	5 (H)	For Shoeburyness		16 (H)	Delhi (for Roorkee)
	17, 19 (H)	Larkhill			
2	H.-Q.	For Ambala			
	9 (H)	For Ambala	5	H.-Q. 3 (H), 18 (H), 20 (H), 22 (H),	Constantinople
	4 (H)	Ferozepore			
	7 (H)	Peshawar			
	12	For Ambala		8 (H)	Karachi (unbrigaded)
3	H.-Q. 2, 10 (H), 6 (H)	Constantinople		21	Rhine (unbrig'd.)
	11 (H)	Gibraltar			

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D.—Royal Engineers

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, Chatham
Electric Light School, Gosport
Training Battalion R.E., Chatham
Depot Battalion R.E., Chatham
R.E. Mounted Depot, Aldershot
Railway Training Centre, Longmoor
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot
2nd Co. (Field), Egypt
3rd Co. (Fortress), Dover
4th Co. (Fortress), Gosport
5th Co. (Field), Aldershot
6th Co. (Fortress), Belfast
7th Co. (Field), Rhine
8th Co. (Railway), Longmoor
9th Co. (Field), Colchester
11th Co. (Field), Aldershot
12th Co. (Field), Constantinople
13th Co. (Survey), York
14th Co. (Survey), Edinburgh
15th Co. (Fortress), Constantinople
16th Co. (Fortress), North Shields
17th Co. (Field), Londonderry (for Bulford)
19th Co. (Survey), Southampton
20th Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
22nd Co. (Fortress), Gosport
23rd Co. (Field), Aldershot
24th Co. (Fortress), Constantinople
26th Co. (Field), Bordon
27th Co. (Fortress), Bermuda
29th Co. (Army Troops), Constantinople
30th Co. (Fortress), Plymouth
31st Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
33rd Co. (Fortress), Spike Island
34th Co. (Fortress), Guernsey
35th Co. (Fortress), Pembroke
36th Co. (Fortress), Sierra Leone
38th Co. (Field), Aldershot
39th Co. (Fortress), Sheerness
40th Co. (Fortress), Hong Kong
41st Co. (Fortress), Singapore
42nd Co. (Field), Egypt
43rd Co. (Fortress), Mauritius
44th Co. (Fortress), Jamaica
45th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
49th Co. (Fortress), North Queensferry
54th Co. (Field), Bordon
55th Co. (Field), Constantinople
56th Co. (Field), Bulford
57th Co. (Field), Bulford
58th (Porton) Co., Porton
59th Co. (Field), Carrickfergus
Experimental Bridging Co., Christchurch
1st A. A. Bn. R.E., Blackdown

E.—Infantry Regiments

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Grenadier Guards	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. B. N. Sergison Brooke, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. Hon. E. M. Colston, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
3rd ditto	Windsor	Lt.-Col. Lord H. C. Seymour, D.S.O.	
1st Coldstream Guards	Tower of London	Lt.-Col. J. E. Gibbs, M.C.	
2nd ditto	Warley	Lt.-Col. G. J. Edwards, D.S.O., M.C.	
3rd ditto	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. W. St. A. Warde-Aldam, D.S.O.	
1st Scots Guards	Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. F. G. Alston, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Hyde Park Barracks	Lt.-Col. B. H. S. Romilly, D.S.O.	
1st Irish Guards	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. Hon. H. R. L. G Alexander, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Welsh Guards	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. T. R. C. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O. *p.s.c.*	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Royal Scots (The Royal Regt.)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. J. H. Mackenzie, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. H. E. P. Nash, D.S.O.	For Colchester
1st Bn. The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. H. C. Whinfield.	
2nd ditto	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. E. B. Mathew-Lannowe, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Bn. The Buffs (East Kent Regiment)	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. R. McDouall, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aden	Lt.-Col. W. H. Trevor, D.S.O.	For U.K.
1st Bn. The King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)	Shorncliffe	Bt.-Col. H. R. Headlam, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Rangoon	Bt.-Col. O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.	
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	Rhine	Lt.-Col. A. C. L. H. Jones	
2nd ditto	Fyzabad	Lt.-Col. H. R. Sandilands, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	Newry	Bt.-Col. H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Chatham
2nd ditto	Nazirabad	Bt.-Col. C. F. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)	Jullundur	Lt.-Col. M. O. Clarke, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. H. A. Walker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Bn. The King's Regiment (Liverpool)	Omagh	Lt.-Col. L. M. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Jersey
2nd ditto	Hong-Kong	Bt.-Col. W. A. Blake, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Norfolk Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. F. R. Day, D.S.O.	For Abroad
2nd ditto	Iraq	Lt.-Col. A. L. Hadow, C.M.G.	For Aden
1st Lincolnshire Regiment	Enniskillen	Lt.-Col. R. H. G. Wilson.	
2nd ditto	Dinapore	Lt.-Col. F. W. Greatwood, D.S.O.	
1st Devonshire Regiment	Devonport		For Aldershot
2nd ditto	Delhi	Lt.-Col. J. D. Ingles, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Suffolk Regiment	Wellington	Lt.-Col. F. T. D. Wilson.	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. S. J. B. Barnardiston, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Somerset Light Infantry, (Prince Albert's)	Holywood, Belfast	Lt.-Col. A. H. Yatman, D.S.O.	For Devonport
2nd ditto	Agra	Lt.-Col. A. W. S. Paterson, D.S.O.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Bn. The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own)	Rhine	Bt.-Col. G. D. Price, C.M.G.	
2nd ditto	Iraq	Bt.-Col. T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O.	
1st East Yorkshire	Egypt	Lt.-Col. T. A. Headlam	
2nd ditto [Regiment	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. F. H. Harvey, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	For U.K.
1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. W. Allason, D.S.O.	For Aldershot
2nd ditto	Kamptee	Lt.-Col. G. D. Jebb, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Leicestershire Regiment	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. E. L. Challenor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jhansi	Lt.-Col. C. H. Haig, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Green Howards (Alexandra Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. M. D. Carey	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. G. B. de M. Maris, D.S.O.	
1st Lancashire Fusiliers	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. C. de Putron.	
2nd ditto	Nowshera	Lt.-Col. H. M. Farmar, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Royal Scots Fusiliers	Glasgow	Bt.-Col. O. H. Delano-Osborne, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. R. K. Walsh, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Cheshire Regiment	Ranikhet	Lt.-Col. B. H. Chetwynd-Staplyton, *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. A. Crookenden, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	For Strensall
1st Royal Welch Fusiliers	Ladha	Lt.-Col. C. S. Owen, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Multan
2nd ditto	Pembroke Dock	Lt.-Col. C. C. Norman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st South Wales Borderers	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Devonport
2nd ditto	Barrackpore	Bt.-Col. C. C. Taylor, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers	Constantinople	Bt.-Col. P. A. V. Stewart, C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	For Edinburgh
2nd ditto	Devonport	Lt.-Col. E. N. Broadbent, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Abroad
1st Bn. Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Aldershot	Bt.-Col. J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. R. Oakley, D.S.O.	For Iraq
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	Bombay	Lt.-Col. C. Ridings, D.S.O., O.B.E.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Gloucestershire Regiment	Rhine	Lt.-Col. J. R. Wethered, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	For Aldershot
2nd ditto	Rawalpindi	Lt.-Col. R. I. Rawson	
1st Worcestershire Regiment	Meerut	Lt.-Col. H. A. Fulton, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. G. M. C. Davidge, D.S.O.	
1st East Lancashire Regiment	Jamaica and Bermuda	Lt.-Col. J. E. Green, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Carrickfergus	Lt.-Col. G. E. M. Hill, D.S.O.	For Bordon
1st East Surrey Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. C. C. G. Ashton, O.B.E.	For Khartoum
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. A. Orpen-Palmer, D.S.O.	
1st Duke of Cornwall's Lgt. Infantry	Meerut	Lt.-Col. A. P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. R. M. Wetherell, C.M.G.	
1st Bn. The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. R. K. Healing.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Bt.-Col. C. L. Smith, V.C., M.C.	
1st Border Regiment	Dardoni	Lt.-Col. H. Nelson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. G. de la P. B. Pakenham, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Sussex Regiment	Londonderry	Lt.-Col. R. Bellamy, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Constantinople	Bt.-Col. A. E. Glasgow, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Hampshire Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. A. E. Andrews, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Bordon	Bt.-Col. C. N. French, C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
1st South Staffordshire Regiment	Maymyo	Bt.-Col. R. W. Morgan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Irvinestown	Lt.-Col. M. B. Savage, C.B.E., D.S.O.	For Devonport
1st Dorsetshire Regt.	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. A. L. Moulton-Barrett, D.S.O.	For Abroad
2nd ditto	Khartoum	Lt.-Col. C. Saunders, D.S.O.	For Egypt
1st Bn. The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire)	Belfast	Lt.-Col. D'O. B. Dawson.	For Portsmouth
2nd ditto	Mhow	Lt.-Col. W. B. Ritchie, D.S.O.	
1st Welch Regiment	Peshawar	Lt.-Col. C. R. Berkeley, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. A. Derry, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st Bn. The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	Quetta	Lt.-Col. S. H. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Bn. The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	Bordon	Lt.-Col. S. A. Innes, D.S.O.	
1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. F. H. Stapleton, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Rawalpindi	Lt.-Col. E. R. Clayton, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Essex Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. F. W. Moffit, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Ambala	Lt.-Col. A. P. Churchill	
1st Bn. The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment)	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. W. N. S. Alexander, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rawal Pindi	Lt.-Col. R. S. Popham, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. E R. Fitzpatrick, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. R. E. Berkeley, D.S.O.	
1st Northamptonshire Regiment	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. C. R. J. Mowatt, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Lahore	Lt.-Col. H. C. W. H. Wortham, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Berkshire Regiment (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)	Bareilly	Bt.-Col. S. G. Francis, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. W. B. Thornton, D.S.O.	
1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent	Poona	Lt.-Col. H. D. Buchanan-Dunlop, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto [Regiment	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. C. E. Kitson, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry	Rhine	Lt.-Col. H. E. Trevor, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Ferozepore	Lt.-Col. C. E. Heathcote, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The King's Shropshire Light Infantry	Poona	Lt.-Col. P. L. Hanbury, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. P. F. Fitzgerald, D.S.O.	
1st Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Rhine	Lt.-Col. R. M. Heath, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Aldershot
2nd ditto	Singapore	Lt.-Col. F. E. Swainson	
1st King's Royal Rifles Corps	Quetta	Lt.-Col. B. J. Majendie, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Bt.-Col. H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Tidworth	Bt.-Col. R. D. F. Oldman, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O	
2nd ditto	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. A. W. Timmis, M.C.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Manchester Regiment	Guernsey and Alderney	Lt.-Col. F. H. Dorling, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Jubbulpore	Lt.-Col. W. B. Eddowes.	
1st Bn. The North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's)	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. H. C. Tweedie D.S.O., O.B.E.	For India
2nd ditto	Lichfield	Bt.-Col. L. J. Wyatt, D.S.O.	
1st York & Lancaster Regiment	Rhine	Lt.-Col. G. H. Wedgwood, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Karachi	Lt.-Col. H. M. Hutchinson, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Durham Light Infantry	York	Lt.-Col. A. E. Irvine, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Ahmednagar	Lt.-Col. E. Du. P. H. Moore.	
1st Highland Light Infantry	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Belfast
2nd ditto	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. H. T. C. Singleton, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Seaforth Highlanders, (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's)	Belfast	Lt.-Col. H. F. Baillie, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Landi-Kotal	Lt.-Col. K. G. Buchanan, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Gordon Highldrs.	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. C. Ogston, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Fort George	Bt.-Col. J. L. G. Burnett, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	Calcutta	Lt.-Col. E. Craig-Brown, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. G. C. M. Sorel-Cameron.	For Rhine
1st Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles	Parkhurst, Isle of Wight	Lt.-Col. H. R. Charley, C.B.E.	For Rhine
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. A. D. N. Merriman, D.S.O.	
Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's)	Dover	Lt.-Col. R. G. Shuter, D.S.O.	
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)	Allahabad	Lt.-Col. H. H. G. Hyslop, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. G. Neilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	For Parkhurst
1st Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)	Cawnpore	Bt.-Col. A. T. Paley, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. J. Harrington, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

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5. TANK CORPS

1st (Depot) Tank Battalion .. .. .. Lieut.-Col. T. C. Mudie, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	Wool, Dorset.
2nd Tank Battalion .. .. Bt.-Col. E. B. Hankey, D.S.O.	Farnborough.
3rd Tank Battalion .. .. Lieut.-Col. W. J. Shannon, C.M.G., D.S.O.	Wareham.
4th Tank Battalion .. .. Lieut.-Col. H. G. R. Burges-Short, D.S.O.	Wareham.
5th Tank Battalion .. .. Lieut.-Col. K. M. Laird, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	Perham Down, Salisbury Plain.
"B" Company, 5th Battalion .. .. .. Major A. G. Kenchington, M.C.	Cologne.
Tank Workshops Training Battalion .. .. Lieut.-Col. N. Hudson, D.S.O., M.I.Mech.E., *p.a.c.*	Wool.
Central Schools Tank Corps .. .. .. Lieut.-Col. H. K. Woods, D.S.O.	Wool.
1st and 2nd Armoured Car Companies.. ..	Iraq.
3rd " "	Egypt.
5th " "	Ireland.
6th " "	Bareilly.
7th " "	Peshawar and Kohat.
8th " "	Lahore and Delhi.
9th " "	Secunderabad.
10th " "	Manzai.
11th " "	Kirkee.
12th " "	Ireland.

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II. THE ARMY IN INDIA

[*Corrected up to the 1st February*, 1923.]

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Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency General H. S., Lord Rawlinson of Trent, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., *p.s.c.*

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D.D.G.O. Lieut.-Colonel C. J. D. Freeth.

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D.A. and Q.M.G. Major-General H. C. Tytler, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

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(*Nowshera*)

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Headquarters, Kohat District

(KOHAT)

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(*Kohat*)

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(*Dardoni*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. E. Herdon, C.I.E., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 8TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Bannu*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel J. L. Furney, I.A.

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(RAWALPINDI)

Commander. Major-General Sir H. C. C. Uniacke, K.C.M.G., C.B., B.S.

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(*Abbottabad*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. R. P. Boileau, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.A.

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(*Jhelum*)

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(*Lahore Cantonment*)

Commander. Major-General Sir S. T. B. Lawford, K.C.B., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 2ND INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Sialkot*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. H. Rankin, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 16TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Ferozepore*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. J. Poole, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.

JULLUNDUR BRIGADE AREA

(*Jullundur*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. F. Bainbridge, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

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(*Lahore*)

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AMBALA BRIGADE AREA

(*Ambala*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. J. P. Browne, C.B., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

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(KARACHI)

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(QUETTA)

Commander.	Major-General Sir D. G. M. Campbell, K.C.B., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 14TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Quetta*)

Brigade Commander.	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. L. Tarver, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 15TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Quetta*)

Brigade Commander.	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. A. F. Sanders, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

ZHOB AREA

(*Loralai*)

Area Commander.	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. B. D. Baird, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

Headquarters, Sind-Rajputana District

(KARACHI)

Commander.	Major-General Sir H. C. Holman, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, NASIRABAD BRIGADE AREA

(*Mount Abu*)

Area Commander.	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. H. Hare, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

Headquarters, Waziristan Force

(DERA ISMAIL KHAN)

Commander.	Major-General Sir T. G. Matheson, K.C.B., C.M.G., B.S.

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Waziristan Force—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Ladha*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) F. P. C. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 10TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Manzai*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. W. Jackson, C.S.I., D.S.O., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 21ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Sorarogha*)

Commander (Temp.). Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. J. Mitchell, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

Headquarters, Eastern Command

(*Naini Tal*)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. General Sir H. Hudson, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., A.D.C., I.A.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.

D.A. and Q.M.G. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) J. Charteris, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, R.E.

Headquarters, United Provinces District

(*Mussoorie*)

Commander. Major-General C. J. Deverell, C.B., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 3RD INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Meerut*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. L. Gregory, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Lucknow*)

Brigade Commander.

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Dehra Dun*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. Isacke, C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 18TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Bareilly*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. N. Macmullen, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

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United Provinces District—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 19TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Lucknow*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) T. H. K. Stewart, C.B., D.S.O., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, DELHI BRIGADE AREA

(*Delhi*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) K. Wigram, C.B., C.S.I., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, 2-2nd G.R.

Presidency and Assam District

(*Calcutta*)

Commander. Major-General T. A. Cubitt, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

ALLAHABAD BRIGADE AREA (INDEPENDENT)

(*Allahabad*)

Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. G. Stewart, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

Headquarters, Southern Command

(*Poona*)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Marshall, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., B.S.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. H. Norman, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

D.A. and Q.M.G. Major-General P. Holland-Pryor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

Headquarters, Central Provinces District

(*Mhow*)

Commander. Major-General Sir L. R. Vaughan, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 20TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Jhansi*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. R. Cassels, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, JUBBULPORE BRIGADE AREA

(*Jubbulpore*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) J. W. O'Dowda, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

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Headquarters, Poona District

(*Poona*)

Commander. Major-General C. W. G. Richardson, C.B., C.S.I., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

5TH INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Secunderabad*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. A. C. Godwin, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 22ND INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Ahmednagar*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. D. H. Moore, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

Headquarters, Bombay District

(*Bombay*)

Commander. Major-General H. A. V. Cummins, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

Headquarters, Madras District

(*Wellington*)

Commander. Major-General J. Ponsonby, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, BANGALORE BRIGADE AREA

(*Bangalore*)

Area Commander. Major-General W. P., Lord Ruthven, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

Headquarters, Burma Independent District

(*Maymyo*)

Commander. Major-General Sir V. B. Fane, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., I.A.

RANGOON BRIGADE AREA

(*Rangoon*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. Ross, D.S.O., I.A.

Aden

Commander. Major-General T. E. Scott, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

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III. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

1.—Air Council

President of the Air Council.	Lieut.-Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G. Hoare, Bt., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
Vice-President of the Air Council.	His Grace the Duke of Sutherland, Under Secretary of State for Air.
Members.	Air Chief-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., K.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Chief of the Air Staff; Air Vice-Marshal O. Swann, C.B., C.B.E., Air Member for Personnel; Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Air Member for Supply and Research; Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B., Secretary of the Air Ministry.

2.—Air Ministry

Secretary of State for Air.	Lieut.-Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G. Hoare, Bt., C.M.G., M.P.
Parliamentary Private Secretary.	Major Viscount Sandon, M.P.
Air Secretary and Private Secretary.	Group Captain E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.
Assistant Private Secretary.	Flight-Lieutenant G. W. Dobson, O.B.E.
Under Secretary of State for Air.	His Grace the Duke of Sutherland.
Private Secretary.	P. J. Oldfield, Esq.
Secretary of the Air Ministry.	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
Deputy Secretary and Accounting Officer of the Air Ministry.	W. A. Bland, Esq., C.B.
Department of the Under Secretary of State for Air :—	
Director of Civil Aviation.	Major-General Sir W. S. Brancker, K.C.B., A.F.C.
Deputy Director of Air Transport.	Lieut.-Colonel I. A. E. Edwards, C.M.G.,
Controller of Aerodromes and Licensing.	Brig.-General F. L. Festing, C.B., C.M.G.

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Air Ministry—*continued*

Department of the Secretary of the Air Ministry:—	
Secretary.	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
Private Secretary.	R. Monk-Jones, Esq.
Deputy Secretary.	W. A. Bland, Esq., C.B.
Private Secretary.	W. B. Foden, Esq.
Principal Assistant Secretaries.	H. W. W. McAnally, Esq., C.B.; B. E. Holloway, Esq., C.B.; J. A. Webster, Esq., D.S.O.
Director of Accounts.	J. S. Ross, Esq., C.B.E.
Deputy Directors.	H. W. Clothier, Esq. (acting). F. W. N. Sibley, Esq.
Director of Contracts.	C. R. Brigstocke, Esq., C.B.
Deputy Director.	A. H. Self, Esq. (acting).
Director of Meteorological Office.	G. C. Simpson, Esq., C.B.E., D.Sc., F.R.S.
Directorate of Lands (Joint Service for War Office and Air Ministry):—	
Controller of Lands.	E. H. Coles, Esq.
Chief Valuer and Compensation Officer.	Colonel H. F. Cobb, O.B.E.
Department of the Chief of the Air Staff:—	
Chief of the Air Staff.	Air Chief-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., K.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
Civil Assistant.	Captain T. B. Marson, M.B.E.
Private Secretary.	C. G. Beatson, Esq.
Director of Operations and Intelligence.	Air Commodore J. M. Steel, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E.
Deputy Director.	Group-Captain C. S. Burnett, C.B.E., D.S.O.
Director of Training and Staff Duties.	Air Commodore T. C. R. Higgins, C.M.G.
Deputy Director of Training.	Group-Captain P. L. W. Herbert, C.M.G., C.B.E.
Educational Adviser.	Colonel I. Curtis.
Director of Works and Buildings.	Major-General Sir Andrew M. Stuart, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Deputy Director.	H. E. Oakley, Esq., O.B.E., M.Inst.C.E.
Deputy Director.	Colonel T. D. Mackie, C.M.G., O.B.E., M.I.Mech.E.
Controller of Communications.	Group-Captain L. F. Blandy, D.S.O.

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Air Ministry—*continued*

Department of the Air Member for Personnel :—	
Air Member for Personnel.	Air Vice-Marshal O. Swann, C.B., C.B.E.
Chaplain-in-Chief.	Rev. H. D. L. Viener, C.B.E., M.A.
Deputy Director of Personnel.	Group-Captain A. G. Board, C.M.G., D.S.O
Deputy Director of Organization.	Group-Captain R. P. Mills, M.C., A.F.C.
Director of Medical Services.	Air Commodore D. Munro, C.I.E., M.B., M.A., F.R.C.S.(E.).
Department of the Air Member for Supply and Research :—	
Air Member for Supply and Research.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Private Secretary.	A. R. Wolbrom, Esq.
Director of Research.	Brig.-General R. K. Bagnall-Wild, C.M.G., C.B.E.
Deputy Director of Design.	Wing-Commander H. M. Cave-Browne-Cave, D.S.O., D.F.C.
Deputy Director of Armament.	Wing-Commander E. D. M. Robertson, D.F.C.
Deputy Director of Instruments.	Wing-Commander J. B. Bowen, O.B.E.
Director of Aeronautical Inspection.	Air Commodore F. C. Halahan, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.
Director of Equipment.	Air Commodore D. Le G. Pitcher, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
Deputy Director.	Wing Commander G. Laing, O.B.E.

3.—Air Commands

A.—HOME

(a) Inland Area

The Inland Area comprises all units in Great Britain, with the exception of those units included in the Coastal Area, and the Cranwell and Halton Commands.

Headquarters : Hillingdon House, Uxbridge.
Telegraphic Address : Airgenarch, Uxbridge.
Telephone No. : Uxbridge 231/2/3/4/5/6.

Air Vice-Marshal	J. F. A. Higgins, C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.
Air Commodore	H. C. T. Dowding, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, Chief Staff Officer.

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(a) Inland Area—*continued*

Units as follow :—

Headquarters, No. 1 Group	Kenley.
No. 24 Squadron	„
(*a*) Signal Co-operation Flight ..	„
„ 32 Squadron	Kenley.
„ 12 Squadron	Northolt.
„ 41 Squadron	„
„ 56 Squadron	Hawkinge.
„ 1 Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
„ 4 „ „	Ruislip.
The Packing Depot	Ascot.
Medical Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
Armament and Gunnery School ..	Eastchurch.
No. 5 Wing H.Q.	Biggin Hill.
Care and Maintenance Party ..	„
School of Technical Training (Men) ..	Manston.
Record Office	Ruislip.
Headquarters, No. 3 Group	Spittlegate, Grantham.
No. 39 Squadron	Spittlegate.
„ 100 Squadron	„
Care and Maintenance Party	Digby.
Care and Maintenance Party	Bircham Newton.
No. 2 Flying Training School ..	Duxford.
„ 5 Flying Training School ..	Shotwick.
Aeroplane Experimental Establishment	Martlesham.
Headquarters, No. 7 Group	Andover.
No. 2 Squadron	South Farnborough.
School of Photography	„ „
Experimental Section (R.A.E.) ..	„ „
School of Army Co-operation ..	Old Sarum.
Central Flying School	Upavon.
No. 1 Flying Training School ..	Netheravon.
Electrical and Wireless School ..	Flower Down and Worthy Down.
School of Balloon Training	Larkhill.
No. 3 Stores Depot	Milton, Berks.
„ 11 Squadron	Andover.
Units Directly under Area Headquarters :—	
R.A.F. Depot	Uxbridge.
(*a*) School of Physical Training and Drill	Uxbridge.
R.A.F. Central Band	„
Inland Area Medical Headquarters ..	„
M.T. Repair Depot	Shrewsbury.
Inland Area Aircraft Depot	Henlow, Beds.

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(b) Coastal Area

The Coastal Area comprises Stations, etc., as follows: Calshot, Lee-on-Solent, Gosport, Isle of Grain, Cattewater, Donibristle, Leuchars, and Felixstowe. Also all Aircraft-Carriers and Units afloat in Fighting Ships in Home Waters, and all Recruiting Depots.

Headquarters: 33–34 Tavistock Place, W.C.1.
Telegraphic Address: Airgenarch, Kincross, London.
Telephone No.: Museum 7840.

Air Vice-Marshal. Arthur V. Vyvyan, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain. Frederick W. Bowhill, C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follow:—

Headquarters, No. 10 Group	Lee-on-Solent.
R.A.F. Base	Gosport.
(*a*) Headquarters	,,
(*b*) No. 3 Squadron	,,
(*c*) No. 210 Squadron	,,
(*d*) Development Flight	,,
Care and Maintenance Party	Cattewater.
R.A.F. Base	Calshot.
(*a*) Headquarters	,,
(*b*) No. 230 Squadron	,,
(*c*) H.Q. Training Squadron	,,
(*d*) Air Pilotage Flight	,,
(*e*) Seaplane Training Flight ..	,,
(*f*) Marine Training Section	,,
Seaplane Training School	Lee-on-Solent.

Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters.

Care and Maintenance Party	Donibristle.
R.A.F. Base	Leuchars.
(*a*) Headquarters	,,
(*b*) No. 203 Squadron	,,
(*c*) No. 205 Squadron	,,
(*d*) R.A.F. complements in— H.M.S. "Argus." H.M.S. "Eagle."* H.M.S. "Hermes."*	
Marine and Armament Experimental Establishment	Isle of Grain.
Care and Maintenance Party	Felixstowe.
Inspector of Recruiting, R.A.F. ..	Henrietta Street, W.C.2.
(*a*) R.A.F. Recruiting Depot ..	,,
(*b*) ,, ,, ,, ..	Newcastle-on-Tyne.
(*c*) ,, ,, ,, ..	Birmingham.
Air Ministry Wireless Section	Kingsway, W.C.2.
R.A.F. Central Hospital	Finchley.

* Not in commission.

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(b) Coastal Area—*continued*

Research Laboratory and Medical Officers' School of Instruction ..	Holly Hill, N.W.3.
Central Medical Board	„

(c) Cranwell

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Cranwell, is Commandant of the R.A.F. (Cadet) College and commands all units at Cranwell.

Headquarters : Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.
Telegraphic Address : Aircoll, Sleaford.
Telephone No. : Sleaford 64/5/6/7.

Air Commodore.	Charles A. H. Longcroft, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.
Wing-Commander.	L. A. Pattinson, D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C., Administrative Duties.

Units as follow :—

R.A.F. (Cadet) College.
Boys' Wing.
Band.
R.A.F. Hospital.

(d) Halton

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Halton, is Commandant of No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) and commands all units at Halton.

Headquarters : Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.
Telegraphic Address : Aeronautics, Halton Camp.
Telephone No. : Aylesbury 161/2 ; Wendover 72/4.

Air Commodore.	Francis R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.
Wing Commander.	A. T. Whitelock, Staff Duties.

Units as follow :—

No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys)..	Halton.
School of Cookery	„
R.A.F. Hospital	„

(e) R.A.F. Staff College

Postal Address : Andover, Hants.
Telegraphic Address : Foresight, Andover.
Telephone No. : Andover 84–87 and Salisbury 190.

Air Commodore.	Henry R. M. Brooke-Popham, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., *p.s.c.*, Commandant.
Air Commodore.	Robert H. Clark-Hall, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Group Captain.	Philip B. Joubert de la Ferté, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.a.*

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B.—OVERSEAS

(a) R.A.F., Middle East

Headquarters : Cairo.

Air Vice-Marshal. Sir Edward L. Ellington, K.C.B, C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*, Air Officer Commanding.

Group-Captain.

Units as follow :—

Administered direct by Command Headquarters.

Egypt Stores Depot	Aboukir.
„ Engine Repair Depot	Abbassia, Cairo.
„ Aircraft Depot	Aboukir.
Aden Flight	Aden and Somaliland.
Headquarters, Egyptian Group	Heliopolis.
No. 216 Squadron	Heliopolis.
„ 47 „	Helwan.
Care and Maintenance Party	Moascar, Ismailia.
No. 4 Flying Training School ..	Abu Sueir.
„ 2 Armoured Car Company (less 1 Section)	Heliopolis.

(b) Constantinople Wing

Headquarters : The British Forces in Turkey.

Group Captain. P. F. M. Fellowes, D.S.O., Officer Commanding.

Wing Commander. D. L. Allen, A.F.C., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follow :—

No. 4 Squadron
„ 25 „
„ 56 „ (Detached flight).
„ 207 „
„ 208 „
Aircraft Park.
No. 1 Aerodrome Party

(c) Iraq Command

Headquarters : Baghdad City.

Air Vice-Marshal. Sir J. M. Salmond, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Air Commodore. L. E. O. Charlton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, Chief Staff Officer.

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(c) **Iraq Command**—*continued*

Units as follow :—

Administered direct by Command Headquarters.

Station Commandant	Hinaidi.
H.Q. Accountant Office	Baghdad.
Brigade Accountant Office	,,
Aircraft Depot	Hinaidi.
Combined Hospital	Baghdad.
Central Supply Depot	,,
Inland Water Transport	,,
No. 1 Squadron	Hinaidi.
,, 6 ,, ...	,,
,, 8 ,, ...	,,
,, 30 ,, ...	,,
,, 45 ,, ...	,,
,, 55 ,, ...	Mosul.
,, 70 ,, ...	Hinaidi.
Headquarters, Armoured Car Wing	Baghdad.
No. 3 Armoured Car Company. ..	Basrah.
,, 4 ,, ,, ,,	Baghdad.
,, 5 ,, ,, ,,	Mosul.
,, 6 ,, ,, ,,	Baghdad.
Headquarters, Basrah Group	Basrah.
Rest Camp	,,
R.A.F. Prison	,,
Stores Depot	,,
Base Supply Depot	,,
Combined Hospital	,,
Inland Water Transport	,,
No. 84 Squadron	Shaibah.

(d) **R.A.F. India**

Headquarters : Simla.

Air Vice-Marshal. P. W. Game, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain. J. A. Chamier, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follow :—

Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing ..	Peshawar.
No. 31 Squadron	Peshawar.
No. 28 ,, ...	Kohat.
Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing ..	Risalpur.
No. 27 Squadron	,,
No. 60 ,, ...	,,

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(d) R.A.F. India—*continued*

Units administered direct by Command Headquarters :—

Aircraft Depot	Karachi.
„ Park	Lahore.
No. 5 Squadron	Ambala.
„ 20 „	Quetta.
Central Accounts Office	Poona.

(e) R.A.F. Mediterranean

Headquarters : Valletta, Malta.

This Command comprises all units co-operating with the Navy in the Mediterranean Sea area.

Group Captain. A. W. Bigsworth, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Officer Commanding.

Squadron Leader. Harry F. A. Gordon, O.B.E., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follow :—

No. 267 Squadron .. .. .. Calafrana, Malta.

Aircraft-Carriers :—H.M.S. *Pegasus*.
H.M.S. *Ark Royal*.

(f) Other Units, &c.

Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee (British Section) .. .. .. *via* A.P.O., S 40, British Army of the Rhine.

(g) Palestine Command.

Headquarters : Bir Salem, Palestine.

Major-General. H. H. Tudor, C.B., C.M.G., General Officer Commanding.

Colonel. C. Evans, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, General Staff Officer.

Colonel. H. G. Reid, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.A.S.C., Colonel i/c Administration.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

Command Accounts Office	Bir Salem.
Headquarters, Palestine Wing	Bir Salem.
No. 14 Squadron	Ramleh, Palestine.
No. 1 Armoured Car Company ..	Jerusalem.
M.T. Workshops and Pool	Surafend.
Headquarters, R.A.F., Trans-Jordania ..	Amman.
Flying Section	„
1 Section of No. 2 Armoured Car Coy.	„

Other Units in the Command :—

Palestine Horse Transport Company	Surafend.
Supply Depot	„
Ordnance Depot	„
Palestine General Hospital	Ludd.

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THE
ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. VI. No. 2. JULY, 1923

EDITORIAL

THE resignation of the office of Prime Minister by Mr. Bonar Law on account of ill-health and the formation of a new Government by Mr. Stanley Baldwin have been the outstanding political events since the last appearance of the *Army Quarterly*. But, except for the fact that the Secretary of State for Air has been given a seat in the Cabinet, no change affecting the administration of the Services has been made by Mr. Baldwin. The elevation of Sir Samuel Hoare to Cabinet rank is no doubt a recognition on the part of the new Prime Minister of the importance which he attaches to the problems of air-power and a sign that he intends that the Royal Air Force shall be brought up to a strength sufficient at any rate for the actual needs of our national defence.

In saying this we do not wish to be understood to imply approval of the divorce of their flying branches from the naval and military Services.

* * * * *

We have much pleasure in publishing in this number of the *Army Quarterly* the first in order of merit of the two essays to which prizes have been awarded under the terms of the Bertrand Stewart Bequest, and we hope, in view of the importance of the subject, to be able to publish the second essay in our October number. We feel that a better coordination of the three fighting Services is a matter of such urgent national importance that the more often the attention of the public is directed to the question the better.

* * * * *

The main argument against the formation of a single Ministry of Defence which we have heard, is that in existing conditions such a Ministry would not really solve the great problem for which a solution

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is being sought—the problem of Imperial defence. A better co-ordination of our naval, military and air forces is required not only for the defence of these Islands, but also for the whole of the British Empire. Now there is no reason to suppose that the people of the Dominions are more inclined to-day than they were before the Great War to agree with any scheme of Imperial defence which would place the control of their armed forces either directly or indirectly in the hands of a Minister responsible only to the Parliament of Great Britain. Until, therefore, some scheme of Imperial Federation may be devised acceptable to all the self-governing States which own allegiance to the British Crown, and all their defence forces can be made subject to the control of a single legislative authority, a Minister of Defence in London would, it is suggested, be little better able to coordinate the military resources of the Empire than they are now coordinated by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air.

* * * * *

But although it is arguable that from the broader Imperial standpoint the establishment of a Ministry of Defence in London might not solve the problem at the present time, it yet might well bring about a more effective coordination between, and a more economical administration of, the three fighting Services in this country. The salient lessons of the war with regard to the intimate relationship between the Services seem in considerable danger of being forgotten, and we doubt whether some of those responsible for the organization and administration of the Services, in the scramble for money for their own departments, bear fully in mind that their particular Service is only part of a great whole—only the complement of the other two Services.* In time of peace, especially in a period of unusual financial stringency such as exists to-day, the competition for the comparatively small amount of money available for the maintenance of the fighting Services is too keen to enable the Admiralty or the War Office or the Air Ministry, as the case may be,

* "It is to be hoped that we shall hear no more about one fighting Service being of supreme importance to the country, and the others of little or none. Having an Empire scattered all over the globe, connected together not by roads and railways but by the sea, it is a platitude to say that we must maintain a navy second to none in the world. But it is equally true that ships cannot fight on land, that land fighting occurs in all great wars, and therefore that land forces are necessary. Again, neither the navy nor the army can fight effectively without the assistance of the air force. Each Service is in fact the complement of the other two, and this view is now accepted, I think, by the officers of all three." *See* "From Private to Field-Marshal," by Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Bart., pp. 294, 295. London: Constable & Co., Ltd.

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to think of anything but its own needs when formulating its demands on the public purse. It is only natural that any department should be concerned primarily with its own affairs. But it would be the first duty of a Minister of Defence to see that the annual Estimates for the Navy, the Army and the Air Force were so framed that the total sum asked for from Parliament on the Defence Vote should be distributed between the three Services to the general advantage. From the point of view, therefore, both of national economy and also of military efficiency, we feel that the placing of the three great spending departments under a single chief should be a valuable reform.

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But no such far-reaching change in our administrative system will be effected in a day. It will not be brought about in one fell swoop. It cannot be accomplished by a stroke of the pen. Nor, in our opinion, is it advisable that a reform of this kind—wise and salutary as we believe it to be—should be made in the frantic hurry so much favoured by reformers at the present time. We feel that no good purpose would be served by hurling Mr. Amory, Lord Derby and Sir Samuel Hoare from their high places on Monday, and raising up one or other of them, invested with a triple power, on Tuesday. The change in the administration of our defensive organization must come about by stages if its efficiency is to be assured—indeed, it must be developed gradually if it is to come at all, for it will have to encounter a great deal of opposition. Each part of the new machinery will have to be carefully devised and thoroughly tested before the next part is added. The actual creation of a Ministry of Defence, in our judgment, therefore, should not be the first, but the final, objective.

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The great majority of the Bertrand Stewart essay writers recognized the fact that some kind of Combined General Staff, on which the military chiefs of the three fighting Services should serve, was essential both for the preparation for war and also for the actual conduct of military operations. We have more than once in these notes advocated this proposal, so that there is no need for us again to enlarge upon the arguments in its favour. What exactly should be the relationship between such a Combined Staff and the Government, what should be the functions conferred upon it, how its members should be recruited, who should be its president—are all questions upon which there is naturally diversity of opinion. It seems to us, however, that they are in the main questions of detail

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which can only be satisfactorily answered in the light of experience. The first and most important task is to set up some permanent and authoritative body representing the Navy, the Army and the Air Force by which the problems of national and Imperial defence as they affect all three Services can be carefully weighed by their respective chiefs in council. Whether this body should be directly responsible to the Cabinet, or whether it should receive its instructions and make its reports to the Committee of Imperial Defence, are again questions of detail. If accredited representatives of the Dominions could be definitely appointed to sit as members of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and if that Committee were to meet regularly instead of in its present intermittent and spasmodic manner, we are inclined to think that in time of peace and until a Defence Ministry were established, it would be best for it and not the Combined General Staff to be directly responsible to the Cabinet in all defence matters. In the event of another European war, however, in view of the lessons learnt in the last war, a small War Cabinet would probably be set up for the direction of the military policy of the Government. This body might replace the Committee of Imperial Defence and deal directly with the Combined General Staff. It would receive the guidance and advice of the latter in all military matters, but the final decision upon any question of policy would clearly rest with the Cabinet which constitutionally is alone responsible to Parliament and to the country.

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So much diversity of opinion appears to exist as to the nature of the work to be performed by a Combined General Staff that it may be worth while to set down very shortly what in our opinion should be its main duties. In time of peace its task would be the preparation of plans—(*a*) for the speedy and effective mobilization of the whole strength of the nation, both civil and military, in the event of a great war; and (*b*) for the general conduct of naval, military and air operations in any quarter of the globe where hostilities were likely to take place. In both these tasks, but more especially in the latter task, the Combined General Staff would have to be in close touch with the Defence Ministries in the various Dominions and also with the military authorities in India. Whether or not upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Combined General Staff should exercise any executive functions is open to question. If its work in time of peace had been well conceived and its war plans well laid down, there should be no reason why the Chief of Staff of each Service should not be able to act upon the plan of campaign as it affected his own

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Service, more especially in view of the fact that being a member of the Combined General Staff he would himself be fully cognizant of the whole plan of operations and upon the strategic and other reasons on which it was based. Naturally, however, the coordination of provision of *personnel* and *matériel* would remain a function of the Combined Staff.

On the other hand, it might well be that the naval, military and air force problems of the war were so inextricably interwoven that the Commander-in-Chief in the field might find it convenient to have the guidance of the Combined General Staff throughout the whole course of the campaign.

But in either case there need be no real difficulty, because, the operation plans having been prepared conjointly between the three Services, their respective Chiefs of Staff would obviously be able to continue working together after war had begun and their Combined Staff would still be in being.

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There seems to be a general impression abroad—to judge at any rate by the views expressed in the Betrand Stewart essays—that the members of a Combined General Staff would have to be super-men intensively trained and set apart for the whole period of their active careers like the Vestal Virgins of old for the performance of their divinely-appointed duties. We do not at all share this view. The British Empire has not been won by super-men ; it has been brought together, and kept in being, by ordinary human beings with no especial training or long apprenticeship for the mission which they have accomplished. Common sense, courage, tenacity of purpose and a deep-seated but silent belief in the superiority of the British to any other race have been the characteristics of the sailors and soldiers who have carried the British flag to the ends of the earth. But in modern times, it is scarcely necessary for us to remind our readers, war has become a far more complicated and scientific business than it ever was in the past. It is no longer merely a trial of strength between trained fleets and armies ; whole nations are dragged into the field or into the munition factories, while the introduction of a new kind of warfare under the sea and of war in the air has rendered more difficult than ever the problems of strategy which have to be faced, especially by those who are entrusted with the defence of a widely scattered Empire. The same qualities which won the British Empire are still needed for its defence, but a more profound study of military science and a more complete knowledge of the powers and requirements of the different Services are clearly

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called for in the staffs which are employed in the preparation for, and the conduct of, war.

A Combined General Staff, such as we contemplate, need not perhaps be a large body; it would be representative of the three Services and would be modelled on the lines of the General and Administrative Staffs of the Army to-day. It would be divided into three branches—Operations, Intelligence, Administration. It might also be necessary to have another branch, on which civilians would serve, the work of which would be concerned solely with the organization of industry in the event of war.

Whether it would be advisable to found a new Staff College for the training of officers destined to serve on the Combined General Staff, or whether the training supplied by the existing Staff Colleges combined with periods of attachment with the Services not their own would be sufficient education for them, are questions open to argument. The education given at Camberley and Quetta, and presumably at the Naval and Air Force Staff Colleges, combined with periods of attachment of a reasonable length of time with the other Services, might be sufficient to qualify officers of ability to master the point of view of the two other Services and to do the work which would be required of them. We consider, in any case, that the suggestions which are sometimes made that officers once appointed to the Combined General Staff would have to continue to serve on it for the remainder of their professional careers, are wholly misconceived. No such necessity would exist, and the establishment of a class apart would be most detrimental in very many ways to the country, the Services, and the officers concerned themselves.

The war taught us—or rather should have taught us, for the opportunity of testing the truth of this assertion was too often missed—that no man is indispensable in any particular post or profession. It also taught us that the more trained staff officers available, the better it is for an army—and that it is necessary in the interest both of the Staff and also of the remainder of the forces that no officer should remain too long away from actual duty with the fighting troops.

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We feel that most of the views which we have put forward are more or less self evident. At the same time, we are aware that there are eminent sailors, soldiers and airmen who do not wholly share them. They are firmly convinced that the strategy and tactics of their respective Services are so difficult to master, and the technical knowledge required for their application so various and intricate, that it would be out of the question for any outsider, however

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intelligent, without years of training, fully to understand the problems with which he would be confronted on a Combined General Staff.

We ourselves believe that these contentions are groundless, and that, in any case, officers of all three Services working together day by day on the same Staff could not fail to learn from each other.

We earnestly hope that the Cabinet Committee which is now considering the whole subject, even if it is not prepared to advocate the immediate formation of a Combined General Staff in its entirety, will, at any rate, recommend a more effective employment of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the establishment of a closer intercourse between the military chiefs of the three Services; whilst, if the Committee decides that the time has not yet arrived for the creation of a Combined Operations branch for the three Services, we hope that it will recommend the immediate merging into one body of the three existing Intelligence branches.

In order to put an end to the overlapping and competition which exist at the present time between the administrative departments of the three Services, we trust that the Committee will recommend also the constitution of a single authority for the provision and distribution of the *personnel* and *matériel* required by the Navy, the Army and the Air Force.

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The article entitled " Study and Reflection *v.* Practical Experience," which we publish in this number of the *Army Quarterly*, may possibly arouse some adverse criticism. We have printed it because it represents a point of view which is held by a good many people at the present time—namely, that a keen and intelligent amateur practitioner in almost any profession enjoys an advantage over his professional rival because " the man who makes a study of another profession than his own, if only as a hobby, naturally preserves a wider outlook and a less constricted habit of thought than one whose pursuits are confined to a single profession." The military profession is made to appear the most narrowing of all professions. The writer of the article is very severe in his criticism of the professional officer, whose imagination and individuality he believes must inevitably be destroyed " by years of military routine." He is contemptuous of the training of " a public school, Sandhurst and a regiment," because in his opinion such training " leads in a considerable measure to a sealed-pattern type . . . is not the ideal training ground in which to acquire a knowledge of the psychology of the many varying types of men." He is a profound believer in the gifted amateur not only in the Army, but also in most other professions, except apparently

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in Government departments, in which he considers that "the business man" has proved himself a failure.

We ourselves confess to being somewhat old-fashioned. We hold that a definite and practical training is required for the complete understanding of any profession, and, although occasionally some especially gifted individuals may be successful in a profession without having undergone any of the usual training, we believe that he is the exception, not the rule. In the military profession, more than in almost any other calling, it is essential that there should be a similarity of training and a common doctrine—without it there would inevitably be lack of discipline and confusion. But such uniform training need not—and in the British Army to-day does not—destroy the imagination and initiative of the individual. It does not prevent a man from thinking for himself. It merely gives him a sound foundation upon which to build—a technical knowledge of his profession without which no man should attempt to work out his own ideas or to suggest any innovations. Imagination without preliminary education is a dangerous gift, especially when the lives of men are concerned.

We doubt, therefore, whether it is at all true to assert that "original ideas can come only to a mind untrammelled by contact with precedents and traditional methods." A really great mind will rise above such things. But it is only by a knowledge of precedents and methods that a man can discern the errors in them and so improve upon them.

* * * * *

In the late war it was inevitable that there should be some ill-feeling between the professional and amateur officers. There were undoubtedly some regular soldiers, usually men of no outstanding mental power or military ability, who evinced a superior attitude towards their war-time companions in arms, and imagined that, because they themselves had had from fifteen to twenty years' service, they must inevitably be better fitted to command troops in the field and to fill the more important staff appointments than men who had not been soldiers or only in the Territorial Force before the war. It is not surprising that many of the latter, especially in the later stages of the war, when they greatly outnumbered the old regular officers and had learnt their work on active service, resented an attitude of contempt when they found it. There was also in some cases a feeling among them that they were unfairly treated as compared with the regular soldiers in the matter of commands and staff appointments. They could see no reason why, if Canadian

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and Australian amateur officers could command corps and divisions and brigades successfully, so comparatively few British amateur soldiers were entrusted with similar posts.

On the whole, however, we believe that the relations between the officers of the Old Army and the officers of the Territorial Force and the New Armies were eminently satisfactory. The latter recognized that they owed such military knowledge as they possessed to their regular instructors and the wiser of them were able to appreciate to the full the value of the training which they had received. They were perfectly ready to leave the higher commands and staff appointments to men who had been trained to hold them.

The former were proud of their pupils, and the vast majority of them never attempted to depreciate the fine courage and devotion to duty which characterized the amateur soldiers. The training, the tradition, the moral of the old British Army leavened the whole of the British and Dominions forces which served in the Great War.*

Into the discussion which is raised in this same article as to the relative military value of various amateur and professional leaders of armies, and to the advantages in a commander of youth over age, we do not propose to enter. We should be inclined in more than one example brought forward by the writer in support of his arguments to dispute his historical accuracy. Most of the " victories " of the American colonists, for instance, over " our professional armies " would not have been secured had we not been 3,000 miles from our base and had they not been assisted by French regular officers ; and it was our loss of the command of the sea which lost us the war ; Garibaldi's efforts would not have overthrown the Austrians in Italy had it not been for the active intervention of the French Army ; the " many successes " of the Boer leaders in South Africa did not win the war and can no more be cited to prove that amateur soldiers can defeat regular troops than can the recent " Campaign " in Ireland.

In fairness, too, to the British Corps Commanders on the Western

* " In the earlier stages of the war the Regular Army was called on to provide instructors and cadres round which the new Armies could be formed. All that was best in the old Regular Army, its discipline, based on force of character, leadership and mutual respect, its traditions, and the spirit that never knows defeat, have been the foundations on which the new Armies have been built up. Heavy demands were necessarily made upon our establishment of trained regular officers, most regrettably depleted by the heavy sacrifices of the early days of the war. The way in which such demands have been met by those who survived those days have justified our belief in them. Neither have the officers of the new Armies . . . risen with less spirit and success to the needs of the occasion. The great expansion of the Army, and the length of the war, necessitated an ever-increasing demand being made on them for filling responsible positions in command, staff and administrative appointments. The call has been met most efficiently." *See* " Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches," pp. 348, 349. London : J. M. Dent & Sons.

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Front we should like to make this comment on the writer's comparison of their work with that of the " amateur " commanders of the Canadian and Australian Corps. These latter officers would be the first to admit that much of their success was due to the fact that they invariably commanded the same divisions and were intimately acquainted with all the leaders who served under them. This was never the case with the British Corps Commanders, and every soldier of experience knows how vast a difference this makes to a military commander.

* * * * *

General Maunoury, who commanded the French Sixth Army which fought on the left of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 during the later part of the retreat to the Seine, the battle of the Marne and the battle of the Aisne, died suddenly in the train on the way to Bordeaux on the 28th of March. Apart from his close association with the British Army in those early and difficult days, he will be remembered in English history as having led the troops which obtained two very striking successes in August—September, 1914 :—the defeat of the German Crown Prince in the battle of Longwy and of Generalcolonel von Kluck in the battle of the Ourcq, that is the western section of the battle of the Marne.

Born in 1848, two years later than Kluck, General Maunoury, who entered the artillery, held many high appointments in the French Army, including those of Commandant, before Foch, of the Staff College, and Governor of Paris. Having reached the age limit, he was, eighteen months before the outbreak of war, placed on the reserve list. In August, 1914, he was recalled on mobilization to command two Reserve Divisions on the Italian frontier ; but when it was found that there was no need to keep forces in that region, he was sent to Verdun to form the Army of Lorraine. This Army consisted of Maunoury's two original Divisions (the 65th and 75th), the 67th and General Durand's group of the 54th, 55th and 56th Reserve Divisions ; it was placed between the Second and Third Armies, opposite and west of Metz. The arrival of General Maunoury coincided with the news of the first misfortunes of the French offensive. But he brought good luck. One of his Divisions captured a German staff officer in a motor car, and on him was found an operation order of the German Crown Prince, which completely revealed that commander's misconception of the situation : he was wheeling the left of his Army to envelope the right of the French Third Army, thereby exposing his troops to be rolled up, and actually turning the backs of the outflanking division towards

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Maunoury's force. At the instance of General Ruffey, commanding the Third Army, although General Joffre had issued orders for the retirement to begin, Maunoury obtained permission to attack, and in the battle of Longwy drove back the Crown Prince's Army, its right retreating in panic flight. But events farther west were too critical to permit of an exploitation of this success, and on the evening of the second day of battle, the 26th of August, Maunoury, with three of his Divisions, was ordered to entrain for the north of Paris, whence he moved up to Amiens. His mission was to fall on the flank of the German line. But Kluck had already swept beyond him, and after some partial combats, Maunoury joined in the general retirement, on the west of the B.E.F.

His Sixth Army was gradually reinforced, so that on the 4th of September Maunoury had two divisions, an Algerian Division, five Reserve Divisions, a Moroccan Brigade and the remains of Sordet's Cavalry Division. His force, now attached to the Paris garrison under General Galliéni, while concentrating for the great attack of the 6th of September, was discovered, in the afternoon of the 5th, by a reconnaissance in force of Kluck's flankguard, the IV. Reserve Corps ; but the news of the danger threatening reached Kluck too late to save the Germans from disaster. On the three following days, in the Ourcq region, Maunoury attacked the German right flank, causing Kluck to bring back to reinforce his flank guard first two, and then the remaining two, of his Corps from the right of the Second Army. Thus was created a gap in the German front into which the British columns penetrated, and, on the 9th of September, forced Bülow's Army to retreat, and brought about the " miracle " of the Marne. Maunoury's position during the battle was perilous ; his troops were mainly of the reserve category, and had been badly shaken in the early fighting. But he managed to hold on and even to make progress. Though obviously not strong enough to defeat Kluck's better-trained and more numerous divisions, Maunoury eventually saw them retire before him, and he has every right to go down to history as the victor of the Ourcq. His attempts to outflank the Germans during the battle of the Aisne were frustrated by their bringing up forces from Alsace.

Retained in command of the Sixth Army, in March, 1915, while visiting his front line trenches and looking through a loophole, he was struck by a bullet in the head, and lost his sight. He was from November, 1915, to March, 1916, Governor of Paris for the second time, but, incapacitated for ever from duties in the field, though he occasionally appeared in public, his health gradually failed and he

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spent his last days in retirement. His posthumous promotion by the French Government to the rank of Marshal of France was a fitting tribute to the memory of a great soldier who had spent his life in the service of his country.

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The interesting account of the United Services Fund which we publish in this number of the *Army Quarterly* describes in some detail the admirable work that is being done for ex-service men and women and their dependants with the money at the disposal of the Fund's Council of Management.

We should also like to draw the attention of our readers to the report for the year ending the 31st of December, 1922, issued by the Officers' Benevolent Department of the British Legion,* which is working in cooperation with the United Services Fund. The report is an eminently satisfactory one. During 1922 there was a sensible diminution in the work of the Department which may be taken as being an indication that real progress is being made in the work of after-war re-settlement. But although there is undoubtedly a slow but steady decrease in the amount of assistance required, there were still more than 10,000 non-disabled ex-officers without employment at the end of 1922, while discharges on reduction of the forces are still numerous. It is clear, therefore, that there is much work ahead of the Department and that it will require all the help that can be given to it, both financial and otherwise. The figures in the report give some idea of the scope of the Department's work. In 1921 the total number of cases assisted financially was 24,221, and in 1922, 18,340; while the total number of cases actually dealt with was 50,550 in 1921 and 47,500 in 1922.

The report, which is signed by General the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, states that the resources of the Department are at present sufficient to meet the estimated expenditure (£193,400) for 1923 without encroaching upon the reserved Fund intended to provide for the future needs of the disabled, widows and orphans, but that it is doubtful whether this will be possible in 1924. It would be a misfortune if this reserved Fund, which has been formed by allocating to it two-fifths of all unear-marked donations made by the public, together with interest, and which amounted on the 31st of December, 1922, to £316,500, should have to be used for the other purposes of the Benevolent Department.

* *See* British Legion: Officers' Benevolent Department, Third Annual Report and Accounts for the year ending the 31st of December, 1922.

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£100 MILITARY PRIZE ESSAY, 1923

CAPTAIN BERTRAND STEWART'S BEQUEST

The Referees appointed under the terms of this Bequest—namely: Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, Major-General Sir W. Bird and Lieut.-Colonel Cuthbert Headlam—have examined the 22 essays which were sent in, and, after careful consideration, have unanimously decided to divide the prize, awarding £60 to Major C. F. Stoehr, R.E., 3rd Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners, and £40 to Captain E. H. Grant, 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

The Referees are of opinion that the essays with the following mottoes also deserve commendation:—"Army Book"; "Peace with honour can be purchased only by readiness for war"; "Three form a College—an you give us four, let him bring his share with him"; "The Game is more than the Players"; "Simple: I see no danger. Sloth: Yet a little more sleep. Presumption: Every vat must stand upon his own bottom."

The Referees report that the majority of the competitors were comparatively junior officers in the Army and that the general standard of the essays was high, especially when the difficult nature of the subject is taken into consideration. Some of the schemes proposed, whilst otherwise well written and worked out, failed owing to their authors' obvious lack of appreciation of the political problems involved in the creation of a Ministry of Defence.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR OR AGAINST THE POLICY OF COMBINING THE THREE FIGHTING SERVICES UNDER ONE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, AND THE BEST MEANS OF SECURING A CLOSE COOPERATION AND COMBINATION BETWEEN THE THREE SERVICES

By Major C. F. Stoehr, R.E., 3rd Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners

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INTRODUCTION

The armed forces of the nation exist for the purpose of imposing the national will by force on another nation, should resort to force become necessary. It is possible that at some future time air-power alone may be able to bring so severe a direct pressure on the civil population of another nation as to cause that nation to give way; but hitherto in the history of the world it has proved impossible to bring sufficient pressure to bear on another nation until its armed forces have been defeated; and it is unlikely that, even with the greater facility for evasion which is given by movement in three dimensions in the air, this rule will not apply to the Air Force as it does to armies and navies. For the present, therefore, the immediate purpose of a nation's armed forces is, as in the past, to defeat the enemy's armed forces; and it is certain that for many years to come our armed forces will include naval, military and air forces.

These three forces cannot do their work in the most efficient and economical manner unless their energies are coordinated, both in peace and in war, towards the attainment of this aim.

This might appear to be a self-evident truth were it not for the amazing statement made in the House of Commons (on the 24th of

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July, 1919), which might have been ignored had it not been made by a distinguished naval officer, that "In respect of its strategy the Navy stands alone. It is not dependent in any way on the Army. The Army can do nothing towards the command of the seas, and that is all the strategy the Navy has to consider." To take instances from the Great War alone. Was it of no consequence to the Navy whether or not the Army held Egypt and Aden against the Turks? Would naval strategy have been quite unaffected if the Army had been able to seize the Belgian coast in 1915–1917? In 1915 one of the main objects of our strategy was to obtain command of the Black Sea and the waters leading to it. The Navy tried and failed. Would the capture of Gallipoli by the Army have made no difference to the Navy? Would naval strategy have been unaffected if the Army had been ready two months earlier?

In March, 1916, the naval Commander-in-Chief East Indies wrote that there were reports of the construction on the Red Sea littoral of enemy craft which would form a threat to the safe passage of the Red Sea. The defensive attitude of the force at Aden was having a bad moral effect on the Arab tribes, and he hoped that it would be able to assume the offensive. So much for the statement that the Navy is in no way dependent on the Army. It is true that the primary function of the Navy is to obtain command of the sea, but that is only a means to an end, and the Navy has to consider what further aid it can give towards beating the enemy's armed forces. Instances of such aid from the Great War are the covering fire at Gallipoli, the aid which was to be given for the landing planned to be made on the Belgian coast, the fire of warships in the Suez Canal, and the prompt changes of base as the Army advanced in Palestine, particularly in the last phase.

The minimum that must be done by the coordinating authority to secure efficiency is:

(*a*) In peace, to consider all political situations which may necessitate the use of armed forces, and the consequent strategical problems which may have to be faced. To consider the armed forces necessary to deal with these problems, and the part to be played by each Service. To decide what the size of each of the three Services must be to enable it to carry out its part, and to adjust their inevitably conflicting claims.

(*b*) In war, to consider future problems, as stated above, and to deal with the existing strategical situation. To decide on the amount of expansion of each Service, taking into consideration its rôle and the resources of the country.

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CHAPTER I

The Conditions to be Fulfilled

Part I. Coordination in the Past

It is little or no exaggeration to say that twenty years ago there was no coordination. This is proved by the fact that at the Imperial Conference of 1902 the Admiralty memorandum on sea-power rejected the word "defence" on the ground that naval defence consists entirely in taking the offensive so as to destroy the enemy's ships wherever they may be; thus reasserting the Duke of Devonshire's saying of 1896 that "The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attacks from over the sea." At the same conference the War Office gave figures showing the strength of the regular forces, including a Home Field Army of 120,000 men and somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 employed in various positions for the defence of London and for strategic positions which might be threatened in case of invasion, forces not too large *in view of the possibility of our at any time losing command of the sea.** Here was a case of military effort being expended on a contingency which was absolutely incompatible with the rôle laid down for the Navy, viz., to secure command of the sea. Yet compared with the coordination of the Navy, Army and Air Force, the coordination of the Navy and Army alone is a simple matter, for the direct action of either only extends to a few thousand yards on either side of the coast line or navigable waterway, and neither Service can do the work of the other. The Navy can only fight the opposing Navy, and the Army the opposing Army.

The institution in 1905 of the Committee of Imperial Defence was in two respects a great step in advance. For the first time it officially brought the leading soldiers and sailors into touch both with each other and with the statesmen primarily concerned with questions concerning Imperial defence; and for the first time there was an Estimate to be voted which gave members of Parliament an opportunity of considering, giving their views on, and stating problems involving both Services. Hitherto, it had been necessary to discuss the Navy and Army separately without considering their interaction.

After the institution of the Committee of Imperial Defence various important problems, such as the principles of Home defence,

* *See* "The Imperial Conference," by Richard Jebb, pp. 358–363.

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were more or less settled, but the coordination was far from complete. Naturally not many instances of lack of coordination see the light, but a few have been made public and may be cited.

" Under the system of centralization a great plan was concocted (by the Navy) possibly very remote from reality and entirely independent of the other great departments of state. It was carefully kept secret, ready to be revealed at the critical hour. The critical hour came in 1911. The secret safe was opened and was found to contain a military campaign of which the General Staff had never heard. According to common report it included a landing on the Frisian Islands—a long low group of sandy islands fringing the German coast. The General Staff protested against it as inconceivable. What was the Army to do when it had landed on the Frisian Islands? " *

Again, on the 5th of August, 1914, a council of war was held, consisting of practically the whole Cabinet, and six eminent military, but no naval officers, to discuss (1) the composition of the Expeditionary Force; and (2) the area of concentration. After discussion it was resolved to keep back two divisions for Home defence.† Now here was a situation which had been foreseen, and which was eminently one for previous detailed discussion between sailors and soldiers, and this not only for a previous decision as to what troops would have to be retained for Home defence, but also for fairly detailed arrangements for their distribution and concerted action with the Navy. Yet even in 1918 Sir William Robertson, when he became G.O.C. Eastern Command, found that " the arrangements for Home defence as between the Army and Navy did not appear to be as good as they ought to have been." ‡ He considers himself not blameless, but actually the fault would appear to lie with the lack of previous habit of, and organization for, cooperation rather than with any individual.

It can do no harm now to state that in August, 1914, while we were preparing to embark the Expeditionary Force at Southampton, preparations were being made at Portsmouth to resist invasion by a first-class power.

Again in 1915 Lord Fisher, without consulting any member of the Directorate of Military Operations, with his " own hands alone to preserve secret all arrangements " prepared plans for depositing " three great armies " at different places in the Baltic, " two of them being feints that could be turned into reality." Any one who has had anything to do with schemes for a combined expedition of this

* *See Naval Review*, May, 1921, p. 191.
† *See* " 1914," by Sir John French, p. 4.
‡ *See* " From Private to Field-Marshal," by Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, p. 352.

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sort will agree with General Callwell that " for a project of this kind to be worked out solely by naval experts would be no less ridiculous than for it to be worked out solely by military experts." * If we find an extremely able man like Lord Fisher committing this absurdity, it can only be concluded that the system which made it possible was gravely at fault.

Finally, there are many points connected with the landing of a force in the face of possible opposition, which required, and still require, to be worked out by the three Services in combination.

After the fiasco in 1911 over the project of landing on the Frisian Islands, the Naval War Staff was constituted in 1912, but no system of liaison with the General Staff of the Army appears to have been started by 1914, and its organization and methods of work do not appear to have been altogether satisfactory; at any rate, it was reorganized in 1917. On the outbreak of war " it was snowed under with work, and had little time for the present, less for the future, none for the past," † and naturally little or none for cooperation with the Army. The General Staff had been formed in 1905 and was in good working order in 1914; but, owing partly to the peculiar position and character of Lord Kitchener, and partly to the denudation of the General Staff on the outbreak of war, the Chief of the General Staff had little influence on operations during the first year of the war, and in fact " the Director of Military Operations only really functioned as such from April, 1915." ‡

Not only was there no system of liaison between the Admiralty and the War Office, but such machinery as there was for obtaining a considered opinion from each department separately was practically ignored, the method of inception of the Dardanelles expedition being the result. Of the general situation when he became C.I.G.S. at the end of 1915 Sir William Robertson says:

" It is no exaggeration to say that every mistake we had made in our wars with France 100 years before had been repeated. We had committed ourselves to expeditions, on a vast scale and in remote theatres, which were strategically unsound, had never been properly thought out, and in the Dardanelles alone had cost us considerably over 100,000 casualties." §

General Callwell has stated that:

" It has been found impossible to secure the needed collaboration and concerted action between the War Office and the Admiralty. . . . The

* *See* " Experiences of a Dug Out," by Major-General Callwell, pp. 120, 121.
† *See Naval Review*, May, 1921, p. 192.
‡ *See* " Experiences of a Dug Out," p. 63.
§ *See* " From Private to Field-Marshal," p. 248.

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sea Service and land Service generally worked in perfect harmony during the war except in the one matter of their respective air departments." *

The latter statement may be true, but evidence has been given above that the collaboration and concerted action obtained were insufficient.

Another factor, imponderable but of serious import, had entered into the question since the Committee of Imperial Defence was instituted.

"When Asquith took over, and for some time afterwards, the Committee of Imperial Defence was small, safe and sound. The structural principle on which it had been built up was that it should form a common ground whereon the leading sailors and soldiers of the day might foregather and compare notes under the direct personal supervision and guidance of the Prime Minister of the day. . . . Those days passed, and for several years before the war the Committee of Imperial Defence was undergoing a change. . . . The politicians crowded in; the three or four soldiers could hardly find sitting room. If there was hardly room for a sailor or soldier to sit there was still less opening for him to talk! The Royal Commissioners on the Dardanelles were unable to picture the real state of affairs and so they were vastly puzzled by the direct conflict of evidence as to whether the soldiers and sailors could have had any voice in the decisions. Mr. Balfour and Mr. Asquith swore one thing. Lord Fisher swore the contrary. . . . What Mr. Balfour and Mr. Asquith said referred to an earlier period and may have remained a pious intention; what Lord Fisher said, he had *felt;* and if he, a self-assertive man, had felt it, how much more would the average shy sailor or soldier feel it? . . . No soldier or sailor ever spoke during a discussion in those latter days, unless he was 'billed' to make a statement or first spoken to, but politicians would eagerly break in on their own and deliver little speeches." †

Part II. The Present System and its Disadvantages

Since the War the only means of coordination has been the Committee of Imperial Defence with its sub-committees.

The weaknesses of the present system appear to be:

(*a*) There is still little opportunity for discussing the general question of Imperial defence in the House of Commons.

"It is a regrettable fact, but nevertheless true, that it is almost impossible to find an opportunity in the House of Commons to debate these matters as a whole and at length; occasionally Army estimates are discussed when any matter connected with the Navy are ruled to be irrelevant and out of order, and *vice versa;* the problem of Mesopotamia may be debated, but one is not permitted to bring this into connection with India; the India Office vote may come before the House, but reference to the Near and Middle East is debarred." ‡

* *See* "Experiences of a Dug Out," p. 335.

† *See* "The Soul and Body of an Army," by Sir Ian Hamilton, pp. 242–244.

‡ *See* "Defence of the British Empire," by Major-General Sir J. H. Davidson, *Army Quarterly*, January, 1921.

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(*b*) All the members, and particularly the president (the Prime Minister), have their time fully occupied with their own work. Therefore, while they may have time to consider and to make a decision on a matter which has been fully considered in detail by a subordinate body, and about which definite recommendations with their pros and cons have been made, they have not the time to consider properly a question which has not been previously prepared. The Machinery of Government Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction, in its report issued in 1918, lays down as one of the conditions of efficient working of the Cabinet, " It should be supplied in the most convenient form with all the information and material necessary to enable it to arrive at expeditious decisions." * The case of the Committee of Imperial Defence is absolutely analogous.

(*b*) But there is no subordinate body qualified to do this preparatory work. Questions are referred to sub-committees for examination, but, so far as is known, the members of these sub-committees are also very busy men, who can only meet occasionally. Moreover, *ad hoc* committees have several disadvantages compared with a permanent staff, viz. :—

(1) The members are not accustomed to working together. This question of personal touch is an intangible, but very important one. A staff which has grown accustomed to working together is vastly more efficient than the same staff when newly formed.

(2) The object of a committee or combined staff is to find a solution of any problem arising which will be acceptable to each Service concerned. But the members of a permanent staff will be much more likely to approach each problem in that spirit than will the members of a committee, who will inevitably be more concerned with making their own point of view prevail and of gaining as much as possible for their own Service. Especially will this be the case in future, now that the Air Service is taking over the duties of parts of the Navy and Army. There is bound to be far more competition over the estimates now, than when the Navy and Army alone were concerned, each of which had its own definite sphere of action.

(3) A permanent staff accumulates a fund of experience and information, which an *ad hoc* committee cannot possibly possess, and will probably develope a common doctrine.

(*c*) " Meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence are held at comparatively rare intervals and for the discussion of a particular question only." It is believed that neither the Committee nor any of its sub-committees met from November, 1918, to May, 1920, and

* *See* p. 5 of the Committee's Report.

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the writer has been informed that it only met once in 1920 and once or twice in 1921.

"In the intervals between its meetings continuity of policy is only secured by the Secretariat, which has neither power to act on its own initiative nor would be a suitable body to which to entrust any power of decision. Consequently there is a lack of continuous effort, an absence of long thought out and well matured policy, and questions often reach an acute stage before they are dealt with; with the result that hasty decisions, not always perhaps those which would have been arrived at after fuller consideration, are taken, or a decision is delayed in a matter in which early action is of importance until the question at issue shall have been thrashed out." *

(*d*) Since there is no body which can go thoroughly into questions affecting more than one Service, expert opinions are apt to be given from the point of view of the one Service only, without taking into account the views and limitations of the other Services. This is bound to be accentuated by the lack of opportunities which one Service gets of learning about the others, and this is particularly the case between the Navy and Army. The result is that, whilst a combined and detailed investigation might well lead to a solution satisfactory to all the Services, a comparatively hasty decision has to be given by some civilian authority who, except for his impartiality, is by his lack of knowledge less qualified to give a decision than any Service representative would be.

(*e*) The disadvantages of lack of opportunity for previous detailed inter-Service discussion are accentuated by the change in the character of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the ousting of the soldier by the politician so graphically described by Sir Ian Hamilton (*see* Part I).

(*f*) "The Committee of Imperial Defence before the war was really nothing more than a secretariat of the Prime Minister." † Its constitution has been praised for its elasticity, but elasticity is not altogether an advantage, for it is open to the Prime Minister to pack the C.I.D. in order to carry through a particular policy. This point ought to have no practical importance, but unfortunately it cannot be ignored.

(*g*) The new manual of combined operations which is now being prepared still leaves untouched several technical problems which need working out by the three Services in combination, but, so far

* *See* "Imperial Strategy and a Combined Staff," by Lieut.-Colonel Dundas, *Journal R.U.S.I.*, 1920, p. 685.

† *See* a statement by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, 22nd of March, 1920.

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as is known, these problems receive no consideration except that they are touched on in the combined scheme which is done at the Staff Colleges each year.

Part III. The Essential Conditions of Efficient Coordination

It now becomes possible to lay down the conditions which must be fulfilled by any organization which will secure efficient coordination. It must contain :—

(*a*) a civilian body which will make decisions ; and

(*b*) a professional advisory body composed of all three Services which :

(1) is permanent, and therefore has the advantages which a permanent staff has over a committee ;

(2) has authority to initiate investigation of any problem which concerns more than one Service ;

(3) is adequate in numbers to think about the future ;

(4) is able to obtain any information required from civilian departments ; *

(5) gives, whenever possible, one combined opinion ; and

(6) is composed of officers whose previous training has given them some insight into the powers, limitations and methods of the other Services.

In addition to the constitution of a Defence Council outlined above, it is essential that Parliament should be able to debate questions of Imperial defence as a whole.

The first three conditions ((*b*) (1) (2) and (3)) need no further discussion.

With regard to the fourth, it must be remembered that big strategical problems are largely governed, both in peace and in war, by questions of foreign relations, finance, commerce and transport ; one of the duties of the Government, therefore, is to coordinate military proposals with these other factors. But it is desirable that the military experts who have to advise from the military point of view should be able to obtain an idea of their effect on the proposals which they wish to make.

With regard to the fifth condition, it is of the greatest importance that the three Services should come to an agreement and speak with one voice whenever possible. It is a British custom for the layman to get the opinions of several experts, and then either to act upon the

* Fulfilment of these four conditions will ensure that every problem is adequately considered before it becomes urgent.

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opinion which pleases him best or to make a compromise between them. This method may be suitable in civil life, but it is not so in matters of strategy. In the first place an opinion upon a strategical problem can only be worth having if it is based on full knowledge of all the military factors involved; and the only man in the Army who is in that position is the man who is at the head of the organization which collects and assimilates the data on which alone a valid opinion can be given; that man is the Chief of the General Staff.

"Advice given by other than 'responsible' advisers, although they may be professionals, is often without value and may be positively mischievous. Such advice poses as being expert, whereas the person who gives it can seldom possess the information on which to base a reliable opinion." *

In the second place, civilians seem to have the greatest difficulty in grasping the limitations which transportation problems put upon the movements of large armies. Take, for instance, the scheme evolved by the War Cabinet of moving some six divisions from France to Alexandretta at the close of the Flanders operations in 1917, and back again in time for the opening of the spring campaign in France; a three months' excursion. It would have taken three months merely to get the expedition landed in the gulf of Iskanderun. As Sir Charles Callwell says:

"Had this been suggested by a brand new Ministry, a Labour Cabinet, say, reviewing the situation at its very first meeting—nobody could have complained. People quite new to the game naturally enough overlook practical questions connected with moving troops by land and sea, and do not realize that these questions govern the whole business. . . . But the War Cabinet of 1917 contained men of light and leading who had been immersed up to the neck in the conduct of hostilities ever since 1915." †

After reading of this project it becomes possible to realize how in 1917 "at least 20 per cent. of the time of the General Staff at the War Office was occupied in explaining, either verbally or in writing, that the alternative projects put forward (by the War Cabinet) were either strategically unsound or were wholly impracticable." ‡

It is clear that civilians are not well fitted to decide differences of opinion between naval, military and air experts, and that the best solution is likely to be found by these experts agreeing among themselves, after full discussion based on all available information.

* *See* "From Private to Field-Marshal," p. 319.
† *See* "Experiences of a Dug Out," pp. 185, 186. *Cp.* also "From Private to Field-Marshal," p. 315.
‡ *See* "From Private to Field-Marshal," p. 319.

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It is not to be expected that for several years, if ever, the three Services will invariably be able to speak with one voice; and provision must be made for this contingency. But it can at least be expected that in many cases previous discussion will lead to complete agreement, and that in other cases all proposals which are impracticable or dangerous from the point of view of one Service will be eliminated, and that the Government will be given a choice between two or more plans, all practicable, with a full statement of the arguments for and against each plan.

The sixth condition hardly admits of argument. It is clear that the more each Service knows about the others, the more likely it is that agreement will be reached between them.

CHAPTER II

How these Conditions can best be Fulfilled

The ground having been thus cleared, it now becomes possible to go into practical questions, such as composition, power and methods of action.

Part I. The Body which makes Decisions

Final decisions must rest with the Cabinet, which alone is responsible, through Parliament, to the nation. But in practice, as has been well described by Sir Ian Hamilton,* recommendations by the Committee of Imperial Defence come to much the same thing as decisions by the Cabinet; and there are strong reasons why there should be a body such as the C.I.D.

In the first place, besides the Ministers of the three Services, it brings the other Ministers concerned with defence, such as those for Foreign Affairs, India and the Dominions, into direct touch with the sailors, soldiers and airmen.

In the second place, it is of the utmost importance that Dominion representatives should be kept fully in touch with problems of Imperial defence. Only thus can Dominion Governments remain fully cognizant of the problems arising, and the solutions considered best. And unless they are kept fully cognizant, it is impossible to expect that their military efforts will be developed on the lines which will secure the fullest coordination with the other armed forces of the Empire. It is improbable, however, that in time of peace the Cabinet can be made to include representatives of the Dominions;

* *See* "The Soul and Body of an Army," pp. 240, 241.

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and in any case the Cabinet is already too large. But in the Committee of Imperial Defence Dominion representatives can meet members of the British Government who are directly concerned with Imperial defence, and who probably form the inner Cabinet which really directs policy. They will also meet the professional heads of the Services and will learn their views at first hand.

It is open to question whether the composition of the C.I.D. should be fixed or whether, as hitherto, it should include only the Prime Minister and such other persons as he chooses to summon. The latter method has the merit of elasticity, and enables just those persons to be summoned who are really concerned, and no others. But it gives the Prime Minister a personal power which may arouse jealousy, and may even be misused; and, as already shown, it may lead to the Service members being swamped by the civilians. On the other hand, if its composition is fixed, officials, such as the President of the Board of Trade, who will only occasionally be directly interested, must either be excluded, in which case they will not be available; or they must be included, which will bring in regularly several people whose presence is not often needed. On the whole, it appears best to adhere to the present system, and to trust to its weaknesses being minimized by the recognition of their existence.

The House of Commons, which has to approve or to reject the proposals of the Government, cannot come to sound decisions on the Estimates for the various Services unless it has considered the whole problem, of which each Service only solves a part. Therefore, in order to give the House of Commons an opportunity of debating Imperial defence as a whole, it should be the invariable practice to take the vote for the Estimate for the Committee of Imperial Defence separately from other votes, and before any of the Service Estimates are considered.

Part II. The Professional Body which tenders Advice

This body, whatever may be its name, is in reality a Combined Staff of all the three Services. Many questions at once arise for solution concerning:

(1) its functions; (2) its composition; (3) its constitution; (4) its method of tendering advice; (5) whether it should have any executive powers; (6) how it should be given the information which it needs with regard to foreign policy and other non-military factors; (7) what special training its members should have; (8) whether its members should belong to it permanently; and (9) to whom it should tender its advice.

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The writer proposes first to consider these various problems from the point of view of the minimum requirements necessary for an efficient cooperation between the three Services; afterwards he proposes to discuss the question of expanding these minimum requirements.

(1) *Its functions.*—The primary function of the Combined Staff, whether in peace or in war, must be to make plans for all operations involving both Navy and Army, and for all operations involving the Air Force, except those in which the Air Force is already allotted in peace time to the Navy or Army and is acting under the orders of the other Service.

Whilst, however, operations requiring the tactical cooperation of the Navy and Army are comparatively rare, there are few operations by British land forces which do not necessitate the safeguarding by the Navy, either of the transport by sea of the expeditionary force to its destination, or at least of its communications. Also in a few years there will probably be few or no operations which do not need a reinforcement of the local air forces; for instance, it will not be very long before operations anywhere between Egypt and Peshawur will involve a concentration of air-power from part, perhaps from all parts, of the Middle East. Since it would be impossible to have two departments, each dealing with plans of operations, in the same area, all plans must come under the Combined Staff.

The Operations Division of the Admiralty exercises a large measure of direct control of actual fleet or ship movements near the British Isles. The details of fleet movements do not interest the other Services, it is only the results with which they are concerned, and the same applies to the details of military and air movements. It appears, therefore, that the actual orders for operations as opposed to the general directions, are not, or at least need not be, part of the functions of a Combined Staff.

(2) *Its composition.*—The naval War Staff includes a Plans Division and an Operations Division, and only the Plans Division need be included in the Combined Staff. The War Office Operations Directorate really corresponds to the Admiralty's Plans Division, for it does not control military operations in detail. It only lays down for the General in command the objects to be attained and the factors which limit his freedom of action, and then watches over his methods of attaining these objects. The actual execution is carried out entirely by the General on the spot. In 1914 Home defence was at first under the Directorate of Military Training, but this arrange-

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ment was found to be unsatisfactory, and it was put under a General who was appointed for the purpose, as in the case of any overseas operation. Therefore, the whole of the Operations Directorate of the War Office should be included in the Combined Staff. Air conditions appear to be similar to naval rather than to military ones, and, as a consequence, the Air General Staff is likely to work rather on naval lines, exercising direct control over squadrons in England. Its Plans Division must be part of the Combined Staff, but it may in addition have an Operations Division of its own.

(3) *Its constitution.*—The Combined Staff must be constituted on the area system, each part of the world being looked after by a division which will include one or more officers from each Service.

It is important that the area boundaries of each Service should coincide, and, in the case of the Navy and Army, there appears to be no great difficulty about this, for to the Navy sea areas are natural commands, and to the Army the lands bounding these sea areas also form natural areas of control. This is owing to the comparative mobility of armies in movements by sea and their slowness on land unless moving by rail, and also to the fact that British armies will always be based on the sea, operating inland from it. Air forces, on the other hand, are exceedingly mobile over land, and, counting the time spent in dismantling and re-erecting machines, very slow in moving by sea, except in special aircraft carriers. Therefore, to the Air Force large land blocks are the natural areas of command. For the Navy the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean form two natural naval commands, with their boundaries either Perim or Egypt; and the Syrian and Arabian deserts form for the Army a corresponding natural line of demarcation. But to the Air Force Egypt, Palestine and Iraq form one natural area, to which in a few years India will certainly be added.

The only apparent solution is to adopt the best combined naval and military boundaries, and, where an Air Force area overlaps two naval and military areas, to make the same Air Force officer the senior air representative in each division. In the case considered there might be one Air Force officer forming part of the staff of both the Mediterranean and East Indies division, coordinating the work of one or more assistants in each.

It appears to be impossible, at least for several years, to have a division working under any one officer. The only way is to make the division as a whole work under a board composed of the senior officer of each Service. In the same way there would have to be a board of

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three directors in charge of the whole of the Plans Directorate of the Combined Staff. Every officer could thus be made responsible to an officer of his own Service.

There appears to be a misconception that such a Staff as that advocated would be something above and apart from each Service, dictating orders to it against the advice of its professional heads. The objection may be summed up in the fear that the Combined Staff would "lower the status, authority and efficiency of the Admiralty Board and Naval Staff." But it is certain that no organization of this nature would be accepted, or would work if it were accepted. The most eminent member of each Service is its Chief of Staff, and it is his primary duty, assisted by the Plans Section of his Staff, to advise the Government on the subject of strategical plans and preparation for war. It is true that the other members of the Board of Admiralty had some indefinite claim to a share in the shaping of policy, and at one time during the war some members complained that they were not being consulted as they should be. But such a sharing of responsibility is not really sound, because, as explained above (Ch. I, Part III), they cannot be in possession of the necessary knowledge. So far as the Army Council in war time was concerned, Sir William Robertson definitely settled the matter before consenting to become Chief of the General Staff. All that is proposed here is to bring together that portion of the staff of each Service whose duty it is to make plans. Moreover, plans and operations must work hand in glove, and must be coordinated with organization and administration; in 1918 the British section of the Versailles Staff, although established solely to give strategical advice, found it necessary to form an administrative branch, in order to get the data on which their plans could be based. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that the actual head of the Combined Staff should be a Board consisting of the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff, each of whom will link up the Combined Staff with the rest of his own Service.

(4) *The method of tendering advice.*—It is this Board which, representing the Combined Staff and the individual professional heads of the three Services, must tender advice to the Government, and the question is how this advice should be given. It might be given by a separate chief, to whom the other three would be sub-chiefs of the Combined Staff while each remained head of his own Service; or one of the three might be appointed chief and the other two sub-chiefs; or the predominant partner theory might be adopted, and the officer who was most concerned act as spokesman,

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the First Sea Lord or Chief of the Air Staff where command of the sea or the air was in question, and the Chief of the General Staff where the Army was chiefly interested; or, finally, advice might be tendered in the form of joint memoranda.

The difficulties in the way of any single chief are, first, that of finding a professional man sufficiently unprejudiced and broad-minded to be absolutely impartial, and second, the difficulty of getting him accepted by all three Services. In spite of the lack of opportunity for contact between the Services which there has hitherto been, it is improbable that no man of the necessary stamp could be found, but it is to be feared that, for the present at least, the second obstacle is insuperable. But it may be hoped that, after the Combined Staff had been in existence for a few years, the result would be to produce both the man with the necessary all-round knowledge and the mutual confidence to make him acceptable.

The predominant partner theory would work well enough where the Services had agreed on one plan as being the best, but, in the event of disagreement, difficulties might arise in the choice of a spokesman, especially as in some cases command both of the sea and of the air might be involved.

For the present, therefore, it would appear that advice would best be given in the form of a joint memorandum which would either recommend one particular course or, if one course could not be agreed upon as the best, would state the different courses open, with their advantages and disadvantages.

(5) *Should the Combined Staff have any executive powers?*—It is clear that a Combined Staff of the nature outlined so far could have no executive powers. Its function, the Board of Chiefs of Staff at its head included, would be to offer advice to the Government. Decisions of the Government would be translated into action by orders to each Service concerned. Operation orders would be issued by the Chief of Staff, the channel probably being, for the reasons given above (*see* (2) Composition), in the case of the Navy a naval Operations Directorate, and in the case of the Army the military side of the Combined Staff. Other orders would be issued through the branch of the individual Service staff concerned. Only in the case of the preparation of plans, which, of course, would not go beyond the Combined Staff, would a different procedure be necessary. All orders for the preparation of plans should be combined orders, issued in the name of the Board of Chiefs of Staff to the Directors of the Combined Staff, and passed on by them to all officers of the division concerned. Even if the actual work were only

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a matter for one Service, this procedure should be followed as a matter of routine, in order to make sure that each Service was fully conversant with what the others were doing, and to emphasize the fact that it was a Combined Staff working as such, and not three separate staffs merely acting in cooperation.

(6) *How should the Combined Staff obtain information from other departments?*—It has been said that a Combined Staff would not have the authority to summon experts from other departments, which is enjoyed by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, because the latter derives its authority from the Prime Minister. The obstacle, if a real one, appears to be somewhat artificial, and could probably be overcome in several ways. If there was a Minister of Defence who acted as Vice-President of the C.I.D., outside experts might be called in on his authority; or a permanent advisory Board might be formed consisting of the Chiefs of Staff and the permanent Under-Secretary of every department likely to be concerned, and experts from these departments could be summoned on the authority of this Board. If for any reason there was difficulty about any such method, recourse could always be had to the Prime Minister whenever the necessity arose.

(7) *What combined training is required by the officers of the Combined Staff and other officers?*—So far as the writer knows, the only combined training which is carried out at the present time is that :—

(*a*) some six or eight officers in all from the three Services are always doing a course at the Staff College of one of the other Services;

(*b*) in the course of every year at the military Staff Colleges, and possibly also at those of the Navy and Air Force, one joint scheme for a landing on a hostile shore is worked out;

(*c*) at rare intervals, combined manœuvres are held; and

(*d*) practices are carried out by the Navy and Army in cooperating with the Air Force units allotted to work under them; this, however, is in a sense purely naval or military work, since the primary object of these air units is to assist the operations of the Service to which they are attached.

This amount of combined training is certainly insufficient to produce a body of officers who can realize the powers, limitations, requirements and general methods of the other two Services.

Opinions will differ about how much training together is needed to obtain the desired result, and probably only experiment will give the correct answer. A Combined War College, which would fulfil the functions of the present Staff Colleges, has been suggested, and something of the sort would appear to be indispensable.

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The functions of the Army Staff Colleges are twofold :

(1) To teach staff duties ; and (2) to give a knowledge of the higher art of war. The whole of the first of these functions, and part of the second, including all tactics except those connected with a combined landing, concern the Army alone, and the same principle must be true of the Naval War College and the Air Force Staff College. Some of the subjects under the second heading, however, should certainly be taught in common, including :—

(1) strategy, naval, military and aerial ;
(2) the relations between the statesman and the armed forces, and the influence of policy, including foreign policy, commerce, etc., on strategy ;
(3) transportation, in so far it is a limiting factor in strategy ;
(4) naval and military geography, and Imperial defence ; and
(5) combined expeditions.

To go properly into all these subjects would take at least six months, or say two terms, and it is suggested that for their last two terms, that is to say, for a third of the course in the case of military officers, students at the three Home Staff Colleges should study these subjects in common.

This could be carried out in one of three ways :

(*a*) By having one single War College in place of the present three Colleges, the courses of study being kept separate until the final stage. The great advantage of this would be the intimate personal acquaintanceship which would be gained by members of the three Services through living together for one to two years.

(*b*) By retaining the present separate Staff Colleges but reducing the length of the course in each of them by two terms, and building a separate War College, rather smaller than that in solution (*a*), in which the common course would be done. This would have the advantage of enabling the output from Camberley to be increased by 50 per cent., without increasing the accommodation there, and the same may perhaps apply to Greenwich and Andover. The students of the different Services would, however, only be in personal contact for two terms, instead of throughout their staff course.

(*c*) By carrying out an exchange of students and instructors between the three Colleges during the final stage, so that for the last two terms of the course the proportion of Navy, Army and Air Force in the senior division would be the same at each College. The main advantage of this method would be its cheapness, for no new buildings would be required ; in fact, the only extra expense would be the

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cost of moving the students and instructors. Its chief disadvantages would lie in the smaller circle of personal acquaintances which would be formed in the other Services, and the danger of divergences in the teaching, due to the fact of there being three separate staffs, and three commandants of different Services, each responsible for the teaching of a different set of students. But, although the results of this method would certainly not be so good as would be obtained under one of the other two, this interchange of students would be an enormous advance on the present very inadequate amount of combined training given by the various Staff Colleges, and, so far as the position in England alone is concerned, is perhaps the most that can be hoped for under present conditions.

The position of the Quetta Staff College, however, has not been so far considered, and here also there appear to be three ways of dealing with the problem :—

(1) To adopt solution (*a*) or (*b*) above, and to have no Staff College in India. If solution (*b*) were adopted and the time spent at Camberley were reduced from the present six terms to four, then, since Camberley has twice as many students as Quetta, Camberley alone could pass through as many students as the two together do at present.

(2) To adopt solution (*c*), and to send the Quetta students home for their last two terms. Camberley is already congested, and the possibility of carrying out this idea depends upon whether the necessary extra accommodation could be provided at Greenwich or Andover. With this solution 50 per cent. more students could be passed through Quetta Staff College.

(3) To add a certain number of naval and air force officers to the Quetta College for two terms each year. This would necessitate extra accommodation at Quetta.

Both (2) and (3) would involve considerable extra annual expenditure, but it is also worth noting that it is proposed to move the Quetta Staff College to Deolali, there to build a new Staff College at a cost of something like £250,000. It should be considered whether the money would not be better spent in contributing towards solution (*a*) or (*b*) at home. As Sir Ian Hamilton points out,* the commandant of a staff college stamps his personality on the students, and to avoid the risk of confusion it is better to have only one commandant instead of several. There is no doubt that solution (*a*) or (*b*) would be the best, and the question whether one of them should be adopted and a new combined college built depends mainly on finance.

Given a common training in matters of common concern, as

* *See* " The Soul and Body of an Army," pp. 252, 253.

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outlined above, it should be possible to abolish the present system of sending one or two officers to do the whole course at the Staff College of another Service.

A doctrine is imparted to a Service through its staff, and the combined course advocated must lead to an increase of mutual knowledge between the Services. But such a course is only theoretical, and since all admirals and generals may have to command parts of the Air Force they, or at least their staff officers, ought to have practical acquaintance with its working. This would best be given by attaching all *p.s.c.* officers to the Air Force for a few months. In addition, it is suggested that, before being appointed to the Plans Directorate of the Combined Staff, every naval and military officer should be attached to the Army or Navy respectively, and every Air Force officer to both, for a few months, in order to learn, as far as possible, their methods of work and ordinary routine, to soak himself in their atmosphere, so to speak. For this purpose, they should be appointed for short periods to different types of ships or units and staff offices.

It is possible that, for the Combined Staff, still further study of the policy, economics and armaments of foreign Powers, for instance, might be required, but this is outside the question of training in cooperation.

(8) *Should the Combined Staff offer a separate staff career?*—It has been suggested that officers of the Combined Staff should devote their whole lives to it, and give up all idea of executive command. This is contrary to the principle in force in the Services, where it has been found by experience that an officer who is kept too long on the staff tends in some subtle way to become dehumanized, to lose touch with the human beings who make up the forces, and to cease to realize how they actually feel and what are their powers and limitations. This factor has of course less importance in the Intelligence Section and in the control of operations on a broad scale than it has in the issue of orders which directly affect the troops; but it is doubtful whether the difference in the conditions is sufficient to warrant a departure from the general rule. Moreover, an officer cannot be fully efficient at General Staff work unless he has some acquaintance with the administrative side of the staff, and *vice versa*. It would appear unwise, therefore, to cut off the Combined Staff from interchange with the three Services, and to turn it into a separate caste. It should be on the same footing as other branches of the staffs, though there would be a natural tendency to bring officers back to it after periods of service with troops.

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CHAPTER III

The Ministry of Defence

To whom should the Advice of the Combined Staff be tendered?

It is possible to imagine the Combined Staff taking its orders direct from the Prime Minister, as the Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defence does now, and giving its advice directly to him. But the normal constitutional procedure is for the permanent head of a department to advise the political head of his department, who, to him, represents the Government. If the Combined Staff were to advise the Prime Minister direct, he would become for all practical purposes a Minister of Defence, for the political head of each Service could only be held responsible for its administration. In peace, therefore, the advice of the Combined Staff must in the first instance be given either to the three existing political heads of the three Services, or to a Minister of Defence, who would be at the head of all three Services. It could then be considered by the C.I.D., and it is desirable that, while the Minister or Ministers concerned acted as the spokesmen for their particular Services, the advice tendered by the Combined Staff in its original form should invariably be laid before the Committee, in order to obviate any possibility of Service views not being fully and fairly represented, as might happen, whether intentionally or not, when a Minister was set upon some project. This happened, for instance, at the proceedings of the War Council in January, 1915, when the question of an attack on the Dardanelles was being considered;* and again on the 1st of February, 1918, when Sir William Robertson was silent because on the previous day the Prime Minister had objected to his giving his own opinion in opposition to that of the Prime Minister.† It must be admitted that during the latter half of the war this was an exceptional case, and that professional advisers gave their views freely before the War Cabinet.

In the event of a big war in the future, we shall probably again see a War Cabinet. If there is a Minister of Defence, he will of course be one of its members. He should in the first instance receive the advice of the heads of the Combined Staff, without prejudice to its being afterwards given to the War Cabinet direct. If there is a Minister at the head of each Service, he will have no responsibility for the general conduct of the war, which will be vested in the War

* *See* Report of the Dardanelles Commission I, sec. 6, especially para. 92.
† *See* "From Private to Field Marshal," pp. 317, 318, 331.

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Cabinet, and in this case the Combined Staff should give its advice directly to the War Cabinet.

If advice direct to the Prime Minister in peace is ruled out, the question resolves itself into one of whether it is best to retain, as at present, three separate Ministers, or whether there should be one Minister responsible for all three Services.

In cases where there is real agreement between the three Services it is probably of little consequence which solution is adopted, for no Minister could disagree on technical grounds with the unanimous opinion of the three Services, and it would only be necessary for the Government to balance military considerations against those of finance, foreign policy, etc. It is in the case of disagreement that the advantage of a Minister of Defence becomes apparent. Ministers for the separate Services must inevitably tend to back up their own professional advisers, and this will especially be the case in time of peace, when it is a question of sharing the amount of money available. In that case the Committee of Imperial Defence, working probably through a sub-committee, must become the coordinating authority. It has already been shown that the work of a Combined Staff would make the task of deciding between different views far easier by presenting clear-cut issues with the arguments on each side. But there is another factor which has rendered this work of coordination very much more complicated and difficult, and that is the advent of the Air Force.

The issue is complicated in three ways. First, both sea planes and land planes can operate to a distance of some 250 miles on either side of the coast line, thus enabling the whole of the Air Force in any area to be used to assist either Navy or Army within very wide limits. This 250 miles radius of action of land planes over the sea brings within their sphere of influence all the focal areas, that is the areas which, owing to the congregation of sea traffic there, are the most important from the naval point of view. No great naval action has ever been fought more than 250 miles from land, and the vast majority have been fought within what is now easy aircraft range of a civilized country. Secondly, aircraft can more efficiently perform certain work which has hitherto been done by parts of the Navy and Army, such as distant reconnaissance, and artillery spotting; and the Air Force is taking an increasing part in pursuit, harassing fire, torpedo launching, etc. The tendency must be for the proportion of aircraft operating with the Navy and Army to increase, and the gradual adjustment of the proportion will raise very intricate and delicate problems. Thirdly, the fact that the

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power of aircraft to strike at hostile territory independently of navies and armies is being constantly enlarged, raises a further set of difficult problems in connection with the allotment of available resources.

Inter-Service problems were dealt with by the last Government by means of a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, generally consisting, it is believed, of the Minister and Chief of Staff of each Service under the presidency of the Lord President of the Council (Lord Balfour). Such an arrangement is hardly satisfactory, for the other three Ministers were Lord Balfour's equals except in experience and prestige, and, moreover, it is unlikely to happen again that a man of his calibre and authority is holding a post which gives him the time to go thoroughly into these matters. It appears far better that there should be one man of unquestioned authority, whose main task would be to investigate the very important and difficult problems which are arising and will continue to arise, to correct the centrifugal tendencies of the three Services, and to hold fairly the balance between them, in other words a Minister of Defence, who would be responsible for all the Service Estimates. Such a Minister would eliminate the possibility which exists at present of one Service receiving more than its share of attention and funds owing to the personality of its particular parliamentary chief.

This, in the opinion of the writer, is by far the most important argument in favour of a Ministry of Defence. It is the only way of ensuring that there is one impartial man with the time and the power to coordinate the work of the three Services. In theory coordination is the task of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, but the work has become too vast and intricate for the existing machinery. This essay merely deals with the defence side of the matter, but it is open to question whether a similar process to that advocated here is not advisable in some of the civil departments of the Government. Minor points in its favour are that the work of the three Chiefs of Staff would be rather easier if they were responsible to the same Minister, that the size of the Cabinet would be slightly reduced, and that economy would result. It was on the ground of economy that the Geddes Committee recommended a Ministry of Defence, and doubtless its creation would have that effect, although probably not to the extent expected, but the most important result would be the increase in efficiency which should be gained.

The main argument that has been put forward against a Minister of Defence, as apart from a Combined Staff, is that the work would be too much for a single man. Of course it is quite impossible for one man to do the work which is at present done by three, but that

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is really only a matter of decentralization. A Minister of Defence would have to deal with three Under-Secretaries or subordinate Ministers, each responsible for the administration of one Service, and with either a Board of the Chiefs of Staff, or with the three separately where their individual work was concerned, *i.e.*, with four or six subordinates. A more serious question is whether, with the delegation of authority which the Minister would have to make, the tasks of the Under-Secretaries would not be too big for men of their status. There appears, however, to be no objection to making them subordinate Ministers, on a level with the other minor Ministers except for the absence of direct responsibility to Parliament. It appears even possible to raise their status still further, if considered necessary, by making them directly responsible to Parliament for administration only, leaving the Minister of Defence responsible for strategy and preparation for war. This would, however, complicate matters and make more difficult the task of the Chiefs of Staffs, who would have to serve two independent masters. Such an arrangement, therefore, is not advocated by the writer.

There would of course be only one vote representing the Services in the Cabinet instead of two or three, but the power of that one vote, or at least of its holder, would be equal to the combined powers of the three present Service Ministers. It is in this very fact that lies, not an argument against, but the main obstacle in the way of, the formation of a Ministry of Defence ; it is the spectre of Oliver Cromwell and the memory of what he did. Of course this is absolutely irrational ; Cromwell was not only a statesman but a great soldier, and he commanded the confidence and devotion of the Army. This was the secret of his power, and no politician, although he might be nominally head of all the fighting forces of the nation, could hope to attain this power. It is just possible that Lord Kitchener had at one time sufficient popular authority behind him to carry out a *coup d'état* had he considered it necessary, but for a mere politician—and against the British of all nations—never ! But it is just because this objection is irrational, because it is a matter of instinct and not of reason, that it is so formidable. It would be much lessened if the creation of a Ministry of Defence was merely part of a general scheme for reducing the size of the Cabinet to ten or twelve, as was suggested as desirable, if not essential, for its proper working by the Machinery of Government Committee (Report, pp. 4–6).

Another difficulty, although not an argument, is the natural reluctance of a Prime Minister to have a colleague with authority second only to his own and superior to that of all other Ministers.

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In this matter, however, the path has perhaps been smoothed by the precedent of Mr. Bonar Law's acting as a sort of deputy Prime Minister in Mr. Lloyd George's Government.

But while these difficulties must be recognized, they are not arguments, and do not influence the conclusion that a Ministry of Defence is certainly a goal to aim at, though not it, but the Combined Staff, is the main element at present wanting to make possible a complete cooperation and combination between the Services.

CHAPTER IV

The Question of the Air Force

Hitherto the continuance of the policy of concentrating all air-power under the Royal Air Force has been assumed; but there has been a persistent advocacy, especially on the part of, or at least on behalf of, the Navy, of the policy of naval and military air forces, whether with or without a separate Air Service; and since this solution of the difficulties which, it is anticipated, must arise in the next war, will probably continue to be advocated, it seems advisable to consider the question here.

There are really two distinct problems: (*a*) is an independent Air Force necessary? and (*b*) if so, are separate air forces also necessary for the Navy and Army?

The main arguments in favour of a separate Air Force are:

(1) Whereas in 1914 aeroplanes were useful only for reconnaissance, and could only be used, therefore, as an auxiliary to the Navy and Army, they now have a vast and increasing offensive power of great range, which was not fully exploited during the Great War, has much increased in the past four years, and may, in the near future, become a decisive factor in war. "The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable; but it is clear that such an attack, owing to its crushing moral effect upon a nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the government, and thus becoming decisive" (Marshal Foch).

(2) This offensive power is quite outside the functions of either Navy or Army, and the officers of these Services are bound to be cramped in their outlook, and to tend to look on the Air Force mainly as an auxiliary to the activities of their own Services. Whereas the auxiliary work, although it absorbed nearly all our energies in the air during the Great War, will increasingly tend to become a minor item in the work of all air forces. In order to ensure that due regard is

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paid to the potentialities of air-power, both in offence and defence, and to keep abreast of other nations in research, design and thought, an Air Force freed from the control of the Navy and Army, and developing a body of officers who will look at strategical problems from the air point of view, is absolutely necessary.

These arguments appear to be quite incontrovertible. The answer usually made to them is that it is only by the occupation of an enemy's territory and the defeat of his army in the field that a war is decided, and that, consequently, it is for the Army to direct the Air Force, except for the comparatively small portion of it required for the Navy. But this view of the case ignores or minimizes the potentialities of air action on munition and distant communication centres, and on the nerves of the civil population—the reasons which make a separate Air Force so necessary.

The following are the arguments in favour of a Navy Air Service which the Navy Committee of the House of Commons put before the Committee of Imperial Defence :— *

The naval air force needed is small compared to the total air forces required, but its work is of a highly specialized nature, and for its proper performance necessitates an understanding and appreciation of sea operations and sea conditions. A small, highly skilled professional *personnel* is, therefore, needed, with a thorough knowledge of the specialized technique involved, a knowledge that can only be obtained by sea service and training.

Aircraft may gradually replace floating craft, but they will remain essentially naval units in their functions and methods.

The number of aeroplanes provided is quite insufficient. No machines are available or in use for period-training purposes in connection with the Navy, or for development. The only possible judge of what the Navy requires must be the Navy itself. The Admiralty should be in a position to indicate the types which it desires to have constructed, whether for certain sized torpedoes or bombs, or to escort the Fleet. The Admiralty should be in a position to work out all the various problems of aeroplanes, seaplanes, amphibians or craft lighter than air, and should be free to say, "We will do without a light cruiser and have a squadron of reconnaissance planes, or without a destroyer and have a flight of torpedo planes."

It is a matter of complaint that pilots working with the Navy are interchangeable with those employed on other duties, in order

* Partly summarized and partly quoted from the *Daily Telegraph* of the 4th of August, 1922.

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to give them the widest possible experience. The duties of a pilot with the Navy and with the Army are quite different. The wing commander in the *Argus* was relieved after holding his appointment for only two years; and in one case the progressive gunnery training of a principal portion of our main Fleet was entirely deranged owing to some of the *personnel* having been withdrawn between two series of the operations.

Naval technical *personnel* are just as good as Air Force *personnel* in the maintenance of aircraft, and all able seamen are very much preferable to aircraftsmen in handling aircraft at sea. Such a system would lead to a great economy in *personnel* in aircraft carriers. Naval officers would automatically attain an air knowledge which they do not get now. The difficult problem of the disposal of surplus pilots would also be solved, to the great financial relief of the country.

The arguments in favour of an Army Air Service are on generally similar lines.

Against this, the arguments of those who favour the present system are:

(1) Without superiority in the air, aircraft attached to the Navy and Army cannot carry out their rôle efficiently, and the naval and military forces will constantly be subjected to attack from the air; nor can the Air Force exert its full pressure against the enemy's resources and population. This superiority will be best obtained by offensive action at the very outset of the war, before the Navy or Army has had time to come into action, by bombing and fighting attacks upon the enemy's aerodromes and aircraft factories. For the moment the decisive point will lie in these objectives, and all aircraft which can be utilized for this purpose must be concentrated on it; torpedo-carrying seaplanes, for instance, would be most useful for bomb carrying, and the naval bomb and torpedo planes would form an increasingly important contribution towards the whole available force. At the same time short-range aeroplanes, such as the "Bristol Fighter," which are largely used for Army purposes, could, during this initial stage of a campaign, be concentrated for defence against hostile air action. Only if the Air Force controls all aircraft can these concentrations be carried out, and the principles of concentration and economy of force be fully complied with.

(2) The widest basis for technical progress will only be utilized if all research and experimental work is under one authority.

(3) Air training involves far more than merely learning how to fly. It is at least as important that the airman should be an air

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specialist as that he should master naval technique ; and the amount of naval specialization which is really needed is exaggerated by the Navy.

The first two broad reasons are overwhelmingly strong, and make it essential that the Air Force should control the distribution of all air units which can be used for obtaining superiority in the air, and must also control all research, design and production.

At present every machine which flies, and its *personnel*, are controlled and paid for by the Air Force. Would it be possible, consistently with fulfilling the two conditions laid down in the preceding paragraph, to move the line of demarcation so as to comply with some of the naval objections to the present system ? Could the objections concerning the *personnel* be overcome by letting the Navy man all aircraft which are normally with it ? In that case the Navy would certainly raise the greatest objections to these units being taken away, even temporarily. Would it be possible to dispose of the objections about material by putting all aircraft normally with the Navy on the naval Estimates, so that the Navy could decide without question what numbers and types of machines should serve with it ? It is to be feared that in that case the Navy would object strongly to paying for units over which it had not full control. It must not be forgotten that the system of separate naval and military air services has already been tried, and that the various attempts made during the war to coordinate research, output and distribution all broke down. The Admiralty and War Office had not prepared for the Geddes Committee any scheme for joint control of matters of common air concern, in the event of the Air Force being abolished, and there is no reason to believe that coordination would be better now than it was in the past.

Should flying boats which are only of use for naval purposes be developed, it may be desirable to leave them with the Navy ; but for the present the existing line of demarcation appears to be that which, on the whole, will give the best results. There seems, for instance, to be no valid reason why, under the present system, the Navy should not sacrifice a light cruiser in order to obtain an additional squadron of reconnaissance planes ; or why naval officers should not be lent to, or interchanged with, Air Force officers, in order to give them the air knowledge necessary to enable them to control the air units with the Fleet.

It must be recognized that, wherever the line of demarcation may be, some difficulties are bound to arise, and every endeavour must be made to minimize them by sympathetic treatment. For

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instance, it might be made a rule that Air Force officers detailed to work with the Navy or Army should, so far as possible, specialize in that work, and should only leave it in order to keep in touch with that portion of the Air Force not allotted to either. In no case should they be transferred from naval to military work, or *vice versa*. It might well be made a rule, too, in order to obviate the possibility of spoiling training by the sudden transference of Air Force *personnel* in the middle of operations, that no such *personnel* should be transferred without previous reference to the naval or military authorities concerned.

Wherever, too, the line of demarcation comes, there will be some tendency to overlap, and this will need watching. The Navy has instanced the formation of a separate Air Force Torpedo School, and it certainly does appear that this is unnecessary separation, and that the naval Torpedo School might have been utilized.

CHAPTER V

The Possibility of Further Combination

The conclusion, which has so far been reached by the writer, has been that the minimum required to secure efficient cooperation and combination is a Ministry of Defence, controlling the three Services through subordinate Ministers and a combined Plans Directorate through the Chiefs of Staff. The question now arises whether any closer combination is desirable.

(*a*) *Intelligence*.—Lack of coordination in Intelligence will not have the same baleful results as lack of coordination in plans. There may be gaps, for instance in an absence of maps which will enable ships' guns to bring accurate fire to bear inland, but the most probable result will be overlapping and therefore waste of money, as actually happens. For instance, it is surely the business of the Army rather than of the Navy to compile a " Manual on the Turanians and pan-Turanianism." Not only would efficiency and economy be promoted by the institution of a Combined Intelligence Directorate, but the work of the Plans Directorate would be made easier by having to deal with one source of Intelligence instead of three. It is recommended, therefore, that alongside the Combined Plans Directorate there should be a Combined Intelligence Directorate, constituted and working on the same general lines, by areas, which should be unified as far as possible.

It has been suggested that there should be a Central Intelligence

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Bureau, controlling all Intelligence, naval, military, air, foreign, commercial, etc.; but this proposal does not seem practicable, at least in time of peace. To what Minister would this bureau be responsible? Nor does there seem to be any necessity for this innovation, provided that reasonable liaison is maintained between the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence and the Intelligence Branches at the Foreign Office, Board of Trade, etc.

(*b*) *Administrative work.*—The Geddes Committee reported: "There is overlapping and duplication throughout. In order fully to realize these economies the three Forces must be brought together by the creation of a Coordinating Authority or a Ministry of Defence responsible for seeing that each Force plays its part and is allotted appropriate responsibility for carrying out various functions. . . . With one Ministry of Defence complete coordination of Supply, Transport, Education, Medical and other services would then be possible" (Part I, Introductory Remarks, para. 6).

In these lines the Ministry of Defence is given two quite distinct functions. The first and most important is to allot to each of the Services its most appropriate rôle. This, as has been shown, can best be carried out by a Combined Intelligence and Plans Staff, a Ministry of Defence, and the Committee of Imperial Defence. The second function is to prevent waste and overlapping in certain technical services which are common to each force.

The Geddes Committee did not indicate how this complete coordination of technical services could be carried out, and, when examined in detail, the subject bristles with difficulties, as will be seen when the various methods which might be used are considered.

Take a concrete case, and imagine that in a naval port the naval hospital and the military hospital are each just sufficiently large to deal with any probable emergency in its own Service, but that the double margin of safety is unnecessarily large, and that one X-ray room would be sufficient, so that a saving could be made by combining the two hospitals and closing half of one of them. One solution would be for one Service, say the Navy, to look after all patients. There might occasionally be a little friction, the Army might think that its sick were not being quite properly treated; but responsibility would be clearly defined, and there is no reason why the system should not work quite well. In many instances, of course, this system is used and works perfectly satisfactorily, as in the case of Air Force units which depend on the Navy or Army for their supplies and medical arrangements. Another possible solution would be to staff the hospital with *personnel* of both Services. But immediately

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difficulties would spring up; internally, difficulties of discipline and perhaps of administration; externally, difficulties of responsibility; to whom would the head of the hospital be responsible? If it is attempted to avoid this by forming a single combined medical service, the difficulty is merely moved higher up. The head of this service would have to be responsible either directly to the Minister of Defence or to some one working under him who does not deal with Navy or Army alone. This would be a consequent loss of touch between the Navy or Army, as the case might be, and the medical service, and this would probably be more marked and have worse effects in the case of transport. If an attempt were made to coordinate at the top by means of a combined council on the lines of the Army Council, etc., then, if each branch of the staff of each Service were represented, the council would be intolerably large; while, if one councillor represented each Service as a whole, or one branch of all three Services, *i.e.*, one Adjutant-General trying to coordinate the "A." work (*e.g.*, medical), of all three Services it would be hopeless to expect to obtain men with the necessary range of knowledge.

The truth is that, while it is comparatively easy to organize a staff which, as in the case of the proposed Intelligence and Plans Staff, merely has to allot to each Service the work it has to do, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to devise a single organization which can satisfactorily minister to the wants of two or three Services. The example given above illustrates the sort of difficulty which would at once spring up if an attempt were made to do so in any of the Services—whether supplies, transport, medical or education. It appears impossible to do more than to form inter-Service committees, both in London and locally, from each department in which duplication or overlapping occurs, in order to try to find a means of avoiding it in particular instances; where it does occur the best remedy is for one Service to perform, locally at least, the whole of the departmental work in question.

It is always wise, especially in Great Britain, to let an organization develope naturally out of what has gone before. The Combined Staff, advocated in this essay, is such a natural growth, and there is no reason why its formation, which is by far the most urgent reform, should be strongly opposed; while any attempt to impose a sort of executive super-Staff on the Services would rouse fierce opposition, which might well wreck the whole scheme.

(*c*) *Other General Staff work.*—Besides intelligence and plans, General Staff work includes operations, organization, staff duties

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and training. It has already been shown that operation orders would be issued under the authority of the individual Chief of Staff concerned, possibly through a separate Operations Directorate. But plans and operations are so inseparably connected that both must be housed together and practically form part of one staff. It seems essential that in respect to these three Directorates of Intelligence, Plans and Operations, the Chiefs of Staff should be directly responsible to the Minister of Defence, and should hold much the same position as Sir William Robertson and Sir Henry Wilson did in 1916–1918.

The same does not apply to organization, staff duties or training, and it may be questioned whether in respect to these the Chief of Staff should be directly responsible to the Minister of Defence or, as a member of the Board of Admiralty, etc., responsible to the subordinate Minister dealing with the one Service. On the one hand, it may be argued that to put the Chief of Staff in any way under the subordinate Minister is to make him serve two masters. On the other hand, this often has to be done—in fact it is the normal experience of commanders of technical units; and the difficulty is minimized when the one master is subordinate to the other. Also organization, staff duties and training are intimately concerned with the daily life of the troops or with administrative questions, and must be in close touch with "A." and "Q.," whilst in time of peace intelligence and plans are practically separate from the other branches. It appears, therefore, that it would be best for the Chief of Staff to be responsible to the subordinate Minister in these subjects.

CHAPTER VI

(1) The Imperial Aspect

The Imperial aspect of the problem is outside the title of this essay, and has not been mentioned except in connection with the Committee of Imperial Defence. But it seems desirable to go very briefly into the matter in order to remove any misconceptions that may exist. (For a full discussion of the principles involved, *see* "The Problem of the Commonwealth," especially Part II.)

Briefly, in a democratic country there is one invariable chain of responsibility: electorate, parliament, government, permanent officials; also, no man or body of men can serve two masters whose instructions may conflict. Therefore, although there is a so-called Chief of the Imperial General Staff (a term avoided in this essay),

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there is not, and cannot be, a real Imperial General Staff or Imperial Combined Staff until there is a single Imperial Executive to which it can be responsible; and, in turn, there can be no single Executive, or Government, until there is a single Imperial Parliament, to which each Self-Governing Dominion in the Empire elects representatives and entrusts the control both of foreign policy and of the taxation needed to maintain the armed forces on which that policy rests. Until there is such a Parliament, any body like an Imperial Defence Council can only be advisory to the separate Governments of the Empire, and the General Staff of each part of the Empire can only be responsible to its own Government.

At present the Dominions have an influence on the foreign policy of the Empire, but no share in its control; nor have they any responsibility for maintaining any armed forces against external foes. They do, however, maintain certain forces, and it is of great importance that these forces should be coordinated with the other armed forces of the Empire. So far as the Governments are concerned, this is best done by each Dominion having a political representative on the Committee of Imperial Defence (*see* Chap. II, Part I). But technical liaison is also required, and this could probably be best attained by each Dominion representative having an adviser (or one for each Service), of sufficiently high rank both to represent fully the Chief of the Dominion General Staff and to make his advice carry weight with his own Government. There should also be Dominion officers attached to each division of the Combined Staff in which the particular Dominion is interested, and perhaps also to other branches of the Staff.

In war, should a War Council be formed which includes Dominion Ministers, and these Ministers have full authority delegated to them, then this War Cabinet would temporarily form a real executive head of the Empire, and in this case it might be possible to give to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff a certain amount of real authority over the Dominion General Staffs.

(2) Summary and Conclusion

It will be seen that in discussing this subject the question of a Ministry of Defence has sunk into a subordinate place. Such a Ministry is certainly to be desired, and neither on constitutional nor on technical grounds do there appear to be any valid arguments against it. But the real means of securing a close cooperation and combination between the three Services lies in a Combined Intelli-

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gence and Plans Staff; combined in the sense that each part of the world would be dealt with by a set of officers from each Service; combined also, in many cases, by previous personal knowledge and friendship, and in all cases by a mutual acquaintance with the other Services and by the sense of solidarity which is always given by a period of training in a common school; separate merely in the sense that responsibility would be owed only to a superior of the same Service.

Such a Staff is a natural sequel to the present Secretariat to the Committee of Imperial Defence. It is really only this Secretariat with the strength and authority to do the preparatory work which must be done in order to enable the sub-committee of the C.I.D., *i.e.*, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services, to find the highest common factor of agreement in the advice which they give, and to enable the Government to give well-weighed decisions. Even without this Staff, a Ministry of Defence would be a considerable advance on the present system, for it would ensure that there was one man with the authority to make his will prevail, whose principal task was to coordinate the work of the three Services. But his task would be immensely lightened if, instead of dealing with three Chiefs of Staff who have been brought up in ignorance of the ways of the other Services, who to a large extent speak different languages, and have not found any previous basis of agreement, he could deal with three Chiefs whose common problems had, by means of the Combined Staff, been thoroughly thrashed out, and everything impracticable eliminated; three Chiefs, moreover, who had been brought up to understand and to appreciate each other's point of view.

The best means, then, in addition to the existing Committee of Imperial Defence, of securing a close cooperation and combination between the three Services are:

(1) An Intelligence and Plans Staff, formed from all three Services and working under the combined direction of the Chiefs of Staff of each Service.

(2) A measure of common training for all Staff College students of the three Services, and further attachment to the other Services before joining the Combined Staff.

(3) A Ministry of Defence.

(4) Inter-Service departmental committees for the purpose of eliminating overlapping and duplication wherever possible.

The organization recommended is shown in the attached diagram.


Mr. Churchill, after a year's experience as Secretary of State for

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War and Air Minister combined, said in the House of Commons on the 22nd of March, 1920:

"A Committee of Imperial Defence, as the great instrument by which the Prime Minister exercised his responsibility over the whole field of military policy, would certainly continue and endure. . . . It would be a mistake to suppose that any rejuvenated Committee of Imperial Defence would be able to bridge the gulf which existed between the different Services. If the gulf was to be bridged, it could only be by building up over a number of years a breed, a brand of officers well trained at a common Staff College. The development of such a body was far more urgent than any question of the unity of the various Ministries under one head. He believed that the mere advent of the air in the whole conception of war would cause complications between the two other Services which would lead to a solution of that kind."

These conclusions are practically those which have been arrived at in this essay.



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NOTES ON THE FRENCH ARMY OF TO-DAY

By Major Sir T. Thompson, Bart., 3rd Hussars

The following notes were compiled during a visit which the writer paid to the Camp at La Courtine (Creuse), during the Divisional Training of the 16th French Division, in September, 1922.

This Camp is situated on the plateau of Millevache, to the west of the mountains of Auvergne, and consists of an area approximately 9 miles long by 4 miles broad, which the Government acquired about 15 years ago, and which has been completely cleared of all inhabitants, so that it can be used as an artillery range as well as a manœuvre area. The country consists chiefly of wild moorland, covered with heather, and traversed by numerous glens and boggy valleys, with occasional patches of birch woods ; it is, in fact, very like the New Forest, on the Ringwood side.

1. Infantry

(A) *Organization.*—All the infantry of a division is under one commander, usually a *général de brigade*, who is directly under the divisional general. This divisional infantry, or " I.D. " (*infanterie divisionnaire*), which is its abbreviated name, is sometimes called a brigade of infantry, although this term refers rather to a pre-war organization, according to which there were in a division 2 brigades of infantry, each of 2 regiments.

The divisional infantry now consists of 3 regiments. The regiment comprises 3 battalions and 1 *compagnie hors rang*. Included in this company is a *peloton d'engins*, made up of 3 *groupes*, each *groupe* including 1 37 *mm.* gun, 1 Stokes mortar, and 1 spare mortar (although the *personnel* is only sufficient to man 1 mortar). As a matter of practice, these *groupes* of the *peloton d'engins* seem to be usually distributed to the battalions, and not kept under the control of the regimental commander.

The battalion includes 3 companies and 1 *mitrailleuse* company.

The company is made up of 3 sections, each of 3 *groupes de combat*, the *groupe* comprises 1 *fusil mitrailleur équipe* and 1 *grenadier voltigeur équipe*.

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A *fusil mitrailleur équipe* consists of :

1 corporal.*
1 private who carries and fires the *fusil mitrailleur*.
1 private who is the principal ammunition carrier.†
3 privates who are assistant ammunition carriers.‡

A *grenadier voltigeur équipe* consists of :

1 corporal.*
1 private whose principal duty it is to throw bombs.§
3 privates who carry bombs and rifle grenades.‡
1 private who is a rifle grenadier.‖

The *mitrailleuse* company comprises 3 sections, each of 2 *groupes*, each *groupe* consisting of 2 machine guns.

(B) *Clothing and Equipment*.—The clothing and equipment carried by the French infantryman are as follows :—

Worn by the man :

1 greatcoat (always worn as part of field kit).
1 jacket (this is sometimes taken off and carried in the pack).
1 pair pantaloons (not trousers).
1 pair boots.
1 pair puttees.
1 flannel belt.
1 shirt.
1 pair drawers.
1 jersey (if not carried in the pack).
1 pair socks.
1 tie.
1 pair braces.
1 identity disc (on the wrist).
1 handkerchief.
1 helmet.
1 field service book.
1 field dressing.

Carried by the man :

2 gas masks (these are always carried, even on drill).
1 belt with 3 pouches, each holding 32 rounds.

* Armed with rifle and long bayonet.
† Armed with a revolver, and carries a special pack on his back for ammunition strips.
‡ Armed with carbines (*mousquetons*) and short bayonets.
§ Armed with a revolver.
‖ Armed with a rifle and long bayonet, and carries a special cup (*tromblon*) for attachment to the muzzle of the rifle to hold the rifle grenade (*grenade Vivien Bessières*, or V.B.).

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1 bayonet and frog.
1 rifle (or *mousqueton*).
1 panel (carried by every alternate man).*
1 water-bottle.
1 haversack, containing spoon, fork, mug and towel, and 1 day's reserve ration.
1 pack.

In the pack are :

1 shirt.
1 pair drawers.
1 tie.
1 handkerchief.
1 towel.
1 pair socks.
1 housewife.
1 forage cap.
1 piece of soap.
1 rag wrapped round a box of dubbin, and a brush.

Attached to the pack are :

1 blanket.
1 section of bivouac tent.
1 pair boots.
1 entrenching or other tool.†
1 mess-tin (with remainder of current day's ration).
1 ration bag.
2 camp kettles (*marmites*) and 1 coffee-machine per *groupe*.

Before the commencement of an attack, the men take off the pack, and detach the blanket and the section of the bivouac tent (the former being rolled in the latter), which they then put on *en banderole*. The entrenching tool is also taken off the pack, and carried on the belt by means of a special strap.

(C) *Formations in the Attack.*—The *organisation ternaire* of their infantry enables the French to adopt a triangle formation on practically all occasions, *e.g.* in an advanced guard, a triangle formation of sections in the leading company, or of companies in a battalion, is employed, with the apex of the triangle towards the front, in such a

* These panels (*de jalonnement*) are red on one side and white on the other, so as to suit either a white or a normally coloured ground, and are laid out by the leading infantry, on receiving a signal from an aeroplane, to indicate the farthest positions reached.

† The tools carried may be either a pick, a shovel, wire-cutters, billhook, or axe.

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way that the 2 sections, or companies forming the base of the triangle can protect the flanks of the advanced section or company.

Similarly, in the attack, the normal distribution of a battalion is a triangle formation of companies, 2 companies in front side by side, and 1 company in rear. When under distant artillery fire, the company will also have 2 sections in front, and 1 section in rear, each section in line or lines of *groupes* or *équipes*, men of each *équipe* in single file. As the company comes under rifle or machine-gun fire each *équipe* deploys into extended line.

Normally the *fusil mitrailleur équipe* of a *groupe* precedes its *grenadier voltigeur équipe*. When the advance is checked, the usual procedure in the *groupe* is for the *fusil mitrailleur équipe* to open as heavy a fire as possible on the hostile centre of resistance, while the *grenadier voltigeur équipe* endeavours, under cover of the fire, to work round one flank or other, and to get up to within rifle-grenade or bombing range of the enemy.

The French attach little importance to the rifle as a means of obtaining superiority of fire; the rifle is considered as a weapon of defence, rather than of offence. They look solely to their automatic weapons, the *fusil mitrailleur* and the machine gun, to obtain superiority of fire. In fact, the infantryman is discouraged from using his rifle during the attack, in order that he may devote all his energies to moving forward, under the covering fire of the automatic weapons.

In the actual assault, he is taught to get rid of the bombs he carries (every man goes into action with two), before going in with the bayonet. Until he has discharged his bombs he carries his rifle (or *mousqueton*) slung over his back.

As with us, men are trained to advance singly by short rushes; any tendency to advance in line, or to bunch is at once checked.

(D) *Machine Guns.*—The *Réglement provisoire de Manœuvre d'Infanterie*, dated the 1st of February, 1920, lays down, as broad principles, governing the employment of machine guns both in attack and defence, that they should be used in depth, and that there should always be a reserve kept in hand.

In the attack, the normal distribution of the machine guns of a battalion is for 1 section (4 guns) of the *mitrailleuse* company to be allotted to each of the 2 companies in the front line, while the remaining section remains with the battalion reserves.

The section with a leading company sends 1 *groupe* (2 guns) forward with the leading wave, under the covering fire of the other *groupe* of the section; when the forward *groupe* reaches a good fire

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position, it comes into action, whereupon the *groupe* in rear moves forward in its turn.

Emphasis is laid on the necessity for at least 1 *groupe* of machine guns for each of the leading companies to be immediately available when the final objective is reached, in order to cover the work of organizing and consolidating the captured position.

The machine gunners are also expected to support, from each intermediate bound, the advance of tanks cooperating with their unit.

Machine guns retained with the battalion reserve are used to support the attack by overhead, or indirect fire.

As regards transport, each machine gun is carried in a low-wheeled one-horse vehicle, as far as possible, after which it is carried forward by its crew, 1 man carrying the tripod, and 1 man the gun itself. This latter is a considerable load, weighing as it does 25 kilos: the tripod is very much the same weight. The rest of the gun crew bring up the ammunition, range-finder, etc.

2. Cavalry

(A) *Organization.*—The cavalry regiment consists at present of 4 squadrons, with 2 sections of machine guns, each comprising 2 guns.

There is talk of this organization being altered to one of 3 squadrons and a machine-gun squadron, with 8 machine guns.

The squadron is divided into 4 *pelotons*, each divided into 4 *escouades*. With each of the first and fourth *pelotons* of a squadron there are, or were until recently, 2 *fusils mitrailleurs* and 1 rifle-grenade rifle, while with each of the second and third *pelotons*, there are 1 *fusil mitrailleur* and 2 rifle-grenade rifles, making a total of 6 automatic rifles and 6 rifle-grenade rifles with the squadron. These numbers are to be increased to eight in each case.

For dismounted work, 2 *escouades* form 1 *groupe de combat*, similar in all respects to the infantry *groupe*.

(B) *Clothing and Equipment.*—The clothing and equipment carried by the French cavalryman are as follows:—

Worn on the man:

1 helmet.
1 shirt.
1 pair drawers.
1 flannel belt.
1 pair socks.

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1 jersey (if not carried in the wallet).
1 tie.
1 identity disc.
1 pair pantaloons.
1 pair braces.
1 jacket.
1 pair ankle boots.
1 pair leather gaiters.
1 handkerchief.
1 field service book.
1 field dressing.
1 panel (*de jalonnement*), similar to that carried by the infantry, on the scale of 1 for every 2 men.

Carried by the man :

1 waterbottle.
1 gas mask.
1 belt with bayonet and frog and 3 pouches each with 30 rounds, the pouch in rear also containing pull-through, oil bottle, brush and rag.
1 *mousequeton*, carried slung across the back (in the case of sergeants, carried in a bucket on the near side of the horse).

Carried on the saddle :

1 sword (on the off side).
1 entrenching implement.
Man's blanket rolled in section of bivouac tent and cloak on rear arch.
1 pair wallets.
1 corn sack, containing 2 nose-bags and 4 lbs. oats, strapped on front of wallets.
1 pair saddle-bags (*monosacs*), on rear of saddle.

In the off wallet :

1 shirt, 1 pair puttees, 1 clothes brush, 1 housewife, grooming kit, a charge of explosive, pickets for bivouac tent.

In the near wallet :

1 pair drawers, 1 pair socks, 1 towel, 1 surcingle, 2 days' preserved rations (less chocolate).

In the off saddle-bag :

2 horse shoes and nails, mess tin with remains of current day's rations, 1 haversack.

In the near saddle-bag :

2 horse shoes with nails, and spikes, 2 lbs. of oats, reserve chocolate rations.

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On the horse :

1 bridle, 1 head collar, 1 head rope, 1 saddle complete, 1 horse blanket (folded under the saddle), 1 horse bandolier containing 110 rounds, 1 horse gas mask (if not carried in transport).

(C) *Employment.*—There was, unfortunately, no cavalry at La Courtine while I was there, the squadron allotted to the 16th Division as divisional cavalry, having already carried out its training with another division, so I saw nothing of their methods of employment.

From conversation I had with senior officers, I gather that there are two schools in the French Army, one which maintains that the principles for the strategic employment of cavalry have been little altered, if at all, and that the next European war will see the two opposing cavalry forces advancing to engage one another in the area dividing the two armies, supported by tanks, and by infantry in lorries. This school does not consider that the tank will have reached, even in fifteen years' time, such a state of perfection as to be able to accompany cavalry, unless carried in lorries, as is done with the present *chars legers d'assaut*, and that therefore its possible participation in a cavalry *versus* cavalry encounter need not be considered. Such tanks as can accompany cavalry will be required more as a support, or a mobile reserve, to help the cavalry to overcome organized, or semi-organized resistance.

The other school maintains that the day of the strategic employment of cavalry is over, owing largely to the enormous strides that will be made in the development and use of poison gases, which will be spread over large areas, and prevent the movement of men or animals, unless provided with gas masks. This would so restrict the use of cavalry, as to make its strategic employment impossible. This school also is a firm believer in the future development of the tank, and of track-propelled vehicles generally, and consequently considers that horses will in the near future have no use in war.

3. Artillery

(A) *Organization.*—The artillery of a French division consists of a regiment, under the command of a colonel, which comprises :

(*a*) 4 *groupes* of field artillery armed with the 75 *mm.* gun. A *groupe* comprises 3 batteries, each of 4 guns, and an ammunition column (*colonne de ravitaillement*).

(*b*) 2 *groupes* of medium howitzers (155 *mm. court*). A

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groupe again consists of 3 batteries, each of 4 guns, with an ammunition column.

(*c*) A divisional ammunition park.

A corps artillery consists of:

(*e*) 2 *groupes* of 105 *mm.* guns (medium).

(*f*) 2 *groupes* of 155 *mm.* (long) (medium) guns; and

(*g*) A corps ammunition park.

All the above are, up to the present, horse-drawn.

The artillery of a corps is commanded by a general de brigade.

There is no army artillery, beyond such batteries as may be detached from the G.H.Q. Reserve.

As with us, the G.H.Q. Reserve will consist of heavy batteries of all calibres chiefly drawn by tractors, as well as a number of field artillery *groupes*. Included amongst these latter will be *batteries portées*, in which guns, *personnel*, and ammunition are all carried in lorries, and which include light tractors for dragging the guns from the points of disembarcation on roads, across country to the firing positions. Two touring cars are provided for the use of the officers of a battery; they will generally have to carry out their reconnaissances on foot, but as they will move considerably faster along the roads than the lorries carrying the guns, they will have ample time.

(B) *Employment*.—When the division is attacking, the usual procedure is for the artillery to be divided into two *groupements*, a *groupement d'appui direct*, consisting possibly of three *groupes* of 75 *mm.* guns, each of which would be allotted to an infantry regiment for purposes of direct support, and a *groupement d'ensemble* comprising the 4th *groupe* of 75 *mm.* guns, and the two *groupes* of medium artillery with the division (155 *mm. court* guns). This latter *groupement* would be directly under the divisional general, and although, when the division is engaged, the guns of this *groupement* would generally be in action, it would correspond to an artillery reserve, in that it would always be available for employment in whatever direction the divisional general might wish.

The rôle of the *groupement d'appui direct* is, as stated above, to support the infantry, to which it is allotted, as closely as possible, by means of concentrations on successive points lying in the sector of attack, or by rolling barrages—although these latter are losing favour with French artillerymen, on account of the prodigious amount of ammunition they consume; it is doubtful if they will be much used in future, even against a fully organized position.

The medium artillery of the *groupement d'ensemble* would come into positions of observation as soon as possible, ready to bring

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concentrations to bear on points well in advance of the attacking infantry. Its rôle does not include counter-battery work, which comes within the sphere of the corps artillery.

The duty of supporting the advance of friendly tanks would probably be allotted to the *groupe* of 75 *mm.* in the *groupement d'ensemble*, and this would be effected by means of concentrations on any hostile machine-gun nests, or anti-tank guns which might disclose themselves in the sector in which the tanks are operating. In addition, orders might also be given for all available guns, whatever their task, to be turned on to any anti-tank gun disclosed.

The methods of anti-tank action recommended are either that individual tanks should be taken on by whole batteries of medium howitzers (155 *mm. court*), or field guns, firing salvoes at them, or that single field guns should be taken up to as near the front line as possible, and remain silent until an opportunity presented itself of taking on a tank at close range.

(C) *Liaison with Infantry.*—To ensure as close liaison as possible with the infantry, an officer is detached from the artillery *groupe*, and goes to the headquarters of the infantry regiment with which his *groupe* is cooperating; he keeps in touch with his *groupe* by telephone so as to be in a position to pass all information received as to the progress of the infantry, or as to the points on which concentrations are required. It is recommended that the headquarters of the infantry regiment and of the artillery *groupe* should be in close proximity to one another, but it is recognized that this is not always possible.

As with us, flares may also on occasions be sent up by the leading infantry as signals to the supporting artillery.

Wireless is not used as a means of communication between guns and O.Ps. or between guns and the leading infantry. There are wireless sets at the headquarters of every regiment of infantry, regiment of artillery, and *groupe* of heavy artillery.

(D) *Infantry Guns.*—No decision has at present been come to regarding the employment of infantry guns, or *canons d'accompagnement.*

Under present conditions, the employment of sections of guns with battalions is advocated, in special circumstances, as, for instance, during a pursuit, or when the ground is favourable and lends itself to close support, to act entirely under the orders of the battalion commander, for employment against nests of hostile machine guns, etc., which may be holding up the advance of the infantry.

It is recognized, however, that this can only be a makeshift, and

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it is probable that any development in this direction will be on the lines of an improvement of the present infantry gun, the 37 *mm.*, and of the Stokes mortar. It is realized that an infantry gun requires a curved trajectory in order to take on machine guns, or infantry in trenches, and must at the same time be capable of being used as a high-velocity gun, with a flat trajectory, against hostile tanks. No gun has yet been designed to combine both these desiderata, so it is probable that the French will continue on the lines they have adopted of having two weapons. The introduction of some form of caterpillar carriage for these guns will simplify the question of their transport, which at present has to depend largely on man-power.

It appears certain that the *personnel* of the infantry gun, whatever form it takes, will be infantry. It is thought that better results will be obtained if it is an integral part of the regiment, than if it is worked by artillery *personnel*, owing to the intimate liaison necessary between it and the leading infantry to obtain the necessary measure of close support.

(E) *Prize Competitions for Gunners and Drivers.*—At the conclusion of the practices with live shell, a *concours de tir* is held in which all the gunners compete. The method is as follows :—

A canvas screen, about 6 feet square, with a bull's-eye in the centre, is erected about 500 yards away from the battery position. An aiming post is then put up in such a position that when the gun is laid with a certain angle on the aiming post, the shell will traverse the centre of the screen : the correctness of the angle is then tested by expert layers firing two trial shots, and the gun is then put out of action.

The competitors are then each given a limited time in which to lay the gun at the given angle, and to fire as many rounds as possible. Marks are deducted for slowness in firing, and also for the distance of the shot holes from the centre of the screen : if the screen is missed altogether, the competitor is disqualified.

For the drivers, a driving competition was held which included a novel feature, in that the competing teams, after driving round a pegged out semi-circular course, and down a straight, had to pull up on a given line, and then back out, still on a pegged-out course, to one flank, sufficiently far to be able to advance and return in an opposite direction along the semi-circular course. As with us, marks were given for turn out, condition of horses, etc.

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4. Tanks

(A) *Organization.*—The French divide their tanks into two categories—*Chars de rupture*, and *Chars d'accompagnement*. Of these, the first category is still in the experimental stage; these tanks are intended for use, in preference to the lighter tanks, in the attack of strong points which have been heavily shelled, or in localities where there is an intricate system of trenches.

Of the *chars d'accompagnement*, there are again two types, a medium, represented by our Mk. V. star tank, and a light. The present *char leger d'assaut*, as it is termed, is obsolescent, but it is to be replaced by another of similar design, but with a greater speed. The present ones are rather smaller than our "whippets," and carry either 1 37 *mm.* gun,* or 1 machine gun. Their weight is about 7 tons, and their maximum speed 7 kilometres an hour.

These *chars legers d'assaut* are organized in battalions, 1 battalion being the normal allotment to a division. The battalion comprises 3 companies, each of which is organized into 2 *pelotons*.

The 1st *peloton* is made up of 3 combatant sections, each consisting of 3 gun tanks and 2 machine-gun tanks. The section commander is in a gun tank, and the remaining 4 tanks are divided into 2 half-sections each consisting of a gun tank and a machine-gun tank and commanded by a sergeant.

The 2nd *peloton* is also made up of 3 sections (the 4th, 5th and 6th). The 4th section includes *personnel* and material to make good wastage, as well as 5 spare tanks, and also 3 repair tanks and their crews. The 5th section is a workshop section, while the 6th section includes the company transport, on which is carried 3 days' ammunition, 2 days' supply of petrol, oil, etc., and 2 days' rations.

In addition, with the company headquarters, is a gun tank, included for the exclusive use of the company commander, and also a wireless tank. This latter does not come under the orders of the company commander during an action, but is placed at the disposal of the divisional signal service, for use wherever considered necessary. The wireless tank has nominally a range of 5 *kilometres*, but this is subject to weather conditions.

(B) *Employment.*—The normal formation of the section of tanks in an attack is for the section to be in line, the 3 gun tanks (of which the middle one is the section leader's tank) in the centre, and the 2 machine-gun tanks on each flank, with intervals of 50 *metres* between each tank. When the section arrives at a distance of

* The 37 *mm.* gun can fire case, as well as an explosive shell.

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80–100 *metres* from the hostile centre of resistance, it halts and opens fire with its 37 *mm.* guns (the *char leger* can only fire its gun when halted). When the enemy is sufficiently demoralized for the advance to be resumed, the two flank machine-gun tanks move on at top speed, and endeavour to outflank the hostile strong point.

If the point to be attacked by a section of tanks is too great for it to be encircled, or turned, the two machine-gun tanks, instead of pushing on round the flanks of the hostile strong point, act in a similar way to the gun tanks.

If anything arises during the advance on an objective to interfere with the advance, such as the discovery of an anti-tank weapon, the section should devote all its energies to overcome it before continuing its advance.

Stress is laid upon the necessity for tanks to be immediately supported by infantry in order that the fruits of their success may be exploited, as tanks cannot hold what they win.

After the capture of the objective, the tanks are withdrawn behind cover, as soon as the assaulting infantry have arrived, and remain under cover until the position has been properly consolidated. They then return to the refilling point.

During an assault the tanks precede the infantry, or should it so happen that the infantry has started in front of them, their task is to overtake the attacking force, and to arrive at the objective in front of it. The infantry never advances to the assault in the intervals between the tanks, but aims at reaching the objective immediately behind them.

The French regulations lay down that tanks should be employed in mass and in depth, and that care should be taken to ensure that they all appear at the same time, and at as short an interval as possible before the infantry assault. Further, that a sufficient number of tanks must be put into the leading wave to support the infantry units in the first line effectively, but that not more than this sufficient number should be given to the leading infantry, as it is only by echeloning the tank sections in depth, that the continuity of support, indispensable to enable the infantry to penetrate deeply into the enemy positions, can be assured. This echelonning of tank sections should be arranged opposite the localities where the principal effort is required.

When possible, a commander should keep some tanks at his disposal, as a mobile reserve, but only after sufficient tanks have been allotted to the attacking troops to assist them to attain their objective.

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Against an unorganized position when it is important to act quickly, or when the enemy has not had time to provide himself with all auxiliary means of defence, it is laid down that tanks may approach in broad daylight, overtaking the infantry in time in order to lead the actual assault.

Against an organized position, however, tanks must attack at dawn, unless there happen to be good covered approaches to the line from which the assault is to be delivered.

In defence, tanks must not be used passively, for instance, to protect the flanks; if used as a stationary machine-gun shelter, they are far more vulnerable and no more efficacious, than machine-gun posts concealed in a trench system. Tank sections should rather be echelonned behind points of resistance, so as to be able to reach expeditiously proposed lines of counter-attack.

Special emphasis is laid on the duty of the infantry to help the advance of tanks, by preparing crossings, etc., over wide trenches, and particularly by bringing an intense neutralizing fire from all its automatic weapons to bear on points suspected to be held by the enemy, or on localities where anti-tank weapons have been discovered. It is further laid down that the infantry is not to look upon tanks as indispensable, and is to be prepared to carry out an attack against a hostile strong point on its own, without waiting for the arrival of tanks.

Tanks detailed for employment with an advanced guard or with cavalry, would, in the case of *chars legers* be carried in lorries, and would not be disembarked until contact with the enemy had been established; the time taken to put a section of tanks on to their tracks would be about 1¼ hours. The tanks would then be ready to go into action complete with 8 hours' petrol, oil, ammunition, etc., on board and with fresh crews.

(C) *Liaison with Infantry.*—In each *groupe* of an infantry company, men are selected, whose duty it is, when the advance of the *groupe* has been checked, to go to the nearest tank, and indicate to its crew, verbally, if possible, or by signs, where its help is wanted.

The infantry also fires flares out of rifle-grenade rifles, to indicate to tanks the direction of any hostile resistance.

(D) *Communication between Tanks.*—The *chars legers* communicate to one another by means of flags, which are put up through a hole in the cupola, and with which 4 different signals are made, viz.:

(i) follow section leader;
(ii) form line (at 50 *metres* interval);
(iii) form column of half-sections;

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when the section forms as under :

ϕ gun tank	ϕ gun tank	ϕ gun tank
($\frac{1}{2}$ section leader).	(section leader).	($\frac{1}{2}$ section leader)
-⊖- M.-G. tank.		-⊖- M.-G. tank.

(iv) form column of single file.

The section leader makes the signal first, and it is then repeated to all the tanks in the section.

There are four different coloured flags :

Red and white	Section leader.
Red	Gun-tank.
Blue	Machine-gun tank.
Yellow	Out of action.

No other signalling apparatus is carried by the *chars legers*.

(E) The problem, the solution of which is now exercising the minds of tank experts in France, is that of *double roulement*, *i.e.* the capability of a tank (or other vehicle) to travel at will either on tracks or on wheels ; when this is satisfactorily solved, the principle will doubtless be applied to vehicles of all classes, at present horse-drawn, and will probably lead to the abolition of horse transport in the Army. Presumably owing to this question being still in embryo, nothing appears to have been done yet towards putting any infantry vehicles, as, for instance, the carriages for the 37 *mm.* gun, or for machine guns, on to tracks.

I was told that a motor car exists at the present day—the *Kegresse* —the hind wheels of which can be taken off and replaced by india-rubber tracks ; the car is then capable of travelling across country or negotiating obstacles like the ramparts of Paris. This is perhaps an indication that the problem is nearing solution.

5. Engineers

There were no engineers at La Courtine, and I was not able to obtain any useful information regarding them.

6. Signals

The engineers run the signal service down to and including the I.D., or infantry brigade headquarters.

From regimental headquarters downwards, the communications are run by infantry *personnel*. There appears to be a strong opinion in favour of a signal service being instituted, very much on the lines of our signal corps, to take charge of all communications.

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As regards means of communication the following are used :—

From divisional headquarters to :

(*a*) infantry brigade—telephone, wireless, cyclists ;

(*b*) aeroplanes—panels (wireless messages can be received from aeroplanes) ;

(*c*) tanks—wireless.

From infantry brigade headquarters to :

(*d*) divisional headquarters—telephone, wireless, cyclists, pigeons ; *

(*e*) infantry regiments—telephone, wireless, cyclists, electric signalling lamps ;

(*f*) aeroplanes—panels (wireless messages can be received from aeroplanes) ;

(*g*) artillery *groupe*—telephone ;

(*h*) tanks (no messages can be sent but wireless messages can be received).

From infantry regimental headquarters to :

(*i*) infantry brigade headquarters—telephone, wireless, cyclists, pigeons,* electric signalling lamps ;

(*j*) battalions—telephone, electric signalling lamps, power buzzer (T.P.S.), fullerphone, flares ;

(*k*) aeroplanes—panels (wireless messages can be received from aeroplanes) ;

(*l*) artillery *groupe*—telephone, electric signalling lamp.

From battalions to :

(*m*) infantry regimental headquarters—telephone, electric signalling lamp, power buzzer, fullerphone, flares, pigeons ; *

(*n*) aeroplanes—panels ;

(*o*) companies—electric signalling lamp (although there are at present only 2 in the battalion), semaphore, runners, dogs.

From companies to :

(*p*) battalion—electric signalling lamp, semaphore, runners, dogs, pigeons ; *

(*q*) section—runners.

The engineer signal *personnel* have motor transport for their equipment, but the infantry *personnel* have to carry all theirs by hand.

* * * * *

* The pigeon loft is at divisional headquarters, hence all pigeon messages would be transmitted through divisional headquarters.

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In conclusion, I must give expression to my indebtedness to the many friends whom I made among the officers of the 16th French Division for the kindness, courtesy and assistance which they gave to me on all occasions during my stay at La Courtine.

Although I was there at a time when political feelings between Great Britain and France were somewhat strained, this fact was never allowed to influence our relations; on the contrary, I was assured that, whatever our politicians might say or think, the *entente* between the British and French Armies was far too strongly cemented to be affected by any passing wave of political feeling.

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ON THE ART OF COMMAND

By Major-General A. G. Wauchope, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.

"*La troupe idéale cet un être ayant un cerveau, le chef; un moelle épinière et des nerfs, les cadres; des muscles obéissant docilement aux ordres de la volonté et aux reflexes de la moelle épinière, les soldats.*"—General de Maud'huy.

"*L'éducation, est l'art de faire passer le conscient dans l'inconscient.*"
—Commandant Gaucher.

One of the best known sayings of the late Colonel Henderson is that the art of command, whether the force be large or small, is the art of dealing with human nature; and in his book, "The Science of War," Colonel Henderson reminds us that we have to deal in war not so much with numbers and arms and manœuvres, as with human nature. Napoleon said that he found in the study of the great campaigns not merely a record of marches and manœuvres, and the use of entrenchments, but a complete study of human nature under the conditions that exist in war; human nature affected by discipline, by fear, by need of food, by the weight of responsibility and by patriotism.

It is the purpose of the writer of this article to show that though inhibition has little effect, and punishment has less, on the development of character, commanders who have faith in themselves and in their men are able to exercise a real influence over their command in two ways: partly by directing the natural impulses of their men from unworthy to worthy ends, but chiefly by cultivating the group spirit until the aim of the whole unit is the well-being of the command, rather than either the safety or the comfort of the individual.

Now, if human nature changes at all, it changes very slowly. Civilized man, like wild tribesmen and, indeed, all animals, is subject to the influence of certain definite instincts. It is the business of officers to study these instincts so that they may learn how soldiers respond to the stimulus of each; they are neglecting an important

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branch of training if they do nothing to modify the growth of those instincts which weaken a fighting force, if they do nothing to increase the power of those which add cohesion and strength to an army.

Above all, it is necessary to inquire whether these instincts act on individual soldiers in the same way, and with the same power, as they do on soldiers when organized in platoons, companies and regiments.

There is no need to embark upon any abstruse psychological argument, but it is generally accepted that there are three primary groups of instincts to which all mankind, and, indeed, all animals are subject. The first of these, is the instinct of self-preservation; the second, the instinct of feeding and nutrition; and the third, the instinct of sex and reproduction.

These three groups of instincts in various forms have influenced ourselves and our ancestors for hundreds of thousands of years and are, therefore, of incalculable power. But, in ordinary circumstances, their influence is felt by soldiers as individuals, and not as members of companies and battalions. In fact, under certain conditions, it seems that we act exactly contrary to the admonitions of these instincts. A soldier, instead of obeying the instinct of self-preservation and flying from the enemy, will sometimes sacrifice his life for his platoon; a platoon will sometimes hold out till the last man is killed in order to save a battalion.

There are some philosophers who argue that soldiers do these things because they enjoy doing them; or because they seek to gain heavenly rewards or to avoid hellish punishments. To most of us it is obvious, that while some animals are only subject to the three groups of primary instincts, all gregarious animals are also subject to a fourth, the herd or tribal instinct which acts most powerfully on men when bound together as a tribe or as a nation, or on soldiers when organized in a regiment or in an army. In certain conditions it can even take the place of these primary instincts to which the same soldiers would respond were they unorganized and untrained, and accustomed to act, each according to his own individual impulses.

When opposed to instinct, fear of punishment is a poor deterrent. To give a new stimulus, chance to act is far more effective than mere inhibition. When a soldier is trained to put the interests of his regiment and country before his own, he will be ready to sacrifice himself in order to save that which he loves better than self. To do this, is to be obedient to the group instinct. It is the power of this instinct which must be studied and developed by all officers who lead and train companies and battalions. Commanders, whose daily

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work it is to govern men, must realize and be guided by this axiom: soldiers, when organized in companies and battalions, think and act differently than they think and act as isolated individuals.

For the essential distinction between a body of soldiers and a crowd of men is that the former are trained together to act under one leader, so that the group, it may be a platoon, it may be a battalion, developes a vitality of its own and has mind and spirit separate and different from those of its members. The psychology of the platoon or battalion must no more be neglected than the psychology of the individual soldier.

"Who knows the art of impressing the imagination," said Napoleon, "knows the art of ruling." A wise commander has more power over his command as a whole than he has over the individuals composing it. For the mind of the commander acts directly on the spirit of the group, whose members are animated by a common purpose, whose collective action the commander guides towards a single end.

In a book on social psychology Professor MacDougall says, that it is only by sharing in the collective life of organized societies that the mass of men is raised above a low level of almost purely selfish behaviour; and it is only through sharing in this collective life that men can be raised to heights of heroic self-sacrifice. Nowhere is this made more manifest than in our Army, where the capacity for collective thinking and acting is highly, though often unconsciously, developed.

The collective spirit is not merely the sum, or resultant, of the minds of the men composing it. Its life is far longer, its memory more retentive, its imagination more vivid. Consequently, it is more responsive to the appeals of tradition and of history, and more responsive to the guidance of its leaders. Therefore, those who would study the art of command must also bear in mind this second axiom: the collective life of a regiment attains a far higher level, intellectually and morally, than the average of its members.

Those who pay no heed to these two axioms limit their power of command in two ways: they make no appeal to that which is most responsive in the mind of their command, and they exercise no influence over what is best and highest in the spirit of their men.

No one can dispute the importance of the art of command, but by our inaction we imply that it is not only a subject which we cannot teach, but also that it is a subject which cannot be taught—and so, to comfort ourselves, we say that a man is either a born leader or a born fool, and that is the end of it. But that is not the whole truth.

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There are some men, it is true, who are born supremely gifted in this way, but many of us can only learn by our own efforts and through the experiences of others, the principles of this, as of any other, art.

We must now turn from the discussion of the group spirit and consider two other matters affecting the power of command: the qualities which are essential to a commander, and the means by which he may best employ those qualities to the development of character in his command.

It is said that all men, and indeed all animals, may be divided into two classes, those who instinctively seek to lead and those who by nature are content to be led. It is obvious that either by nature or by training, all officers, to be effective commanders, must belong to the former class.

Of the qualities which fit for command none is more essential to inspire confidence than strength and vigour, and a commander, whether he leads a pack of dogs or a company of men, must not only possess vigour, but he must also show that he possesses it. A commander whose orders, once given, are not invariably obeyed is soon despised by his company, because the company, like a pack of wild dogs, instinctively demands those qualities in their leader, which are needed for the safety of the pack, or, for the well-being of the company. He may consult freely and often with his subordinates, but a decision once given, there must be no further discussion. An army is happy under a strong commander, but not under a soviet committee.

If a commander has no faith in himself, he may feel perfectly sure that his doubts will be universally shared by all those under him. Knowledge breeds self-confidence. If his mind is filled with doubts and hesitations, it is best for him to hide them from himself if possible, but most certainly from his men.

A loyal commander can count on loyalty in others, and, although it is a fact not always remembered, a commander who is disloyal can count most surely on being the direct cause of disloyalty in others. A disloyal commander will infect his whole command with the same fatal spirit, for it is indeed the spirit of ruin and disaster. When the salt has lost its savour wherewith shall it be salted?

A sense of justice is perhaps a quality equally important as vigour in a commander. If it be not universally felt that a spirit of justice animates all commanders in a regiment, then discipline, good spirit and real cohesion vanish. We all make mistakes at times. But British soldiers forgive and excuse many mistakes in their officers. A company will make every effort to shield and protect its company

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commander, however ignorant he may be, from the attacks and assaults of a brigadier, cursed with an inquiring mind. But if a company, rightly or wrongly, convicts its commander of injustice, then God help that commander in peace and in war, for most certainly his men will pardon him nothing.

A commander must be direct and simple or his men will not understand what he is driving at. Individually, we may tolerate and laugh at a humbug, but we do not do so collectively. Humbug in a leader is too great a danger to the army for the army to put up with sham. Whatever a commander says or does, let him say or do it in all sincerity. A man who has no faith in his own actions, no belief in what he preaches, may deceive some individuals, but never the collective mind of his command.

If we compare small things with great, we shall see a strong if superficial resemblance, in the qualities of a good drill sergeant with those of a strong commander. A drill sergeant may be hard and exacting in his demands, but he must be just. To get the best work out of his squad, a drill sergeant must show absolute firmness by his word of command, only then will his orders come to be obeyed instinctively, by the whole squad working as one man. Obedience becomes a habit, and a well-drilled squad obeys without consciousness of obedience. All orders must be clear, simple and easily understood. The drill sergeant must make no mistakes in his orders, for, if any mistake is detected, he will lose prestige, and the squad will no longer drill with perfect cohesion.

He must show complete knowledge of drill, although knowledge of no other subject is demanded. It is one of the great tests of a good drill sergeant, as it is of a good commander, that he can get the utmost out of his men, but that he never asks the impossible. His judgment must be both quick and sure.

A commander must have prestige. An officer gains prestige—or is it only the reflexion of the real article ?—from his rank, from his uniform, and from the power and the authority which are given him by the regulations. But true prestige is not acquired by passing an examination or by receiving a Commission. When Napoleon said he hated unlucky commanders, he expressed the feelings of all who serve under them. But continuous success is not necessary to acquire prestige. No commanders were ever more trusted by their armies than were Stonewall Jackson and Lee. A commander who demands much of his men must give much ; he can only inspire confidence when he shows knowledge, respect when he proves himself just, good order when he shows himself resolute.

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Now, if these are the most notable qualities necessary to commanders, let us consider shortly how they may best be employed to influence the men of their commands. The first task of a commander is to make his men feel that they are bound together by common ties of self-interest, fellow feeling and devotion, both traditional and acquired, towards the unit of which they are members. A platoon commander need have no misgivings when encouraging the *esprit de corps* of his platoon : far from damaging, his action will strengthen company and regimental spirit. For one man may belong, and normally does belong to several groups, his platoon, regiment and army, his fellow workers, his townspeople and his fellow countrymen. The more accustomed men are to the influence of one group spirit the more ready they are to accept impulses of a kindred nature.

The essence of the task lies in making men accustomed to think less of their individual interests and more of the interests of their platoon, regiment and their country. Having achieved this, the commander must remember that his chief source of influence rests in this collective spirit, and it is by means of this spirit rather than by appeals to, or punishments of, individuals, that he is able to excercise most power over his command.

In all regiments we do much to encourage *esprit de corps* and the team spirit. We do this in our daily work, since the bulk of our training is carried out by squads, platoons and companies. We also encourage the team spirit by means of competition in games and military exercises, and in principle we all agree that the spirit of the regiment can be fostered by educating men to take pride in regimental tradition and giving them knowledge of regimental history. To make men show by their actions that they are influenced by tradition, is a great and frequent achievement in our Army.

Discipline derives much of its power from the fact that it is discipline which makes men realize that their well-being in peace, and their safety and success in war, depend on the cohesion which binds them together into a regiment or an army. In the old days when men fought in a phalanx, or in a square, the fact of advancing shoulder to shoulder gave each soldier a feeling of power and security, since he knew he was being closely supported by his own comrades, and he felt he was part of a moving and irresistible mass.

Now that this close physical contact is no longer possible in modern warfare, the feeling of moral cohesion is more than ever needed. This feeling of solidarity can only exist on the widely extended front of a modern battlefield when men have been trained

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to rely on the support of their comrades and of their commanders ; when they know that to be out of sight is not to be out of mind.

" Close order," said General Maud'huy, " is the guarantee given by discipline in the presence of danger. The sense of moral solidarity must, in these days, take the place of close physical contact." This sense of solidarity can only be inspired by a commander who is in perfect sympathy with the men of his command—whose men are moved by the same emotions and impulses as himself. The commander, although he is the directing brain, is not separate from, but the most vital part of, his own command.

Study the capacities, character and mind of the individual ; pay every heed to the private rights of the private soldier, but remember that a commander's duty is to his command as a whole. He is a useless commander who has a kind heart and no high sense of duty. Even though individuals may suffer, a commander must never hesitate to make whatever demands are needed for the collective good of his command. Soft-hearted commanders are responsible for more crime in an army and more casualties in war than are hard-hearted men.

If a commander works, sometimes it may be regardless of the individual, but always for the good of his command, he will not only prove his worth in an army, but he will gain the respect, and more than the respect, of his command. Too often a young commander concerns himself overmuch with the worst men in his command. It is the subordinate leaders and the company as a whole that merit his chief attention. Raise the moral of the company to the highest level, and the spirit so created will suffice to settle the scamps. Certainly, in time of peace, it is the besetting sin of officers to be content with mediocrity, not only among themselves, but also in their command.

The good is the enemy of the best. Look after the moral of the company and the scamps will need to look after themselves. Create a strong collective spirit and even the most unruly men must need conform to its will.

Rewards and punishments are not the main regulators of conduct. Much of human conduct is the outcome of impulses which reason does not approve and which the will cannot control. A soldier who joins a British regiment falls heir to a great tradition, which has slowly been built up in peace and in war through the efforts and sacrifices of countless predecessors.

How profoundly his character is affected by this tradition, and by his surroundings, rests greatly with the commander. The

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problem of the commander is to direct the soldier's impulses towards objects advantageous to the command. The more successful he is in this, the stronger becomes the collective spirit ; and the more vital this spirit, the more power is given to the commander.

To some extent a regiment or an army has, like a nation, the rulers it deserves. The leader of a herd of wild animals, though he excels his fellows in strength, energy and experience, unites in himself the qualities of the herd. A shepherd, said Doctor Le Bon, must resemble his sheep ; this means that a shepherd, in order to shepherd his flock, must have understanding and sympathy for the instincts and needs of his flock. The same is true of a platoon commander and a platoon, of a general and an army. The sympathy in character and in aim which united the commander and his men, was the power that gave cohesion to the poorly organized forces of Montrose in Scotland, of Garibaldi in Italy, and of Ashby and Stewart, the cavalry leaders, in the American Civil War.

The commander is the mirror of his men, and when true sympathy exists, they will show the same impulses as their leader ; in battle they will fight as he wills, in the attack they will conquer.

It is instructive to consider how closely the qualities of armies corresponds with the qualities of their commanders. Dash, or *élan vital*, is the first quality most of us would say that marks the French Army, and the kindred qualities of energy and imagination are what have chiefly distinguished, and still distinguish, its commanders—Napoleon and many of his marshals, Foch and some of his principal generals. It was this very quality which was lacking in 1870, not only among the French generals, but also among the subordinate commanders.

An iron discipline and ready submission to authority are the two military qualities which have so often brought victory to the armies of Prussia, and we see their reflexes in the driving power and the gift of organization possessed by Frederick the Great, by Moltke, by Ludendorff.

There is no need to quote examples to show that time and again victory has come to British armies, owing to their staunchness and determination, and the counterpart is seen in the outstanding qualities of our greatest commanders—the resolution of Marlborough, the inflexible strength of Wellington, and the unwavering resolve of Lord Haig and his principal commanders, to win the war and to win it in France.

Now with what object has the present writer dealt with subjects which are rather strange to normal military training—with instincts

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and impulses, with the collective spirit, with the sympathy between the commander and his men? For this reason, that the art of command deals not only with the training of the mind, but also with the moulding of character. Men are not moved by reason only. Our actions are largely swayed by our emotions, by fear, by passion, by faith and by love of country. As an iceberg derives its mass and momentum from its bulk which never appears above the level of the ocean, so are we all constantly driven by impulses which spring neither from our reason nor from our intelligence, but from the very depths of our being. These are impulses which no commander can suppress, but he can in some measure direct them to good purpose. Every commander should ask himself this question:—Is my command the better for my being, or do I exist as a passenger without power or drive, dressed in the commander's uniform, showing his emblems, and wearing his badges of rank, but with no control of rudder or of sail?

The years which officers spend in the Army, the years which they devote to their troops, may in great measure be judged by the answer that they can give to this question, by their success or failure in this high task. It is a true saying that the troop manœuvres as it is commanded, but, to fight at its best, the troop and its commander must be animated by one and the same spirit. Character and cohesion of units are the determining factors of victory and defeat. That commander is most skilled in the art of command, who has so trained his men that in the hours of stress and crisis they continue obedient to the impulse which bids them, regardless of themselves, do their duty by their regiment, fight for the flag, and, if need be, die for their country.

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AN ASPECT OF THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, 1918

(With Map)

By Cyril Falls

In " Sir Douglas Haig's Command," * it is recorded that there was disagreement between Marshal Foch and the British Commander-in-Chief after the launching of the Allied offensive down the Amiens—Roye road, on the 8th of August, 1918. Marshal Foch, it is stated, was anxious for Sir Douglas Haig to continue the attack after the advance had been checked by the old entrenchments of 1916. The latter felt himself compelled to refuse, and eventually obtained the consent of Marshal Foch to the launching of the great new British offensive farther north, now known as the battle of Bapaume. Roye itself was never actually subjected to a " full-dress " attack, and was evacuated by the enemy, after he had been outflanked to the north of it.

The following account, by one who was then serving as liaison officer with successive French divisions on the right flank of the British Fourth Army, may be of interest, as showing in some detail what happened in the front line when there was a difference of opinion and of purpose between the two Commands. The sequence of events will be more easily followed if a short account is first given of the opening of the action at the point of junction between the British Fourth Army and the First French Army.

I had been for over two months with the 37th French Colonial Division, which had held the line from south-west of the Bois de Hangard to just south of Villers-Bretonneux, where it was in touch with the Australian Corps. On the nights of the 31st of July and 1st of August this Division had been relieved by the 4th Australian Division, and I had moved to the French division next farther south, the 42nd, with headquarters at Le Paraclet, at the confluence of the rivers Noye and Avre. On the nights of the 4th and 5th of August the 4th Australian Division was relieved by the 2nd and 3rd Canadian

* By George A. B. Dewar, assisted by Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Boraston. Constable : 2 vols.

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Divisions, leaving, however, as had been done at Cambrai, an outpost screen, the men in which knew little or nothing of what was impending. A German raiding party actually took one of these posts in the neighbourhood of the Amiens—Roye road, but the enemy certainly learned nothing of the presence of Canadians in rear. The boundary between the two Armies was to be the Amiens—Roye road, though from their "jumping-off" ground the Canadians had a strip south of it a thousand yards broad for about three thousand yards.

Of the attack at the point of junction it may be said, more truly even than of most attacks, that the most anxious moments were those just before zero hour. The tank assault had to be launched from a narrow spit of land between the Avre and the Luce. It requires little imagination to realize what would have been the effect of a really heavy bombardment of this area before dawn on the 8th, when it was packed with tanks and with men. Of the tanks one company had crossed during the night at Thennes, in the French area; the other remaining at Domart till "zero." An attack by the enemy following such a bombardment might have brought about a disaster. But all went well, a quiet night being followed by the dense mist which dawn so often brings in that maze of rivers east of Amiens. General Deville, commanding the 42nd Division, was insistent upon good communications, and he certainly got his news in quickly. Zero was at 4.20 a.m.,* and at 5.3 a.m., he was informed of the capture of a number of prisoners of the 4th Bavarian Regiment, who stated that the attack was a complete surprise. One subaltern officer said that he had heard the tanks on two nights, but that no one behind would listen to his reports. This information in itself is almost enough to confirm one's opinion, founded on the state of its defences, that the Army commanded by General von der Marwitz was a bad one. At 6.30 a.m. we learned that the Bois Dodu, the big wood on the right hand of the Amiens—Roye road, half a mile from our line, was still giving trouble to the Canadians. It was not eventually cleared till after Demuin. The "liaison company," a mixed force, moving on the flank, had an extraordinarily brilliant little action at the Bois d'Hollan, taking 30 prisoners and 12 machine guns; its own strength being about 60 French and Canadians, with a Lewis gun and a *fusil mitrailleur*. The Territorials

* Colonel Boraston follows the Despatches in stating that the French on the immediate right of the Canadian Corps attacked at 5.5 a.m. As a fact, the 42nd French Division advanced at "zero" to Magdebourg Trench, a distance of 600 yards, halting there in touch with the Canadians. The Canadians moved on from this line at 5, the French at 5.23. The latter drew level again at the Bois d'Hollan.

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of the 42nd Division did some splendid work in repairing the road across No Man's Land, and it must have been soon after 9 a.m. when, with the aid of their man-handling, I got my car across. There was by that time practically no German shelling, owing no doubt to the speed of the Allied advance. Once past the line of the German field-gun positions, where the ground was naturally cut up by French bombardments, the " going " was surprisingly good, and I was able to see much of what was happening and to bring in news to General Deville. It gave me an extraordinary sense of exhilaration, to see the whole countryside dotted with little snakes of khaki and blue, as companies in artillery formation followed up the attack, with here and there a tank crossing the undulating ground like a boat in a swell. At the day's end the line ran west of Plessier-Rozainvillers and Fresnoy-en-Chaussée, while the Canadians were approaching Le Quesnel. The headquarters of the 42nd Division moved to Gretchen ravine, a horrible valley near the Bois de Moreuil, where German artillerymen had been sleeping peacefully by their guns the previous night.

Fresnoy was taken before dawn, and it was reported that the 4th Canadian Division had had the same good fortune at Le Quesnel, but the 3rd, which again passed through it, was certainly in trouble in the woodlands about the village during the morning of the 9th of August. Here also the 126th French Division relieved the 42nd. At nightfall the French had surrounded Arvillers and were " mopping up." The Canadians had taken Bouchoir. The headquarters of the 126th Division moved to Mezières, and that of the 3rd Canadian Division to Beaucourt-en-Santerre.

At 10 a.m. on the 10th of August I saw the Divisional Commanders of the 3rd Canadian and 32nd British Divisions. The latter had been ordered to pass through the former, but the Canadians had not waited. Pressing forward, they took Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre. The French after capturing Erches early in the day, took Andechy about noon, breaking through a fairly formidable line of trenches. Going forward in the car in the same afternoon I found the advance checked from a point on the eastern edge of the village, west of La Cambuse, a lonely little shop on the main road, and also west of Damery. The enemy was in the old French trenches of 1916, and his machine-gun fire was very heavy. But General Mathieu had prepared a big attack, timed to take place at dawn the following day, and was confident of continuing the advance. From the 32nd British Division, which had been rushed up into the action after long marches, however, came news that its attack could not be launched

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before 7 a.m. Our headquarters was moved up to Arvillers on the night of the 10th of August.

It was on this night that the British Commander-in-Chief visited the headquarters of the 32nd Division. "He studied the situation," says Mr. Dewar, "and found that the position on the Roye—Chaulnes front was most formidable. . . . He came to the conclusion that an attack in this area by the British would be clumsy and unsound." As a matter of fact, the 32nd Division did attack on the 11th. Unfortunately, not only did its attack not synchronize with that of the French, but it was considerably further behind it than the two hours which had been anticipated. At 4.30 a.m., on the 10th, my "opposite number," the French liaison officer with the British, arrived to say that orders had just been issued for an attack, not at 7 a.m., but at 9.30 a.m. General Mathieu immediately rang up his Corps Commander, and begged for a postponement of the French attack; but, before he could get a reply, the French barrage opened. At 5 a.m., consequently, the French attacked and penetrated as far as the edge of the Bois en Z, the highest point for miles either way along the Amiens—Roye road; but they were badly cut up by enfilade fire from Damery and driven back by a counter-attack with considerable loss. It must be explained that from this morning the Allied boundary was no longer the Amiens—Roye road, but, from a point upon it south-east of Le Quesnoy, ran due east. Goyencourt was thus in the French zone and Damery in the British. Damery was attacked later by the 32nd Division, with equally bad fortune; nor did an attack by the 126th French Division at 6 p.m. fare better. The latter Division suffered fairly heavy losses, and was relieved at dawn, on the 11th, by the 47th, a division of Chasseurs Alpins. I asked General Mathieu, before moving to the headquarters of General Dillemain in another part of Arvillers, how it came about, if we were under British G.H.Q., that the attacks were not coordinated by the higher authorities?

"Oh," he replied, "that is all over now. We have returned to our G.A.R." *

The arrangement appeared unfortunate, since it resulted in three gallant attacks being unsupported on the flank. That of the 32nd Division in particular had been pressed with the utmost bravery. If a single control had been necessary at the outset, it was still more urgently wanted now.

* General Fayolle's Group of Armies. According to General Montgomery's "Story of the Fourth Army," the First French Army was under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig until the 16th of August.

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The 12th and 13th of August were quiet days—though for those in Arvillers the same could not be said of the nights, as we were heavily bombed by German aeroplanes. The 13th of August was given up to preparations for a new advance. The 3rd Canadian Division had come into the line again on the French left. There were, I remember, animated though quite friendly discussions with regard to the pace of the artillery barrage, the Canadians desiring to move considerably faster than the French thought wise. These discussions were continued on the morrow, when I went with General Dillemain to see General Lipsett, commanding the 3rd Canadian Division, at Le Quesnel. The divergence of opinion was of small importance, for doubtless two such good soldiers would have arrived at a compromise. I mention it only to show that the continuation of the attack was still expected, indeed, desired, by the Canadians as well as by the French. It was not until the 15th of August that the latter were informed by the former that there was a " postponement." The news was naturally unwelcome to General Dillemain, who knew he had to attack, and wished to do so whilst his troops were fresh. Now it was on the 13th of August, Mr. Dewar states, that Sir Douglas Haig finally decided to break off the attack. " In order to make perfectly sure that the view he had reached about this German position was the correct view," says Mr. Dewar, " the British Commander-in-Chief ordered further reconnaissances on the 13th of August. These bore out entirely his conclusion. Therefore it was necessary to write to Foch, and let it be known that he was not prepared to attack the Roye—Chaulnes position."

It is interesting in view of this statement to mark what followed. At 2 p.m. on the 14th of August, we learned that Parvillers had fallen, having been turned from the north. During the morning of the 15th, the 3rd Canadian Division suddenly laid hands on Damery. It was more in the nature of a raid than a major operation, and the fierce fighting that developed when the enemy counter-attacked, resulted only in very heavy casualties to himself. I was told that losses had been slight and that about 250 prisoners had been taken. The Canadians then swept down into the Bois de Damery, which was outside their area, and helped the Chasseurs of the 47th Division to take that. The French then naturally began to move along the road, and shortly afterwards broke through the trenches in front of the Bois en Z, possessing themselves of this valuable height, from which the road runs downhill over two miles and a half into Roye. Thus turned from the north, the obstacle which had caused serious loss to the 126th Division was taken with hardly a casualty by its

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successor. But this was not the end of the success. General Toulorge, commanding the XXXI Corps, gave orders that strong pressure was to be kept up at night, as he was of the opinion that the enemy was disorganized and that more might be dared than in ordinary circumstances. At 1 a.m. on the 16th, Villers-les-Roye fell. There were trenches in plenty still between us and the town, but then we had been crossing trenches ever since Hangest and strong lines since Bouchoir. The most formidable obstacle between us and Roye was now Goyencourt.

On the morning of the 16th, I paid two visits to the headquarters of the 1st Canadian Division, which had relieved the 3rd. It was evident now that different orders had been issued to and by the two Army Corps ; in other words, that the two Armies were not " pulling together." I think, although I have made no note of the fact in my diary, that it must have been on the occasion of the second visit, about noon, that I saw General Currie at Le Quesnel. Some one called as he came out of the headquarters of the 1st Canadian Division :

" Oh, sir, here's the liaison fellow from the French. He can tell you what they think of the state of things."

The General was a little gruff. I imagine he had been compelled, much against the grain, to resist his subordinates' plea for further attacks. He said to me :

" Well, what *do* they think of the situation ? "

I told him that General Dillemain thought a big attack all along the front would go through with ease. The German prisoners who had been recently taken were jaded, hungry and dispirited, with the conviction that they had been left in the lurch. They belonged to a great number of regiments. With the very considerable field and heavy artillery at his disposal, the General was quite confident that the German position could be pierced.

" I'm always hearing that from their Corps," said General Currie, " but I have no proof of it. No proof at all."

Soon afterwards he got into his car and drove away. The G.O.C. and Staff of the 1st Canadian Division were most sympathetic, saying that they asked nothing better than to go wherever their neighbours went.

Goyencourt was the next nut to be cracked. At 2 p.m. the same day, therefore, under a heavy barrage, it was attacked by (I think) two battalions of Chasseurs and taken with over 100 prisoners. The Germans did not abandon it lightly, at least two counter-attacks being crumpled up by the barrage and the fire of the *fusils-mitrailleuses*

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before dusk. This was, however, merely a clearing of the way. That afternoon the staff was preparing a more important attack for the carrying forward of the line up to the Roye—Chaulnes railway line, which was to be launched the following morning. The 1st Canadian Division had been promised the orders the moment they were ready, and, at 11.30 p.m., I took them over myself to the G.S.O.I. He and his General said they would do all in their power to help us, and that wherever the Chasseurs went their men would go. I pointed out that Fresnoy-les-Roye would take the French advance in flank, and they replied that it should be bombarded and attacked. I was informed that the orders of the XXXI French Corps, which had been taken to the headquarters of the Canadian Corps by the liaison officer, had been seen and approved by the Corps Commander.

The French attack on the morning of the 17th of August started well, but there soon came word of trouble on the left flank. The Germans counter-attacked from Fresnoy and threw the advance south of that village into some confusion. We afterwards learned that the Canadian scheme for cooperation had been modified by the Corps to an advance by strong patrols after an artillery bombardment. These patrols were unable to gain any ground, and the French line on the left remained stationary. On the right, however, the French made good progress, as did their right-hand neighbours through the trenches south of the Roye road. At dusk there was another attack, pushed almost up to Roye station. Over 150 prisoners were taken in the course of the day.

There was never any doubt of the anxiety of the 1st Canadian Division to continue the advance, but it was not permitted to employ more than strong patrols on the following morning against Fresnoy. This attack was unsuccessful. The French then abandoned the idea of advancing on the left, but they had no intention of ceasing their efforts on the right. At 5 p.m. that day, the 47th Division again attacked, and captured the Bois Fendu and Bois de Bracquemont, east of Goyencourt. The latter, which almost touches the railway, was lost to a counter-attack, and retaken by the Chasseurs after dark. Eighty-seven prisoners remained in their hands.

That night I learned that, in consequence of the misunderstandings between the French on one side, the Canadians and the 32nd Division on the other, Sir Henry Rawlinson wanted all the liaison officers changed round. I was sent to Breteuil, to which General Débeney had moved his headquarters. The French were now relieving some six or seven miles of the front held by the British, as far north as Lihons, to permit the latter to carry out their great new attacks.

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The first of these took place, with what result is known to all the world, on the 21st of August, whilst at the same time General Mangin's attack to the south was carried to the Oise.

Every phase of history wears a different guise according as one aspect or another is observed, and military history is assuredly no exception. The history of the battle of Amiens has been written by Colonel Boraston purely from the British point of view—the British G.H.Q. point of view, indeed—and according to it we do appear to have been hardly treated. I have tried to show that there was another point of view, that of the French, and that they also had something of which to complain. I have tried to show also that there was not a little to be said for their opinion that the so-called Roye—Chaulnes line was by no means impregnable. I confess I do not understand where exactly that line may be supposed to have lain. What I saw on the ground, in that advance as well as in the retreat of the previous March, was a whole series of defences, the front, support, and reserve systems of French and Germans in 1916. From these I noted in March that a fair proportion of wire had been torn up by returning farmers. All critics, including Ludendorff, are agreed that the enemy had done little or no work here since his successful offensive. There were trenches east of Hangest-en-Santerre, a very strong line along the Erches—Bouchoir—Folies road, another line along the road Erches—Le Quesnoy, a strong line west of Andechy, another between that village and Villers-le-Roye, running west of the Bois en Z and Damery, and, of course, more trenches between that and Roye. The strongest position of all was undoubtedly the line Villers-les-Roye—Damery—Parvillers. Now from the evening of the 10th of August, when the advance on the British right, save for the brilliant Canadian *coups-de-main* at Parvillers and Damery, ended, the front *was advanced upwards of three miles due east*, across these trench lines. And it was advanced by isolated minor attacks, by one French division which remained in line at least ten days, with no shelter other than that of the trenches which it captured. And by that one division upwards of 350 Germans were captured during that period, and many killed in counter-attacks.

I should like to add that I cannot agree with the suggestion which runs all through Colonel Boraston's chapter on the battle—as, indeed, throughout his account of all the victories of 1918—that the British did everything and the French little or nothing. Before we contrast their achievement, let us contrast the physical state of the troops at the junction. On the one hand was the Canadian Corps, absolutely fresh after its rest and untouched by the German offensives,

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full of energy and vigour from generals to youngest soldiers, with battalions 1,300 or 1,400 strong; undoubtedly the finest body of troops in the world. On the other were the 42nd and 37th French Divisions, which had been in line without relief for three or four months. The 37th, I remember, had been forced to hold its front with three regiments in line, and the fourth bivouacking in close reserve in a wood on the plateau between the Somme and the Avre. The 42nd had no tanks, save for the support it got from four Canadian tanks from the Bois d'Hollan to Mezières.* A third division, of which I forget the number,† which passed through these two at one point early in the attack, was a colonial division just formed from regiments "milked" from divisions possessing four. I heard one of its white sergeants say that he left his trenches for the seventh time that year in attack or counter-attack. It was trying these troops pretty highly to ask them to advance beside the Canadian Corps. Yet the 42nd Division took nearly 1,400 prisoners and had about 1,100 casualties. There can have been few occasions in the course of the war when any division, French or British, achieved so much. If the Canadian flank was occasionally a little ahead it was never far, and was never checked by obstacles in its neighbours' territory such as Damery and Fresnoy-les-Roye. The point at which the Canadian flank was most conspicuously in air was when Bouchoir was taken before Arvillers, but in that case the French were well to north of the latter village, which is about the largest along the Amiens —Roye road, and was very strongly held. As for the 47th Division, it fought with greatest determination and was handled with extraordinary skill. All its work was well worthy of the high reputation gained throughout the war by the Chasseurs Alpins.

Lastly, let it be said that, whatever were the disputes behind, there was never anything but the warmest good-comradeship in front between the Canadians and French. The former were most distressed when prevented from giving their Allies all the assistance they demanded, and more than once stretched their instructions to the limit to give them what they might. It was a case of good men on either side working in the dark, and so unable to coordinate their work as they desired.

* These tanks were apparently not up to time, but the French were helped by the Canadian "Independent Force" with armoured cars.

† Probably the 153rd Division.

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SMALL WARS

By Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Vickery, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.F.A.

Since it has been indicated that the British Army is to prepare only for small wars during the next few years, it may not be inopportune to suggest some passing reflections on this nature of warfare.

It occurs at once to the student to ask, what is a small war? An operation such as that threatened by Austria-Hungary in 1914 against Serbia might be called a small war, regarded from the point of view of magnitude. It would have been, in fact, a military execution, not a war. I do not, however, classify an operation of this kind as a small war, for, despite the numerical disparity between the opposing forces, they were both armed with modern inventions, and in accordance with modern ideas.

I define small wars, therefore, as small scale operations under two categories.

Under the first category I should group (*a*) countries such as Abyssinia, Afghanistan and Persia which might be in possession of some light artillery; and (*b*) tribes such as those of the N.W. Frontier, the Bedouin Arabs of Iraq and Arabia, and the people of Kurdistan.

Under the second category I group such people as the many tribes in the Sudan—Arabs and pagans—and the natives of West, Central and Eastern Africa, who are not armed with modern rifles.

The British Army during the fifty years which preceded the Great War was continuously engaged in many parts of the world in small wars.

The mighty continent of Africa, India, China, all bear testimony to the valour and enterprise of British arms. The soldier of to-day may look round and bemoan the absence of any fresh countries which might afford a potential outlet for his energies and for his training. Certainly the halcyon years of 1880 to 1910 are gone and their equal will not be seen, but there will remain for many years wars and rumours of war on the frontier of India and elsewhere on the marches of the empire.

The British soldier in days gone by adapted himself with singular

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felicity and remarkable resource to the conditions of warfare against an uncivilized or even primitive enemy. His inbred love of sport and adventure were contributory causes in no small degree to this success, for he entered into the contest as into a game in which he had to defeat stratagem by stratagem, ruse by ruse.

The old Arab proverb, which is expressed more happily in French, found in them ready disciples: "*La guerre c'est la ruse appliquée par la force.*"

It is often suggested, if not stated didactically, that the powers of hearing, of sight, of endurance, of skill and of many other qualities are possessed by the savage or oriental to a far greater degree than by the average Englishman. There is no evidence to prove this, and a great deal to disprove it.

No one who has spent days and weeks hunting with native guides can but admire their wonderful skill in tracking and their powers of endurance, but one also remembers how quickly the average Englishman—and I use the word to designate the inhabitant of Great Britain—has learnt the secret of the desert, the bush and the mountain.

The Great War and its aftermath interrupted the sequence of our small wars and consequently the training and experience of our officers in this nature of warfare. It is proposed to make a few observations, before examining any of the tactical principles of savage warfare, on the predominating part policy must play in the conduct of operations, and the importance of the work of the political officer.

The relations of strategy and politics have been discussed at great length by many writers. The axioms of Von der Goltz and other German writers, so much in vogue in the British Army before the war, are well known. "War is an outgrowth of politics," it is the means by which one nation seeks to impose its will on another.

In small wars there are many qualifications to this axiom, for they are often unavoidable whatever the policy followed. It is not, however, the larger question of the relations between politics and strategy that the writer wishes to discuss, it is the subsidiary question of how great an attention the military commander of a force engaged in a small war or operation must pay to the political factors. In great wars the politician disappears, at least in theory, from the active councils of the Commander-in-Chief, who is free to frame his plan to a great extent on the existing military situation, a strategic plan which offers the best chance of a successful tactical result. Not so in small wars, where the commander ought to bear constantly in mind the political results of his actions, and to weigh

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carefully the advice given to him by the head of the political mission accompanying the force.

Whether it be in operations against the frontier tribes, or some small pagan tribe in Africa, a punitive force or reconnoitring column will be accompanied by a political mission or a political officer according to the magnitude of the undertaking.

In dealing with orientals or savages there are certain well-known principles which cannot be disregarded, principles of a moral or political nature rather than strategical. For instance, it is a great blunder ever to issue an order of which one may not be able to enforce the execution.

Leniency is often regarded as fear, but, on the other hand, extreme severity must be avoided. The punishment of small countries, and particularly of small independent tribes, must be as the chastisement of a child, sufficient to meet the case and no more. A punishment which will leave a deep estrangement, or a permanent feeling of injustice, or an indelible sense of grievance will have defeated utterly the object for which the expedition was organized.

The punishment must meet the case, for there will be degrees of guilt, and a very great differentiation must be made between punitive measures undertaken to explore or to bring under control virgin and undeveloped country and those sent forth to exact penalties for wanton aggression.

The duties of the political officer are to assist the commander of the force in collecting and collating information, and with advice as to the political effect of any action that may be taken.

In an operation against a country such as Afghanistan there are certain well-defined military objectives which must be gained before there can be any cessation of hostilities; but in expeditions against small tribes the position is somewhat different, and the responsibility rests on the political officer to submit advice when he thinks sufficient punishment has been awarded. It is not suggested that his advice can always be accepted, for it may appear, quite rightly, to the commander of the force that the operations have not been sufficiently conclusive. The cardinal point to remember is that the political officer will have the administration of the country to undertake when the troops are withdrawn, and that he should have some voice, therefore, in the decision as to when to break off operations.

It is convenient to observe here how much harm can be done by thoughtless and unnecessary acts at the expense of a defeated enemy.

In many countries there are very highly prized possessions at various villages such as their trees in Afghanistan, their date groves

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in the Sudan, and so on. The destruction of these only embitters the inhabitants, and has no military advantage. To this day the name of the Caliph Abdullah is cursed by many tribes in South Kordofan, where, as a mark of his vengeance, he cut down date groves ruthlessly, for these groves were the result of the labour and care of them, of their fathers and fathers' fathers for many generations past.

Hence it will be seen how close and harmonious must be the relations between the military commander and the political officer. The political and strategical issues are so closely interwoven that disastrous results may happen without a frank and loyal cooperation. The conduct and duration of operations will be held to be the affair absolutely of the military commander. This is so, but he will be ill-advised if he does not give careful attention to the suggestions or advice of his political officer. The latter will have in all probability a knowledge of the people, their language and customs, more intimate and precise than that possessed by the soldier. The political officer is apt to think of the soldier as a licentious ruffian bent upon an orgy of conquest and fighting, while the latter considers the former to be responsible in some way for the war and then unwilling to see the enemy properly punished. The expedition, however, will be barren of all fruitful results if the military and political chiefs do not work together towards a common goal with a singleness of purpose and of aim.

F.S.R., volume II, brings out with much lucidity most of the guiding principles of savage warfare, and subdivides the chapter on this form of warfare under three headings, mountain, bush and desert.

The fundamental principles, courage, determination, perseverance, endurance, remain the same, but others will vary according to the armament and organization of the enemy and the resources and nature of his country.

Great boldness and a ready acceptance of responsibility are vital, while the moral factor has a predominating place. Risks can be taken which might be considered suicidal in regular warfare, but non-observance of tactical principles when actually in contact with the enemy will often result in disaster.

The column or force will usually consist of all arms with aeroplanes, and the determination of the strength of the force is a problem requiring much consideration and judgment. The bigger the force, the greater the transport required, and in a barren country the defeat of the enemy often resolves itself into a satisfactory organization of

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the transport to feed the force. There is also the well-known maxim, "*Après un certain chiffre c'est la qualité qui décide plus que le nombre.*"

Aeroplanes have recently been much used in Mesopotamia, and in Waziristan. They were also used in operations in the Sudan against Ali Dinar of Darfur. In the light scrub and desert they were not particularly successful in observing or locating an enemy who did not move in big formations and an enemy dressed in home-spun shirts the colour of the soil.

What success they have had, or will have, in these other countries it is not proposed to discuss. It may be observed, however, that grouse will sit like stones under a kite for the first time, but after that they will scatter in all directions. In mountainous countries the activities of aeroplanes will be limited also by the number of landing grounds available, and the distance of these from the scene of operations. Thus will their rôle be one of cooperation with other arms in the actual attack rather than one of reconnaissance.

To the writer it appears that the arm *par excellence* for savage warfare is the mounted arm; its moral effect is overwhelming, whilst its mobility is often a decisive factor. In densely wooded, or thick bush countries cavalry has naturally no scope, but in desert or open countries and even in hilly or mountainous countries its value is inestimable. Artillery employed in a mountainous country against a well-armed enemy supplies a moral and actual effect both necessary and valuable, but in small operations against such people as the pagan tribes of northern, eastern or western Africa its value is principally moral.

Machine guns with their great fire power and economical demand for transport will be more suitable than artillery in many countries where roads and communications are bad.

Thus does one arrive at the inevitable conclusion, when discussing the necessary strength or composition of a punitive column, that it depends entirely on the organization, numbers and armament of the enemy, and the nature of the country in which the operations will take place.

The illustrious Marshal Bugeaud laid down that strong columns should be avoided, and that they should be freed of artillery and baggage columns which would prevent the pursuit or surprise of an enemy. It may be argued that his many principles of guerilla warfare are applicable more to desert or bush warfare than to operations in hilly countries. Yet the underlying main issue is the same, namely, to crush the enemy by one sudden onslaught, to inspire his

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respect or fear and ultimate obedience. Thus the objective must always be the enemy. There will be no army to deal with, rather a whole population, not necessarily nomad but very mobile.

The problem to be solved will be how best to meet that population in numbers and to inflict on it severe loss. It is not by the burning of crops or by the destruction of villages that we shall be able to impose our will on the enemy—these are only pin-pricks, satisfying doubtless as an outward sign of our supremacy and as an outlet for our annoyance at being eluded by a savage enemy, satisfying on these counts, but valueless on all others.

The objective will not be attained by building blockhouses, or by forming entrenched camps; these, indeed, may constitute garrisons, but they will not secure peace or the submission of the enemy, while they will be prodigal of men and costly to maintain. The enemy must have no peace, and, if he will not stand united to give battle, he must be sought out and harassed by flying columns which will give him no rest by day or by night.

He must be defeated at his own game, his stratagem must be met by stratagem, his cunning by cunning; above all, it must be remembered that with uncivilized people casualties alone destroy their taste for the combat.

In war one is told that time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted. With this maxim, so far as savage warfare is concerned, the writer disagrees. Against the savage the column should always march in a state of tactical preparedness and readiness for instant action; this precaution should never be relaxed and the column should always be as a reconnoitring patrol on the alert. A reconnaissance in force, however, of an enemy's village or position has a curious effect upon the savage, since he generally ascribes the withdrawal after the reconnaissance to fear.

On many occasions the writer has been with a force detailed to reconnoitre the enemy's position—whether a hill, a village or a grazing ground—a position which it could itself easily have taken. Many casualties have been suffered and the column has been withdrawn—having attained, of course, its object. The following day the attack has been made, to find only a stiffer resistance than that encountered the day before, and finally the objective has been taken with far more difficulty than would have been encountered by the original reconnoitring column.

It is not intended to lay down that reconnaissance should be avoided, but it is intended to suggest that commanders should limit this work to small patrols. Such a course of action will not lead the

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enemy to believe that a large force has come out, advanced a short way and then retired, or frighten him by a display of force which he knows to be but a part of the whole column.

In the operations against some pagan tribes in the thick bush of Nigeria many years ago a reconnaissance in force was ordered to report on an important village which was to be captured and occupied on some subsequent day. To effect this reconnaissance in such a country, the force had to push on to the outskirts of the village. It did so, suffering many casualties and the enemy withdrew, so did the column after a short rest. Two days afterwards the whole force moved forward to the attack of the village. The fighting was really severe, and lasted several hours before the centre of the village was occupied and resistance ceased. The same result could have been achieved the previous day. What was there to reconnoitre?—the country was all thick bush, the strength of the enemy was roughly known, and his armament. There was not likely to be a stockade, for these exist chiefly in fairy tales and in the minds of those who write for hire.

To take another instance, that of a column operating against the Nubas in their mountain homes in South Kordofan.

The writer remembers a reconnaissance made in some strength against a Nuba tribe which was encountered in large numbers in the hill country. The force could have attacked at once, with the certainty of killing or capturing a good number of Nubas—and it is the enemy who is the objective in small wars—but, since it was only a reconnaissance, no action was permitted.

The force returned to camp, and, the second day after the reconnaissance, the whole column moved out to the attack. The mountain was deserted, for the Nubas, alarmed at the size of the reconnoitring force which they learned was only a third approximately of the whole strength of the column, had fled to neighbouring hills or taken refuge in their caves. The subsequent operations were very protracted.

It has been stated that disregard of tactical principles of protection, whether in camp or on the march, has always ended in disaster. A few examples may be given in support of this statement.

X. was operating on the Blue Nile with a small flying column against a *fiki* who, after proclaiming himself a prophet and raising a considerable number of adherents, had defied the Government.

X. was on the march and halted his column, just short of a low rise. Riding forward with his orderly the few hundred yards to the rise, in order to take a survey of the country, he encountered

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on the crest the *fiki* and his party marching from the opposite direction. X. was instantly speared. The ordinary precautions of reconnoitring patrols in a hollow square formation round the column would have averted the tragedy, for they would have given notice of the proximity of the *fiki*'s party.

The writer was in command of a half-company of infantry in Nigeria on a punitive expedition. He was ordered to destroy a certain village distant about seven miles from the main camp. He did this, encountering but little resistance. Patrols were pushed out for the protection of the troops while they rested for a meal in the market place, a large open square. The interpreter then came up with the information that a small outlying part of the village, situated a few hundred yards away and belonging to the head chief, had not been destroyed. As it was so close, the writer, accompanied by a British non-commissioned officer and 10 rank and file only, in order to disturb as few men as possible from their rest, went off to destroy it. The huts in question were only just outside the circle of protective patrols. Marching along a narrow bush path the writer, after going not more than 300 yards, suddenly saw round a bend a deep cutting with banks perhaps 10 feet high. Realizing that it was an unpleasant-looking place and that he had chanced the patrols for so short a distance, he blew the " double " on his whistle. A second later there was a fusillade of shots, the British non-commissioned officer was killed, 2 soldiers and the writer wounded. The men were well trained and at once swarmed the bank and dashed into the bush on each side of the path. There was no trace of the enemy and the huts were but 100 yards beyond the cutting.

Protective patrols in the bush have a very fatiguing task, as will be shown later, and, in order to save the men a tiring duty, a chance was taken which was unwarrantable and ended disastrously.

It is no exaggeration on the part of the writer to say that of all the other minor disasters which have happened to his knowledge in Africa and Arabia there is not one that cannot be directly attributed to a disregard of, or carelessness over, the principles of tactical protection.

Tactical formations on the march or at rest differ in principle in no way whether the country be mountainous, bush or desert. In mountain warfare protection is obtained by picketing the heights in order to permit the main body to pass unmolested. Special troops will be told off for this purpose to the advanced guard, and they will picket such heights as will deny the main body to the enemy. When the columns have passed, they will close in and march at the rear. The inexperienced officer will find probably most difficulty

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in determining what heights should be held and what left. The temptation will be strong to push farther out from one height to another, for, whatever the crest gained, there appears generally to be another a short way on which dominates it. Various other principles, such as the action to be taken by column or rear guard commanders, if they find that they cannot reach camp before dark, are all clearly set out in F.S.R.

In bush warfare the column must be surrounded by a square of protective patrols, and the column will move forward in this square. Each patrol will consist of 2 or 4 men, 1 (or 2) to cut a way through the bush, and 1 (or 2) to be ready with the rifle. They will move from 10 to 40 yards parallel to the path, and there may be in addition an outer square of patrols. These patrols should remain out day and night whether on the march or in camp. At night they will come closer in, but the circle of protection should never be withdrawn.

Another instance may be recorded here of a minor disaster which happened to a small column operating on the east bank of the Niger. Camp was formed in a big open market square, the centre of which was out of range of the enemy's short-range muskets even from the side of the square. Patrols were put out, and all hostile resistance seemed over. There was a creek about 300 to 400 yards away from the camp. One company commander sent 40 or 50 of his men without their accoutrements, but with rifle and bandolier, down to the creek to fill their water bottles. They went down the narrow path in single file with no patrols in the bush and were ambushed close to the water, suffering some 18 casualties.

The reader will smile, perhaps, at the incredible folly of the company commander—not the writer this time—but such things did happen and do happen.

In desert warfare there will be the same hollow square of protective patrols, and the columns will probably march in echelon or a spear-head formation ready to form square at any moment.

Mention has been made of the composition and strength of a column, and of its objectives.

There is another point to remember, namely, that the length of time during which operations can be conducted is limited by climatic factors. During the rainy season when rivers—whether called spruits, khors or wadis—are in flood and mosquitoes rampant, operations are difficult and sometimes impossible. The grass is long, making the service of reconnaissance a slow and arduous undertaking, while the roads are heavy and frequently impassable for the transport animals.

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No mention has yet been made of night attacks. They are rare. Sniping of the camp is frequent, and an attack at dawn not unusual, but certainly in Africa the writer can recollect no case of a true night attack. There has happened, though, recently a night attack in Arabia, which deserves mention and even the study of officers; for in Arabia they may find themselves one day employed. The tactics of the Bedouin Arabs require, therefore, something more than a passing consideration.

The Emir Abdullah sent by King Hussein was operating with a column about 1,200 strong, south-east of Mecca on the Nejd border. He had some mountain guns, maxims and a large quantity of ammunition. His strength in cavalry was probably 300 or 400, 200 or 300 camel men, and the remainder infantry.

With the political or military objects of his mission the writer is not concerned. The Emir knew Ibn Saud, ruler of Nejd, was in the neighbourhood and meant to attack him.

Abdullah had many ex-Turkish officers serving with him, and his infantry was well drilled and armed. He camped for the night near Tarabah. Except for a few feeble protests from some of his officers, it did not seem to occur to him or to his chief of staff to take any tactical precautions for the safety of their camp during the night. The men were not even halted in a " perimeter camp " formation, that is to say, in a formation which would permit of fire being opened on all sides. The officers went to bed in pyjamas.

Shortly after midnight, Ibn Saud attacked. The scene, as described to the writer by an eye-witness, was indescribable; the massacre complete. Officers and men in wild confusion rushed to their arms too late to stem the disaster. Abdullah, awakened by a slave, fled through a gash cut in the rear of his tent, while seventeen faithful Sudanese slaves died fighting at the door to allow their master to escape. Thrown on to a horse, bare-backed, he escaped into the darkness, to arrive some twenty hours later at Mecca, with a few stragglers, the remnant of his army, to face the wrath of his royal master. Such was the coup planned by the greatest soldier and statesman in Arabia.

No mention has been made, except of aeroplanes, in the above pages of how far modern inventions such as tanks and gas will affect savage warfare. Eliminating tanks at present, will gas ever be used? The use of lethal gas will certainly find no supporters, but the writer cannot help thinking that a mild form of " tear " gas would prove extraordinarily successful in operations against people such as the Nubas of Kordofan, who hide in caves which defy penetration.

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In these caves they can live for weeks, or even months, so amply stocked are they with grain and water.

Finally, since operations against desert Arabs have been recently before the public eye, the writer will conclude by quoting the great Marshal who conquered that part of Northern Africa, now a French possession. "*Votre mission n'est pas de courir après les Arabes, ce qui est fort inutile, elle est de les empêcher de semer, de récolter, de pâturer.*"

The true objective, as has been stated, in savage warfare must always be the enemy's man-power, but situations will arise when his army has melted, and his people have scattered in a nomad existence—then will the truths of the Marshal's maxim be abundantly clear.

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STUDY AND REFLECTION *v.* PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CLAIMS OF AGE, THE PROFESSIONAL, AND THE "PRACTICAL" SOLDIER TO UNIQUE AUTHORITY ON WAR

By "Bardell"

I. Amateur *v.* Professional

It is widely recognized that one of the greatest sources of friction in our Armies during the Great War was the "superior" attitude of the regular soldier to his Territorial and New Army brethren.

This air of superiority, based not so much on the former's consciousness of being better equipped with professional knowledge, but rather on the implied assumption that by virtue of being a Regular he must in consequence know more of war, gave rise to constant irritation—an irritation which went very deep among temporary soldiers, if less openly expressed than among the Dominion forces. In dealing with the latter it was noteworthy that those who succeeded were men who not only avoided any air of patronage but who were the best equipped in military knowledge—in fact, the very ones who might have had some excuse for an assumption of superiority.

This fact surely proves that those professional soldiers who have made a thorough study of their profession learn to realize that a knowledge of the art and science of war is not necessarily conferred by years of routine soldiering, that the book of military knowledge is open to all, and that those few who have mastered its contents by intensive study may include representatives both of the professional and also of the amateur soldiers.

Appreciating these truths, they neither expect wisdom as a matter of course from an officer who has been through the "regular" mill, nor do they refuse to recognize its existence under the temporarily donned uniform head-dress of the "amateur" officer. The exceptional professional soldier who has achieved a mastery of his profession knows that there is no royal road to competence, that it

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can only be attained by hard study and, above all, by constant reflection and meditation on the data drawn from that study. He realizes that the advantage he may have from personal acquaintance with the difficulties and "friction" of military operations and movements and with the psychology of the time-serving soldiers of his particular Army is counterbalanced by the more independent mind of the civilian student of war, unfettered by years of military routine and the inevitably narrowing influence of a lifetime spent in the circumscribed sphere of army and, worse still, of regimental life.

That the professional soldier has passed through this groove is not his fault, it is his misfortune. Rare, indeed, is the gifted individual who can pass through the successive grooves of a public school, Sandhurst and a regiment, with never a break, and remain completely untainted by the traditional prejudices of his class and his calling. Magnificent influences though these are for producing a type whose sterling character and habit of self-discipline is recognized throughout the world, it is equally indisputable that this self-discipline can only be attained at the expense of individuality, and leads in considerable measure to a sealed pattern type. Moreover, a separate and self-contained community, be it a monastery, a public school or a regiment, is not the ideal training ground in which to acquire a knowledge of the psychology of the many varying types of men.

Miraculously blessed is he, whose mental horizon when he has reached a position of command remains unclouded by the traditions, social and professional, he has imbibed; whose experience has not been bought at the price of some measure of his imagination, mental independence and receptiveness to new ideas. Every generation prepares for a war unlike in many respects to the previous one. To be prepared and mentally equipped to grapple with these new conditions and to foresee them, is necessarily more difficult for those whose whole time and occupation are perforce a perpetual contact with an organization and with methods springing from the previous war. How difficult—history, with its long record of disasters due to commanders who were thinking in terms of past wars, clearly tells us.

Let it not be thought that these mental grooves are peculiar to the soldier. They are true of every profession—of none probably more than that of the much-lauded "business man," whose clamoured-for intervention in the realms of government proved in practice by no means an unqualified success. No doctor, again,

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with the memory of the treatment meted out by his profession to many unqualified but successful healers derided as quacks, can afford to throw a stone at the professional soldier's lack of foresight and imperviousness to new ideas. But the man who makes a study of another profession than his own, if only as a hobby, naturally preserves a wider outlook and a less constricted habit of thought than one whose pursuits are confined to a single direction.

It is this priceless gift of independence and lack of custom-bound prejudice which the "amateur" student of war brings to bear upon the study of war. This, the larger minded and really proficient regular soldier appreciates, and hence values the cooperation of his non-professional colleagues. It is the professional hack, incapable alike of personal research or critical judgment, who disparages without examination the views of the outside student. It is wonderful what a contempt the village police sergeants of this world have for the Sherlock Holmeses!

Not daring to think for himself, the routine soldier asks, when any original idea or paper is brought to his notice, who is the author of it? Incapable of weighing its *pros* and *cons* for himself, albeit unconscious that the deficiency is his own, he requires it to be labelled with the trade-mark of high military rank. If a general has put forward the idea or written the treatise, he feels that he is safe in accepting it at its face value. No surer sign of mental incompetence and sterility exists than that shown by his invariable question, "Who is the author of it?" This mental attitude, which judges a theory not on its own merits but on the position of its author, is unfortunately too common in the Army. Officers who are incapable of weighing a question in time of peace by the light of their own reason and study are unfit to command troops in war, for they are manifestly incapable of thinking or judging for themselves, let alone for the units for which they are responsible.

It is the same attitude which is the characteristic of the modern mob, miscalled democracy. We see this degenerate habit of thought in the Press, which panders to the unreasoning instincts of the mob in its accounts of sporting contests by putting them under the label of some famous player. The latter, whose deftness of hand is generally equalled by his denseness of head, is usually incapable of critical judgment on the game he plays, but is willing to lend his name, for a consideration, to adorn the heading of a column actually written by a more skilful pen, if not necessarily more competent critic.

In sport this mob tendency does not matter, for all concerned are satisfied, the newspaper proprietor equally with his public, who

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do not realize that if the label is that of their idol, the voice is that of his " ghost." But in matters concerning war, where the security and destiny of the country are at stake, the proverb " Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise," paves the path to national downfall as surely as good intentions pave the path to hell.

The widespread prejudice of the professional soldier against even examining the suggestions of an amateur, let alone admitting their value or accepting them, is not of course a characteristic peculiar to the present generation of soldiers or to our own country. It is long-standing, and the pages of military history, written and unwritten, bear constant witness to its antiquity.

II. The Theoretical *v.* The Practical Soldier

This scarcely veiled contempt of the " practical " professional for the amateur, is allied with that he holds for the despised " theoretical " regular soldier. He lays down in tones generally more emphatic than polite, that work in the study is immeasurably inferior, if not valueless, as a preparation for war compared with experience in the field.

(*a*) *Peace Experience*

It may be pointed out that this type of professional soldier generally confounds " experience " with the years he has spent in drawing full pay, and " the field " of war with the routine duties of barracks or the artificial conditions of the training ground.

Since the Great War placed the majority of amateur students of war on an equality with the professional in respect of actual personal experience of war, there has been an increasing tendency for the narrow-minded type of regular soldier to fall back upon this last line of defence of his claims to superior authority on war. He conveniently forgets also that not ten per cent. of his working hours during an average year in time of peace is spent in field training.

When we thus bring his claims to the bar of reason, the absurdity may be realized of associating competence in barrack duties, on the square, in the office, or in the barrack room, with a mastery of strategy or tactics. The Manual of Military Law, the Equipment Ledger, even the Drill Book, are poor guides on the field of war.

Even field training is at best but a means of practising the execution of movements and the habit of making decisions—even then under manifestly artificial conditions. It is a palliative, not a cure for ignorance, a peptonized tactical food for " infant " officers who

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are not intellectually mature, and hence not capable of digesting the pure food of military science. This can only be gained by study of and reflection on the lessons of military history and their application, in the light of new weapons and conditions, to future war.

If, as has been shown, the mechanical tasks of the " practical " regimental soldier in peace time bear no relation to, nor help him in any way to an understanding of, strategy and tactics, how much less likely are they to stimulate within him the vision which foresees future conditions and creates new ideas and methods to meet them ! Mechanical perfection in any task, civil or military, must always be the foe of individuality and originality of thought.

All the more honour to those few gifted professional soldiers who have shown creative brains, but also all the more reason why we should preserve an open and receptive mind to the far larger stream of ideas which have come from " amateurs," from Roger Bacon and Leonardo da Vinci down to the Volunteers who simplified our cumbrous drill and developed our musketry and tactical instruction.*

Let us not forget that the decisive new *weapon* of the Great War, the tank, owed its introduction principally to " amateurs " in the face of stubborn opposition from the supreme professional opinion.

(*b*) *War Experience*

Let us turn now to the final contention of the practical soldier, that actual experience in the field is superior to study as a means to a mastery of war. The inevitable corollary of this claim is that the man who has seen most fighting must be the greatest authority on tactics.

In this connection, one may recall the story of Marshal Saxe and the aged general who urged the acceptance of his opinion on the ground that he had seen more campaigns than anyone else, whereupon Marshal Saxe replied that he had a mule which had been through twenty campaigns " and was still a mule."

The experience of any individual, however wide, is restricted to certain phases and localities, and can at most only comprise an infinitesimal percentage of the episodes and conditions of a war. Far less can it be compared with universal experience as contained in military history. How ridiculous appears the claim that prolonged experience of war is sufficient to make one an authority on it !

* *See* " An Experiment in Military Education," by Spenser Wilkinson, *Army Quarterly*, October, 1921.

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What was the verdict of the greatest master of war on this question? Napoleon's dictum was: "The only way to learn the art of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains."

Here in one breath is swept away the fantastic claim of the professional soldier to sole authority on strategy and tactics, for only in the performance of routine duties has he any advantage over the outside student of war. The library of war is open to all, and it is to be feared that only a minority of professional soldiers make deep researches in it.

While the vast majority, therefore, have obviously far less claim to speak with authority than the conscientious amateur student of war, even the minority, the "theoretical" soldiers despised of their "practical" and ignorant brethren, have no decisive advantage. The sole advantage which they possess is an acquaintance with the "friction" of military movements and the actual conditions of the battle zone. This advantage is counterbalanced by the amateur's possession of a mind, the freshness and versatility of which has escaped the cramping influence of professional life. When, further, the amateur has also seen something of war—and the duration of his experience need only be in inverse ratio to his capacity for reflection—he has an actual advantage over his professional brother, given equal study and intellect. The knowledge of a particular region is again an asset open to either.

The conclusion, therefore, is surely unanswerable, that where each has some acquaintance with actual war and has devoted to it an equal degree of study, that man will have attained the greater mastery of strategy and tactics who has the greater capacity for reflection, analysis and originality of thought, whether he be an amateur or a professional soldier.

III. The Value of Staff College Training

Counsel for the professional student of war may here intervene to point out the advantage the latter enjoys in regard to study by attendance at a Staff College. Certainly such a training is an aid to acquiring the mechanism of staff work, whilst it undoubtedly facilitates cooperation between formations and for the carrying out of the intention of the commander. But again we are brought up against the axiom that mechanical perfection and a common mode of thought can only be gained at some sacrifice of originality and intention. No system of Staff College training, however far developed, can escape the danger, because of its very nature, of

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becoming a factory for the mass production of stereotyped brains. The truth of this cannot be better exemplified than in the case of the German Army, the best Staff College trained corps of officers ever known, where the administrative efficiency of the staff was first wasted and then brought to ruin by the blunders of the Higher Command. Here we have the best possible proof of how leaders who have passed through the professional mill are almost invariably robbed of those particular qualities of originality of conception and vision, which are the essential qualities of the great captains. In this respect war is no different to the other branches of life and knowledge. The great discoveries of science have all been achieved by the solitary research of some individual, whose mind is able to investigate unfettered by the mental grooves characteristic of all types of corporate institution. Thus while we recognize the great advantages for the smooth working of the machine which a common staff doctrine bestows, it is well to bear in mind the disadvantages and dangers which it necessarily entails.

IV. Age *v.* Youth

Having dealt with the case of amateur *v.* professional, and incidentally of the theoretical *v.* the practical soldier, we may now turn to the question of age *v.* youth. Here again our former postulates apply. The advocates of the claims of age and experience cannot pretend that intellect is any more the prerogative of age than of youth. They may, however, urge that age has had greater opportunity for study. But rare is the senior officer who could honestly claim to have devoted his lifetime to intensive study. More often the hours spent in study steadily decline with the gradual extension of responsibilities. Few, indeed, have been able to devote even a year or two during their career to intensive study. In the case of the majority, study has been desultory. Thus where, as so often happens with genius, the intellect ripens early, the young student may have spent more hours in reading and reflection by the time he is twenty-five or thirty than most men spend in their whole lifetime.

Even where, as in the case of a Marshal Foch, the period of intensive study is sustained until ripe years, youth has still the compensating advantage that it brings greater freshness of mind to bear upon the problems of war.

Thus Napoleon, having completed his period of intensive preparation before the ordinary young officer has even turned his mind to the serious side of his profession, was able not only to

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take command of an army at twenty-six, but to attain to a height of military capacity which even he himself never surpassed as he acquired the greater " practical " experience so widely acclaimed as the only key to success.

According to these pedants, Napoleon at Waterloo, having nearly twenty years of practical experience in command, should have exercised a far greater mastery than as a youth at Montenotte. History demonstrates the contrary, showing us that even in the case of that supreme genius his mental elasticity decayed as his practical experience grew.

Clausewitz put the case for independent study *v.* practical routine experience in a nutshell with his comment on this Montenotte campaign. " Bonaparte was twenty-six years old, Beaulieu (his opponent) sixty-two. Bonaparte had a vast historical education : the great events of the history of the world had passed in panorama before his eyes. Beaulieu had merely forty years of official pedantry for education."

Let us see if the record of the other great captains confirms the conclusions we have drawn.

Alexander the Great was barely twenty-five when he won his last great victory of Arbela, Hannibal only twenty-nine when he invaded Italy and but thirty-one when he achieved his crowning triumph, Cannae. After sixteen years of war he succumbed at Zama to the more youthful Scipio of thirty-two. Since both Alexander and Hannibal owed their elevation to command to hereditary influence, the question of professionalism does not arise. Cæsar only assumed a military career at the age of forty. Yet his lack of practical experience and professional training did not prevent him proving his superiority to Pompey, who had spent his life in the field and had had thirty-five years' experience in the command of armies, since the age of twenty-three.

These are the great captains of antiquity, and there is no other who can be ranked as such until we come to modern history. Gustavus Adolphus, another commander by virtue of heritage, was still but thirty-seven when he won his great victory of Breitenberg over Tilly.

Cromwell knew nothing of soldiering till the age of forty-three, when he commanded a troop of sixty horse at Edgehill. A lieutenant-general in less than two years, he was commander-in-chief at fifty, when he won the battle of Dunbar, followed a year later by " his crowning mercy " Worcester. But the high-water mark of his vision and creative power was reached in his first three years of service,

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when he trained the " New Model " and stamped himself as one of the supreme cavalry generals of history.

Turenne is, on the whole, the exception which proves the rule. An out-and-out professional soldier, he certainly had genius, becoming a Marshal of France at thirty-two. But unlike the other great leaders, his genius ripened instead of decaying with the passage of years. The anomaly may have been due to the peculiarly geometric and chess-like methods of waging war in his time, which demanded a deliberate, calculating brain rather than the mental energy infused into war by Napoleon.

The course of Turenne's great contemporary and rival, Condé, forms a contrast. Heritage placed him in command of an army at the age of twenty-two. But fortunately to the mental freshness of youth he added years of education in military theory during his boyhood. Faced by the Spanish Army, the most renowned troops in Europe, under leaders so experienced that they had lost their elasticity of mind, Condé proved as brilliant in his first battle as in his last. In this battle of Rocroi, the youth of twenty-two ended the long military supremacy of Spain and inaugurated the reign of French military glory, displaying a genius more versatile than that of Turenne, a power of quick decision and energy unknown until the eruption of Napoleon into the placid course of chess-like war.

Marlborough, though having some military experience, was in the early part of his career primarily a courtier. Given a command in the Monmouth rebellion at the age of thirty-five, it was due to his skill that the rebellion was crushed. In the seventeen years which intervened before the War of the Spanish Succession, politics and diplomacy kept keen the sharp edge of his wits, which were not subjected to the dulling influences of peacetime military routine. Thus at fifty-two he entered the theatre of his great triumphs with the freshness of his military brain undimmed.

Frederick the Great, by right of inheritance, found himself in command at twenty-nine, but as yet a novice as regards military knowledge. His first battle of Molwitz was creditable neither to his skill nor to his courage. In another four years he had risen, through application, to be the first general of Europe.

Napoleon we have already dealt with.

Wellington again, owing to family influence, escaped the long years of professional apprenticeship and was only thirty-four when he had the opportunity to display his military genius in winning the victories of Assaye and Argaum. Still under forty when he landed

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in the Peninsula, he achieved his final triumph of Waterloo at the age of forty-six.

Robert E. Lee can be claimed as an example of the true professional soldier, but even in his case Mexico, engineering work at Washington and Baltimore, and frontier fighting gave relief from the insidious influence of the years of routine soldiering.

Stonewall Jackson was only twenty-seven when he abandoned the professional army to take up a professorship at Lexington. Ten years of isolated study and quiet reflection enabled him to return when the American Civil War broke out with mind fresh and ungrooved to conceive and execute the dazzlingly original moves of his ever-famous Valley campaign.

Von Moltke's victories, great though they were in extent, were triumphs of the obvious. Their flaws have been so clearly demonstrated that his place in the list of great captains is far from secure. In them is to be found no trace of the *unexpected*, which has ever been the hall-mark of the supremely great.

Finally, we come to Marshal Foch. Here if anywhere is to be found the vindication of age and of the professional soldier. But for the supporters of the " practical " soldier there is little consolation. No great commander has ever suffered so much and so long under the unjust stigma of being a mere theorist. Escaping, except for a few early years, the deadening effect of routine regimental soldiering, he came to the war which raised him to the pinnacles of military glory even without any experience in the field, fortified only by intensive study and reflection. Experience of war had not availed to save the French leaders of 1870 from disgrace.

How rash a man is he who any longer ventures to use the term " theoretical soldier " as one of reproach ! .

What do we find when we examine the records of these, the fifteen most famous commanders in history ?

First, as regards age, that four had demonstrated their mastery of war before they were thirty and six more before they had reached forty years of age. The powers of three of the greatest had definitely decayed long before they were fifty, whilst only three still demonstrated their mastery when over the age of sixty.

Secondly, as regards the value of professional experience, only four out of the fifteen had served any considerable duration of apprenticeship, whilst only one could truly be said to have passed through the sterilizing influence of routine soldiering in time of peace, and even in Lee's case there had been breaks.

Thirdly, touching the question of amateur *v.* professional, we

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find that no less than nine were really amateurs who took to a military career either as a means to greater power or for the sake of their country. Of these, Cæsar and Cromwell were complete amateurs who had passed forty before they even dabbled in the profession of arms.

Let us now study the list of notorious blunderers who have served as foils for the genius of the great captains or whose defeats have gone down to history because of their disastrous effect on the destiny of the countries whose security they guarded so inadequately.

We find that almost without exception these unworthy custodians of the national honour were professional soldiers. Dealing with modern history alone, one may recall the names of De Mello and Fuentes at Rocroi, Tallard and his subordinates at Blenheim, Villeroi at Ramilles, Vendôme at Oudenarde, Braun at Prague, Soubise at Rossbach and Wilhelmsthal, Daun at Leuthen, Contades at Minden, Beaulieu, Wurmser and Alvinzi in the Italian campaign of 1796, Mack at Ulm, Weyrother at Austerlitz, Pope at 2nd Manassas, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Benedek at Sadowa, Bazaine at Metz, MacMahon at Sedan, Samsonoff at Tannenberg, Von Moltke at the Marne; all these were professional soldiers. So also in our history were such as Craddock, Gage, Burgoyne, Wauchope, Macleod, Beresford, Pakenham, Raglan, Elphinstone, and others in recent years whose names any reader can supply.

Let us also recall the verdict of Colonel Henderson on the tactical ability of amateurs compared with the best trained professional army of the period. Referring to the American Civil War, he said, " The tactics of the American troops, at a very early period, were superior to those of the Prussians in 1866." Moreover, practical experience did not give results which altered his opinion, for he added: " Nor were the larger tactical manœuvres even of 1870 an improvement on those of the American campaigns."

Finally, one may recall the many instances where amateur leaders with amateur troops have successfully defied, outwitted, and defeated the representatives of the great professional armies. Selecting only a few from the lengthy roll of history, one may mention the destruction by Arminius and our remote ancestors of the Roman legions under Varus, next the leaders of the Swiss Confederacy who routed the forces of Imperial Austria, the Netherlanders who defied the veteran troops of Spain, then the greatest military nation in the world, the victories of the American colonists over our own professional army, Garibaldi's overthrow of the Austrian yoke, the many successes of Botha, Smuts and De Wet against us in South Africa. In this connection, it may be pointed

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out that the two most recent masters of guerilla warfare thrown up by our nation, Lawrence and Erskine Childers, have both been pure amateurs.

In the last war the road to advancement in our own forces was securely bolted and barred against the amateur soldiers, but where, in the case of the Dominion forces this rule did not apply, were produced Currie and Monash and many other highly capable commanders?

Could any Regular Corps Commander on the Western Front show as successful a record as the two above-mentioned Generals?

Thus the verdict of history appears to support our contention that neither age nor practical experience of regimental routine are essential to a mastery of strategy and tactics. Youth and independent study come well out of the argument with seniority and "practical experience," which too often are other names for senility and mental atrophy.

No one would be so foolish as to pretend that every young student of war is a Napoleon or every amateur a Cromwell. Yet we meet with many regular officers who base their claim to speak with authority on the length of their service, and who appear to think that a knowledge of war and a grasp of tactics is impossible in the case of anyone who has not years of regimental experience. They are intolerant and contemptuous of the opinions and the suggestions of the amateur. As such an attitude can only arise from an ignorance of military history or incapacity to assimilate its lessons, it is hoped that the facts, if not the arguments brought out in this article may serve to broaden their outlook—should it reach their eyes, which is doubtful, for few of this type are numbered among the readers of the military reviews. Intolerance has ever been the child of ignorance.

Surely the lesson of history is that while study and reflection are the keys to success, it is equally certain that profitable study can only be made by a mind which has not yet fallen into the grooves of custom and which still possesses an unfettered habit of thought.

The typical professional soldier inevitably bases his tactical thought on the methods which prevail at the moment, and with which he is in constant contact. He concentrates upon the attainment of mechanical perfection in the executive acts with which he is familiar. The result is that he is thinking in terms of the last war, and not of the next.

Original ideas can come only to a mind untrammelled by contact with precedents and traditional methods.

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That is why so few wars have been decided by the introduction of new weapons or tactical methods. The exceptions have been due to the influence either of civilian inventors, quondam civilian or amateur generals, or else leaders so youthful that their minds have not settled into the grooves of professional thought.

The professional's whole training tends to make him ever more expert in execution, a skill gained at the expense of fertility of ideas, originality of conception and elasticity of views. There are fortunately exceptions to every rule, and our own Regular Army has thrown up its military Luthers, from Sir John Moore down to those creative minds of to-day which are thinking ahead—not like Lot's wife risking petrification by looking back. How then in the future are we to ensure that our methods shall be those of surprise instead of mere attrition? Surely not by the further development of orthodox war colleges, too often museums for the preservation of obsolete thought. It is suggested that the clue to our national security in the future is by the encouragement and tangible recognition of new ideas. It is useless to pour new wine into old bottles, and even more futile to expect generals whose minds have become set to make effective use of new weapons or tactics.

The young and still flexible-minded professional and the semi-amateur student of war should alike be enabled to feel that each has a marshal's baton in his knapsack, can he but " deliver the goods " in the form of fresh and practical ideas.

It may be objected that we have confused " ideas " with " execution "; that the possession of original ideas is different from, or even incompatible with, the power of executive command. To this contention, we would reply that the gulf between these two faculties is narrower than is commonly supposed. The conception of ideas implies mental initiative, and the moral courage required to express them publicly and with vigour in the face of tradition-bound authority indicates a strong personality, for the rôle of pioneer or reformer is rarely a popular one. These two qualities of mental initiative and a strong personality, or determination, go a long way towards the power of command in war—they are indeed the hall-mark of the great captains.

The theorists who have failed in war have nearly always been of the academic type, whose habit it is to delve pedantically in the past rather than to probe boldly into the future. These soldier pedants reveal their nerveless personality in their very prosiness and custom of hedging every point with innumerable reservations.

The written essay or appreciation is a fine test of character

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and grasp of the principles of war. It explodes unkindly the legend of the "strong, silent man"—who is usually silent because his mind is so hazy that he fears to commit himself to the risk of logical argument. The man who writes gives proof that at any rate he possesses some knowledge, whereas it is quite a possibility that the mind of the inarticulate one may be a military vacuum. Further, arguments that would pass muster in verbal conference are easily seen to be lacking in logic when written, for cold print is a merciless exposer of mental fog.

Even if ideas do not prove wholly true in practice, the ability to conceive and express them is of value, for it is an axiom that even an imperfect plan carried out with determination is better than a lack of plan.

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THE "COMPLEAT GENERAL" OF THE ANCIENTS

By F. J. Hudleston, C.B.E., Librarian, War Office

It was once the fashion in the illustrated magazines to produce a composite portrait of the ideal writer, artist, politician or scientist by photographing the likenesses of a number of eminent men on one plate. The result was often most displeasing, resembling a Boojum rather than a human being. You would see, for instance, the Superman of Letters represented by the Shakespearian cranium of Mr. C., the bulging brow of Mr. B., balanced behind by what at first sight seemed a huge water-melon, but which proved on investigation to be the Bump of Philoprogenitiveness of Mr. X.; then would come the nose, more than faintly suggestive of the Orient, of Mr. Z., the oyster-shell-like ear of Mr. D., the teeth, false as his characters to nature, of Mr. G., the whole horrid countenance being fringed below by the cocoanut-mat beard of Mr. S.

Similarly the ancient writers on the art of war were much addicted to drawing up lists of the qualities which should go to the making of a "compleat general." Onosander, a Greek author of the first century A.D., says—

"A general must be continent, sober, frugal, hardworking, middle-aged, eloquent, a father of a family and member of an illustrious house.* Soldiers do not like being under the command of one who is not of good birth. In addition, a general should be polite, affable, easy of approach and cool-headed."

The Emperor Leo VI. † goes into more detail.

"A general must be continent, sober, frugal, temperate, industrious

* Napier, who wrote "The British soldier fought in the pale shade of the Aristocracy," would probably not have agreed with this. And yet he dedicated his "War in the Peninsula" to the Duke of Wellington. In 1776 one of the chief reasons for making Colonel Washington C.-in-C. was that he was "a man of position."

† Known as "the Philosopher": so philosophical was he that "*il se plaisait à composer des Sermons au lieu de s'occuper de la défense de l'empire.*" According to Gibbon he was called the Philosopher because he was less ignorant than his contemporaries. "*Parmi les aveugles le borgne est Roi.*"

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and a good man of business, cautious and prudent; he must despise money, and glory must be his sole ambition; he must be not too young and not too old; * and he must, when occasion arises, be eloquent. He ought also to be a father, this will make him a keener soldier for the sake of his family and, if he has grown-up sons, he can consult them. He should be of a noble and distinguished house; no one likes to serve under an officer of humble origin. Bad-mannered generals are hateful and intolerable. He should be a father to his men, and should be pleasant and affable.† If your army is defeated, do not abuse your troops. ‡ Scipio attached no importance whatever to astrology or prophecies, or dreams and their divination. To sneeze is a very bad omen, but remember the general who on such an occasion, happily remarked that amongst so many people it was amazing that there was not more of it. A general should let his men see him; a few agreeable and flattering words will inspire both officers and men. A general should be a very model of temperance, especially with regard to female captives."

That fine old fire-eater the late General Bangs, of immoral memory, could he read this, would probably comment on the "damnable iteration" with which these ancients insist on continence as a virtue in a commander. With some hazy recollection of Lemprière and the exploits of Hercules floating in his mind he might have said, "there were giants in those days," adding thoughtfully and perhaps (who knows?) regretfully, "they had great opportunities." And yet there are people who say that a classical education is worthless!

Vegetius, a Latin writer who flourished towards the end of the fourth century, makes an interesting addition, "A good general should know the characters of the generals opposed to him—if they are prudent or rash, if they fight according to rule or haphazard." The importance of this very interesting point appears to have first been insisted on by Polybius, whose words are—

"All men, even of moderate discernment, must acknowledge that nothing is more useful, or of greater importance, in the conduct of a general than to examine, with the nicest care, into the character and natural disposition of the opposite commander. A general in the field should endeavour to discover in the chief that is sent against him, whether there be any weakness in his mind and character, through which he may

* *Cf.*, as the commentators say, the lines (written by a learned Don of Cambridge) which used to be so charmingly sung by Miss Kate Cutler—

"The proper kiss for a girl, I'm told,
Is not too hot, and not too cold."

† But this may lead to embarrassing results. Arrian records that, on one occasion, after a speech of Alexander the Great, "the men quarrelled as to who should first embrace him."

‡ Napoleon would have added, "and if they are victorious give them the credit due to them." "I count myself," he said, "for half in the battles I have won, and it is much even to name the general in connection with a victory, for it is after all, the army that wins it."

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be attacked with some advantage; for among those who are placed at the head of armies, there are some who are so deeply immersed in sloth and indolence that they lose all attention both to the safety of their country and their own. Others are immoderately fond of wine, so that their senses always are disordered by it before they sleep. Others abandon themselves to the love of women—a passion so infatuating that those whom it has once possessed will often sacrifice even their honour and their lives to the indulgence of it."

And now, as we appear to be approaching the condition shared in common by the Old and the Young Obadiah,* we should like to quote rather a long excerpt bearing more or less on this point from a curious old MS., author unknown, date uncertain, entitled "Stop! or a Word in Season and of good Cheer addressed to all Gallants who have smelled Powder elsewhere than on the Soft Cheeks of Wenches." It runs as follows:—

"Whosoever, be he veld-marischal or plain captain, who taketh thought cunningly to read, as in the pages of an open book, the character and parts of the commander whom he opposeth in the tented field, may, when (blessed day!) the Gates of Janus shall be shut, look confidently to replenish, if needs be, a meagre purse, with craft and subtilty, yet with a guileless countenance as of one wearing a mask, by venturing the certain and ultimate hazard at that pastime or diversion, of origin obscure, which, like the Indian Weed,† was brought amongst us to our great comfort from the plantations, where men call it Poker. Thus shall a man put more money in his purse than by writing his *Apologia pro vitâ suâ*, unless indeed he be a High Officer of State, for many men will pay much money to see such an one a-whitewashing himself. Touching this sport from the plantations and its origin, certain it is to all men of reasonable understanding that they played not Poker upon the *May Flower* that accurséd bark, accurséd not *per se* but for her cargo of sour-faced, psalm-singing, swivel-eyed, constipated Killjoys. Who, as is well known, landed on Plymouth Rock, but would that Plymouth Rock had landed on them! 'Pilgrim Fathers' quotha! And how many of 'em could point to Marriage Lines? Nor do I, in this matter, willingly subscribe myself a follower of Josephus Pantaleone in his treatise, dated from Bethlehem Hospital, *De rebus mirabilibus Novi Mundi*, in which you may read such Tragick, horrid happenings as of whole tribes of freedmen bound down by Tyrants to drink nothing but fair water, if that liquor

* For the benefit of a younger generation that may not know this classic, we quote the actual dialogue which seems to us as terse and pointed as some of those faithfully recorded by Plato—

"Said the Old Obadiah to the Young Obadiah,
'Obadiah, Obadiah, I am dry.'
Said the Young Obadiah to the Old Obadiah,
'Obadiah, Obadiah, so am I.'"

† "O thou weed
Who art so lovely fair and smell'st so sweet."
—WILL SHAKEBACON, in his pitiful play about the Jealous Blackamoor.

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can be called fair which but distendeth the stomach and giveth no man a heart for aught save Bootlegging,* and also may you read in that book of such Awful Prodigies as a great Statue of Liberty, their *guardacosta*, laughing consumedley upon some such an occasion and crying with a loud voice that re-echoed over their city (Noo Yark) that she was 'Tickled to Death' recalling some pleasantry of the Holy Inquisition; Josephus, I say, doth pertinaciously affirm that Poker is but a transmogrification or sublimation of 'Lubin, Come Rob thy Neighbour,' and then falls a-babbling of Cousins Jane and Prudence and how he, a green youth (the three of them wearying of Hot Cockles) did oft play this game with his cousins yet never rose a winner, e'en though he had his hose stuffed with Jacks and aces, much to his Discomfort. Indeed once, it seems, he was so ill at ease that Prudence (the saucy maid!) cried, 'Look, Harry,' which they called him as short for Josephus, 'thou hast a Royal Flush, but 'tis on thy countenance, not in thy hand: prithee, pay up and look pleasantly on me.' And then in the right Pantaleone fashion he discourseth on 'cozenage,' deriving from 'cousin' *sicut lucus a non lucendo*. For my part had not that stout and seaworthy circumnavigator Cristobal Colón," etc., etc.

Here follows a fulsome eulogy of Christopher Columbus for discovering America, apparently inspired by the deplorable fact that the bigoted, trifling and longwinded author of the MS. had recently won large sums at Poker from "Young Squire Credulous, of Agmondesham, at the apartments of Miladi Belchamber (Honest Sue) over against the Cockpit in St. James's."

To revert to more serious writers, it is pleasant to be able to quote some very wise words from an Englishman, Mathew Sutcliffe, who in his "Lawes of Armes" (1593), writes as follows:—

"The principall care that a Prince or State that entreth into warres is to have, is that there be choyse made of a sufficient Generall. If Princes looke for good successe in their warres, let them without affection and partialitie, make choyse of a sufficient Generall, religious, skilfull, couragious, and adorned with such vertues, both for warre and peace, as the importance of the matters which he manageth requireth. Machiavel's divinitie, that thinketh religion in men of warre foolerie, and proposeth that impious Atheist Cæsar Borgia for a patterne to a Prince that aspireth to be great to be followed was detested even of the barbarous nations. After knowledge and judgement in matters of warre, the next vertue required in a Generall is courage and speede to execute that which is wisely determined. There are also other vertues required in a Generall, which although they be not so necessarie as the former, yet for the execution of matters are very requisite and profitable, as namely justice, liberalitie, courtesie, clemencie, temperance and loyaltie. Who can look for modestie

* An obscure word. We have consulted Ducange, divers dictionaries by various eminent hands, the Encyclopædia Britannica, Mrs. Beeton and "Every Man's Own Lawyer," but without result.

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and sobrietie in the souldiers, where the captaine is given to wine,* or women, and spendeth his time in riot and excesse ? "

Sutcliffe also remarks most wisely, " Nothing is more hurtefull to the proceedings of warres than miserable niggardise." He is also much to the point in insisting that the general should be given a free hand.

" Whosoever for envy or feare or other cause goeth about to persuade Princes to pare their Generall's authoritie and to binde them with strait conditions, hath an evil minde himselfe, and as much as in him lyeth, ruinateth the affaires of his Prince. For what service can they doe that are not onely pinched in their provisions, but also bound by their commissions ? "

He also observes, " Seeing so many vertues are required in a captaine, and so small faultes lay him open to the enemy, it is no marvell if perfect Generalls be so rare and hard to finde." †

Montluc (1502–1577), nicknamed by the Protestants for his severity " le Boucher Royaliste," stresses the fact that secrecy is of the greatest importance, " *Mordez-vous la langue plutôt que de trop parler*," and also insists that a general should be easy of access, unlike one he knew who would shut himself up for hours on the pretext that he was writing an important despatch, but really in order to read *Rolland le Furieux* (" Orlando Furioso ") in the original Italian.

Montaigne the Prince of Essayists, not excepting Bacon, Lamb (and perhaps some benighted beings would add the new Master of the Obvious, Dr. Frank Crane), points out the importance of the study of military history. He tells us that the favourite reading of Alexander the Great was Homer ; of Scipio Africanus, Xenophon ; of Marcus Brutus, Polybius ; and of Charles X., Philippe de Commines. He adds with enthusiasm—

" *Mais le feu mareschal Strozzi qui avoit prins César pour sa part, avoit sans doubte bien mieulx choisi ; car, à la vérité, ce debvroit estre le breviaire de tout homme de guerre, comme estant le vray et souverain patron de l'art militaire.*"

De Feuquières (1648–1711) puts first of the qualities that a general should possess " loyalty to his Prince." Many will remember that Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson in one of his addresses to the

* Bacon has some wise words in this connection. " I know not how, but martiall men are given to love : I think it is but as they are given to wine, for perils commonly aske to be paid in pleasures."

† There is not a housewife in England who, carelessly reading this conclusion, would not exclaim with a sigh, " How true ! "

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officers of the Staff College points out that this loyalty "includes loyalty to the statesman as well as to our military superiors." De Feuquières also mentions courage, resolution, experience, prudence and the same old sobriety that has been mentioned so often previously.

Montecuculi (1608–1681) writes that the most necessary quality is knowledge of war acquired by experience, "*car on ne naît pas capitaine, on le devient, non par les livres, mais en campagne.*" *

Folard (1669–1752), known as the French Vegetius, appears to be the first author to write in detail on that elusive quality *coup d'œil.* This is a difficult word to translate. As a distinguished traveller said of "the word poltic," it "surprises in himself." Freytag-Loringhoven translates it as "*Entschlossenheit und Geistesgegenwart.*" It may be so; no doubt it is insular prejudice which makes us wish it meant something sounding less like opening a soda water bottle. Folard on this quality is worth quoting at length—

"*Le coup d'œil est un don de Dieu et ne s'acquiert pas; mais si la science ne le perfectionne, on ne voit les choses qu'imparfaitement et dans le nuage,† ce qui ne suffit pas dans les affaires, où il importe si fort d'avoir l'œil serein. La lenteur du coup d'œil est dangereuse dans une affaire embarquée. Il faut que la réflexion qui naît de la vue de l'objet soit tout aussitôt suivie de l'exécution, et que celle-ci aille aussi vite que le coup d'œil. Encore une fois reconnaître un champ de bataille, en saisir au premier instant les avantages et les défauts, c'est une grande qualité dans un général.*"

Coup d'œil, in fact, seems to resemble the faculty a good physican possesses of rapidly diagnosing, knowing the remedy and instantly making use of it.

It is impossible not to admire (although he once set out to invade us) that high-spirited *bâtard de Roi* Marshal Saxe.‡ He certainly did not possess one of the qualities on which the ancients insist. To wrap it up pleasantly, in the quaint language of the turf he would have "started at 100 to 1, and no takers, for the Continence Gold Cup." His career was a romance; there is none more interesting in military history save, perhaps, that of Suvorof, which indeed is like a tale by Hoffman performed by the Russian Ballet. The Marshal puts, as he naturally would, courage at the head of the qualities the ideal general should possess. Then come the power of rapid decision and the ability to read his opponent's mind while

* But remember "*le mulet du prince Eugène, pour avoir assisté á plus de 30 engagements, n'en était pourtant pas plus fort en art militaire.*"

† An early example of the phrase "Fog of War."

‡ Son of Augustus the Strong and Aurora von Königsmarck, sister of the ill-fated lover of Princess Sophia Dorothea; he "disappeared" in very tragic fashion. Saxe was christened Maurice at his father's wish, "in memory of the victory I gained over his mother at the Castle of Moritzburg." George Sand was a great-granddaughter of the Marshal.

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remaining a sealed book to him. He makes one interesting observation : " *J'ai vu de fort bons colonels devenir de très-mauvais généraux.*" There must have been, in past military history, many generals who in their secret heart of hearts would have admitted that this exactly applied to—many of their fellows.*

To turn to an Englishman, there is much to the point by Henry Lloyd (1720–1783), a British soldier of fortune and the first really serious professional writer in English on strategy. According to him a general's—

" conduct must be irreproachable, and free from all kind of vice and even of any remarkable weakness either of body or mind. If he is given to women, gaming or debauchery his example will be followed and a general dissipation will ensue. A sullen, sulky and morose temper is totally unfit for any command, it will soon produce an universal hatred, [just] as levity, affectation of wisdom expressed by nods of the head,† or other such grimaces expose him to contempt and derision. Above all things a general must avoid warm, harsh and intemperate expressions, or any word or motion which savour of insolence or contempt, which generally give greater offence than the most severe treatment." ‡

The Marquis de Quincy, an eighteenth-century soldier and writer, makes a somewhat similar remark to that of Marshal Saxe quoted above : " *on voit si peu d'habiles généraux quoiqu'on trouve un si grand nombre de vaillans capitaines.*" His ideal general must possess " *une fermeté inébranlable,*" he should be disinterested, honest, polite, affable, easy to approach and, when necessary, stern to a degree. In addition to the " *coup d'œil bon et juste* " he must be " deeply versed in history, geography and mathematics." This last, war being an art as well as a science, may perhaps on occasion be carried too far. It was said of H. D. von Bülow, author of *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems* (1799), that he considered strategy to consist mainly of angles and straight lines. Von Bülow was one of three brothers, of one of whom he remarked," William is the least

* Pompey, for example, whose character Mommsen pithily and epigrammatically sums up. " He was neither a bad man nor an incapable man, but a man thoroughly ordinary, created by nature to be a good sergeant, called by circumstances to be a general and a statesman."

† The *locus classicus* for this is, of course, the shake of Burleigh's head which " gave you to understand that even though they had more justice in their cause and wisdom in their measures, yet, if there was not a greater spirit shown on the part of the people, the country would at last fall a sacrifice to the hostile ambition of the Spanish monarchy." Would that we could often read in Hansard, " Here the honourable gentleman shook his head."

‡ Two notable instances of this are Picton for good, old-fashioned hard swearing and Craufurd for bitter sarcasm. A less distinguished individual, Mr. Chucks, R.N., was a combination of the two.

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gifted of us three—but he is by far the wisest officer in the Prussian Army."

As we approach modern times the burden of a complete general's knowledge gets heavier and heavier. After reading *Des connaissances nécessaires à un général en chef d'armée* (1780), by General Comte de Lacuée Cessac, one can only exclaim with Goldsmith—

> "Still the wonder grew
> That one small head could carry all he knew."

The list is almost as long as the catalogue of the duties performed by Mr. Polly at the Potwell Inn. The gallant count's general must have at his finger's ends Thucydides, Polybius, Xenophon, Vegetius, Leo the Philosopher, Frontinus, Polyænus * and Cæsar; he must know geography (and, from the details given, the author means military geography, which is interesting as the term had not then been invented); he must be an accomplished linguist; international law should be, as they expressively put it in the United States, his middle name; he must be well coached in the constitutional and civil law of all important countries; and he must be capable of lying for his country as an ambassador as well as of fighting for it as a soldier. Jomini does not take this view. The first qualities necessary in a general, according to him, are character, moral courage, cool-headedness and physical courage "*Le savoir n'apparaît qu'en troisième ligne.*"

Napoleon insists on mathematics and the study of military history: his "*lisez, relisez,*" etc., is so well known that it is not necessary to quote it. It will be remembered that he had a very high opinion of Marlborough, but Wellington was, in his eyes, "*un homme borné.*" † But the most interesting item in Napoleon's list is something that a general ought not to possess, "*un général ne doit jamais se faire de tableaux, c'est le pire de tout.*" He returns to this repeatedly. A general must be cool-headed, must never be over-impressed by good news, or "rattled" by bad: "*il est des hommes qui, par leur constitution physique et morale, se font de toute chose un tableau.*" In this connection it is interesting to note that Colonel Niemann, writing of July, 1918, says, "*die impulsive Art des Kaisers dazu neigte, zeitweise Erfolge zu hoch einzuschätzen, Misserfolge schwerer zu nehmen als sie tatsächlich waren.*" (By the way, what a ghastly commander-in-chief Hamlet would have been!) And yet, on the other hand, imagination (which, however, cannot be acquired

* Whose *Strategematum libri octo* is a most entertaining work.

† The Duke was more generous, "Napoleon was the first man of his day on a field of battle, and with French troops."

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by study) must, surely, on occasion be a useful quality for a soldier. As a matter of fact, we cannot think of any general in history who has been a poet, though some have written verse. And with regard to " tableaux," did not the Great Duke say, " I have been passing my life in guessing what I might meet with beyond the next hill, or round the next corner ? "

Having considered ancient generals in the abstract it might perhaps be interesting to take two soldiers famous in history and make a brief survey of them or, as no doubt the Philosopher of the Baked Bean Town would say if he were now alive, " give them the once-over." Let us first take Hannibal, whose military exploits to many people are probably chiefly associated with vinegar and elephants. The first remarkable thing about him is that he was a young man, only twenty-nine, when called on to take the place of Hasdrubal. Vigorous, athletic, hardy, " ever foremost in the charge and the last to leave the field after the battle " (unlike a certain " unaffected, undetected, well-connected nobleman "), he was also a master of stratagem and ruse and a careful student of the character of the enemy. He had spies in Rome itself, and " was frequently seen "—but not, we trust, recognized—" wearing disguises and false hair in order to procure information." Happy the modern generalissimo who can leave such beaverings to his D.M.I. His history has been written mainly by enemies, but Livy speaks with enthusiasm of him as a soldier, though he qualifies it by attributing to him " more than Carthaginian treachery, no respect for truth or honour, no fear of the Gods, no regard for the sanctity of oaths, no sense of religion." * Indeed, he seems to convey a general sort of impression that Hannibal was " no gentleman." This bitterness is probably due to the fact that nobody likes being made a fool of, and Hannibal fooled the Romans many a time by guile and ambush. His mainspring was patriotism, yet he could not make use of this in addressing his troops to whom, of so varied origin were they, the word meant nothing. He has been blamed by many, Napoleon included, for not marching on Rome after Cannæ. Maharbal in command of the cavalry, in the true cavalry spirit strongly urged this course : on Hannibal replying that the affair required time for consideration, the

* Unlike the pious historian who will complacently and chattily set down such items of news as " In Picenum it rained stones," which necessitated an extraordinary expiation. Does one not expect to read next " For pictures see back page ? " And what in the world would the expiation have been if it had rained cats and dogs at Picenum ? The leaves of the Sibylline books would probably have been torn to bits in anxiety to find out what was " *comme il faut* " on such an occasion.

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cavalryman went so far as to say, "You, Hannibal, know how to acquire victory, but you know not how to use it." Nice words to one's superior officer! We wonder Hannibal did not reply to Maharbal, "You, Maharbal, will get what is coming to you, and then some," to quote, is it a chorus in a Greek play or is it the Movies? Perhaps the chief reason why he did not advance on Rome was that his genius was for open warfare rather than for siege operations. In considering Hannibal's career we must always remember that if ever there was a general badly served by the authorities at home it was Hannibal. As General Canonge well puts it, "*Annibal a eu deux ennemies : Rome et Carthage.*" Napoleon called him "*le plus audacieux de tous, le plus étonnant peutêtre, si hardi, si sûr, si large en toutes choses,*" while Wellington's verdict was "by many degrees the greatest soldier on record."

Julius Cæsar's character was very different. Of noble birth, an athlete, a master of horsemanship, an excellent swimmer, he was also in youth a writer of light verse and a decided dandy. We can find no trace of it in history, but we like to think that his friends called him Gilbertus Philbertus. He could get into debt like the noblest Roman of them all. Napoleon, who had the greatest admiration for him, condemns his early career as "*une jeunesse oisive et des plus vicieuses.*" The serious Mommsen says of him, "he appeared among all victories to value most those won over beautiful women." He was curiously modern in some respects. Like any city prince of high finance or modern feuilleton writer, he would dictate to several scribes at the same time, and his private secretary, Balbus (not our edifying and Addisonian old friend of the Latin grammar), was rarely allowed out of his sight. He was, says Plutarch, "the first to communicate his thoughts by letters to his friends, though both parties were in Rome"; an old commentator on Plutarch makes the delightful note, "Here we discover the rudiments of the Twopenny Post."

Unlike Hannibal, he was over forty before he became commander-in-chief. His men, when he addressed them, were "Fellow-soldiers," not "Soldiers," and he would not be deterred from any enterprise by unfavourable auguries. He has been the subject of more eulogies than any general who ever lived.* Montaigne's praise has been quoted above. "*Nommer César c'est nommer le génie de la guerre,*" wrote Turpin de Crissé (1785); Napoleon's

* It is true that Mr. Wells is very stern with Julius Cæsar. But sometimes we are tempted to think that "The Outline of History" was written, not by Mr. Wells, but by Mr. Chester Coote.

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opinion of him was "*un homme à la fois d'un grand génie et d'une grande audace.*" Soliman II. had his Commentaries translated into Turkish and read them daily like any fourth form boy, but, we trust, with more pleasure. He had one great advantage over Hannibal—he wrote his own history. It is true his veracity has been called in question. A portentous German, Tobias Wagner (early eighteenth century), picking out a minute point in the Commentaries wrote, "Either his memory betrayed him or he would not tell the truth." We wonder that the egregious Tobias did not comment on the fact that Cæsar preferred the company of "Fat, sleek-headed men and such as sleep o'nights," and then draw up a "*Zusammenfassender Verzeichnis*" of lean and hungry men of the period who were quite as "*vertrauenswürdig*" as their stouter contemporaries. How much pleasanter is the comment of the Prince de Ligne who, while admitting that "*César mentoit un peu,*" added, "*il est sûr qu'il y a des choses bien étonnantes mais il y en a de si vraies et si incroyables, que j'ai envie de croire tout également.*" *Credo quia impossibile.*

Whichever may have been the greater general, Hannibal or Cæsar (and surely Hannibal had the harder task), there is no doubt that the world owes a deeper debt of gratitude to Hannibal. Was it not on Cannæ that the great chamber-strategist von Schlieffen based the famous plan of campaign which the second Moltke, *magni nominis umbra*, failed to carry out? Without Cannæ there might have been no Marne. With reference to this latter battle it is odd, seeing that Germany claims Shakespeare * as her own son, that in not one of their numerous books upon the Marne can one find the apposite quotation—

> "Does he feel his title
> Hang loose about him like a giant's robe
> Upon a dwarfish Chief?"

Before taking leave of Hannibal and Cæsar we would suggest that probably soon after May, 1821, it was definitely settled in the Elysian Fields who were the three greatest soldiers in history. It does not seem likely that the Great War of recent date will cause any alteration in the placings.

We might point out that where the Compleat General is concerned physiognomy means little or nothing. There are some professions which seem to have a kind of sealed-pattern face which all members of them must attain if they would be eminent. Even "my dear

* One can forgive much of the turgid and nebulous Bosh (or Bunk) written about Shakespeare in Germany when one remembers the story of the learned Herr Doktor who came to the amazing conclusion that the mysterious Mr. W. H. of the Sonnets was—Mr. William Himself!

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Watson" could detect the celebrated actor, not by his astrachan-trimmed overcoat (slightly worn at the right elbow from leaning on, well, let us say mantelpieces), but by his Crummles-like countenance; in the purlieus of the Temple you may see what is technically known as "the legal mug," which must cause shudders in young Mr. Briefless, who has just eaten his dinners, when he reflects that he must look like this before he ascends the Bench or the Woolsack; you shall identify the Eminent Divine not by some strange fashion of hat or gaiters, but rather by a bland benignity or wrinkled asceticism of face; but it is not so with the Higher Command of the past. Wolfe had no chin; Frederick the Great is best described in the tongue, but not the words, of Longfellow as "an old grouch"; Seydlitz, that dashing cavalry leader (whose name, however, seems to suggest a powder other than villainous saltpetre) was, according to one of his portraits, the very type of a prim and elderly maiden-aunt, one might even say a plus four maiden-aunt; Bernadotte resembled a pirate king; Grouchy, "a horseman by nature and a cavalry soldier by instinct," had a great look of the late Dan Leno; there are some portraits of "that good gray head" which show "an unforgiving eye and a damned disinheriting countenance"; his lieutenants all looked, what they were, English * gentlemen, with the possible exception of Beresford, whose face seems to us to suggest a bewildered potato; St. Arnaud could have played a very important (and sinister) part in *Faust* without any make-up; Marshal Saxe looks like an aristocratic Squire Western; Meade overheard one of his men describe him as "a damned old goggle-eyed snapping turtle." Count Fosco, that mouse-loving scoundrel, had a great look of Napoleon; and there is a very distinguished living Orientalist who is extremely like in face, not, of course, in character, Count Fosco. So it is of no avail to try to look like some distinguished soldier of the past; there is, however, consolation in the words of the Polite Lunatic who asseverated that he "looked like what Napoleon would have looked like if Napoleon hadn't looked like the way he did look like."

But it is not for a civilian, and a bookworm † at that, to tender suggestions to young officers as to how they should develope from the chrysalis state of captain to the full glory of a Compleat General. (In this chrysalis connection we should like to ask, why should the

* We use the word English advisedly: "British gentlemen" is so horribly like some cheap tailor's advertisement. Lord Wolseley, by the way, made the interesting statement "Nearly all his [Wellington's] generals were duffers."

† Our American cousins, who touch no word that they do not adorn, have, by latest advices, pleasantly elaborated this into "woolly-whiskered book-louse."

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Senior Service alone be honoured, as it is, in the world of Lepidoptera? If this has its Red Admirals, so often to be seen in the immediate vicinity of Painted Ladies, why should it not also have, say, its "Bright Brigadiers," or its "Gay Generals"? The present nomenclature seems based on favouritism.)

But to continue, for a civilian to proffer advice of this kind would be as though a middle-aged maiden lady, Miss Priscilla Prim, of Honeysuckle Cottage, Muckbury Magna, were to advertize in the sporting Press that she was the possessor of a "sure pinch" for the Derby: "fear nothing," in the brave if ungrammatical words of those eloquent men the tipsters, "help yourselves, and when * * * rolls home an easy winner, act honourable to Little Priscy."

Still, even a "Worm, Book" may be allowed to have opinions and to hazard a conjecture. It is not, of course, possible for any one individual to combine all the excellent qualities of generals famous in history as "Rosalind of many parts" possessed—*

> "Helen's cheek, but not her heart,
> Cleopatra's majesty,
> Atalanta's better part,
> Sad Lucrecia's modesty"—

but supposing, now, it were possible to unite in one military mind the fine character of Wordsworth's "Happy Warrior" and the ripe learning of Major-General Stanley! . . .

* At least, so Orlando thought—before he married her.

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THE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

By Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Wright, M.C., Commanding Eton College O.T.C.

Public interest has recently been aroused on the question of military training in schools by the abolition of the War Office grant to Cadet Corps. The consequent discussion and a misleading leading article in a prominent daily paper showed that the general public, and even schoolmasters and soldiers who might have been expected to be better informed, had little knowledge of the machinery by which the country is continuing to build up a reserve of officers. It is not proposed in this article to argue the case for and against the grant to Cadet Corps, whether the money so spent is mainly for military or for educational purposes, and whether the expense should be borne by the War Office, or by the Board of Education, or entirely by the schools and institutions and individuals concerned. It is only proposed to examine the existing condition of the Officers Training Corps, which is a more definitely military institution, and to reassure the taxpayer that expenditure on this, at any rate, is judicious—in fact, is a profitable investment.

The Officers Training Corps is divided into two branches; the Senior Division consists of cadets at 23 universities; the Junior Division of cadets at 164 schools. The number of cadets in the Senior Division was 2822 in 1922; the number in the Junior Division has risen steadily from about 30,000 in 1918 to over 32,000 in 1922. This article will deal mainly with the Junior Division, the larger and in many ways the more important, but something will be said of the Senior Division later.

"The primary object of the Officers Training Corps," to quote the opening sentence of its regulations, "is to provide students at schools and universities with a standardized measure of elementary military training, with a view to their applying eventually for commissions in the Militia or the Territorial Force." And the regulations go on to observe that the degree to which this result is attained will be the main consideration in deciding whether the O.T.C. as a whole, or any part of it, is giving an adequate return to the State for the

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expenditure involved. In this connection, one might quote figures from the past, from the records of the war, in which the O.T.C. certainly justified its creation and its creators. Or one might point to the number of cadets appointed to commissions in the Territorial Army since its reconstitution: 735 cadets had been so appointed up to the end of 1922, a figure which seems scarcely large enough to justify the expenditure involved.

But the value to the country and to the individual of the O.T.C. training cannot be measured merely by the numbers of those cadets who subsequently apply for commissions in the Territorial Army. The remainder, perhaps the vast majority, may never do another day's soldiering in their lives, and have possibly in some instances left school or university with a profound distaste for what they call "militarism" ("perishing Prussianism" was a phrase used by one young free-thinker).

Still they have learnt something about tactics, drill and discipline, which will help them to become officers in a national emergency; and it is among them, as in 1914, that the nation will find its reserve of officers. Many of them have also learnt, as this article will endeavour to show, something about the technique of leadership which will stand them in good stead even in civil life. It is a favourite remark of the visiting preacher or lecturer at a large public school to refer to his audience as "the leaders of the future"; and it is a common mistake to ignore the value for peace purposes of the training in leadership given in the O.T.C. It is the duty of every one who believes in it to try to convince the unconvinced schoolmaster or parent of its value—one might almost say, to the materialist, its commercial value.

It is important that schoolmasters and parents should alike be convinced of the value of the training given, for the conditions of enrolment and service in O.T.C. are in the hands of school authorities, and in most instances both the initial enrolment and subsequent service are on an entirely voluntary basis. Consequently, both in obtaining recruits and in keeping a sufficiently firm hold on them subsequently for disciplinary purposes, the commanding officer of a corps is largely dependent upon the cordial cooperation of housemasters and parents as well as upon public opinion in general. In the contingent with which the writer is most familiar, a recruit does not enlist for a definite term of years, and he is free to resign at any moment on obtaining the permission of his housemaster and parent. If such permission is lightly given, a cadet who becomes slack and finds himself faced, say, with the prospect of extra drills

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for idleness on parade, finds the easiest way out of his difficulties by resigning the corps altogether. Instances of this in the writer's experience have been comparatively rare, but they serve to emphasize the slightness of the hold that the company officer has over his cadets and the imperative necessity of maintaining a sound public opinion on the value of the training.

The training comprises Drill, Musketry, Field Training and Tactics, and its object is essentially to " inculcate the principles of leadership in the field." A cadet is returned as " efficient," and so qualifies for the War Office capitation grant, if he is physically fit and if during the year he has (1) attended not less than 40 instructional parades of his unit of at least 45 minutes' duration each (first year, not less than 45 parades); (2) undergone the prescribed training in musketry; (3) been present at the annual inspection, except in case of leave especially granted.

Thus the War Office requirements for efficiency are sufficiently low and can be satisfied by a single weekly parade and an occasional field day. Even so, it is as much as a cadet in a normal year can be expected to do without making too great a demand on time required for other school purposes, though at many schools the corps parades regularly twice a week. This amount of training annually, even after an intensive course of recruit drills at the beginning of a cadet's career, would never by itself do much to inculcate the principles of leadership, and, if this was all that was done, the gibes of those who talk about " playing at soldiers " might well be justified, for no great permanent results could be expected. But, in addition to this, a further demand is made upon the good will and patriotism of the cadet; after a year or more of service in the corps he is expected and more or less peacefully persuaded to take a " proficiency " course, which is a test imposed by the contingent and qualifies him for promotion to non-commissioned rank; subsequently, he is encouraged to become a candidate for Certificate " A ", which is the War Office guarantee of proficiency. It is undoubtedly during these periods of intensive training and, after promotion, from actual experience of commanding a unit, however small, on the parade ground and in the field, that the boy acquires the most valuable and essential part of his training.

When taking either of these courses a cadet at Eton attends anything from six to nine parades a week for a period of six to eight weeks. Considerable and generous concessions are made by the school authorities to find time for this, but even then a boy has to sacrifice a large slice of his ordinary leisure time. It is during these

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courses that he learns his musketry and tactics and also acquires experience in giving commands. It is in the handling of a squad of boys, often his personal friends, or perhaps his enemies, that he acquires self-confidence and the power of leadership. These instructional squads are numerous and overflow into the streets where alone in winter time a suitable hard surface for close order drill can be obtained. It is an amazing sight to see these squads being handled by boys amidst a crowd of passers-by, often critical and sometimes contemptuous onlookers. The squad—in top hats and tail coats, for there is no time to change into uniform—drills imperturbably, its youthful commander usually showing complete outward self-confidence, and an entire absence of self-consciousness. One cannot help thinking that a boy who learns to keep his head and control his section in these trying conditions will not be found wanting when he has to move his men through a hostile barrage or perhaps face a crowd of angry employees.

In order to obtain Certificate "A" a candidate has to pass a practical examination and a written examination. In the practical he has to drill a squad and show that he can detect faults in individuals and is not afraid to check them, and he has to be able to act as platoon commander in a company. In musketry he has to be familiar with the rifle as a weapon, to be aware of its powers and limitations; and in tactics he has to show himself capable of handling a platoon in open warfare as part of a company in attack or defence. He must also show a practical knowledge of map-reading and the use of the compass. After passing in the practical examination, he is eligible to sit for the written examination, in which he must show that he is able to apply his knowledge of the duties of a platoon commander in the field to simple situations, and that he knows enough about the action of other arms to enable him to carry out his duties as a subaltern in the field efficiently.

There are certain tangible advantages conferred upon holders of Certificate "A." If they are candidates for the Royal Navy, Woolwich, Sandhurst or Royal Air Force Cadet College, they receive a small but often valuable number of marks in the competitive examination. If they are entering into civil life, they are eligible for direct appointment to Commissions in the Territorial Army or in the Reserve of Officers. For the boy who is entering the services the marks are perhaps the most valuable result; the training he would in any event obtain later. For the civilian, there is the inestimable advantage of a training in control and leadership of men; and for the country, there is a potential officer in reserve for the future.

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When a boy has obtained Certificate "A," his career in the corps is by no means ended. He can then hope to rise to be a senior non-commissioned officer or perhaps a cadet officer. Every opportunity is given him to handle his unit on weekly parades and on field days. In the Eton Corps all platoons are commanded by boys and often on a field day all the companies are commanded by boy cadet officers, the company commanders themselves acting as umpires. It is in the handling of his house section that a boy's capacity for leadership is tested to the utmost. The senior member of the house section may or may not be prominent in his house in other respects: he may be captain of his house; he may be prominent athletically and often such boys are naturally and inevitably selected for early promotion; or he may be a comparatively insignificant individual outside the corps. In any event his task is not an easy one; he has to preserve his authority on parade over boys with whom his relations off parade may be of an entirely different nature. He has to use tact and judgment in the exercise of his authority, for he knows, or at any rate his company commander realizes that, apart from his personal authority and prestige, there is little by which he can keep control, and that, if any member of the section chooses to dispute his authority, there is little enough disciplinary power in the background. Occasionally, a few extra drills are given as a disciplinary measure, but in the long run the only method of dealing with a refractory member is to dismiss him from the corps, a sad confession of failure. Probably most unit commanders could, by weeding out some ten per cent. of those physically incapable or mentally intolerant of efficient military service, create a superficial appearance of greater smartness and efficiency. But it should certainly be their policy to retain every possible boy in the ranks with a view to their potential value in the future if trained, however imperfectly, in the present. There is little doubt that under the voluntary system one must sacrifice something of quality to obtain quantity.

There is one other feature of the training given in the O.T.C., an important feature though often the most unpopular with boy, parent and housemaster alike, and that is the annual camp. For nine or ten days at the end of the summer term, contingents from most schools go to various camps. At each camp units are organized as a brigade of four battalions, staffed and officered by regular soldiers, under the auspices of one of the Commands. It is in these camps that the cadet gets a real taste of what soldiering may mean. A progressive course of training illustrated by plentiful demonstrations

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teaches him more about field work in practice than he is likely to learn throughout the rest of the year; incidentally, officers get an opportunity of getting into touch with recent developments in tactics and refreshing their previous knowledge. At the same time the cadet learns a little about the administrative side of a soldier's life, sees something of the organization necessary for feeding and housing a large number of troops, of the necessity for cleanliness and sanitation, and experiences something of the minor hardships and discomforts inevitable when under canvas in an uncertain climate.

With many public school boys camp is decidedly unpopular; few like the prospect of it, rather more enjoy it in retrospect. For this, the main reasons are that camp comes at the end of a long period at school at a time of year when home pleasures are at their best, and that the life in camp is more like hard work than a holiday. To many of these boys, coming as they do from homes where they have every comfort and luxury, where indulgent parents are often inclined to spoil them for the pleasures of a simple life, in an age when luxurious living is regarded as an indispensable adjunct of existence, the minor hardships of camp life, sleeping on a hard floor in a crowded tent, eating off enamelled ware, washing up the greasy things afterwards and so on, such things seem to them all but intolerable. They naturally exaggerate the hardships—it is the British prerogative to grouse—but they are often supported in this attitude by their parents, who maintain that camp life is injurious to their boys' " delicate constitution " and that they come back exhausted and under-fed. The apparent and temporary exhaustion, if there, is probably largely due to a long train-journey begun in the early morning after a short night's sleep and an hour or two of hard work in packing up equipment and striking camp; this, coupled perhaps with the effects of over-smoking on the journey, is often sufficient to account for a sudden change in boys, who, on their last day in camp, appear to be in radiant health. Also, with many housemasters camp is unpopular; they are apt to maintain that barrack conditions and rough living have a coarsening effect upon their boys, who consequently suffer in the tone of their language and perhaps of their morals.

That all these objections are, in the main, overruled and that attendance at camp is numerically satisfactory is a great tribute to the power of the voluntary spirit. At most schools a cadet is left free to attend camp or not as he chooses; it is not, in the Junior Division of the O.T.C., an indispensable qualification for efficiency. At Eton it was wisely decided in the past not to make a fresh call

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upon the boys' patriotism and good will each year, and attendance in camp is compulsory for all members of the corps who are over sixteen years old and are not excused for medical or other special reasons. Moreover, to prevent the faint-hearted boy from throwing up the sponge at the last minute, there is a close time for resignations, and no boy is allowed to resign the corps between April and the end of camp. That the unpopularity of camp is a real problem is proved by the persistence with which boys try to secure a medical excuse; there are many such, from the prominent oar, who is suddenly discovered to be suffering from "debility," to the chubby fellow who bravely asserts and whose doctor witnesses that he is suffering from "under-nourishment," to the scandal of his housemaster and the amazement of his friends.

In a way all but the softest enjoy camp; only they cannot help thinking that they might be enjoying other things much more. They receive a slight compensation in the future—at Eton at any rate—by being allowed to come back one day later each school-time than boys who have not attended camp. Even so, they have lost a week of holidays; and it is to their eternal credit that not one per cent. go so far as to resign the corps in order to obtain a more pleasant life. They regard camp as an unpleasant duty which they have to perform and make as pleasant as possible, and this sensible attitude would be greatly strengthened if one could be sure of the loyal support of housemasters and parents in appealing to the boy's higher motives.

Housemasters, it is true, are mainly sympathetic and often positively helpful, though it is difficult to deal with the man who is convinced that some of his boys have been hopelessly coarsened and their morals ruined by the baneful influence of camp.

Parents are often not sufficiently well-informed of the nature of camp and of its object and value. The writer has known a serving soldier write to put the point of view that a single attendance at camp should be sufficient and that it is an intolerable hardship that the best part of a boy's holidays should be spoilt in this way. Unfortunately, camp cannot be run by boys who are attending for their first year; its whole success depends essentially on the old soldier who has learnt the ropes the year before and can see to the comfort of his tent, and on the non-commissioned officer who has a longer experience, who can be depended upon to maintain discipline in his tent, to keep his men clean and get them on parade and generally act as a father to them.

At the end of his career at school a boy who has had three or four years in the corps and has risen in the ranks is really well qualified

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to become an officer, and there are many of them whom private soldiers would cheerfully and confidently follow knowing that they were in the hands of a man who knew his job. To obtain these qualifications, the boy will have made considerable sacrifices of leisure and comfort, and all honour is due to him in consequence.

And then, perhaps, he proceeds to a university, and a fresh appeal is made to his patriotism by the Senior Division of the O.T.C. What is his attitude? A fair number join the cavalry or artillery, branches where they see they will get an agreeable change of training; some of the keenest at once apply for a commission in their home Territorial unit and cannot be expected to continue to support the O.T.C. The remainder, the large majority, think they have "done their bit" and intend to do no more. It is difficult to blame them if they have served as sergeants or cadet officers in their school units, and are expected to begin again at the beginning as a private soldier in an infantry platoon. But an attempt is now being made to get at them in the right way, to assume for those who have been through their school unit all the elementary knowledge, and, reducing or cutting out drill parades altogether, to treat them as an officers' squad, to be instructed progressively in tactical schemes and the knowledge of other arms besides their own. This movement should meet with the success it deserves and the best wishes of all who are interested go with it.

The Junior Division is certainly prepared to give its whole-hearted support to the Senior, and to make at the right moment an appeal to boys leaving to do so likewise. Yet even this appeal is not an easy thing to make. After having worked hard to keep a boy keen and enthusiastic when at school, and after having seen him respond to personal influence and encouragement so that he has accepted his responsibilities and has led his unit with a fine *esprit de corps*, it is not easy then to tell him to begin again with a fresh unit, and to persuade him convincingly that he has learnt but the rudiments so far and must go on to learn more. Still, it can be done; and one hopes that a good numerical response will result, for admittedly the Senior Division of the O.T.C. is not in such a flourishing condition numerically as the Junior.

Nothing has been said so far on the officer question. At most schools at present this is not a serious problem. There are plenty of assistant masters who have seen something of active service in the war, and, though some profess a distaste for "militarism," many have retained, if not enthusiasm, at any rate a stern sense of public duty. Looking to the future, one must realize that this source of supply

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will soon dry up unless there is another war on the same scale as before. But there are means of training fresh officers more or less effectively, and young assistant masters can generally be found ready to take their part in this side of school life. To them also it involves, of course, considerable sacrifice of leisure, but there are, as in all departments of a schoolmaster's life, compensations, and not the least is the intense belief that one is in this work doing something of real value both for one's country and for the individual boy.

Finally, as to the expense involved: the total cost to the country of the O.T.C. in the latest financial year was about £109,000. Of this total about £45,000 comes under the heading of capitation and other grants to units; some £21,000 went in pay of officers at camps and on courses of instruction; and the remaining £43,000 is accounted for in cost of permanent staff, administration, transport, rations, ammunition, etc. The actual capitation grant to a unit, dependent on the numbers returned as efficient and the numbers passing in Certificate "A," is far from covering the unit's expenses. Probably four or five times as much is contributed by the school funds, or directly by the parents, to cover the total cost of staff, training and camp; in addition to this, the parent has to pay for the upkeep of uniform, though in many instances this is reduced to a minimum by a judicious use of second-hand material. In return for this expenditure, the country receives every year some 8,000 partially trained officers, of whom over 2,000 have passed in Certificate "A," and are thereby definitely considered qualified to become officers in the Territorial Army or in the Militia. Without this training this reserve of officers would be non-existent or would have to be created in some less efficient and probably more expensive manner.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the really essential part of this training in the O.T.C. is the inculcation of a sense of discipline, and ultimately of the leadership which is its avowed object. The musketry practice may be meagre, the tactics learnt rudimentary and old-fashioned, but, if a boy has learnt how to obey and how to give an order, to lose his self-consciousness in a position of authority and to acquire self-confidence in its stead, to hold his head high and look his enemies in the face, he has learnt something which he can acquire in no other way. A sense of leadership and physical efficiency he may get in his games, a sense of obedience he may get in his schoolroom (but not much in these days of modern educational methods and the "classroom republic"), but it is only in the corps and in steady drill on the parade-ground that he can learn that instant and instinctive obedience to authority and expect that immediate response

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to his own orders, which is going to enable him to take his part in life as a leader of the future in a world where authority seems to be waxing feeble and discipline to be becoming a thing of the past.

There is little fear of a boy taking his military training too seriously and becoming imbued with a wrong spirit of militarism. A young Etonian who was killed in the war, who had already distinguished himself among his friends as a witty and brilliant conversationalist, once admitted that he had his blind side. " There are two subjects," he said, " on which I have no sense of humour, Eton and my regiment." No boy is likely to lose his sense of humour or his sense of proportion about the corps ; the old gibes, " dog-potters " and the like, are sure to survive. But, whatever the superficial attitude may be, of flippancy or of grumbling, a boy may well be expected to take his job seriously at heart and to rest satisfied, both in himself and those under him, with no standard short of the best.

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RECOLLECTIONS OF THE R.F.C. DURING THE GREAT WAR

By Rothesay Stuart Wortley, M.C. (late Major, Hampshire Yeomanry and R.A.F.)

No. II

It was a real joy to be back in France once more, with all its atmosphere of gaiety and cheerfulness. David was posted to a "Bristol Fighter" squadron stationed on an aerodrome at that time occupied by four fighting squadrons in G.H.Q. Reserve, whose area of operations was, generally speaking, that of the Ypres salient, and whose chief duties were:—to keep the Germans from crossing over to our side of the lines, to prevent them from interfering with our artillery machines, and to escort our bombing squadrons on their raids into hostile territory.

The newly joined flying officer undergoes a two weeks' period of probation, during which time he is not allowed to cross the lines: but, under the guidance of his squadron or flight commander, and with an old and trusted observer in the back seat, is sent out on "line patrol" to watch the proceedings of his more experienced comrades and to study the geography of the countryside. A good eye for country, combined with an instinctive knowledge of his "airabouts" is a qualification absolutely essential to a good fighting pilot.

In some this faculty of finding one's way about is instinctive, whilst in others it appears to be entirely lacking. One fresh arrival, who, whilst on patrol in the neighbourhood of Poperinghe, some twenty miles west of the lines, for no apparent reason completely disappeared, was reported as missing, and some time afterwards appeared in the casualty lists as a prisoner of war. He had landed near Ghent! Another recruit sent out on the same duty, but evidently determined not to make the same mistake, left his formation over the Forest of Nieppe (one of the best landmarks in the country, and situated only ten miles from his aerodrome), also

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vanished, and three days later wired that he had crashed about a hundred miles south-west of Paris!

After this period of probation the new pilot is posted to a flight and joins in the regular patrols; if he manages to get through his first month safely, he has every chance of surviving to the end!

David's first adventure across the lines was very nearly his last. On taking off, his engine developed a defect, and he was obliged to return to the sheds to change his machine. By the time he was again in the air the Flight was far away; and, though following with all possible speed, when he eventually reached the Ypres salient he could find no trace of his companions. Wandering disconsolately around the heavens (as yet without sufficient experience or knowledge of how to distinguish different types of aircraft), he suddenly descried above his head five large aeroplanes looking, for all the world, like "Bristol Fighters." With soldierly promptitude he joined on to the tail of the formation. Congratulating himself on the success of his efforts in finding his friends at last, his horror may be imagined when, as they "banked" in turning and their wings displayed two large and life-like crosses, he found that he had attached himself to the tail of five "Albatross Two-Seaters." Both David and his observer emptied their guns at point-blank range; then, yielding to the conviction that discretion was the better part of valour, and without waiting to discover whether he had inflicted any material damage upon the enemy, our "intrepid airman" went spinning down about 10,000 feet of æther and made tracks for home, there to be greeted with the roars of rude merriment of his messmates on retailing the details of his endeavours.

The spirit of the Flying Corps was superb. In spite of heavy casualties (David's squadron once losing no less than eighteen machines in ten days), optimistic ardour reigned supreme. Even fatal accidents, a large number of which occurred at that time, owing to machines breaking up in the air in practice flights, caused no dismay.

Such was the keenness displayed by pilots that, their day's work done, some would, without even going through the formality of asking leave, get into the air in order to lie in wait for any stray German aircraft which might venture across the lines for the purpose of taking photographs or making a reconnaissance report. Games would sometimes be interrupted for the more exciting pleasures of the hunt and, should a Hun be spotted in the sky (reversing the

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tactics of Admiral Drake in the days of yore), our aerial privateers would break off in the middle of a set of tennis, jump into their machines arrayed just as they were, in flannel trousers or shorts, chase, and sometimes bag their quarry, and so return to their unfinished match. One particular pilot had reduced this pastime to a fine art: rarely did the enemy escape him. So deadly was his skill and so many were his victories that the German reconnaissance machines grew more and more scarce, as anxiety to undertake those perilous expeditions diminished in the champions of the hostile camp.

The *esprit de corps* of individual squadrons was at its highest. A healthy spirit of rivalry existed between the pilots of the different types of fighting machines, and even more so, between those of squadrons using the same types. "Tit Bits," as the R.F.C. weekly *communiqué* was familiarly termed, was devoured with avidity, and if by any chance one "Bristol" squadron claimed more aerial victories than another, the flying officers of the runners-up would certainly be found casting the gravest aspersions on the capacity of the winners for strict adherence to the truth!

But great care was always exercised in claiming "Huns," and before any claim was sent to the Wing H.Q., it had to be substantiated, either by several other pilots or observers, or by the Anti-Aircraft Corps, whose duty it was, to watch and to report on aerial fighting from the ground. The most coveted triumph was the bringing down of a Hun on our own side of the lines, a comparatively rare achievement, as most of the fighting took place on the other side.

David's observer was a Canadian and due for his six months' leave to Canada. On his last patrol before leaving for home the Flight encountered a very large formation of enemy aircraft which had crossed the line near Ypres. During the fight that followed the Canadian succeeded in shooting down a German in flames, the wreckage crashing near Vlamertinghe. His joy knew no bounds. The fight was duly recorded in the *communiqué* "Tit Bits." Shortly after the departure of our hero the office copy of "Tit Bits" was discovered to be missing. The incident was soon forgotten. Two or three months later a story filtered through of a wild and woolly R.F.C. observer "moaning at the bar" of a trans-Atlantic liner, buttonholing every passenger in turn, producing from his pocket a much-thumbed piece of paper, and again and again retailing "how he shot down a Hun in flames and picked up the remains near Vlamertinghe!"

The early morning patrol was the most important function of the day.

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Climbing out of bed, roused by the hateful blare of a Klaxon horn, at an hour at which one feels anything but warlike, requires an almost superhuman effort; but once up and awake, and seated in his machine, David was ever exhilarated by the sense of latent power afforded by the sight of twenty or thirty fighting aeroplanes drawn up in formation ready to leave the ground; a sensation enhanced when, at a given signal, Flight after Flight, the red flames pouring from the exhaust pipes, rose roaring through the semi-darkness just preceding dawn up into the misty morning air. This was Britain going forth to battle in the heavens. There was a mysterious beauty in the scene; the sleeping world below lay under a pall of white fog, above which the tallest trees, the church-spires, and the hill-tops alone could show their heads. Over the lines to the east, under the golden sunrise, the Germans were equally preparing for the morning's fray. Half an hour later, at about 18,000 feet above the Messines ridge, the protagonists would meet.

It was during these months of 1917 that the R.F.C. gained decisive supremacy in the air. With the exception of a few really good men, the Germans were inferior to ourselves as fighting pilots. Nearly the whole of the fighting took place on the far side of the line, and rarely did they penetrate over our territory, excepting during the night, when aerial counter-attack was impossible. That a very large number of German machines were brought down (one squadron alone scored their two hundredth aerial victory), in spite of the fact that the " Albatross Scout," the type of aeroplane then most generally employed by the enemy, was as good, if not better, than any machine at our disposal, was entirely due to the initiative and fine fighting qualities displayed by our flying officers.

The patrol line usually assigned to David's squadron was Inglemunster—Ledeghen—Lichterfelder, but, as the patrols almost invariably ran into a host of the enemy's machines to the east of this line, these good Belgian towns became known to us as " *places* we have often heard of, but never seen."

The four squadrons on the aerodrome worked well together. The hours of their patrols and their operation orders usually coincided. Consequently, the patrol leaders were able to cooperate with each other, and so form an opposition " circus " to that of the enemy, which was led by Richthofen, Voss, Wolff and other famous aviators. The Germans were in the habit of painting their machines in the gayest colours, and always flew the same machines. Richthofen flew a scarlet " Albatross," Voss affected black and white chequers,

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whilst others revealed their identity by their individual tactics and methods of flying. Each side became acquainted with the other, and almost every pilot picked his particular rival in the enemy ranks.

Dawn and dusk were the hours when the fighting waxed its hottest. In the morning the eastern sun favoured the enemy—in the evening it deserted them and helped the British cause. The wind was nearly always pro-German—and was the cause of many a good pilot being forced to land on the other side, his fuel exhausted, having been carried too far away in the excitement of a fight.

On a clear day the opposing forces could watch each other's movements, as squadron after squadron appeared in view, climbing and converging upwards and inwards, gaining height behind the shelter of their own lines (to be above your opponent is a tremendous tactical advantage), until they met above the trenches. Fast and furious were the melées that ensued—little groups of five or six machines, slipping in from all directions, diving, whirling, circling as they flew to the attack; British and German all mixed up together—pairs of single combatants. A sudden red streak would shoot across the sky—some poor devil gone down in flames. A lull; as the pilots broke away for breathing space before plunging into battle once again. At last, exhausted and weary, their fuel and ammunition nearly spent, the warriors withdrew; the daily "dog-fight" ended. Once more the scattered Flights reformed, smaller sometimes than when they started out. The sky filled with the leaders' "Very" lights calling in their followers or "washing out" the patrols. So home, to find on landing the squadron commander anxiously waiting on the aerodrome for his chickens to come in to roost.

The French and Belgians were also operating on the northern front, though not in very great numbers. The French contingent included the famous "Stork" squadron, and an unfortunate incident occurred in that a Flight of the latter was attacked by one of our formations. A certain flight commander, but lately arrived from England, meeting an unfamiliar type of machine over Houthulst Forest, and determined to take no chances, opened fire on, as it afterwards transpired, a perfectly friendly group of "Spads." The "Spads" escaped unscathed, but the next morning the British squadron commander received a short, but somewhat biting note from the O.C. "Storks," protesting that "Yesterday your patrol did fire on my Spads, but it did not matter a bit ! ! ! !"

One morning David witnessed one of the finest aerial contests of

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the war. Lieutenant Voss, a celebrated German champion, attacked eight of our best pilots single-handed and put up such a magnificent display that it was only after ten minutes' hard fighting that their concentrated efforts prevailed to shoot him down; even so he succeeded in putting a few bullets through each of the eight machines. It was his Thermopylæ: he crashed in No-man's Land.

Such was the fighting, clean, chivalrous and decisive. Other duties also fell to the squadron's lot. Defensive patrols—cold, dreary performances, waiting and watching for the possible coming of Germans to whom the spiteful notion might have occurred to attempt to bomb or photograph G.H.Q. Reconnaissance and photographic patrols, during which the intruders were subjected to the attentions of "Archie," who never ceased to plaster the heavens around them, though his efforts were rarely anything but futile. Lastly, and most unpopular of all, the escorting of long-distance bombing squadrons, whose objectives would take them up to forty and fifty miles into Belgium, sometimes as far as Ghent and Brussels.

On these raids the mileage to be covered and the amount of fuel consequently consumed constituted a serious handicap to the fighting capacity of the escort and, having stirred up most of the German flying corps on the outward journey, the pilots were faced with the prospect of struggling home in the face of westerly winds through a sky full of Huns. Stop to fight them they could not. Had they done so, their fate might well have been a forced landing, through lack of petrol, in hostile territory—an unpleasant prospect, by no means improved by the fact that on these expeditions they generally set out armed with sheets of paper propaganda generously provided by the Intelligence Department for the education and edification of the Hun. Some of these sheets, when thrown overboard, would, owing to the force of the wind, catch in the wires of the tail-plane, and there remain stuck—damning evidence against the flying officer unlucky enough to be caught! The Huns had recently announced that any Allied aviator taken prisoner and found guilty of dropping propaganda would be shot without further ado!

On the aerodrome the four squadrons made up a very happy family. One commanding officer had had the brilliant idea of collecting the members of various London orchestras as they became due for mobilization and enlisting them as servants and mess waiters; the standard of efficiency in the art of batmanship to which these musicians attained was not quite up to schedule, they nevertheless constituted a very good band. Nor was other talent lacking—vocal, poetic or dramatic. There were concerts and theatrical displays;

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topical songs, recording and burlesquing the exploits of squadrons and their champions, were composed ; rag-time and other songs were parodied and paraphrased. After mess every one would gather round the piano and every sort and kind of song would be thundered out to the accompaniment of instruments real or improvized, producing an effect which one would rather have expected to emanate from the kraal of a Zulu " impi " than the encampment of the Royal Flying Corps. It was all great fun. Everybody dined in everybody's mess and some sort of entertainment was almost sure to be found going on somewhere nearly every night. One of the most popular pastimes was " Progressive Ping-Pong," for which the entrance fee was 1*s.* net ! (Let the scoffer buy the book of rules, if he can find it, and try it for himself—he will succumb !)

The General and his aide-de-camp put in an appearance as often as circumstances would allow. The former made a point of being personally acquainted with as many of his flying officers as possible, a practice which he kept up until the growing strength of the corps rendered it no longer feasible. When on the aerodrome, he would wander about with the squadron commanders, examining machines, hangars or workshops and listening to a long tale of wants and grievances. During these inspections he would sometimes turn and exclaim to his A.D.C., " Take note of that, Tommy." This gallant officer—if not at the moment absent imbibing his morning glass of port in one of the squadron messes—though dutifully following his General, note-book in hand, was usually surrounded by a group of flying officers with whom he was exchanging a series of ribald stories rather than attending to the official conversation of his superiors, and was consequently sublimely unaware of the nature of the note he was to take. But a brazen " Yes, sir," was his invariable reply, and the situation was saved by whispered consultations with each squadron commander in turn, who gladly supplied the information required (and a little more besides), so that the note-book, overflowing as it now was with names, lists, notes, figures and facts presented an appearance which might have brought credit to any brass-hat !

But this merely illustrates the lighter side of the picture. " Tommy's " services to the R.F.C. were invaluable—his talents and character were exactly complementary to those of his chief, and it was the combination of the two that did so much towards the making of the Corps.

The inspection over, the General would collect any pilots and observers who happened to be present and, after cross-examining them as to their views and opinions on all and sundry questions

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connected with fighting in the air, would, in his turn, deliver a lecture on aerial strategy and tactics, lay down an axiom or two for general use, and never fail to end up with the same solemn warning that should any of them be unlucky enough (which he most sincerely hoped they would not) to be shot down and taken prisoner, they must never for an instant forget the vital importance of refraining from imparting any information which might be of use to the enemy. It may or may not have been due to the law of auto-suggestion, but from that time on a considerable number of officers were to be seen setting out on patrol armed with shoes, cap, toothbrush and sponge!

Owing to the fact that the squadron was in G.H.Q. Reserve its sphere of operations was suddenly transferred to another sector of the front. The battle of Cambrai had begun.

Single reconnaissance machines were sent out with orders to collect any possible information as to the movements of troops or transport behind the enemy's lines. The weather at the time was bad, strong westerly winds, rain, and clouds at very low altitudes rendering reconnaissance extremely difficult, especially over a new and unfamiliar area, even the most outstanding landmarks of which the flying officers had had no opportunity of studying. Each pilot was dispatched in turn, but returned more or less empty handed.

It was David's turn. He and his observer, having fortified themselves with "just one more" at the bar of the mess on the pretext that they were in for rather a nasty job, started out on their errand. Crossing the lines at Arras, 400 feet above the ground, and always attempting to fly just below the protecting bank of clouds, David had penetrated to a distance of about ten miles over the enemy trenches (so far without incident), when a sudden clearance in the drifting mist left him "high and dry," a very pretty target for any gunner, machine gunner or rifleman within range. He was greeted with a merry fire from weapons of all calibres. Plenty of activity here! Luckily, the mist descended once again and he plunged into the welcome pall pursued by the puffs of bursting shells.

His intention had been to reach Denain, make a circuit in rear of Cambrai and then to return by way of the Forest of Mormal. But as he had to fly at a low altitude the field of vision was limited to such an extent that, even if the enemy had been on the move, the direction of his march over unknown roads, or the position of his bivouacs, could not be accurately recorded from the air. Consequently the nature of the information which he might have collected would have been of little or no value. In the circumstances,

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David decided to return home. But where was home? For twenty minutes or so he had been tumbling about in and out of the clouds, and had by this time completely lost all sense of his whereabouts. His compass, which had been spinning like a top, still refused to settle down and so was not to be relied upon as a guide. There was only one thing to be done: to decide upon a course which he hoped was due west and to keep straight on, at the same time to offer up a devout prayer that he had chosen the right direction.

The mist had now turned into rain, now and then forcing him down to within 50 or 60 feet of the ground, on which nothing revealed itself as recognizable. An occasional puff of black smoke indicated that he was still somewhere over the German lines, but exactly where, in all that vast shell-torn waste, there was no means of telling. On and on he flew. He was beginning to feel uncomfortable, . . . inside. Suppose he were flying east instead of west. All sorts of doubts assailed him. He imagined . . . But what was that? Out of the mist there loomed a shadowy grey structure which looked very like a hangar. Flying now at about 50 feet he passed and lost it in the gloom; a sharp turn brought him back again. Yes, there it was—two—three of them. Hangars all right. Thank God, he had hit off an aerodrome. But was it British? It might be French or . . . even German! Anxiously he flew around. The sheds were shut and he could see no signs of life. He landed and taxied slowly towards the hangars. Out of them burst a company of Huns. David felt his flesh begin to creep with horror! His "innards" melted right away. His position precluded any chance of escape. A confused medley of thoughts rushed surging through his brain . . . destroy the machine!—there was not a second to be lost . . . he grabbed the "Very" pistol to blow up the petrol tank . . . a prison-camp . . . the mess and all the fellows on the aerodrome whom he would see no more . . . the General's daily homily . . . he wished he had brought his sponge . . . He turned to take one last look round before burning his machine. His whole body went taut with the shock of the surprise. Four British mechanics came running to him. How? Why? Like a flash the explanation came. The Germans were prisoners . . . a working party; he was safe on British ground. With an effort he pulled himself together and, in the most matter-of-fact tones that he could summon, inquired of the corporal the name of the aerodrome on which he had landed. "Warloy, sir—No. X Squadron, sir. Shall I put her in the sheds, sir?" replied the non-commissioned officer, indicating the "Bristol" with a jerk

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of the head. " She " safely housed, the necessary reports dispatched to Squadron and Wing H.Q. An hour or two's wait in a hospitable mess until the weather cleared up : and David and his observer were home once more.

As the autumn drew on, our aerial superiority increased. The best of the Germans had been accounted for. Richthofen was brought down and killed in attempting to shoot up our trenches. The death of Voss has already been described. Wolff was killed by David's patrol one morning. He was flying a new " Fokker " triplane in which he had installed one of our " Le Rhone " engines, taken out of a captured machine.

The moral of the enemy was on the wane. He was beaten, and decisively beaten, by the indomitable perseverance of the R.F.C. He had been gradually worn down and defeated in the daily " dog-fight " all along the line.

It came as a rude shock to David's squadron when orders were received to move at once to another aerodrome. They all hated leaving their comfortable quarters and the mess upon which so much time and trouble had been spent. Preparations began with the outbreak of a state of savage warfare between the adjutant and the flight commanders as to how many baggage lorries they required for the transport of their Flights. Every flying officer wished to take with him as much as he possibly could in order to ensure his own comfort in his future home, so that the miscellaneous collections of beds, tables, chairs, pots, pans, looking-glasses, water jugs and other long-cherished souvenirs, as they piled themselves up outside each hut door, presented a formidable array. But the arrival of the squadron commander and his sarcastic references to gypsies' caravans soon put an end to their fond hopes, and the precious furniture was left to the tender mercies of . . . the Portuguese !

From now onward David and his squadron moved up and down the line according to the fortune of war. The work was always the same—other things were not. The old days of comfort were gone. Rarely did they remain on the same aerodrome for any length of time. The aerodromes they did occupy, moreover, were well known to the Huns, who disturbed the nights with bombs. They also visited them with shells. On one particularly poisonous night the squadron was shelled out of bed and obliged to drag all the machines into the comparative safety of an adjoining field. But by that time David had gone home ; his eyes strained by seven months' flying at high altitudes, he had been recommended for a tour of duty in England.

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THE UNITED SERVICES FUND

WHAT IT IS DOING FOR EX-SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN AND THEIR DEPENDANTS

THE name of the United Services Fund is familiar enough to many of those who took part in the Great Struggle of 1914–1918, but the precise reason for its existence and exactly how it came into being are matters which probably few except those who through misfortune of one kind or another find themselves obliged to appeal to it for assistance, consider it necessary to investigate. Even among those brought into direct contact with it, there is still, despite all that has been done and is being done to make better known the work which it is engaged in carrying out, a surprising lack of appreciation of the aims and objects of the Fund; and the present article is submitted in the belief that there are among the readers of the *Army Quarterly* many by whom an outline of the Fund's activities will be welcomed, and also in the hope that it will help in some degree to promote interest in the various schemes of relief which have been organized.

What has come to be known as the United Services Fund, is in reality the accumulated profits from sales in the Expeditionary Force Canteens, plus the proportion of similar profits of the Navy and Army Canteen Board to which the Army and Royal Air Force are considered to be entitled. Added to this, is the balance of the Central Regimental Institutes' Fund, formerly administered by the War Office, and the balance of regimental funds of demobilized units, the *personnel* of which decided to transfer such funds to the United Services Fund. The total amount received from the above-mentioned sources up to the 30th of September last is made up as follows: Canteen profits £7,200,554; Demobilized Units £42,705.

The profits made by the Navy and Army Canteen Board in the navy canteens have always been kept separate. In the early days of the Fund the Navy was approached with a view to its joining the Fund, and, after considerable discussion, it decided to amalgamate its canteen profits with certain other official naval funds and to set

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up its own organization to deal with them. This organization, known as the Royal Naval Benevolent Trust, was only established last year. Pending its formation, the Council of Management of the United Services Fund decided to assist ex-naval cases, but they have since issued instructions that this procedure should no longer be followed, as it would obviously not be right for such cases to continue to be dealt with by the Fund out of the profits of the Army and Royal Air Force. The Fund will, however, continue to assist cases of men (or their dependants) who served in the Royal Naval Division, as they dealt with the Army Canteens, and in addition any other ex-naval cases already undertaken which require additional grants to complete them, notably under the Education Scheme.

Administration

The Fund, which has its chief offices at 29, Cromwell Road, South Kensington, London, S.W.7, is incorporated under a Royal Charter which lays down the objects to which the money may be applied, the class of persons eligible for benefit, and its constitution generally. Under the Charter the governing body is a Council of Management consisting of a Chairman nominated by His Majesty the King, and twelve members, nine of whom are nominated by the British Legion, the remaining three representative of the ex-service men who do not belong to the British Legion, being nominees of the Chairman.

As at present constituted the Council of Management consists of the undermentioned :—

Field-Marshal Earl Haig (*Chairman*).
Major-General Lord Loch (*Vice-Chairman*).
Captain Waldo R. Briggs.
Mr. H. E. Giles, British Legion.
Mr. R. C. Grace, British Legion.
Captain J. H. Hay.
Mr. W. Lees, British Legion.
Mr. T. F. Lister, British Legion.
Mr. E. Pearce, British Legion.
Major W. O. Prichard, British Legion.
Mr. J. F. Ryan, British Legion.
Captain Donald Simson, British Legion.
Mr. J. Whitehead, British Legion.
Brig.-General R. H. More (*Organizing Secretary*).
Mr. C. K. Thorpe (*Assistant Secretary*).

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The Council of Management meets periodically and decides all questions of principle that arise, and supervizes generally the work that is being done.

For the carrying out of the administrative work of the Fund, a General Purposes Committee, consisting of six of the members of the Council, has been established. This Committee meets weekly and its minutes are submitted to the Council for confirmation.

With a Fund of such magnitude, it will easily be realized that the financial side must be regarded as a most important factor, not only from the point of view of accounting for and investing moneys, but also to ensure that the expenditure is in accordance with the revenue, and that the responsibilities of the Fund can readily be met in the future. To enable the Council to be kept advised in financial matters, an advisory Finance Committee has been formed, and meets as required.

At the outset, it was found impossible to cope by means of a central office with the numerous applications from ex-service men and women and their dependants, and areas have accordingly been established throughout the country, under the supervision of officials of the Fund who are styled Administrative Agents.*

* The following are the administrative areas :—

Administrative Agents' Addresses.	Counties administered by Administrative Agents.
LONDON. Administered by Headquarters, 29, Cromwell Road, London, S.W.7.	London Metropolitan Area, Kent, Surrey, Middlesex, Sussex.
EASTERN. Melton Lodge, Marine Parade, Great Yarmouth.	Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk, Rutland, Suffolk.
MIDLAND. 38, Princip Street, Birmingham.	Buckinghamshire Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire.
NORTH-EASTERN. Central Chambers, 33, High Street, Sheffield.	Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire (West Riding).
NORTHERN. 83, Skinnergate, Darlington.	Cumberland, Durham, Westmorland, Yorkshire (East and North Ridings), Northumberland.
NORTH-WESTERN. 9, Winckley Square, Preston.	Cheshire, Shropshire, Lancashire, Isle of Man.
SOUTHERN. 32, Kingston, Yeovil.	Berkshire, Cornwall, Devonshire, Dorsetshire, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, Somersetshire, Wiltshire, Channel Islands.

SCOTLAND—28, Rutland Street, Edinburgh.
WALES AND MONMOUTH—16, St. Andrews Crescent, Cardiff.
IRELAND—38, Kildare Street, Dublin.

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In every borough, urban and rural district a local committee of ex-service men (unpaid) was also established. To each of these Local Committees in the first instance was entrusted the responsibility of formulating proposals for the expenditure of the Welfare Grant due to the district. Although the work in connection with the Welfare Schemes is practically completed, the majority of these committees are still in existence and deal with applications for assistance under the Education and Rest and Holiday Home Schemes.

When considering the question of assisting the wives, widows and dependants of ex-service men and women, the Council of Management was faced with the alternative of setting up a vast and expensive organization or of cooperating with an existing society which already had an organization, and, more important still, experience. The Council chose the latter course, and effected a working arrangement with the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Families Association.

In March, 1922, however, the Council arrived at the conclusion that the time was rapidly approaching when a system of cooperation between all the funds and bodies working for the benefit of the ex-service community would be possible.

In order to effect this cooperation, the Council decided that the arrangements made for the joint administration of part of their funds and those of the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Families Association, should terminate on the 18th of September, 1922.

Steps were then taken by the Council to establish throughout the country local ex-service Benevolent Committees, including, as far as possible, representatives of the United Services Fund Local Welfare Committee, Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Families Association, British Red Cross Society, British Legion Relief Fund, and any existing local funds, with the view of preventing overlapping, and to coordinate effectively the benevolent work in each district.

Those Benevolent Committees have no executive functions, as the individual members remain directly responsible to their own organizations.

The Honorary Secretary to each Benevolent Committee acts as the local representative of the United Services Fund. He (or she) arranges that applications for assistance which appear to fall within the scope of the United Services Fund, are investigated by a responsible person, and is the channel through which all such applications are submitted to the Administrative Agents of the Fund.

It has been found that members of the Benevolent Committees, in the course of their work for the Society which they represent,

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are bringing to the notice of the Honorary Secretaries, cases which can be dealt with under one or other of the United Services Fund Schemes, whilst the interchange of information with regard to the activities of the various bodies, is proving of great assistance in dealing with the different types of cases which arise.

Social Welfare Scheme

The work of the Fund in establishing social clubs for ex-service men has progressed very considerably, and, at the time of writing, the great bulk of the money allocated for this purpose has actually been paid out in grants.

At the inception of the Fund, the Council of Management considered it very desirable that a portion of the moneys under its control should be devoted to the assisting of existing ex-service men's clubs and the establishment of new clubs. As to whether these clubs were social or athletic clubs, or a combination of the two, was a matter left to the ex-service men themselves in the various towns and districts.

The intention of the Fund in adopting this scheme was to provide ex-service men with social centres where they could meet together and enjoy the usual amenities of club life, and where they would have opportunities, under pleasant conditions, of renewing and fostering the comradeship and friendship which had resulted from their experiences in the Services. How well this has been achieved is clear from the fact that out of some thousands of clubs to which grants have been made only a very small proportion have given any cause for disappointment.

On the whole, it can be fairly said that the clubs have proved a success, that they are a source of pleasure and enjoyment to many thousands of ex-service men, and that they are likely to continue to be such for many years to come.

Sick Ex-service Men's Scheme

The scheme for the assistance of sick ex-service men has proved of great benefit in thousands of cases where the income of the family ceases at the very time when the breadwinner is incurring additional expenses owing to his illness. With the object of making it unnecessary for men to appeal for poor law relief owing to a period of temporary sickness, financial assistance for themselves and their wives and families is granted until they are able to resume work.

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In other cases where some special institutional treatment for a few weeks is required the Fund is prepared to assist in the necessary payments, defray the travelling expenses, and make allowances for the wife and children.

It sometimes happens that men who are leaving some institution require extra clothing, and this, in approved cases, is granted within well-defined limits.

Numerous letters from beneficiaries testify to the value of the assistance rendered under this scheme.

Ex-service Men's Rest and Holiday Home Scheme

An important and much appreciated facility is that provided by the scheme under which ex-service men in need of rest and change of air are enabled to take an extended holiday. It is frequently the case that men though not actually suffering from ill-health, are advised that a breakdown can only be averted by complete change. There are also the cases of men who, having recovered from illnesses, are in need of rest and special comforts to assist them in regaining their former strength.

It is perhaps as well to state at this point that the Fund does not undertake the responsibility of making provision in this connection for men requiring medical attention. The whole object of its policy is to render assistance only in the circumstances described above; further, the first claim on the accommodation available is given to men whose means do not allow of their making other arrangements, and besides meeting the entire cost of their maintenance and travelling expenses, the Fund provides, where necessary, certain allowances for wives and dependants during the men's absence from home

Where accommodation permits, men who can afford either part or the whole cost of their maintenance, are accepted as visitors at the Homes.

Up to the present the Fund is the actual possessor of two homes under this scheme, these being Byng Mansion, Bournemouth, and Byng House, Southport, Lancashire, but additional accommodation is provided at the Lord Kitchener Memorial Home, Lowestoft, where the Fund has endowed a number of beds, the Prudhoe Memorial Home, Whitley Bay, and several other Rest and Holiday Homes in various parts of the country.

During the men's stay at these Homes everything possible is done for their comfort. Bright and healthy surroundings together

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with an abundance of good food and ample facilities for recreation soon have their effect, and the men are able to leave better in every way for their long rest and change of air.

Wives', Widows' and Dependants' Scheme

Another direction in which the Council of Management decided that the resources of the Fund could be usefully employed, was in assisting wives, widows and dependants of ex-service men.

The amount of money available for expenditure under this scheme is limited, and only cases of an unquestionably deserving character are considered, those coming within this category being (*a*) cases of acute hardship caused by the sudden death of the husband; (*b*) temporary sickness; (*c*) women or children requiring clothes when entering or leaving a hospital or convalescent home; (*d*) difficulties arising from lack of means in cases where widows are obliged for reasons of health to remove to another locality; and (*e*) cases where surgical instruments are required in order to enable applicants to resume work.

The experience gained under the regulations as now in force shows that it has not been necessary to refuse assistance in cases of real hardship, and it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulty in dealing with every call that may be made on the scheme in the future.

Care of Children

In the earliest stages of the Fund's activities, it was considered that any assistance rendered to the children of ex-service men and women, was likely to have the most lasting and beneficial results, and prove of greater value to the individual and to the ex-service community as a whole, than any other work the Fund could hope to carry out. This idea has been considerably strengthened and the fruits of the Fund's efforts are becoming more apparent as time goes on.

Clearing Homes

One of the first needs to be met was the provision of Homes for children who could not be properly cared for in their own homes. The Council of Management decided to establish a Clearing Home in or adjacent to each of the undermentioned places: Edinburgh, Carlisle, Leeds, Liverpool, Rugby, Great Yarmouth, Bristol, Yeovil, London and Dublin. These Homes are not intended as permanent homes for the children, but simply as centres where they can be

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properly cared for until such time as they can be placed in the care of foster parents at the expense of the Fund.

Convalescent Treatment

As it is frequently the case that the parents of children recovering from illnesses are prevented by their straitened circumstances from arranging for the all-necessary convalescent treatment, the complete recovery of the children is seriously retarded. The Council of Management decided that this was a direction in which the assistance of the Fund could properly be granted, and an effective organization has been established for this purpose. A close cooperation exists between the Fund and other organizations interested in the welfare of children, and it has been found possible to deal with numerous cases from all parts of the country.

Except for a single institution at Seaford, Sussex, known as "Telsemaure," which is intended only for the reception of babies up to the age of five, the Fund does not possess its own Convalescent Homes, but relies for the accommodation required, on the existing establishments whenever it is desired to place a child. Children are retained in these Homes for periods varying from three weeks to three months, as may be necessary, the cost being borne by the Fund, and there can be no doubt as to the success of this branch of the Fund's activities.

In exceptional cases assistance is given towards the expenses of children being sent to Holiday Homes.

Special Medical Treatment

In the same way that children requiring convalescent treatment are dealt with, so also are those needing special medical or dental treatment, although these children usually require attention for longer periods.

The types of cases are as varied as they are serious in their character, but the large proportion are those of children suffering from infantile paralysis. Arrangements are made by the Fund for the treatment of cases in hospitals specializing in children's ailments, with entirely satisfactory results.

Another direction in which the Fund is able to extend its help to the ex-service man's child, is in the provision of surgical instruments or special footwear rendered necessary by various forms of crippling. In addition, where a child by reason of such disabilities is unable

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to attend an ordinary school, arrangements are made for its admission to the Heritage Craft Schools, Chailey, Sussex, and, at the end of its stay there, steps are taken to obtain a suitable situation for the child.

Surgical Tuberculosis Treatment

The Fund has its own hospital for the treatment of surgical tuberculosis amongst ex-service men's children.

This institution, which is known as Heatherwood Hospital, and is situated in ideal surroundings at Ascot, embodies all that is best of the most up-to-date of British and Continental practice. It provides accommodation in three ward-pavilions for 150 patients, girls, boys and babies, and is an entirely self-contained establishment. It possesses its own sources of light, heat and power, and even its own laundry, and the operation of all these services is carried out solely by ex-service men.

The hospital is fortunate in having on its consulting staff several eminent physicians and surgeons, and the work already accomplished proves that highly satisfactory results may be expected. The system of treatment given, it may be stated, is an open-air one, and operations are only carried out in exceptional cases, the aim being to immobilize the affected part to prevent deformity, and to get rid of deformity where it is present. Although in the majority of the cases, which have been admitted to the hospital, the disease has been in an advanced state, it is doubtful whether there will be any children who, after treatment, may not be expected to be ultimately discharged completely cured.

Having regard to this, it became necessary to consider the question of fitting the children to face life when discharged, by providing necessary educational facilities, and with this object in view a fully qualified teaching staff, approved by the Board of Education, has been attached to the hospital.

Education Scheme

Another work undertaken by the Council for the benefit of the children of ex-service men is an Education Scheme.

The Council has gone carefully into the question. It was anxious to assist children in this direction, but realized that many facilities in the way of scholarships, etc., already existed.

After consulting Local Education Authorities and representatives from the Board of Education and the Scottish Board of Education,

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who have been very willing to give their assistance, the Council came to the conclusion that it would be inadvisable to institute any special scholarships, as a sufficient number were already in existence, or could be created by the Board of Education, to cover the cases of all children whose abilities warranted them.

It found, however, that in many cases in which a child had won a scholarship, its parents were unable, for financial reasons, to avail themselves of the opportunity, as the scholarship did not cover the entire expense of education. Books had to be bought, railway fares in the case of day schools had to be paid, and boarding fees in the case of some of the schools. In addition, parents were often unable to pay for the clothes a child required in order to place it on the same footing as the children with whom it was to associate.

The Council has decided, therefore, that grants to assist children in such circumstances shall be made from the Fund, and it is prepared to make such grants, if necessary, throughout the whole period of education up to and including time spent at the Universities.

In connection with all the schemes which are being carried out for the benefit of children, the Council holds that, in addition to the advantages received by the children themselves, the nation as a whole will benefit by the efforts that are being made to give them a chance of becoming more valuable citizens. Moreover, it feels that, seeing how many of the children who are being helped have lost their fathers in the war, it is carrying out what would have been the wishes of the parents who have fallen.

After-care

The question of the after-care of the children for whom the Fund has undertaken permanent responsibility has recently been considered, and it has been decided that such children shall be started on a permanent career in life, and that assistance shall be given to them, if necessary, during the first few years of their working life. Assistance is also given towards the apprenticeship or special training of ex-service men's children under the age of sixteen years, who are unable, owing to physical disabilities, to enter a trade or profession in the ordinary course, and will have little or no chance of becoming self-maintaining unless especially trained. Grants are also made to enable children to emigrate in cases where relatives or friends residing abroad are prepared to provide them with good homes.

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Ex-service Women

Schemes for the benefit of ex-service women have been developed on successful lines. From the outset the Council of Management considered that the women who served in, or in connection with, the armed forces of the Crown, were clearly entitled to participate in the profits accruing from the canteens. A Committee representative of these women was established and the valuable nature of the work which this body has accomplished is illustrated by the schemes which they have brought into operation. The women who were to be assisted were divided into two categories, the first including those who had served in the Nursing and V.A.D. Services, and the second the W.R.N.S., W.A.A.C., W.R.A.F., and Women's Forage Corps. Benevolent Funds were established for both sections and grants were made for clubs, hostels, etc.

Among the institutions which have been founded for the Joint Nursing and V.A.D. Services are three which have been named after Her Majesty Queen Alexandra, who, as is well known, has always taken a deep interest in matters connected with the well-being of nurses. They have been established in London, Webyridge and Folkestone respectively.

The Metropolitan Institution takes the form of a Residential Club at 90 and 92, Cromwell Road, South Kensington, S.W.7, and provides permanent or temporary accommodation at moderate prices for Nurses and V.A.D.s. At Weybridge there is a well-appointed Convalescent Home, known as " Eddlewood," in Queen's Road, and at Folkestone there is a Holiday Hostel, at 24 and 26, Earle Road, which has become extremely popular.

A grant was made to establish the United Services Club, Ltd., 34, Cavendish Square, London, W.—a social club for ex-service nurses—and in addition financial assistance was also given to the undermentioned Clubs, etc. :—

The V.A.D. Club, Ltd., 28, Cavendish Square, London, W.

The Scottish V.A.D. (Women's) Club, 204, Bath Street, Glasgow.

The Ex-service Nurses' Club, 54, Fitzwilliam Square, Dublin.

The V.A.D. Club, 24, Molesworth Street, Dublin.

(Beds are available at the latter three Clubs.)

The Hostel for Nurses and V.A.D.s, 46, Charles Street, Cardiff.

The West of Scotland Homes for Aged Nurses.

The institutions established for the benefit of the other ex-service women, are as follows :—

The Helena United Services Holiday Home, 56, West Hill, St. Leonards-on-Sea.

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The United Services Club for Women, 26, South Parade, Southsea. (Accommodation exists here for ex-service women who wish to stay for short periods.)

The Women's United Services Club, 12, Drumsheugh Gardens, Edinburgh, where a small number of beds are available.

The Ex-service Women's Club, 5, Buckingham Gate, London, S.W.1. (Beds are available here for members desiring temporary accommodation. Country members are accepted at a reduced rate of subscription.)

In addition to the grants made to the above-mentioned clubs, etc., small annual grants are made to assist in providing a room for periodical re-unions of ex-service women in Birmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and Nottingham.

It may be added that beds are available at the Helena Residential Clubs, Ltd., 81 and 82, Lancaster Gate, London, W. This Hostel is not restricted solely to ex-service women, and provides, at a moderate charge, a permanent home for women who are working in London.

In addition to the Benevolent Funds for ex-service women which have been established in the United Kingdom, sums of money have been sent to especially appointed agents in the Dominions for the assistance of ex-service women who have settled in those countries.

Lack of space makes it difficult to deal as fully as one could wish with the work of the Fund. In this article an endeavour has been made to furnish, as concisely as possible, a simple statement of the various activities of the Fund which, it is hoped, may be instrumental in securing for it a wider and better appreciation among the public generally. Fuller information regarding the work of the Fund is contained in the Handbook published under the authority of the Council of Management, copies of which can be obtained on application to 29, Cromwell Road, London, S.W.7.

It may be stated in conclusion that a sum exceeding two and a half millions sterling has already been expended by the Fund since its inception, and the economical manner in which the money is being dealt with is proved by the fact that the expenses of administration, despite heavy additional responsibilities, are being kept at an exceedingly low figure, and represent by no means an undue proportion of the amount distributed, which during the last financial year was nearly £600,000

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SOME FURTHER PROBLEMS OF MECHANICAL WARFARE

By Lieut. F. A. S. Clarke, D.S.O., The Essex Regiment

An article appeared in the *Army Quarterly* some little time ago,* in which it was asserted that the Army lacks mobility and that in consequence a motorized army is essential for small wars, among which the following types were quoted :—

(A) Desert warfare.
(B) Mountain warfare.
(C) Internal security.

It is not quite clear whether this view of the Army is merely a prophecy or whether it is intended to be applicable to the present time. Speaking generally, however, it would appear that, in the opinion of the writer of the article, infantry will disappear. Whether this view applies to the future or to the present time, a more detailed consideration of the difficulties which will have to be faced in mechanical warfare appears desirable, as the physical characteristics of the countries mentioned in the article in question are such as to render the value of a motorized army using the present equipment extremely problematic.† One is reminded, when one listens to the present cry for an all-mechanical army, of the demand for mounted infantry which was raised as a result of the Boer War—a demand based on the experience of *that war only*. It would perhaps be as well to remember the instance quoted by Col. G. F. R. Henderson ‡ of the unfortunate article on the strength of the defence which appeared in a French review two days after the battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat in 1870.

The present writer proposes to consider the headings (A) and (B)

* *See* " Problems of Mechanical Warfare," *Army Quarterly*, January, 1922.
† *See* " Infantry Training," vol. II, section 58, and " F. S. R." vol. II, section 14, para. 4.
‡ *See* " The Science of War," p. 108.

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in some detail and then to refer briefly to the questions involved under heading (C).

There is, however, one major difficulty which is common to desert and also to mountain warfare on the north-west frontier of India, namely, CLIMATE. The question which immediately arises is for how long would the crew of a tank be able to carry on its work in the Sinai Desert in May, or, to borrow from Kipling, " at the end of an Indian June " ? Even under European conditions the radius of action of a tank is governed partly by the physical endurance of the crew, and it would therefore appear that its radius of action would be in inverse ratio to the temperature. The armoured car no doubt is not so much affected by temperature when opened up and on the move, but, even so, the crew is bound to suffer considerably in a climate where it is sometimes painful to touch a rifle barrel which has been some time in the sun.

(A) DESERT WARFARE

Before considering the difficulties which a motorized army would have to surmount in desert warfare, the following examples of mobility in desert warfare obtained without tanks or tractors may be of interest. There are many examples of such mobility, but the following are chosen as being of recent date, and in conditions approximating to those of " small wars " * :—

(*a*) The raid on Rafa from El Arish by one mounted division and one brigade of Imperial Camel Corps. This force left El Arish on the night of the 8th–9th of January, 1917. It surrounded Rafa thirty miles away at dawn the following day. It fought for ten hours and returned with 1,600 prisoners, beginning its return journey on the evening of the 9th.

(*b*) A column of cavalry and camel corps set out from near Ismailia for Jifjaffa (52 miles) on the 11th of April, 1916.† The enemy post at Jifjaffa was attacked and captured and camp and water-boring plant destroyed. This column covered 120 miles in three and a half days.‡

In any offensive operation the objective must always be the first consideration. In a small war in a desert country this may be a sacred town, a group of wells, or the flocks and herds of some nomadic

* General Allenby's classic pursuits after Gaza and in September, 1918, were carried out with such " elementary " arms as cavalry and infantry and with a few armoured cars as *auxiliaries*.

† One squadron Australian Light Horse, Detachment Bikanir Camel Corps, Detachment R.E. Pack Wireless Set, Camel Transport.

‡ Ref. Sinai 1/250,000.

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tribe, the occupation, destruction or capture of which will be a punishment for the enemy or a loss to his military power.

The kind of country over which the advance will have to take place will probably consist of some or all of the following natures of ground :—

(*a*) Flat stony areas.
(*b*) Heavy sand.
(*c*) Sand dunes.
(*d*) Hills or mountains.
(*e*) Radiating from (*d*) deep ravines and dry watercourses with precipitous banks.

The mobility of armoured cars and tanks would be materially reduced by (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), (*e*), and some areas would be impassable to these vehicles. There is no living on the country so far as petrol is concerned ; a special base, therefore, will have to be established, and arrangements made for convoys of petrol, oil and spares unless the column is to be accompanied by a fleet of carriers.*

It is almost impossible to believe, too, that a force composed entirely of tanks or armoured cars could obtain any real decision, especially if the country were at all difficult. The *personnel* are tied to their vehicles and are not in sufficient strength to operate in the open. Should the enemy make off with his flocks, etc., to difficult sand-dune or mountain country, tanks and armoured cars would be almost powerless. They could only achieve the destruction of a well or two, or a few crops. The operations against Siwa during the Senussi rising in 1916 did not achieve complete success ; the leaders and the bulk of their followers escaped to country into which the cars could not follow them, and, had it not been for the cooperation of the other arms, would still have been in a position to give more trouble. Yet it is presumably to these operations that the writer of the article under consideration refers when he states that a rising of the Senussi was quelled by three armoured cars. As a matter of fact, considerably more than three armoured cars were employed and then mainly as auxiliaries to the other arms.† The rescue of the survivors of H.M.S. *Tara* is an example of what may be attained by armoured cars under favourable conditions, once they had reached

* A force of three light armoured car batteries and three light car patrols was sent to raid Siwa in the Libyan Desert in 1916. It was accompanied by forty light vans of stores, etc., and followed by a heavy supply column on lorries. This was considered necessary for a week's operations in a *favourable* area, *i.e.* flat stony desert.

† *See* Sir John Maxwell's Despatch and Gen. Sir A. Murray's 1st Despatch, paras. 6 and 11 ; 2nd Despatch, para. 3 ; 3rd Despatch, paras. 13 to 17 ; 4th Despatch, para. 15.

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the summit of the plateau, which they only succeeded in doing after great difficulty.

It is stated by the author of the article under consideration that all the camels in the world would not get an army across Arabia, but he forgets that where there is an objective, there is normally a caravan route and water. A further statement detrimental to that unpleasant but useful animal, the camel, is made. The writer states that 28 camels can only carry sufficient water for 224 men. The camels working with the E.E.F. carried 20 gallons each, or sufficient for 20 men for one day, therefore 28 carried sufficient for 560 men for one day. He goes on to state that water must be carried for camels and suggests in place of them a tank carrying 5 tons of water. Now it is known that a trained baggage camel only requires water every third day, and that it is usually possible to find water fit for camels at such intervals, but petrol is not found in desert wells. A tank water transporter with a capacity of 5 tons would certainly require much petrol, but we are not told whether this is to be carried by the water tank itself or by a tender, nor are we told how far such a machine could proceed without the workshop repairs, which appear to be so frequently necessary for the present tank.

It is perhaps not well known that a Bishareen trotting camel can carry a rifleman, his food, ammunition and water for five days at a considerably higher average speed than any tank at present in use. This camel only requires watering every fifth day.

If the criticisms made by the writer of the present article are sound, it does not appear that the entire motorization of the Army is going to solve the problem of small wars in desert areas, although no one will deny that armoured cars are a valuable asset to a force operating in desert country which is suitable for their use. The same criticisms apply to tractor transport. To rely entirely upon a motorized army would appear to be courting a series of indecisive campaigns. General Sir A. Murray's despatches relating to the operations in Sinai and Western Egypt offer proof of this statement, and the experience of the more recent Arab rising in Mesopotamia also points to the same conclusion.

In the latter country armoured cars, assisted by aeroplanes, were unable either to prevent the spread of the rising or to stamp it out, and troops equivalent to over a division of infantry had to be sent to reinforce the garrison. It will be interesting to see if armoured cars and aeroplanes meet with any better success in Palestine if, and when, the experiment is repeated.

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(B) Mountain Warfare

Taking the north-west frontier of India as the most likely scene of a small war, and the most difficult to deal with owing to the country and the characteristics of the tribesmen, we find the two major troubles as regards the use of tanks and armoured cars to be: (*a*) the climate; and (*b*) the nature of the country across the frontier.

The first of these difficulties has already been mentioned in general terms, but the heat of the frontier is of such a virulent type as to claim especial attention. The second difficulty is so great as practically to preclude the use of tanks or any mechanical vehicle, except by the motor road through the Khyber and certain roads built and building in Waziristan. The present writer is of the opinion that he cannot do better than to quote a description given by a distinguished frontier officer when commanding the School of Mountain Warfare in India:—

"The strip of trans-border country that lies between India and Afghanistan inhabited by the Pathan tribes, is approximately 300–400 miles in length and varies from 80 to 100 miles in depth. It is a buffer state between these two countries. Its inhabitants are neither under the suzerainty of the British Government nor that of the Amir. The rugged and mountainous nature of this country becomes more and more accentuated as we advance into it. The ravines are generally flanked by high hills, which occasionally recede sufficiently to give the spaces enclosed the appearance of a broad valley. The width of these is very variable, in some places being some thousands of yards; in others they vary to a hundred yards or less. The narrowest parts are where the water has had to pierce its way through the hillside and are called by the Pathans 'Tangis.' These ravines and watercourses form the natural means of communication in so difficult a country, the beds of which are strewn with boulders and stones, and are dignified by the name of roads by the inhabitants, from which paths branch off here and there over passes of varying height. Terraces of land laboriously cut out on the hillside, or skilfully irrigated bits of land supply a bare existence for the inhabitants, and appear as oases in the general desolation."

On this frontier the object of a campaign is usually to punish some tribe or clan or to break up a combination which has declared a holy war. The objectives short of a definite occupation of the country may be summarized as follows: (*a*) to kill as many of the enemy as possible; and (*b*) in addition to or in default of the above, to destroy villages, towers, crops and to carry off cattle and grain.

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The present writer must now again quote from the article under discussion :—

" We may not be able to design tanks which will scale hilltops, but why should we attempt to scale hilltops if we can *advance securely along the valleys*, and when this progress is impossible walking can always be resorted to, but it should not be contemplated as long as the machine can move."

The past has shown that to achieve the objective in these campaigns it is necessary to penetrate into the recesses of tribal country.* The Pathan is a very cunning fighter and is capable of traversing with ease such distances as forty miles a day over his native hills. His mode of life and early training make him an adept in the use of cover, his garments blend with the landscape, and, therefore, even in numbers he seldom offers a good target. On the approach of an expedition, he moves his cattle, women and grain, etc., to the higher hills and prepares to meet the invader as far from his villages as possible. The column brings him to battle as often as it can, and proceeds to destroy his crops and villages. This is a laborious task, the village towers, which are highly prized, requiring explosives for their destruction. Possibly the column or columns may remain for some time in the country, sending smaller columns into the fastnesses of the hills. Its main object, therefore, is achieved by a force of infantry, artillery and cavalry.

Assuming the possibility of tanks moving up the valleys, which is doubtful owing to the boulder-strewn nullahs which form the chief means of communication, it is still very doubtful whether they would inflict much damage on the enemy for the following reasons : (1) they would seldom get a target ; (2) they could neither climb the hills to destroy the crops on the terraced lands nor cut the upper parts of the irrigation channels, nor could they provide enough *personnel* to do this work by hand ; (3) they could not thoroughly destroy the villages. They might knock a few houses down, but the *personnel* question would prevent the destruction of the woodwork which is the most important part of trans-frontier houses, owing to the difficulty in replacing it ; † and (4) the village towers would present another difficulty, the present tank gun would have very little effect upon them as they are most solidly built.†

It is doubtful, moreover, whether they would affect the moral of the Pathan to any great extent, as he has already experienced the

* *E.g.* Tirah, 1897.
† *See* " Small Wars," pp. 308 and 309.

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armoured car in warfare, and knows how effectual are a few boulders rolled down a mountain side on to a road or track.

The difficulties of a column composed entirely of tanks in this kind of country can easily be visualized. One can imagine the plight of a tank which has been sent forward to reconnoitre and suddenly finds its farther advance blocked by a pile of boulders in a " tangi " and its retreat stopped by an avalanche of rocks and boulders in its rear ; the wily Pathan meanwhile sitting on the surrounding hillsides like a flock of crows waiting for a feast. The arrival of the main body would not solve the difficulty. The path would have to be cleared by hand, thereby giving the Pathan the opportunity for which he has been waiting. It may be urged that the way could be cleared under cover of machine-gun fire from the tanks, but it should be remembered that machine guns are not effective against a number of men concealed over several thousand square yards of hillside. Foot soldiers would deal with the matter by seizing the heights around the scene, which action would have the effect of causing the tribesmen to decamp. (The combination of bullet and bayonet plus ability to move over *any* ground.)

As a further flight of imagination let us suppose that a tank battalion with the necessary carrier units has been detailed to move from a base established on the frontier to punish a tribe living some seventy or eighty miles in the hills. Assume that the tanks are capable of sustained action, which according to the manuals at present they are not, and that difficulties as to terrain and climate have been overcome. Assume also that workshops have been established and that two battalions of " The Queen of Future Fortresses " are at the base for guards and for piquetting the heights around the base to prevent sniping into camp.

Having made our assumptions let us consider the doings of this column. To most practical infantrymen the following thoughts will no doubt occur :—

(*a*) What is to happen at the end of the day's march ? Presumably, the crews cannot live entirely in their tanks and therefore some sort of perimeter camp must be formed and food cooked, etc. The tribesman, who is ever watching, will see an opportunity and from every surrounding hilltop will come accurate rifle fire. The crews must either go back to their armoured boxes or build sangars ; digging is usually out of the question. Sangar building, even when not under fire, is a slow and painful business even to trained men.

(*b*) Dispositions at night afford food for thought. There is

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not the *personnel* available to build and defend a perimeter, much less to find piquets.* If the tanks are placed end to end, sentries would be required in the gaps, even if some form of portable entanglement were available. This would involve the use of the whole *personnel* on a very ineffective form of protection. If the gaps are not blocked, the Pathan, in addition to his amusement of sniping the camp, will probably crawl in to cut up some one.

(*c*) As one can neither drive cattle with tanks nor disembark to acquire them, presumably the crews will subsist on preserved meat unless special refrigerator tanks accompany the force.

(*d*) If it is necessary to destroy crops or houses in a position to which the tanks cannot climb, the *personnel* of one tank battalion will not suffice to do this, as well as to provide the necessary protective troops (bayonet power in addition to fire is required on the Frontier) and the crews would not be physically capable of ascending and descending hills in competition with the Pathan. Also the re-embarcation after an expedition of this sort, hampered with dead and wounded and their arms, would be a somewhat unpleasant business.†

A consideration of the above-mentioned difficulties of climate and terrain, as well as those mechanical difficulties which have yet to be overcome, and the later-mentioned tactical weaknesses, will show that the tank cannot replace the other arms in this type of warfare. Mechanical improvements would doubtless make the employment of tractor transport feasible in places, but even then pack animals able to accompany infantry anywhere would be required.

It should also be remembered that the ravines and watercourses which form the natural means of communication in so much of this trans-frontier country are liable to sudden floods, so that, for this reason alone, it can hardly be expected that tanks could " advance securely along the valleys."

(C) Internal Security

The recent operations by British troops against the irregulars in Southern Ireland may be considered as similar to an internal security problem. It is a fact that when mechanical transport was abandoned for infantry columns with horse transport which could move anywhere despite trenched roads, the troops rapidly attained

* *See* " F. S. R.," vol. II, section 159.
† *See* " F. S. R.," vol. II, 165, paras. 5 and 8.

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the upper hand.* The " armoured box on tracks " did not function, presumably owing to the banks and the nature of the road bridges, but armoured cars were useful to a certain extent in towns; the trenched roads restricted their use in the country areas. Their disadvantage, shared in a greater degree by the tank, is that ill-disposed persons can see and hear them coming, and consequently make themselves scarce for the time being, only to reappear later. It is only reasonable to suppose that the same applies to an Eastern country where we have to maintain order, with the exception of the added difficulty of vast areas to deal with and the need of large numbers of bases.

The Moplah rising is also quoted in the article under consideration as an example of our " lack of mobility in small wars," but from the very nature of the country itself it is doubtful whether tanks would have helped. Up to the present time no tank has been designed which would have been able to follow the Moplah into the tangled mass of jungle-covered hills in which he took refuge; and, even were such a thing possible, there would be a very poor target offered.

A motorized army would require a large number of bases scattered throughout the world each with its tradesmen and expensive plant, and the necessity for furnishing further mobile workshops from these bases would have to be considered. In the event of trouble of any sort it is difficult to see how these bases could be protected other than by infantry

Conclusion

Although no soldier will deny that tanks and tractors are a necessary adjunct to the other arms in modern warfare, the present writer suggests that until the problems mentioned above are solved, we should be unwise to rely upon a motorized army for our " small wars " whatever developments may be anticipated in the methods of European warfare.

Generally, the impression left by a perusal of the article in question was that its author in his anxiety to justify a recently developed arm was running the risk of claiming for that arm responsibilities which are more than it could legitimately be called upon to assume.

* *See* " Some Reflections of a Junior Commander upon the Campaign in Ireland, 1920 and 1921," *Army Quarterly*, October, 1922.

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ON THE WRITING OF "UNIT" WAR HISTORIES

By Everard Wyrall

Quite recently a reviewer in the *Times Literary Supplement* stated that whereas many people imagined a military war history easy to write, it is in point of fact most difficult; he did not err. History, to be of any value, at all times taxes the resources of an author to the utmost, but military history is even more intricate, necessitating not only considerable literary skill but a more than ordinary nodding acquaintance with matters related to the Army of which not the least are tactics and strategy. Even if the would-be author has passed the Rubicon and can with impunity discuss these two bewildering subjects without getting mixed, he will need an astonishing amount of judgment, logic, endurance, perseverance, appreciation and dogged determination, ere he writes *finis* to the last page of his manuscript. For nothing is more exhausting than the writing of history. It cannot be done in a slip-shod fashion; a great battle cannot be described unless every movement of the forces engaged is worked out on a map. And the sword of Damocles is for ever suspended above the head of the unlucky author, ready to fall should he deviate from the path of military and literary righteousness.

I propose to deal with the writing of Divisional, Brigade, Regimental and Battalion histories. Of these the Regimental history is the most difficult. There will be some who will not agree with this statement, but from personal experience in the writing of both Divisional and Regimental histories I can say without hesitation that of all military war histories, the latter demands more of the author than any other form. For conceive the difference: a Division is more or less self-contained, it exists as a whole, moves as a body, whereas a Regiment consists (or consisted) of a number of battalions spread over the whole battle front north, south, east and west; it is like a ball of mercury dropped upon a hard substance, splitting up into numerous small balls: many regiments in the Great War consisted of at least twenty battalions spread over perhaps a dozen

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divisions all fighting on battle-fronts separated by many miles. In writing a Divisional history you merely keep one consecutive story going, but in writing the history of a Regiment you may have to keep the story of a dozen different divisions going at the same time, all dovetailed so that the reader does not notice that he is being taken here, there and everywhere up and down the whole line in a somewhat disjointed and hill-and-dale fashion.

Brigade and Battalion histories are not more difficult than a Divisional history, for in a similar fashion they are more or less self-contained.

Now suppose for the time being that you have undertaken to write a war history, how will you proceed? You cannot sit down to it cold-blooded as a man does to his breakfast. You will need to look about you, to take stock of yourself, to brace yourself ere you plunge into the sea of bewildering diaries which will confront you at the very outset. I am assuming of course that you are to have at your disposal the official war diaries without which it is impossible to write military history. You may think it a small matter to sit down, take the diaries one by one and gradually to write the story from the information contained in them; if you do this, you will almost certainly fail. Even if the diaries are complete—and they are not—to attempt to write your history straight away is simply courting disaster. For you will not get very far before you begin to realize that the thing is too vast, that you have got out of your depth; that you are struggling against wave after wave in a seemingly endless sea of information. And you become afraid.

There is only one practical way and that is to marshal your facts and information *before you begin to write*. If you are writing a Divisional history, take the "G.S." diary and set down in chronological order all items of interest which appear day by day. The fullness of this draft depends upon your literary training. If you have none, you will require to make your draft very full. This preliminary draft will occupy some weeks of work; the number will depend upon the period covered by the war service of the Division. Do not be tempted *at first* to read the diaries of other units of the Division; that may be done later. You must get your first draft from the "G.S." diary alone. Having completed it, go through it again and mark all "actions" with a cross; it is better to differentiate between battles and smaller actions such as trench-raids.

Your draft now exists as an entity; you have taken the first plunge and you will be surprised how much strength it has given

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you; for the first time you will realize the nature of the task before you.

At this stage it is well to put the draft by and read carefully the official despatches which concern your Division. It is no use your saying to yourself, "I know all about the war," *no one knows all about the war!* That honour is reserved for some learned historian yet unborn. But read the Despatches carefully in order to increase your sense of proportion, for in a little while you will begin to see your Division ranged by the side of others; you will see it in relation with the whole operation of an action or battle; you will save yourself from the common fault of placing too much importance upon insignificant matters. But you may say: "My Division saw hard fighting in this attack!" All men saw hard fighting in the war, *i.e.* those who were in the front-line trenches. And I repeat you *must* get a sense of proportion.

Having read the Despatches, there yet remain two things to be done before you begin the actual writing. The first is to come to some sort of decision as to the length of your history, *i.e.*, the number of words. This is most important, for unless you *do* make up your mind to confine yourself to a certain number of words you will find yourself again floundering in a sea of words to which there seems no bottom. The most workable length is 100,000 for a one-volume history. Having decided the length set down the most prominent actions in which your Division was engaged and allot to them whatever number of words you deem adequate; in this you will be greatly assisted by your draft of the history.

The draft of a Divisional history will differ from the draft of a Brigade, or Battalion history; or rather whereas for the first-named you will need only the "G.S." diaries, for the second you should use the "G.S." *and* the "Brigade" diary, and for the third, the "G.S.," "Brigade" and "Battalion" diaries. For a Regimental history you will need the three diaries as for a Battalion, *of each of the divisions in which the battalions were contained.*

Having made your draft you are ready to begin the actual writing. Before, however, you begin, you must have arrived at a definite conclusion as to how you are going to treat your subject, *i.e.* from what standpoint. And here for a few moments it is desirable to discuss the question of what a "Unit" war history should be.

From a fairly comprehensive reading of military war histories as already published—and they are many—I have come to the conclusion that quite half of them are not in the true sense histories

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at all, but merely a series of connected episodes of the greatest war in the history of the world. But history is concerned largely with cause and effect and these elements cannot be separated from the story of a battle or any military undertaking. It is of no use describing a battle or an operation of any kind without giving the reader some idea of what is colloquially described as the "why and wherefore." And it is here that many hitherto published war books fail to come under the heading of war history. The authors have been concerned only with the history of their own particular Division, Brigade or Battalion, they have ignored the larger view and in consequence they have so narrowed their point of view, which point of view they have given their readers, that all sense of proportion, or relation with the operations as a whole, have been lost. Actions which are of small importance are unconsciously emphasized and others of considerable importance are minimized. Let me illustrate this point by an actual example. During the battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915 the flanking troops of the 8th Division and Indian Corps made "holding attacks" on the enemy, in order to contain his forces and to prevent him from sending reinforcements to that part of his line (the village) which was the centre of attack. These "holding attacks" were common throughout the war; they were of considerable importance. Now, unless the author gives the reason as to why the troops were engaged in this secondary operation the reader will be left in the dark why such an attack was made; and, if war books continue to be written in this style, they cannot be counted amongst war histories. In one instance, a certain division made a "holding attack" which failed to gain ground, the troops suffering very heavy casualties. If the cause of this attack had not been given, the credit due to brave men would have remained unexplained. For, although no ground was gained and very heavy casualties were sustained, the attack was successful; it actually had the effect not only of preventing reinforcements being sent by the enemy to the scene of the main operation, but actually drew troops from that part of the line where the principal effort was being made; it deceived the enemy as to the real point of attack.

It is absolutely essential to relate what is going on on both flanks of the Division, Brigade or Battalion; it is even necessary to describe the position of the whole British Army so that major operations may be more easily understood.

But it is not necessary to discuss politics, nor is it desirable to enter into a criticism of higher formations, or flanking units unless you have in your possession unquestionable facts which cannot be

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disproved. Destructive criticism is useless, and of constructive criticism there is not enough. The latter is for the giants.

But all points of view are not the same and some histories are limited to space. There is the " family " history, a book intended merely to remind officers and men of all they went through and how they suffered defeat or gained victories ; of the bravest deeds they ever saw in their lives ; books which contain the names of the brave dead and descriptions of how they died ; of the battle honours conferred. Space may be limited for word pictures, but the poorest book will be illustrated with maps, and in these an idea can be conveyed of the general operations.

I am of the unalterable opinion that all military histories should give the " general situation." Many otherwise excellent books fail only because they do *not* give " cause and effect."

Having then decided that your book is to be a real history, you are ready to begin. At the risk of being thought unnecessarily didactic I would refer to the time-honoured method of reporting operations taught in the Army ; it cannot be bettered. The lines of an introduction to any history cannot be laid down, but the preliminary ground cleared the Army method of describing operations should be rigidly adhered to : first, the intention ; then, the objectives, followed by the dispositions and the artillery, medical and supply arrangements. Then, when zero hour has arrived, the attack is described ending with a recountal of the results of the operation. Here you have " cause and effect," and, if you follow these lines, I cannot see how you can fail to produce a history for your Division, Brigade or Battalion which will do credit to all concerned.

Do not lumber the *text* of your history with casualty lists, honours, etc. ; these should go in the appendices. All " V.C." actions may be put in the body of the book ; in the text if they have any tactical effect, at the foot of the page if they are of a personal nature.

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TANNENBERG, THE 15TH OF JULY, 1410

By Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G.
(retired R.E.)

Ludendorff in his "War Memories" says of the engagement between the German Eighth Army and Samsonov's Army in August 1914—

"On my proposal, the battle was called the battle of Tannenberg, as a reminder of the battle in which the Teutonic knights [*der deutsche Ritterorden*, literally the German Knights Order] were defeated by the combined Lithuanian and Polish Armies."

Curiosity prompted me to seek out some information with regard to this earlier Tannenberg, of which I had never heard, but it was not until I came across "Histoire de l'Ordre Teutonique par un Chevalier de l'Ordre," published in Paris in four volumes in 1786, that a really intelligible account of the fighting, and the events leading to it, was obtained. The substance of it will now be given.

The Order of the Teutonic Knights was founded at Acre in 1190 A.D., and recruited from German knights. It apparently had its origin in the Hôpital des Allemands formed at Jerusalem in 1128 A.D. The distinctive dress of the Order was a white cloak with a black cross. This cross was centuries later adopted as part of the flag of Prussia and of the German Empire, and eventually, as is well known, became the distinctive mark on German aeroplanes.

Affairs in Palestine at the beginning of the thirteenth century were going ill and Herman de Salza, the ambitious Grand Master of the Order, and a figure in European politics, began, no doubt, to consider the possibility of some other sphere of activity and power He obtained at any rate gifts of land on the frontier of the Empire from the Emperor and from the King of Hungary. In 1226, on the Duke of Masovia asking his assistance against the heathen Prussians, he received the Emperor's order to conquer Prussia.

Henceforth the operations of the Order were in that country, and its first foothold was secured by fortifying Marienburg (50 miles south-east of Dantzig). With the end of the Crusades, it became

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fashionable to make a tour to Prussia, and take part in the fighting against the heathen. To recall some instances:—of Chaucer's Knight it is said:—

> " Ful ofte time he hadde the bord bygonne
> Aboven all nacioums in Pruce
> In Lettowe hadde reyced and in Ruce."

The blind King of Bohemia, who fell at Crecy, lost his sight whilst campaigning with the Teutonic Knights. Gaston de Foix had his great adventure at Meaux as he was returning from a trip to Prussia.

Gradually by arms or by guile the Knights acquired East and West Prussia, Courland, Livonia and Esthonia. On a dark night, for instance, in 1308, Dantzig was stormed by surprise, and its inhabitants massacred. The Order made treaties with surrounding Powers and carried war as far east as Vilna. Its activities constantly brought it into antagonism with the Kingdom of Poland, and with this Power it finally came to blows over the succession of Pomerania and the rights to the possession of Samogitia, which lay on the coast, convenient for linking up the two main portions of the possessions of the Order.

At the instance of the King of Bohemia, the Order and Ladislas Jagellon, the then King of Poland, agreed to arbitration; but, so far as can be gathered from the accounts of both sides, neither of them played fair. The Grand Master bribed the arbitrator, the Marquis of Moravia, and the King of Poland gave two forms of powers to his representatives—full powers to accept the decision if it went in his favour, and limited powers requiring them to submit the case to him, before accepting, if it was unfavourable. The Poles found out in good time that the arbitrator was against them, and refused to accept the Marquis of Moravia's award. Thus, one of the earliest attempts at arbitration came to nought. Both adversaries, therefore, prepared for war and endeavoured to obtain assistance. The King of Poland gained as an ally the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Vitolde, besides engaging mercenary troops from Hungary, Silesia and Bohemia. The Order was supported by various German Dukes; but at the last moment the King of Hungary, on whom it greatly counted, stood neutral.

In June, 1410, the Poles and their Allies marched northward to Soldau, as did Samsonov in 1914, moving on Marienburg, the capital of the Order. The number of combatants on either side is placed by various historians as high as 160,000 for the Poles, and as low as 83,000 for the Knights. There seems no doubt that the latter were inferior in numbers, though superior in fighting quality,

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at any rate, to Vitolde's contingent. The Grand Master as the Poles approached on the 15th of July, drew up his forces on Tannenberg hill in three lines, with his flanks secured by ravines, so that the advantage of numbers could not be used to surround him. He flew as his banner a black cross, with a black eagle superimposed, on a white ground.

One must imagine, no doubt, a combat very much of the type of Agincourt, fought five years later :—The princes and the richest knights in plate armour, which was just coming in ; the majority of men-at-arms in hauberks of chain mail, with possibly breastplates ; the rest of the force in leather jackets and such second-hand armour as they could procure. Both sides had a few cannon, and after the opening discharge of these, under a cloud of arrows, the first line of the Order advanced, threw javelins, and closed.

The Lithuanians, who were on the right, appeared to have been driven back by this onset, and, to utilize the advantage gained at a weak spot, the favourite tactics of his Prussian successors 500 years later, the Grand Master shifted some " banners " there from his right. The reduction of force enabled the Poles, who were on this wing, to press the Knights, and their advantage was accentuated by a party of 800 Bohemian men-at-arms, who had at first stood aloof, charging in from the flank. Possibly this gave the Grand Master an idea of envelopment, most unusual in those days but again much favoured 500 years later. He led his third line by a wide circuit, entailed by the ground it is said, to come down on the Polish left flank. The movement seems to have taken some time and was delayed by the Knights coming in sight of the King of Poland, who with an escort had by the wishes of his Council, stationed himself behind the battle. Mistrustful of the strength of this party, the Grand Master on seeing it cried " About " and partly retraced his steps. During his absence from the battle, affairs seemed to have gone ill, and as he drew near it again, he was himself killed, and " his fall was the signal of the complete defeat of what remained of the German Army." Forty-thousand of the Order and their allies are said to have been slain, and most of the rest were taken prisoners.

The Order never recovered from this disaster. It had eventually to cede West Prussia to Poland, and hold East Prussia as a fief from the Polish King. Dantzig again became free, and allied itself to Poland.

At the Reformation, Albrecht von Hohenzollern, Markgraf of Brandenburg, was Grand Master of the Order. In 1525, he became

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a Lutheran, and with the consent of the King of Poland converted the lands of the Order into a temporal and hereditary dukedom, for the benefit of his family, and he abolished the Order. "Thus," as Müller's "Deutsche Geschichte" says, "the German character of the land and its connection with the Motherland were determined," and a succession was established which permitted Frederick the Great to claim and endeavour to collect for Prussia "leaf by leaf, field by field, town by town," the one-time possessions of the Order of the Teutonic Knights, as its legitimate heir and representative.

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THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF THE SOLDIER

By ex-Sergeant F. George

The nation is proud of the magnificent record of the British Army down through the ages to the last Great War. It rightly regards the British soldier as the best in the world as a fighter. I am not going to write in what follows of the soldier as a fighter, or hero, or as a tactical and strategical unit, but as a man. I am going to try to point out that the human element in the soldier must be considered in regard to the supply of men for the Army.

The present military system of the nation, so far as the individual man is concerned, does two things, *i.e.*

(1) it makes splendid manhood, fine soldiers, and excellent character;

(2) it wrecks all its fine work in thousands of men.

The principle that the preservation of the State must come before that of the individual is sound. Even so, justice and humanity must be considered, and the human element must count.

That the soldier is a man, with all the greatness and weakness of man, is so much overlooked by the nation, that under the name of State it becomes soulless. The military system of Great Britain has little justice for the man who becomes a soldier.

A strong statement to make, but let us examine the position of the soldier in the cold light of facts—not as the hero of the battlefield in the glamour of war fever. Let us also examine the position of the soldier after he has served his King and Country in the cold light of facts.

The soldier is obtained and paid as any other servant. He is bound by a contract, a one-sided affair, which can be altered at will by the employer with no redress at law by the man. His contract with the State entitles it to take all he has to offer, his life if necessary, in the interests of the Empire. He is not conscripted to serve in the Army as part of his duty as a citizen, but volunteers in response to inducements held out to him, in the same way that a man volunteers to work for a weekly or yearly salary in the commercial market. The soldier is controlled by Parliament. His primary duty is to

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carry out by force of arms the desires of the country, either protective or aggressive, should diplomacy fail. He is the vital piece of machinery in the machine of State. Should the soldier fail in the hour of crisis the whole State would fail. Those entrusted with the government of the Empire consider the soldier as representing so many figures for fighting purposes, and so many pounds, shillings, and pence on a parliamentary vote. Humanity is not considered.

For the past half-century the nation has maintained a voluntary army in which men serve for a few years only. Those years are the opening years of a man's life, when, if he did not join the Army he would be perfecting himself in the trade or profession which would be his means of obtaining a livelihood for life. The fact that this short service would penalize a man after he left the Army was not considered when the change from long to short service was made in 1870. The chief consideration was to provide an Army Reserve. It has, however, been abundantly clear for some years now that the man does pay a penalty, but the nation still allows the system to go on. But the human element in men is revolting at our present military system. At the outbreak of the Great War the Army was 8,000 men short of establishment, and the Secretary of State for War admitted in Parliament that the principal cause was the position of the ex-soldier. Thousands of men each year were being turned out of the Army to unemployment.

To serve the British Empire as a soldier is an honour. Service in the Army does much to mould a man's character, to bring out all the very best in him. He receives the finest education in Imperialism possible for a man to have. He is imbued with that fine *esprit de corps* of the British Army, with its great ideals and courage. Regimental traditions are instilled into the soldier, who realizes as time goes on that it is upon him to carry on the great traditions of the men who fought at Waterloo, in the Indian Mutiny, Egypt, South Africa and the Great War. To the Crown his loyalty is absolute. Comradeship of the highest order is learnt. Every kind of sport is provided and encouraged in the Army, and the sportsman is produced in the very best sense of the term. Free education of the best is given. So far as material matters are concerned, a man is assured of a roof over his head, a comfortable and warm bed, food, clothes, pocket money, and medical attention and nursing when ill.

To travel the British Empire is an excellent education for a man. A realization comes to the soldier of his great heritage, and of what his position is in regard to the preservation of the Empire. He travels over thousands of miles of ocean, touching at Gibraltar,

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Malta, Egypt, Ceylon, India, Singapore, and far away Hong-Kong—all British possessions, all under the protection of the Union Jack, the inhabitants giving allegiance to the British Throne. The richness and splendour of the Empire, its vastness and economic possibilities are brought home to him, with an understanding of the peoples of diverse races and creeds he protects.

The commerce of Great Britain is world wide. In all the outposts of the Empire trade is carried on under the protection of the soldier. The traders abroad send their wares to those in Great Britain, who also have the protection of the soldier. He is placed at the disposal of all for the preservation of law and order, life and property, should the normal means of protection be overpowered.

He is considered as a paid servant, and the taxpayer thinks it nothing but right he should have his protection. He thinks of the man as a soldier to guard him from any enemy. He does not think of him as a man, a human being. He is right at the back of the mind of the general public, almost forgotten until war breaks out, or a serious industrial crisis arises. When they see the soldier at a Royal Review, the State Opening of Parliament, or similar functions, he is applauded as smart in his drill, and talked of as pretty to look at.

When the soldier first leaves the Army he has a pride of the highest degree for his King, the Empire, his Regiment, his superiors and himself. This fine spirit and character is utterly smashed in thousands of men by the treatment they receive in civil life. It is not the fault of the men, but of the system. The environment a man finds himself in does much to make or break character. In the Army men have the best; after discharge thousands find the worst surroundings and their character depreciates accordingly. The one thought of a man after his discharge is to settle down to good steady employment, and become a self-respecting citizen. But the employment is not to be obtained. He finds his position so different from that of the man who has not been a soldier. The contract between the soldier and the State having expired, he is sacked from his highly specialized profession, and there is no other Army in which the man can find employment as a soldier, neither can he renew his contract for a further period. A small proportion of men are allowed to do so, but the majority cannot. A soldier has to find fresh employment in an entirely different sphere in a market where, after years of absence, he finds he is all behind the times, and in competition with hundreds of thousands of men who, not having served as a soldier, are efficient in their civil vocation.

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The business man has no use for the soldier as he is unskilled, and an employer can obtain all the unskilled labour he requires from that already on the market. The fact that as a soldier the man protected his interests does not count with the average employer in the least. It cannot. Self-preservation is the first law of nature; business is business, and there can be no sentiment for the soldier any more than others. In a competitive market the employer requires the best skill and knowledge to hold his own, and the ex-soldier cannot give him these. The employer will sympathize and that is the end of it. He will gladly buy a flag on a flag day; he will be pleased to write a cheque, or purchase a ticket for a concert to raise funds to keep " heroes " from starvation, never thinking of the demoralization to self-respecting men he is upholding, or that as a member of the community he supports a military system which makes it impossible for him to give a man employment.

The working classes, from which the soldier is recruited, take much the same attitude. They will support flag days, and other methods of raising money to give the ex-soldier doles. Some of this class, through its Trade Unions, will not allow the ex-soldier to work with them, either because he has not served an apprenticeship, or because they regard him as a " strike breaker," a " blackleg." How his position has been brought about by his service as a soldier does not enter into the consideration of the Unions. That he is sweated for his pension or reserve pay by some employers, that he may starve if he does not capitulate to the terms offered him, that he is a man, and therefore human, does not count. They view the man from the standpoint that he was a soldier, the agent of the ruling classes, and as such their enemy. And so they treat him.

Handicapped on all sides, many men within three months of their discharge from the Army, have to ask for charitable help. They do not want to, but have no alternative but the workhouse or starvation.

The British public, generous but unthinking, maintains the organizations which help the old soldier by charitable doles. I submit the principle is entirely wrong. It is the beginning of the wreck which the nation makes of men they have made whilst in the Army the finest in the world. The principle of charitable doles breaks a man's self-respect. The human element in the man who has been a soldier comes into play. Diverse natures are affected in different ways. " Why work when I can obtain money for nothing ? " is one man's thoughts. It carries. He sinks and becomes what people call " an old soldier." This class of man, once his character becomes known, is shunned. I do not blame the man, I blame the

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system which starts him on the downward grade. Given good regular employment the man would have become a self-respecting citizen. Other men do not lose their self-respect to such an extent. Rather than ask for charity, with pride in their hearts, they take to the roads to try and obtain employment. Being unsuccessful they either sell or pawn all they have, their medals even, to obtain food and lodging. Then they get shabby and people will not look at a shabby man as a rule when seeking employment. The end of their journey is the casual ward and the workhouse. Others, to try and keep some semblance of independence, stand at street corners or in the gutter, selling bootlaces or matches, or grinding a barrel organ. These men, neither by example nor desire, make good recruiting agents. Some men become socialists, and herein lies one of the greatest dangers. They are seized upon with avidity by the Socialist party of the country. These men are very bitter in all they say. They have seen the richness of the Empire, and by contrast the penury they are sent to is vivid. It turns their moral equilibrium and they do much harm.

* * * * *

The reader will ask " Having given destructive criticism what have you to offer in constructive reform ? "

To deal with so large a subject in the length of a short article is not possible. I can merely make suggestions as to principle on broad lines, without going into detail. In my suggestions I place the individual before the State. I place humanity first, as I have the profound conviction that if our military system is on a basis of justice to the man the State will reap the benefit. The reader must take into his consideration the fact that I served in the pre-war Regular Army for eight years, and during the Great War, and that I have had practical experience of the short service system, and its penalties.

My suggestions are based on a peace-time Army—or armed police force if one prefers the term—to safeguard the United Kingdom, India, and our Crown colonies. The question of the military defence of the " Commonwealth of Nations " is one for consideration at Imperial conferences. Man-power, in the event of war outside the Empire, will doubtless be considered and settled at these conferences. The League of Nations may bring about disarmament of armies whose object is possible aggression, but I cannot conceive that it will ever be able to disarm the British soldier in the outposts of the Empire, with savage or semi-savage races around him, and substitute a policeman with a baton.

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The same human element is in the soldier and the man as ever it was. The same type of man who served in the Army of pre-war days, the "Old Contemptible" stock, is still being recruited and trained as only the British Army does train men. Under our present military system far too many of these good fellows will meet the fate of their predecessors when they return to civil life in the future. They will be "nobody's child" to put into employment. The State will doubtless say it is the duty of the public to see that its fighting men do not suffer, and the public will say it is the duty of the Government. I say it is the duty of the Nation, of which the Government is the servant, and the Nation must decide the problem, or take the consequences.

If the Nation intends to continue its present military system, I submit that from the point not only of justice, but also of humanity, there should be a statutory right to further State employment, on a percentage basis, which would give work, after eliminating the "won't works," to the men who at present sink into unemployment. The State spoiled their chance of perfecting themselves for a livelihood in the early years of their lives, and the State should make reparation. This statutory right should apply to the undermentioned employments :—

All Government departments.
All military stations.
All Government contractors.
Railways and all undertakings enjoying a monopoly by Act of Parliament.
All Municipal bodies.

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NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

FROM time to time there have been hints in the German Press that the younger Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army from the 1st of January, 1906, to September, 1914, had written his memoirs, but that publication of them had been stopped by higher authority. His widow has now issued a volume of his writings, under the title of *Generaloberst Helmuth von Moltke. Chef des Generalstabes der Armee*, 1906–1914. *Erinnerungen-Briefe-Dokumente*, 1877–1916 (*Stuttgart: Der Kommande Tag*, 800 *marks*). She states specifically that the publication in 1919 was prevented "by the interference of certain persons," but does not tell us whether all that is essential has now been printed. The only persons who could possibly have objected to publication, so far as the contents of the book can be judged, are the ex-Kaiser and his family, or possibly Falkenhayn's relations; for Wilhelm II. and his second War Chief of the General Staff will certainly not gain in reputation by what is said about them. There are, however, no startling revelations in the book. Except for a short memorandum on the political situation on the 28th of July, 1914; a note of twenty pages on the opening phase of the war, written in November, 1914, for his wife's eyes alone; and another of twelve pages, dated the "summer of 1915," on the retreat from the Marne; and a few letters to and from the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, Hindenburg, Ludendorff and some other generals, the 450 pages of the book are made up almost entirely of letters from Moltke to his wife from 1877 onwards.

Gräfin Moltke states in her preface that her object in giving the papers to the world is to provide "irrefutable proof that the German Government did not want the war; that the Government even after the outbreak of war believed in the will of England to prevent its extension, so that the Kaiser and the Chancellor, who had fallen into this error, interfered and hindered the progress of the [German] mobilization." This we may say at once does not prove to be the case.

The general deductions which we draw from the papers are that the General Staff meant to fight France and "down" her at the first opportunity, that the ex-Kaiser was even more of a mountebank

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than hitherto imagined, and that Moltke was less of the pliant courtier than generally supposed, but more of a "climber," whilst his military judgment (or that of his subordinates)—when not in the presence of the enemy—was sound and far-seeing.

After spending nearly thirty years as A.D.C. to his uncle and the Kaiser, with merely nominal command of a regiment, brigade and division during the last eight of them, Moltke in 1904 at the age of fifty-six was appointed one of the two Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff. In military circles it soon became obvious that the Kaiser intended him to be Schlieffen's successor. It would seem that this did not suit Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, for on the strength of a casual conversation with Moltke, he informed the Kaiser that the general did not desire the post. This being far from the case, Moltke sought an interview with the Kaiser on the subject, and according to the account that he wrote to his wife they had a heart-to-heart talk. The names put before the Emperor as suitable to be Chief of the General Staff had been those of Goltz—of "The people in arms," who died during the war at Baghdad, and Beseler, later the captor of Antwerp. The former he did not want, for he had brains, and the latter, an engineer officer, he "did not know" though he was a Deputy Chief of the General Staff; it is notorious that Wilhelm II. "knew" only Guard and Cavalry officers. The Kaiser told Moltke that he had asked Schlieffen what he thought of him, to which the Chief of the General Staff had replied: "he had had you under observation for a year and could suggest no better successor than you." As Schlieffen, Moltke tells us, had issued instructions for manœuvres and war games "when the Kaiser takes part he must be allowed to win, he cannot as Kaiser be beaten by one of his generals," his remarks in such circumstances were probably designed to please his master and not necessarily his real opinion. But Moltke appears to have taken them at their face value, and gratified by the Kaiser's expression of complete confidence in him, began to make conditions before accepting. He said, after compliments—

"How I shall get on in the event of a campaign I do not know. I am very critical of myself. In my opinion it is most difficult, if not impossible, to picture how a modern European War will shape. We have a thirty years' peace behind us, and in many of our views we have largely forgotten what war is like. . . . It will be a national war, which will not be settled by one decisive battle, but by a long wearisome struggle with a country that will not be overcome until its whole national force is broken, and a war which will utterly exhaust our own people, even if we are victorious."

It was an entirely accurate forecast. He went on to say that the

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strategic training of the army was on wrong lines; the war games conducted by the Kaiser ended regularly in the complete surrounding of the enemy after a few days' operations. At manœuvres, too, he said, "the decisions of the commanding generals are always influenced by the interference of Your Majesty, so that these officers lose all desire for initiative and become inert and unreliable." The Kaiser admitted that he had not seen things from this point of view and agreed not to command or to take part again, except as Chief Umpire, and he appears to have kept his word not to interfere until July, 1914.

Moltke made a further condition that he should not be appointed until he had conducted the next Imperial Manœuvres in 1905. These "without forcible encroachment on the duties of commanders and without unnatural cavalry charges were something like war," and a complete success.

On the 1st of January, 1906, Schlieffen meanwhile having been disabled by a kick from a horse, Moltke took over duties as C.G.S., and on examining the plan of campaign for the war against France and Russia, found that Schlieffen callously intended to violate not only Belgian territory but Dutch, by sending Kluck's Army across the strip of territory south of Rohmund, known as the "Maastricht Appendix," in order to circumvent the fortifications of Liége. Moltke wisely considered not only that Germany could not afford to have another enemy on her hands, but also wanted the Netherlands ports open to her as an "air pipe." He preferred the risk of taking Liége by assault to the dangers of Dutch hostility. He "held it for more than probable that England would enter the ranks of Germany's foes as soon as she violated Belgian neutrality, the more so that as England in 1870 had declared it would be a *casus belli*." From the German Official Naval History we know that Moltke did not think that the 160,000 men of the B.E.F. would make any difference, and did not desire that the Admiralty should alter its plans in order to interfere with their passage across Channel; so it is satisfactory to read his opinion in November, 1914:

"That France was not overthrown in the first rush she has to thank England's rapid rendering of help, that the advance of the British divisions at the Marne caused Bülow to order a retreat, and that the severe defeat on the Yser robbed us [the Germans] of the opportunity of bringing the campaign against Russia to an end by a quick decisive stroke."

As regards the rest of the plan of operations, he does not say that he altered what Schlieffen had devised, but states:

"The root idea of the following operations . . . was to drive the French Army, which it was expected to find on the Sambre and Meuse, away from

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Paris and towards the south-east, by envelopment of its left flank. Whilst the First to Fifth Armies executed a wheel to the south on the pivot Metz—Thionville, the Sixth and Seventh Armies were to cross the Meuse between Nancy and Epinal, and gain touch of the Fifth again south of Verdun."

So double envelopment *à la* Schlieffen was definitely intended.

In case, however, that the French attacked in Alsace the Fifth and Sixth Armies were to retire and draw them on. This excellent arrangement miscarried because "the Commander of the Sixth Army [Rupprecht of Bavaria] declared that he could not withdraw his troops further without endangering their moral." Rupprecht's failure in his attack on the French defensive position is admitted.

The correspondence between Moltke and his wife up to February, 1914, presents little of interest. He describes his trips with the Kaiser and many missions abroad on his behalf, but the letters show an almost feminine gift of observation and power of vividly describing trifles of dress and procedure.

On the 31st of July, 1914, that is, the day before the formal mobilization order was signed, Moltke had a certain amount of trouble with the Kaiser, who was obviously frightened at the prospect of a Russian invasion. Moltke was summoned to the Palace and shown a telegram from the German Ambassador in London which said that:

"Secretary of State Grey had informed him Great Britain would engage to keep France out of the war, if Germany would reciprocally engage not to undertake any hostilities against France."

The Kaiser then said:—

"Now we only need wage war against Russia; thus we simply march the whole of our army eastward. I replied: 'Your Majesty that is impossible. The deployment of a host of millions of men cannot be improvized [one would have thought the Great General Staff had an alternative plan!], it means a whole year of laborious work, and once settled cannot be altered. If Your Majesty insists on leading the whole Army to the East, it will not be an army ready for battle, but a disorderly crowd of unorganized armed men without supply arrangements.'"

The Kaiser was "much upset" and among other things said: "Your uncle would have given me a different answer." But though mobilization had not been ordered Moltke persuaded the Kaiser that until the army had been deployed on the French frontier it would not be possible to send a strong force against Russia. In consequence the Ambassador was directed to reply that "on technical grounds" the German Army must be deployed on the French frontier.

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The Kaiser, who evidently knew the whole plan, now turned to an A.D.C., without referring to Moltke, and directed him to telegraph to the 16th Division at Treves that it was not to enter Luxembourg, which it had been arranged it should do on the first day of mobilization in order to secure the railways. Moltke says: "I thought my heart would break, for there was the danger that our deployment would fall into confusion"; and later when the formal order for the 16th Division was brought to him to sign, refused to do so. At 11 p.m. the Kaiser sent for him and receiving him in his bedroom with an overcoat over his night clothes, told him that Lichnowsky's telegram had been sent in error, and said: "now you can do what you like." Thus there was no interference with the "progress" of mobilization as claimed by the Editress, unless, as suspected, the Germans started before the flag was down.

The letters and notes do not add very much to our already great knowledge of the Marne Campaign. Moltke stated that he was misled.

"The intelligence that arrived was always to the effect that Paris was as good as emptied of troops. The reports from armies continuously spoke of 'panic-like retreat' and from the 'commencing dissolution' of the enemy, the army commanders repeatedly insisted that 'relentless pursuit' would complete the annihilation of the enemy."

Moltke himself was in doubt, as Helferich has told us, because no important capture of men and guns were made. The Kaiser, however, was immensely elated. "It is heart-breaking," writes Moltke to his wife on the 29th of August, "how little suspicion the Emperor [der hohe Herr] has of the seriousness of the situation. He has already a certain shout-hurrah mood that I hate like death."

Then came news on the 7th of September that "the First Army was in a bad way; it appeared necessary to issue some directions in view of the possibility that it would be beaten."

Moltke now gives, dated "Sommer, 1915," another version of Colonel Hentsch's mission, differing from that of Hentsch's official report and of the officers who were present—Tappen, Dommes, etc. He says that he sent Hentsch to "the Second and First Armies" not to all five, and puts the date as the 7th of September, not the 8th, which is obviously wrong.

"He was to ascertain the situation; he had not the task to withdraw the First Army, but only to instruct it, in case it could not hold its ground, to fall back to the line Soissons—Fismes, in order to get touch of the Second Army again and close the gap that had arisen."

This plan will hardly hold water as even on the 8th of September

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the right flank of the Second Army was near Montmirail, twenty-five miles south of Fismes, and Bülow had not made up his mind to retreat, in fact his orders were not issued until 10 a.m. on the 9th, and did not take effect till 1 p.m. Moltke, however, points out with some truth—

"the First Army was no longer in a position to move as it liked, as it showed by the fact that it did not succeed in reaching Fismes and getting touch of the Second; its left not its right fell back on Soissons, so that the gap between it and the Second was not closed, and the Seventh Army which arrived later had to be used for the purpose."

His letter to his wife on the 9th of September begins: "Things are going badly. The battles east of Paris will end unfavourably for us. One of our armies must go back, the others will have to follow." And in the day of reparations it is interesting to read, he continues, "and we shall have to pay for all that we have destroyed."

The later correspondence shows that an attempt, with the assistance of the Kaiserin, was made in January, 1915, to replace Moltke in his old position and to remove Falkenhayn in consequence of the latter's failure at Ypres and the repercussion of the German defeat on the Russian Campaign. Hindenburg definitely proposed the change to the Kaiser, and the latter appears to have considered it. It was finally abandoned on the ground of Moltke's health, and we are told that Falkenhayn falsely reported to the Kaiser that Moltke's physician had declared him unfit. His widow states that he was perfectly well in August, 1914, did not go for a "cure" in 1914, those of 1911 and 1912 having restored him to health. He died, however, on the 18th of June, 1916, from heart failure during the memorial service for Field-Marshal von der Goltz.

The general feeling in Germany seems to be that he was only appointed C.G.S. on account of his name, and had neither the training nor the ability for his great task; but the book does not altogether bear this out. At the trial of General Stessel of Port Arthur, a Russian general said to the present reviewer, "we are not trying General Stessel, but the whole Russian nation," and the same idea occurs in regard to the German condemnation of Moltke. He was typical of the German nation, masquerading as first-class brain when he was in fact merely second or third.

Though Germany lost the war in 1914—at the Marne according to Falkenhayn, and by the Ypres offensive according to Ludendorff—a national legend is now being set up that she was everywhere victorious up to 1918, and was forced to make peace mainly as a result of Ludendorff's ill-advised offensive in March of that year.

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For many months a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the causes of the loss of the war has been sitting at Berlin, and now, under the title of *Ursachen des Zusammenbruchs*, 1918 (*Berlin : Hobbing*, 13,800 *marks*), the reports of three technical experts attached to the Fourth Sub-Committee have been published, so that the legend may be officially strengthened.

The three reports are drawn up by Colonel Schwertfeger, General von Kuhl and Professor Delbrück, and deal respectively with the politico-military responsibility for the offensive, the military resources available for the offensive, and the general strategy.

The first is the most lengthy, but has no especial interest for us. It shows by documentary evidence that by 1918 the Supreme Command had usurped not only political power as regards the conduct of the war, but the coordinating power of the Kaiser as between political and military aims. At the Crown Council, held on the 11th of September, 1917, it was agreed, in order to secure peace, that Belgium might be given up ; nevertheless, the March offensive was planned by Ludendorff and agreed to by the Kaiser for the very purpose of the territorial aggrandizement of Germany, and particularly in order to provide her with a new frontier more favourable than the old one as the jumping-off place for the next war. In the January before the offensive Ludendorff was warned by a body of professors, the Press and various experts, that he had not got the nation or the Army behind him. But about this he seems to have cared little, for he was sure of the Kaiser, and in February, 1918, he addressed an appreciation, signed by Hindenburg, to the War Lord, in which, after expressing his opinion that the attitude of the Foreign Secretary at Brest Litovsk had been feeble and had given the Russian delegates the impression that Germany wanted peace as much as they did, he wrote :

" In order to secure the political and economic world position that we require, we must beat the Western Powers. With this intent Your Majesty has ordered an offensive battle in the West. . . . Whether in the final peace negotiations we shall secure the gain for Germany that our position as a Great Power demands and worthy of our sacrifices, I very much doubt after the proceedings at Brest. The inevitable consequences will be a bitter deception for the returning Army and for the nation that will have to bear an incalculable burden of taxes."

Then came a scarcely veiled threat that if the Supreme Command did not get its way about the spoils which it hoped soon would be in its hands, it would resign. One after another, as we know, Ludendorff's opponents : Bethmann-Hollweg, Kühlmann, Valentini

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(the Chief of the Civil Cabinet), Hertling, were got rid of. Prompted by the last two, the Kaiser made one final effort to check the military influence. He informed Hindenburg by letter that with him lay the right to decide, and begged the Field-Marshal and Ludendorff " to devote themselves without prejudice to the actual conduct of the war." But it was the instigators of the letter who had to go. Schwertfeger comes to the conclusion that the Kaiser and the great personalities around him were " unequal to the high duties they had to perform."

General von Kuhl's contribution is a detailed examination whether the men and material collected in March, 1918, were sufficient for the offensive, and whether it would have been possible to bring more to the Western Front. Summarizing, he says the Germans had in the West, " 192 divisions in March and 204 divisions in May, which were not inconsiderably superior in number to the 178 to 188 Allied divisions, although not in the same proportion in the actual number of men." He gives the total strength in France, on the 21st of March, 1918, as 136,618 officers and 3,438,288 men, and in the East (including the Balkans but excluding Turkey), 40,095 officers and 1,004,955 men.

Kuhl next examines each of the minor theatres of war in turn to investigate whether forces could not have been spared. In Rumania, where it was absolutely essential to keep troops in order to secure the crops and oil, were left 4 divisions (one of them Landsturm), 6 cavalry regiments, 29 Landsturm battalions and some minor units. In May, 129 officers and 3,474 men were combed out. In the Ukraine were 20 weak divisions, including 8 Landwehr and 3 cavalry divisions. In March Ludendorff asked if some could not be spared, but received the reply that, in view of the doubtful situation in the Ukraine, a reduction was not advisable. It was calculated that 10 divisions could be spared if the Ukraine, which was held mainly for its resources, were evacuated ; but General Hoffman declared that " the divisions were not fit for an attack and he would require three months to get them out of the Ukraine." Kuhl then shows that large amounts of foodstuffs—though much less than expected—were drawn from the Ukraine.

In Finland, to assist the natives in combating Bolshevism, was a weak division and a Jäger battalion " in plain clothes." In Turkey altogether there were only 7 battalions, a pioneer company and small detachments of cavalry, artillery, air force, etc. ; in Bulgaria, 18 battalions (including 5 Landsturm), " some squadrons, 3 field artillery regiments and a number of heavy batteries," etc.

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These figures seem far from making up the million odd Germans absent from the West. No doubt the remainder were L. of C. formations. Kuhl gives it as his opinion that everything possible was done to reduce the number in the East; but he thinks that greater efforts might have been made to get more Austrian troops (2 divisions came to France in May and 2 in September, 1918), but he admits: "openly, and not without good reason, the German Higher Command laid no great value in the beginning on Austro-Hungarian divisions taking part in the Western battles."

The rapid arrival of the Americans was not foreseen: "We were deceived as to the accommodation in transports and the effect of our U-boats."

Recruiting for the Army is next examined. A calculation made in December, 1917, showed that the supply of men in 1918 would fall 354,000 behind demand, and the 1899 class with lads of only 18 had been anticipated. The Supreme Command proposed to extend the age of service from 16 to 60, instead of 19 to 50; but this merely meant taking a large proportion of the younger and older men already engaged on war industries. It was impossible to balance the men required for the front and men necessarily retained for the manufacture of material; under the Hindenburg programme the numbers in the factories had risen from 1,431,558 in January, 1917, to 2,154,387 in January, 1918, and 123,000 were recalled from the colours in the first quarter of 1918. In April Ludendorff proposed to employ more women, to stop all except essential industries and to exert a sharper supervision. But these were mere words, and between May and July, 1918, the Armies in the West fell in round figures 300,000 men in strength; by October the deficit was 670,000; and between the 21st of March and the 1st of October the total drop was 33,000 officers and 979,077 men. The average strength of a battalion between the 1st of April and the 1st of October fell from 766 to 570. Kuhl considers that the Supreme Command did all that was possible to comb out men and to keep up the numbers.

As regards material, the Army was short only of petrol, oil and rubber, and tanks; "lack of guns, rifles, machine guns, trench mortars and munitions did not affect the operations in 1918." Even the heavy losses were made good, though the monthly quota of guns, rifles and machine guns had been cut down by Ludendorff. Several pages are devoted to investigating the failure to manufacture tanks, and the conclusion is reached that

"at first the Supreme Command did not realize the importance of tanks, which our later experience proved. When the construction of tanks

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was determined on, the work was not so well organized nor so urgently pushed on as it might have been, or a greater number of tanks could have been produced in 1918."

Among other things a super-tank to carry 33 men was experimented with.

Professor Delbrück's report is very condemnatory of the Supreme Command. At the Crown Council held on the 11th of September, 1917, "The Kaiser, in accordance with the proposal of Kuhlmann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decided that if it were possible to obtain peace soon on this basis, Belgium might be given up."

On the 11th of December, two months later, Hindenburg formally wrote to the Chancellor, arguing that the decision did not hold good—

"the permanent possession of the Flemish coast was abandoned on the understanding that we should obtain peace at this price this year and that England left France.

"This assumption no longer holds good. Besides, our military position has developed particularly favourably, so there is no necessity for a partial abandonment of the military demands, and these must again be made valid to their full extent."

The Civil Government made an effort to put the Supreme Command in its place, and, as we have seen, persuaded the Kaiser to intervene and assert himself, but with only nominal success. Hindenburg-Ludendorff threatened resignation, and an offensive plan of campaign was made for 1918 to defeat France and Great Britain and to secure possession of Belgium.

The Professor considers that the means available were inadequate, in view of the Allies' failure to obtain a decision in 1916 or 1917; further, if there were great losses there were no reinforcements available at home to replace them, whilst America's contingent would increase the adverse balance. This help, however, Hindenburg did not estimate as worth very much, and certainly not likely to be decisive, as he told Bethmann-Hollweg.

Complete and rapid success, we are told, could only be obtained by a great strategic operation and an annihilation campaign, and Ludendorff put a tactical victory before strategy. The drawing-board notions of the Professor are very evident. Ludendorff very nearly got his tactical victory, and with it final success. Had he, as the Professor suggests, attacked 12 miles farther north, he would not have got even the limited tactical success that he did, and in such event how would strategy have helped him? He went for a weak place designedly: it certainly led to a "stroke in the void," but this

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is where Sir Douglas Haig's skill came in, and this the Professor neglects to mention and appreciate. He thinks that the situation was similar to 1815—and chides Ludendorff for not understanding that campaign and the advantages—which profited Napoleon little by the way—of driving each of the two Allies back to the base it was protecting, Paris and the Channel Coast.

He makes a better point when he says that Ludendorff failed to use the " present " of information given him by Lieut.-Colonel Repington in the *Morning Post*, that in 1918 the Allied main effort would be in the East. The First Quartermaster-General could calculate, therefore, on his opponents remaining quiet in France, and was entirely free to do something elsewhere. Delbrück thinks no good could be done by attacking in Italy, but suggests that Ludendorff might have gone to Petrograd, overthrown the Soviet Government, and then made an Alliance with the restored old *régime*, and used Russian troops in France. He further criticizes the abandonment of the attacks on Amiens, and suggests that the troops used in offensives at other places had better have been applied to making repeated blows at Amiens.

There is much more of similar ill-informed comment, which ignores the practical difficulties of troop leading and supply, and of campaign planning on a small scale map to which we are accustomed from politicians. Delbrück assisting the Reichstag in military matters is indeed a case of the blind leading the blind. We suggest to him that where Ludendorff failed was that, misled by Tannenberg and easy successes in the East, he thought that he could treat the Allies in the same way ; he ignored the British character, which is at its best in a tight corner. Further, he handled the German troops of 1918 as if they were led by the highly-trained officers of 1914 and pre-war days.

The *Historique du Corps de Cavalerie Sordet. Redigé sous la haute direction du Général Sordet par le Colonel Boucherie* " (*Paris : Charles Lavauzelle*, 7.50 *francs*) has an especial interest for British readers, as the Corps crossed the line of march of the B.E.F. on the 25th of August, 1914 ; was on Smith-Dorrien's left rear at Le Cateau next day ; and detachments of it were seen drifting past the British left flank during the early days of the retreat from Le Cateau. The book, unlike those of some other commanders who were *limogés*—this fate overtook General Sordet on the 8th of September, 1914—is uncontroversial and little more than a good corps history, supported by situation maps and copious appendices of orders and instructions.

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It is, therefore, of especial value to those who desire to study the French handling of cavalry masses in 1914. Throughout the period described Sordet kept his 3 divisions together, and his fruitless riding up and down the country, his *randonnées* as they are called, which totalled 750 miles in 33 days, have provoked a good deal of adverse criticism. His failure to accomplish anything appears to have been due to the variety and often unsuitability of the tasks imposed upon him, to his lack of initiative, to bad horsemastership, and to faulty organization of the Corps.

In the first place, his Corps Staff consisted of 4 officers only, without any means of communication except their horses, 4 motor cars, 4 motor-cyclists and 6 orderlies, and a detachment of telegraphists. He had no Corps artillery, no aeroplanes, although 1 of the 3 divisions had a weak squadron, and no permanently attached infantry. The divisions each had a group of batteries, 400 cyclists and 6 machine guns, but the regimental trains " could scarcely ensure the transport of one day's supplies, for it was a principle that cavalry should live on the country."

The losses in men and horses are not given, but a piteous picture is drawn of the columns strung out and with numerous men on foot as they approached Paris ; and when called upon to reestablish liaison with the British, Sordet was forced to form a "provisional division " by selecting the most serviceable elements (squadron per regiment, battery per group, etc.).

The first orders received from G.Q.G. on the 5th of August were :

" Exploitation on the front Attert—Martelange—Bastogne—Houffalize—Laroche [in the south-east corner of Belgium near the Luxembourg frontier, where no Germans appeared for many days, not, indeed, until Sordet had left the area]. . . . Mission : Ascertain the apparent contour of the enemy on the eastern frontier of Belgium ; examine the extent and importance of the intervals between the different parts. Retard the march of the enemy columns, if there are movements [which there were not]. Clear the region of the enemy cavalry [none was there]. Spread the report that the whole French Army is following."

Finding no enemy, Sordet pushed forward northward to the vicinity of Liége, which he reached at 7 p.m. on the 8th of August (Mezières to Liége, 80 miles).

" It was too late to carry out that evening the action arranged against the investing troops " ; and the Germans evidently being ready for him, he fell back next day southward to his original area, reported Liége empty of Germans and asked for orders. On the 10th, he halted, and on the 11th, hearing from G.Q.G. that there was

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a German cavalry division near Neufchateau, moved back there (Liége to Neufchateau, 55 miles); but, beyond contact with patrols, nothing took place on this day or the next, and Sordet informed G.Q.G. that the enemy appeared to be moving north-west, and suggested going west to the Meuse. During the night of the 12th–13th, he got a reply asking if he had received a special order of the 8th of August—which he had not—and directing him if he retired west of the Meuse to cross between Givet and Namur and to betake himself to the left of the Fifth Army (Lanrezac) then advancing. During the 13th, the main body of the Corps halted while strong contact patrols were sent out. They located the German I Cavalry Corps moving towards Dinant. Next day, therefore, Sordet moved northward, but, meeting with some opposition at the passages of the Lesse and fearing surprise from the south-east, he gave up the attempt, and reported to G.Q.G.: "The Cavalry Corps watched enemy cavalry to-day moving on Dinant, supported by two battalions, difficult country," and again asked for orders. Next day he heard the sound of the guns in the action at Dinant, but took no part in the fighting, as G.Q.G. sent him orders to get to the left of the Fifth Army in order to assure liaison between it and the Belgians. He crossed the Meuse south of Dinant, and then came under the orders of General Lanrezac, who dispatched him to reconnoitre the country north-west of Namur, to delay the enemy trying to cross the Sambre, and to get in contact with the Belgians (Neufchateau to Wavre by this route is some 80 miles). He had a small fight with the enemy between Namur and Louvain on the 18th; but the Belgians withdrew without informing him, and, finding superior forces on his front, he retired back to the Sambre between Namur and Charleroi. General Lanrezac approved of this, and directed him to rest his Corps west of Charleroi, covering the left of the Fifth Army in view of the coming battle. It retired, therefore, west of the Charleroi—Brussels Canal, where, on the 21st, its outposts were attacked and the Corps was outflanked from the north. It was driven back, but was extricated by a brigade of infantry, and at night was in liaison with the British 5th Cavalry Brigade at Binche. On the 22nd, Sordet retired behind the Sambre, and next day was ordered to the left of the British Expeditionary Force, after having declined to do anything farther north of the river "on account of the fatigue of men and horses." By the night of the 25th, after a march of 30 miles, he was to the left rear of the B.E.F. near Cambrai.

Informed by the French Mission at G.H.Q. that the British would continue their retirement on the 26th, and never told,

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apparently, that Smith-Dorrien had decided to stand, or troubling to verify whether the B.E.F. was in movement, or getting into touch with the British or contact with the Germans, Sordet fell back on the morning of the battle of Le Cateau, and concentrated at Gonnelieu on the far bank of the St. Quentin Canal, 10 miles south of Cambrai. The narrative now goes on :—

" Reports received between noon and 1 p.m. [after the British had been fighting 6½ to 7½ hours] indicated that the British left wing was being attacked on the front Haucourt—Caudry—Le Cateau by important German forces, which threaten to outflank it ; the situation is critical and at 1.30 p.m. the Cavalry Corps Commander resolves to intervene : The following order was issued :—

" ' The Cavalry Corps will move north of the Schelde to attack the German forces : 1st Division by Marcoing : 3rd Division by Masnières ; 5th Division by Crèvecœur."

After crossing the Schelde

" scouts report enemy troops on march against the British left wing, while the artillery of the 1st and 3rd Divisions open fire on a long column debouching from Cambrai [this fixes the time as 4.30 p.m.], the 5th Division attacks in the direction of Séranvillers [that is, just clear of the British flank] . . . the cyclists of the 5th Division, supported by the dismounted men of the Light Cavalry Brigade and the machine guns of the Division progress vigorously and reach the environs of Séranvillers, but strike very superior forces and are obliged to retire."

The Corps passed the night near Villers Faucon, 18 miles south of Cambrai, thus nothing of it but its stragglers were seen next day by the British.

The further exploits of Sordet's Corps are of little interest. Sending its " provisional division " on the 29th to keep touch between the B.E.F. and Maunoury's Sixth Army, it retired in woeful condition to Versailles (Cambrai to Versailles is about 130 miles, straight), which it reached on the 5th of September. But it was not to have much rest : at 8 p.m. that day, it received orders, sent off at 3.30 p.m., for the battle of the Marne, thus getting them many hours later than even Sir John French. For Sordet, as for the British, it was impossible to be in the position prescribed ; but he did his best, sending off one division by train and setting the other two by a march of 60 miles to the left of Maunoury. The leading division came into action early on the 7th—a day late—near Betz ; the two others arrived in the afternoon, and only their artillery was engaged. At night :

" Men and horses were at the end of their powers, provisions were exhausted and the country without water. In these circumstances

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General Sordet decided at 9 p.m. to retire his divisions to the north of Nanteuil, to revictual and to water the horses. Some squadrons and the cyclists of the 1st Division were left in contact with the enemy."

At 9 a.m. next day, General Sordet was relieved of his command by General Maunoury, pending reference to General Joffre, who concurred in the action taken by the commander of the Sixth Army.

The Bavarian Government has issued through its War Archives Office an account (600 pages) of the doings of the Bavarian troops during the war, with a separate case of maps and appendices, under the title of *Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege*, 1914–1918 (*Munich : Bayerischer Kriegsarchiv*, 10,000 *marks*).

At the outbreak of war the population of Bavaria was 6,900,000, about the same as that of London. It put into the field on mobilization 6 divisions, 2 reserve divisions, a cavalry division, 4 Landwehr composite brigades, 3 Ersatz mixed brigades, besides fortress and auxiliary troops, a total of 418,000 of whom 278,340, nearly double the strength of the original British Expeditionary Force, went immediately to the field troops. During the war the establishment rose to 12 divisions, the Alpini Corps (rather stronger than a division), 7 reserve divisions, one cavalry division, 3 Landwehr divisions and one Ersatz division, with a total strength of 910,000 at the beginning of 1918, of whom 550,000 were with the Field Army.

Thus 13·2 per cent. of the population were under arms and 8 per cent. in the field ; so far as troops in the field go it was more than double the effort made by the United Kingdom, which, at the Bavarian rate, should have produced 144 divisions. Bavaria also took her fair share in the production of war material, a high percentage of women working at munitions.

Considerable space is given to the opening phases of the war when the Bavarian field troops were all included in the Sixth Army under Crown Prince Rupprecht, and obtained initial successes over the French in the Vosges and in Lorraine. The failure before Nancy is attributed to the strength of the French position which " consisted partly of permanent fortification," to the enemy's powerful artillery and to " serious lack of ammunition." According to this and other Bavarian accounts, there was never any reason for General de Castelnau to have felt nervous at the Grand Couronné.

The fighting at Ypres, in which the Bavarian Cavalry Division, II Bavarian Corps and 6th Bavarian Reserve Division took part, is rather slurred over. We learn that in the month of October the Cavalry Division lost 30 officers and 717 men. Of the great attack on the 11th of November, 1914, in which, according to the German

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General Staff monograph, all 3 Bavarian infantry divisions took part, there is no mention; but there is a marginal heading "Fight for the Wytschaete Park 4–14 November."

Only the 10th Bavarian Division was present at the Somme on the 1st of July, 1916, near Montauban. On this day, 1 of its regiments lost 35 officers and 1,774 men and the entry in the war diary of the 2nd of July is "Nothing more known of the regiment"; another regiment lost 72 officers and 2,559 men, and the third, 11 officers and 1,172 men.

On the 21st of March, 1918, the 5th, 6th and 16th Bavarian Divisions attacked in the Seventeenth Army (the most northern), the 9th Reserve Division in the Second Army and the 1st Bavarian Division in the Eighteenth (Hutier) Army. In eight days' fighting the 5th lost 130 officers and 3,800 men, the 6th 90 officers and 3,000 men, while the infantry regiments of the 16th were reduced to an average of 700 men. The other losses are not given. The failure to break through is attributed to the stout defence of the British Third Army, to Foch sending reinforcements, and to German strength in men and material being "limited in every respect."

It was the Bavarian Alpini Corps which took Kemmel on the 20th of April, 1914, and with it 2,600 French prisoners.

The total Bavarian losses were 176,973 killed and died of sickness, 435,340 wounded, 22,912 missing, 68,943 taken prisoner.

The appendices give the orders of battle, and lists of Bavarians who received decorations.

Die Geschichte des Reserve Infanterie Regiments 245 *im Weltkriege*, 1914–1918 (*Leipzig : Verlag Ehemalige Offiziere des R.I.R.* 245, 45.), *by M. Krämer*, has a certain amount of interest for British readers. The Regiment was a Saxon one and belonged to the XXVII Reserve Corps, which was raised in August, 1914, and fought at the first battle of Ypres. It was formed of "Landwehrmen of the 1st and 2nd Ban and, later, war volunteers and reservists of the 106th, 107th and 179th Ersatz battalions were allotted to it." The number of trained men in it is not given, but all 3 battalions were sufficiently trained to be exercised in tactical schemes from the 5th of October, 1914, onwards.

It is as to the effect of British fire that it is desired to quote from the history. On the 19th of October the regiment went into action near Becelaere. At night "those who remained alive dug in on the forward slope . . . the strain of the fight was so great that no one wanted food or drink." On the 22nd, "the losses were shockingly

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high. The great part of the students of Leipzig, who had entered the regiment as volunteers, lost their lives." On the 24th, any one who showed himself outside the trench got shot. On the 25th, the I and II battalions formed only two companies. On the 28th, the attack on Poezelhoek failed and the companies had to return to the trenches with heavy losses. On the 29th, the attack nearly reached the British trenches, when " it broke down with copious losses " and the right wing of the regiment had to return to its trenches with heavy casualties. On the 10th of November " isolated advances only brought losses." The Regiment did nothing during the great attack of the Prussian Guard. By the 20th of November it was reorganized into 5 instead of 12 companies. There is a panoramic view of a large regimental cemetery at Becelaere at the end of the book, but the figures of the casualties are not given.

The Regiment also took part in the gas attack at the second battle of Ypres opposite the British. At the hour ordered for the infantry advance " the cylinders were still emitting gas, the enemy's resistance did not indicate he had suffered much harm " ; in fact, the Regiment lost 40 per cent. of its strength. As always suspected, the Germans " swallowed much of their own gas," the 245th Reserve Regiment meeting it in a hollow in front of its position as it moved to the attack.

At the battle of the Somme, near Bois de Vaux, the Regiment, which went in 60 officers and 3,042 strong, lost between the 6th and the 25th of September, 1916, 1,792 of all ranks, nearly 60 per cent. It was then opposite the French for nearly two years, mostly in the Vosges, coming up to the Avre in time to be driven back on the 8th of August, 1918, when it lost 15 officers and 528 men, and was reduced to three weak companies.

Das Marinekorps in Flandern, 1914–1918, *by Korvettenkapitan Schulze* (*Berlin : Mittler*, 1,000 *marks*) gives an account of the organization of the coast defences in Flanders, which were under the Commander of the Marine Corps, Admiral von Schroeder. One division, which fought at Antwerp and on the Yser, was formed in August, 1914, from the naval longshore units which manned the German coast defences. In November, 1914, a second division was organized in the same way, but both were kept up to strength by drafts from the Army, and the third division was entirely found from army sources. Starting in October, 1914, with nothing but a few light guns, two steam trawlers and no aircraft, Admiral von Schroeder, practically without interference, built up a great coast defence system with 37 batteries (ranging from 17-inch guns downwards), flotillas

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of destroyers, torpedo boats, U-boats, motor boats, mine sweepers, etc., a powerful air force—which furnished the squadrons that attacked England—and a great variety of docks and workshops.

The author claims that, except for the Zeebrugge raid of the 22nd–23rd of April, 1918, the Corps held its front inviolate, and evacuated the coast in October, 1918, unhindered, after sending off its vessels and destroying guns and stores. Attempts at landings were, of course, expected, but were considered impracticable, except in October–November, 1914, and during the last stages of the evacuation.

General Percin had already written one controversial book on the war, called *Les erreurs du Haut Commandement*. In this he investigated why the French Army was beaten in August, 1914. He has, three years later, followed it up by *Le massacre de notre infanterie*, 1914–1918 (*Paris : Albin Michel*, 6.75 *francs*). It may be recalled that he was Inspector-General of Artillery before the war, and a pioneer in initiating liaison between artillery and infantry. He preached the doctrine that the artillery must conform to the requirements of the infantry—not vice versa—and abandon the right of choosing its own targets. This now universally received doctrine was bitterly opposed in France. Its most prominent opponents, it is curious to recall, were in particular five artillery officers, viz., General Foch, Colonel Nivelle, Colonel Fayolle, Colonel Dumezil and Commandant Buat (now Chief of the French Staff); but it was supported by Colonel Pétain, then a professor at the French Staff College.

General Percin inquires in his new book why the French Army lost 66 per cent. of its combatants and the Germans 41 per cent.—he accepts the German published statistics, which it is now certain are incomplete and released merely for propaganda purposes; but that does not affect his arguments. He shows that the infantry losses were in percentages three times as great as those of the cavalry, four times those of the artillery and engineers, six times those of the flying services, train and such less dangerous branches, combined. He charges the French artillery officers with being particularists, determined that their arm should be " top dog," imbued with the doctrine that the cannon alone wins victories, filled with a contempt for infantry which they did not trouble to disguise, and convinced that it was a subordinate arm. He quotes Buat—of whom one may believe anything, for, as Chief of the Staff, he has in a book stated that the British lost Kemmel in 1918 and the French retook

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it—as shortly before the war still believing in the artillery duel (and he gives the exact references to certain strange statements in Buat's published works):

"Force the enemy guns to silence, so as to have some batteries that may without fear support the infantry."

"The artillery duel is a means of permitting certain batteries to aid its infantry by firing on the enemy infantry."

"The outcome of the fight between the infantries is the registering barometer of the results of the artillery duel."

"The infantry knows nothing. It is for the artillery to see what is to be done."

"The destruction of the hostile artillery . . . is our essential object in war."

The result of such theories was that in October, 1914, a serving deputy in the French Chamber, Abel Ferry, reported to the President: "There is no liaison between the artillery and infantry," and there was general dissatisfaction with the artillery arm.

General Percin next gives a long detailed list, extending over many pages, of the occasions on which French artillery fired on its own infantry, not necessarily the infantry it was supporting—those who saw the second counter-attack of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry on the Prussian Guard on the 11th of November, 1914, stopped by French gun-fire from a front more than a division away, will understand what is meant. He calculates the direct casualties thus occasioned at 75,000 men, and suggests that, as the French guns firing on French men were neglecting to destroy the enemy's machine guns, perhaps a round million should be added as indirect loss.

The author's remedy is a fusion of the field artillery and infantry, officers passing from duty in companies to duty in batteries, and vice versa, and the introduction of a light gun to accompany the infantry. He next proceeds to belabour the faddists who cry, "The Queen of battles is no longer infantry, it is mechanism." Apart from the fact that the campaign ended as it began in the open field without heavy guns, wire entanglements, hand-grenades and other accompaniments of trench warfare, he points out that beaten Germany relied for victory more on her complete material equipment than on her generals or soldiers.

The destructive effects of heavy artillery in the field—that is excluding trench warfare—he regards as illusory, and, as proof, states that German fire did not destroy one-twentieth of the French guns, and that the German infantry took four times as many as the hostile artillery destroyed. He quotes a common translation of what A.L.G.P. (*Artillerie lourde de grande portée*) officially means

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as *Artillerie de luxe pour gens pistonnés* (Artillery de luxe for the officers who ride in motor cars). What is wanted, he thinks, is light howitzers firing a big shell—a heavy shell, not a heavy gun, and he states that neither side had any heavy guns at the Marne, 1914. [Heavy guns from the Paris forts were employed at the Ourcq.] Pursuit even in the entirely successful German break-through at Gorlice-Tarnow was rendered abortive, because it was considered necessary to lug heavy guns along with the infantry. The heavies did little more when they did fire in an attack than make nests for the enemy's machine guns and obstacles for the advance of their own infantry.

Wastage of gun ammunition next comes in for attention. General Percin tells us that the bill for shells accounts for one-seventh of the whole French expenditure in the war. This fraction does not include guns or any infantry ammunition, and he shows how the expenditure of the artillery bombardment per *metre* of front grew year by year.

Those who require ammunition for discussions on the use of artillery will, as has been hinted, find plenty in General Percin's book.

Russian Theatre

Hermann von Giehrl, who was a General Staff officer at Tannenberg, 1914, wrote one of the best accounts of that battle there is, in the first number of " Wissen und Wehr." He has recently died and his widow has now issued, under the title *Tannenberg* (*Berlin : Mittler*, 10,000 *marks*), a more complete version, which he had prepared for publication shortly before his death. As an instance of the complete tactical success in open warfare of a well-trained army over a more numerous but slow-moving and indifferently led and badly-trained force, the battle is worthy of study. But a commander as a rule cannot hope to have " all the aces " as the Germans did on this occasion. The actual manœuvre carried out had been constantly discussed and practised at war games ; the movements of the Russians were fully known to the Germans, who not only had complete command of the air, but read the Russian wireless messages, which were sent *en clair*. Further, the operation which Samsonov was ordered to carry out, that is to advance northward from Poland against East Prussia, while Rennenkampf attacked it from the east—had never been considered or prepared for in peace time by the Russian General Staff, and there were no suitable roads in the area. It was improvized solely to assist the French : it had, indeed, the

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effect of drawing eastward two German corps which should have been at the Marne, and, therefore, strategically achieved its end, though at heavy cost.

Major Giehrl speaks rather contemptuously of " the little Feste Lötzen with the couple of fortresses which blocked the gaps between the lakes, and the blockhouse line which crossed the Johannisberger Heide " [that is continued the defensive line southward to the Polish frontier], although he admits : " the stately row of fortresses from Danzig to Thorn, which blocked the way to Berlin." Actually Lötzen and the lake defences held up Rennenkampf's Army, were never forced, and compelled the Russian commander to a detour to the north ; they thus contributed in no small degree to giving Ludendorff time to deal with Samsonov's Army undisturbed.

There is a curious admission that the Germans at the last moment failed to send Austria the help which it had been agreed should be given on the outbreak of war by means of an offensive from East Prussia south-eastward, in order to cover the left flank of the Austrian attack. The reason for this breach of faith was that, at the last moment, two German divisions detailed for the east had to be sent west, and thus General von Prittwitz's Army was left too weak to carry out the plan arranged.

A good many excuses are made for that unfortunate Commander, whom Hindenburg-Ludendorff superseded. In Prittwitz's opening offensive by his left to cover East Prussia, Mackensen, with the XVII Corps, struck the front of the Russians when manœuvring to get at their flank, and his 35th Division, after some casualties, fled, it is admitted, in " fearful panic," carrying with it the 36th Division. The I Corps could not make any progress. News had hardly arrived of these troubles when a report came through the XX Corps, which was covering the German right flank, that the left of Samsonov's Army extended a great deal farther west than previously reported, and a long column, 12 miles in length, of a new force had been seen. Considering himself completely turned, Prittwitz ordered a retreat to the Vistula to be begun that night. Even 24 hours later, in a telephone conversation with Moltke, he spoke of being—

" swarmed round by Russian cavalry, eight cavalry divisions on his flank : offensive operations were impossible : he begged, on the contrary, for reinforcements, as he was in doubt, in view of the lowness of the water in the Vistula, whether he could hold the river line."

Moltke considered that in view of the tactical advantages offered by the Masurian lakes and the narrow passages between them, it was possible to beat one of the two Russian Armies before the other

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could come to its assistance. He decided to recall Prittwitz and his Chief of the Staff, Waldersee, and selected—mark the order—first Ludendorff and then Hindenburg to succeed them, and immediately set about sending " the last available battalion and the last heavy battery that could be spared " from the eastern fortresses to assist in the coming battle.

By this time, as the Russians did not come on, Prittwitz had become more hopeful—he decided not to retire behind the Vistula, and to attack Samsonov's Army, moving the I Corps by rail to the right of the XX Corps, which was blocking the Russian advance northward, and against Samsonov's left, and the I. Reserve and XVII Corps, by march, against the Russians' right. Thus the Tannenberg manœuvre was initiated before Ludendorff took over. But Prittwitz had hardly done so, before he received notification of his recall.

The surrounding of Samsonov's Army was accomplished as planned, but the process took six days, the 26th to the 31st of August, and the author doubts whether the German commanders would have dared to attempt it if they had known it would take so long ; for there was ample time for Rennenkampf to come to his brother general's assistance. In spite of the excellent intelligence about the enemy, Hindenburg-Ludendorff went through many critical moments, and had Rennenkampf pushed on the German position would have been, indeed, perilous. Even on the evening of the 29th, every available man was ordered to a position of readiness to stop his advance.

There is little doubt that the ease with which he defeated the Russians led Ludendorff to think that he could treat the French and British in the same manner, and to the final downfall of the German Army.

Mesopotamia

Major-General von Gleich's *Von Balkan nach Bagdad*, a book which dealt with the latter part of Field-Marshal von der Goltz's mission to Baghdad, has already been commented upon in the pages of this Review.* The information in it has now been augmented by Oberstleutnant Hans von Kiesling's *Mit Feldmarschall von der Goltz Pascha in Mesopotamien und Persien* (*Leipzig : Dieterich*, 5*s*.). The author left Constantinople in November, 1915, at the same time as the Field-Marshal, and served under him until his death on the 19th of April, 1916.

With the exception of the capture of Townshend's Division in

* See *Army Quarterly*, October, 1922.

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Kut, the story of the German-Turkish operations in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Persia is one long chronicle of failure. Goltz's official reports to the German Supreme Command, which are given in full, are a record of a great enterprise undertaken with insufficient means, and of the utter incapacity of the Germans to handle small wars and Oriental peoples.

His instructions were to expel the Russians and British from Persia, to raise a Persian Army, and to organize a great Mohammedan confederation of Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia and Arabia to expel the British from Mesopotamia, and to invade India. For this purpose, all the German and Turkish troops, gendarmerie, etc., on the Persian border and in Mesopotamia were placed under him, as the Turkish Sixth Army, and a so-called German-Persian Mission of thirty specialist officers " ignorant of the language, without sufficient interpreters, without men, without training apparatus, and without arms " was formed to help him in Persian affairs.

The scheme broke down first and foremost because his forces merely existed in space without any line of communication with the 1,500-miles distant Constantinople, except the incomplete Baghdad line for half the distance, the rest of the route being over country roads. In the true German fashion great paper schemes were got out for organizing the route, but, owing to the apathy or opposition of the Turks, nothing was done to make it effective.

Huge sums of money were expended in Persia in enlisting the aid of notables and chiefs, but the only practical result was the collection of some 6,000 tribesmen " picturesquely attired, but militarily worthless," 1,000 gendarmerie and 2 companies of militia, who on the approach of the Russians to Kermanshah abandoned the Turkish contingent supporting them and fled. The Arabs are described as pro-Allies. The author comments that the Germans had " mistaken Oriental politeness for real interest," and that the German representatives were badly chosen.

Even in Baghdad Goltz had little influence; for although Noureddin Pasha, commanding the Irak Corps which opposed Townshend, was placed under him in a military sense, the Turk remained Vali of the province, and thus was able to put spokes in the German's wheel at every turn. It is claimed, however, that Goltz instructed Noureddin to stop the assaults on Kut and to trust to surrender being brought about by starvation: though on another page it is stated that lack of gun ammunition compelled the Turks to desist. The inactivity of the garrison is commented on, and the statement is made that 4,000 Turks and later only 2,500 were

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employed on the investment, the rest of the Turkish force—some 12,000 men—holding off the relieving force.

Kiesling considers that Gallipoli had a fatal effect on the Turks, as they attributed the British failure to their own military abilities, and henceforward were contemptuous of German advice. Kut only accentuated this. After that place fell, they sent half the forces available into Persia, and thus lost any chance they had of successfully meeting Maude's advance on Baghdad. Goltz himself fell into disfavour with the Supreme Command shortly before his death, and was labelled pro-Turkish. His favourite staff officer was recalled and Gleich was sent out from home to stiffen him up; there was both in Berlin and Constantinople a complete misapprehension as to the conditions in Mesopotamia and Persia.

We learn that, in spite of the arrival of Halil Pasha's Division on the day of battle, Noureddin considered himself beaten at Ctesiphon, and had ordered a retreat when Arabs brought news of the British retreat. Further, that in General Aylmer's fight of the 8th of March, 1916, the attack on the British turning column was a pure accident. The Turkish regiment which made it was sent to the right wing of the position, owing to its abandonment by Fazyl Pasha's irregulars after his fall. This regiment "lost its way in the unknown country, went far beyond this wing and struck by surprise on the British turning column," and thus averted the threatening envelopment.

East Africa

It is somewhat sad to find that the first comprehensive account of the campaign in German East Africa should have been compiled by a Frenchman. *L'Afrique Orientale Allemande et La Guerre de 1914–18, by Commandant J. Buhrer de l'Infanterie Coloniale* (*Paris : Fournier*, 25 *francs*) is mainly based on published sources, but the author has had access to official documents, including the reports of Colonel Viala, who followed the campaign with the British forces. The book is divided into three parts, the first is geographical, the second narrates the operations, and the third deals with the lessons to be derived from the campaign as regards the general conduct of operations in the tropics, the tactics to be employed in bush warfare and the organization of the troops and services.

The author has no particular praise for the British leading, observing that the commanders were selected for political rather than military reasons, and he pokes fun at the tremendous influence which the very numerous administrative staff acquired over opera-

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tions. He remarks that night operations were seldom resorted to and that the British seem invariably to have lost touch with the enemy at night-fall. There was a sad monotony about the British method of fighting: a frontal attack by fire combined with an enveloping movement, with which it was quite easy for the Germans to deal. The author considers that the Belgians did better, for they pressed their frontal attacks to a decision, and their turning movements were more rapid. The failure at large is attributed to the antiquated training of the Indian troops. There are 18 sketch maps. As a study of a small war under modern conditions, the book, which contains about 500 pages, is most interesting and useful.

General

The latest volume of General Schwarte's encyclopædic work on the war—it is to be complete in ten, and he is assisted by a great body of experts—deals with the war on sea, war in the Colonies, war in Turkey, gas warfare and war in the air (*Der Grosse Krieg. Seekrieg, Kolonialkrieg, Türkischer Krieg, Gaskrieg, Luftkrieg. Leipzig: Barth*, 16,000 *marks*).

For the first time, we get a German account of the defence of Togoland and the Cameroons. In the former Colony, we are told that there was no plan except to hold the great wireless station for communication between Germany and her African possessions at Kamina as long as possible; it was placed 100 miles inland for the purpose of protecting it from raids. Of the Cameroons we are asked to believe that the German garrison took refuge in Spanish territory, not because it was on the point of being surrounded, but because it was short of ammunition. There was no defence scheme, except that in case of hostile attack the garrison was to retire to the Ngaundere highlands, which were rich in food supplies. There it was not doubted that it could hold out until Germany had conquered France and Britain.

The account given of the Turkish operations by Major Prigge, who served with it as one of Liman von Sander's Staff, does not lead one to believe that the Turkish Army was, or is likely to be, an effective force. The campaign of the Turkish Third Army in the Caucasus soon after Turkey declared war is very illuminating. The Army consisted of three corps and a cavalry division. Enver Pasha himself was in command, with Bronsart von Schellendorf as Chief of his Staff, and an imposing collection of German General Staff officers in all formations and higher units. The Turkish soldiers

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themselves are described as excellent, and Enver meant to be a conqueror. The expedition, probably over 100,000 strong, completely failed, and after two months numbered only 12,400. The German author quotes, without comment, the Russian bulletin: "The Turkish IX Corps surrendered, the *débris* of the X Corps fled to the frontier, abandoning ammunition and transport." The breakdown in the supply arrangements, lack of food and clothing, are said to have been contributory causes. We find a similar story in Palestine in September, 1918: "When the British advanced to the attack, the Turks had for the most part disappeared; underfed for a long time, and scarcely clothed at all, they could not stand 'drum-fire.'" Such resistance as was offered, we are told, was put up by Germans belonging to the "Telephone sections, railway troops, water-boring parties and the like." Further, the Flying Corps was outnumbered thirty to one.

The account of gas warfare is thoroughly German. It is admitted that the Germans began to make the "first official trials with gas in October, 1914," but in France, "gas hand-grenades and gas rifle-grenades had been issued to the troops before the war!" We shall next expect to hear that France entered the war completely prepared in other ways for trench warfare. The 22nd April, 1915, is the birth-day of gas warfare and the first use of it was made by the Germans. But, having given the credit to the French, the author proves to his own satisfaction that it is not contrary to the Hague Rules and Conventions, and a more merciful weapon than anything else!

After relating that the British gas at Loos was "particularly harmless," Captain Geyer, who writes the article, gives the French the credit for first using "true gas-shell: that is, shell that has no bursting charge, the fuse charge sufficing." This, he argues, was contrary to the Hague Convention on the subject. This may be consoling to him. He has given us the date that Germany began her official gas experiments in October, 1914, at which time no other belligerent had thought of using gas. She meant to win, and just as Prussia broke her pledged word as regards the neutrality of Belgium, so gas is only another of the foul means she stooped to use.

In the "Air warfare" section there is a short account of the operations of the Flying Services in the various battles. It is claimed that on the 3rd and 4th of September, 1914, full notice was given of the approach of new forces from Paris against the German right wing, and "there was sufficient and timely basis for new decisions both by the Supreme Command and the First Army." But the messages are not given and no explanation is afforded of the

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failure to warn Kluck of the approach of the B.E.F. on the 22nd of August, 1914, or of his being informed that on the 24th it was marching on Maubeuge.

The German General Staff has already had a defender in General von Kuhl in his *Der deutsche Generalstab*. General von Zwehl has also been moved to write on its behalf. His *Generalstabsdienst im Frieden und im Kriege* (*Berlin : Mittler*, 100 *marks*) is well worth reading by every staff officer, if not every officer ; for in addition to stating the General Staff's case, it sums up briefly a great deal of valuable experience. For instance, the author says always send on information, good or bad, at once—for what it is worth ; too often was bad news delayed because " perhaps things are not really so desperate," or " wait a bit, don't send that on yet or the people above may think it all over except the shouting."

The great point that General von Zwehl makes is that in peace the German General Staff was far from omnipotent. The Minister of War held the money bags, the Chief of the Military Cabinet controlled patronage, and the Corps Commanders, in whose selection the C.G.S. had no say, were responsible for training. He informs us that in 1912 and 1913 the Minister of War refused the General Staff's requests for a larger reserve of ammunition, besides, as all the world knows, rejecting the demand for two more corps. " The directors of our foreign policy did not believe that a war was imminent."

During the course of the war the General Staff was very considerably diluted. Officers who would never have been looked at in peace time got divisional staff appointments, and the divisional generals could not train them because they themselves were not up to standard. In the last years before the war

" the General Staff was recruited entirely from officers who had passed through the Kriegsakademie. It is true here and there an officer who had distinguished himself in the *Adjutantur*, as a teacher, or on service was appointed to the General Staff ; but this was the exception."

Now the Kriegsakademie, the author makes an especial point of telling his readers, " was not a specialist General Staff school, but had the character of a university with a speciality for military requirements." An officer's general education was completed ; there was little out-door work, he did only one staff tour—at the end of the three years' course—and no attempt was made to send him out as a trained staff officer. Thus, from the British point of view, the Academie produced a class of pedants rather than practical staff

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officers ready to deal with men and emergencies. Staff training came afterwards, officers being attached to the Great General Staff and formations for the purpose. The general reproach in Germany, it is admitted, was that young General Staff officers knew all about handling great masses of men, " but could not make a simple decision or write a simple order." They were merely cogs in a machine, and, if the engine driver was incompetent, the machine broke down. Zwehl confesses that manœuvres with enormous marches and no fighting at the end of them had confused the minds of the Staff; they had not the pulse of the troops in 1914.

There were a good many bad selections among the Staff. The elder Moltke had little interest in personal questions, and Schlieffen was too busy and left the choice of officers to his subordinates. What the younger Moltke did in the matter is not stated, but, as he sent Ludendorff back to regimental duty and made Tappen head of the Operations Section, he seems to have been a poor judge.

The author considers that if in certain cases staff appointments were held by incompetent men, no better ones could be found at the time. He thinks that no army had a better General Staff. But there he errs through ignorance. The German General Staff in its general attainments, methods of work (except pure clerking) and experience was far behind both the French and British. On the other hand, it advertized largely and got in time to believe its own advertisements.

The *Historique des Troupes Coloniales pendant la guerre* 1914–1918 (*Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 5 francs*) is an official publication compiled by the *Section Technique des Troupes Coloniales*. It is a short record of the most important operations in which these troops participated. To do more, says the preface, would mean writing the history of the whole war, for the colonials fought not only in France, but at Gallipoli and Salonica, and in the Cameroons and Togoland. Some statistics will be extracted.

On mobilization there were 60 battalions (European) and 58 batteries in France, and 83 battalions (23 European, 35 Senegalese, 16 Indo-Chinese, 9 Madagascar) and 41 batteries, 3 engineer companies and 1 squadron in the Colonies. At the close of the war there were in France, 39 European and 91 native battalions, and a total of 76 European and 201 native battalions. The slight fall in the number of European battalions was due to cadres and men being taken to raise new units in France. The artillery was increased from 99 batteries to 192.

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During the war 275,290 natives were recruited, exclusive of 211,000 men for the Labour Corps.

The I Colonial Corps existed at mobilization, a second was formed of the 10th and 15th Colonial Divisions in June, 1915, the 11th, 16th and 17th Divisions went to the Near East; single regiments were scattered in various Corps of the Regular Army, and on the lines of communication, and attached to the heavy artillery for escort purposes.

The officers of the Colonial troops appear to have done well: in October, 1918, two were commanders of Armies and four of Corps, besides numerous divisional generals; three generals of colonial artillery commanded the artillery of Armies.

The best known action of the Colonial troops is the fine defence of Rheims in July, 1918, by the I Corps, with the 10th Colonial Division blocking the valley of the Marne towards Epernay.

The French are issuing a large number of short regimental histories of thirty to forty pages. They contain brief accounts of the engagements, citations, lists of killed and missing. The price is a few pence.

German regimental histories on a far more elaborate scale and in far greater number continue to appear at the expense of the German Government—that is actually of the Allies! They average over a hundred pages and form an official series. *Erinnerungsblätter deutscher Regimenter. Auszüge aus den amtlichen Kriegstagebüchern. Herausgegeben unter Mitwirkung des Reichsarchivs.* They have considerable value for the historian, as they are often a useful check on the fiction of the "official accounts."

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REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

The Irish Guards in the Great War. Edited and compiled from their diaries and papers by RUDYARD KIPLING. Two volumes. London: Macmillan & Co. 1923. 40s. net.

The appearance of a regimental history written by Mr. Rudyard Kipling is a literary event of the greatest interest. It is not merely that Mr. Kipling is trying his hand in a new sphere—for if it was by writing of the British soldier that he first came to the front, a narrative history is a new sphere for him—there is the additional interest of seeing how he has tackled the many difficulties which beset the regimental historian in dealing with the late war. Moreover, the regiment which has been so fortunate as to secure him as its historian has a special interest of its own. The Irish Guards were the youngest regiment in the Army when war broke out; they had never been in action and yet had to maintain the high traditions and standards of the Brigade of Guards in a struggle which tried and tested those standards and traditions as they had hardly been tested before.

How fully the Irish Guards attained their aim Mr. Kipling's two volumes bear witness. If the 1st Battalion's baptism of fire at Mons was no test of its quality, the rear-guard action in the woods of Villers-Cotterets a week later was a severe trial enough, though the battalion was soon to endure trials compared with which Villers-Cotterets was the merest skirmish. But when Lord Cavan, their Brigadier in the worst of these trials, quitted the 4th Guards Brigade in June, 1915, he could tell the Irish Guards that they had shown themselves fully "worthy of taking their place along with the other Regiments of the Brigade of Guards—and more so." Nor did the achievements of their 2nd Battalion, which came out to France on the formation of the Guards Division, fall short of those of the 1st. Christened by the 1st "the Irish Landsturm" on their first meeting, the 2nd Irish Guards shared the tribulations and triumphs of its senior battalion from Loos to the spring of 1918, when the unhappy reduction of brigades from four battalions to three caused its transfer

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to the Thirty-First Division. It is hard incidentally to understand why, if the Australians and Canadians were permitted to retain the four-battalion brigade, an exception should not have been made for the Guards also. Anyhow, the reduction gave the 2nd Irish Guards a chance of earning special distinction in stemming the German advance beyond the Lys between Merville and the Forest of Nieppe. It was perhaps their finest achievement, but their last. By that time Irish recruits were not forthcoming even for the Irish Guards, and the 2nd Battalion's losses could not be replaced; indeed, it had itself to be used to replenish its 1st Battalion, so that the latter might take a noteworthy share in the successes of the Hundred Days of 1918, and even then the Irish Guards contained so many Englishmen that the Battalion positively demeaned itself to the extent of playing the essentially un-Irish game of cricket.

But fine as is the record of the Irish Guards—and even the dullest pen might find such a theme inspiring—it is no disrespect to the Regiment to say that to most people the main interest of the book lies in seeing how Mr. Kipling has dealt with his story. He has not attempted to solve one great difficulty of the regimental historian, for he has taken the line of least resistance and has told the stories of the two Battalions quite separately, which involves some repetition and lack of cohesion. But if this is open to criticism, he is amply justified for his decision to look at his story from the point of view of the unit only, confining himself exclusively to its doings and sensations. As he points out, regimental officers and men had an extremely limited knowledge of what was going on outside their own particular corner, they were absorbed in their own job and lived a life from day to day in which to take thought for the morrow and for anything beyond their own Division or even Brigade was useless, as no man knew if for him there would be any "to-morrow." He has therefore concentrated his efforts, not so much on narrating but on interpreting what happened, on recalling in some degree the thoughts and feelings of officers and men, on picturing the "unlovely, yet superb" life of "brilliance, squalor, unreason and heaped boredom." He has been singularly successful; it is not too much to say that years hence, when men want to know what it was that their ancestors had to endure in the long-drawn agony of four years of trench-warfare and mud, it will be to Kipling's story that they will be likely to turn. They will get there a picture at once vivid and sober, distinctive and effective without exaggeration, candid without any attempt to pile on horrors for sensation's sake. If the book is as full of horrible and terrible things, as it is of countless instances of

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high spirits, of devotion, of courage and of endurance, it is because the Irish Guards took the horrors and went through them almost as much as part of the day's work as they performed the heroic things, most of which perforce went unobserved and unrecorded. The reader gets a clear picture of what there was to endure, of mud, of dirt, of fatigues, but with it no less clear a grasp of the splendid way in which officers and men rose superior to squalor and danger and hardships and horrors, of what the battalion and the regiment meant, how traditions were built up and maintained. It is a wonderful description, greater far as a description than as a narrative.

In some of his more recent writings Mr. Kipling has seemed to be becoming forced and exaggerated in style, to be straining after effect, to be twisting and distorting words, to be almost pedantic in the effort to be original. There is nothing of that here. His writing is at its best. He is too much a master of phrase and epithet not to scintillate, not to say things in a distinctive and arresting way, but it comes easily and naturally and there is no smell of the lamp. He has a trick of interpolating parenthetical remarks, put into the mouth of an unnamed speaker, which sum up the situation something after the fashion of the chorus in a Greek play. This is often very effective, whether the remarks actually represent things said to him by members of the regiment or not, they do seem to give what was in the men's minds at particular moments. Moreover, having ample space available, he can find room for many little things, trivial in themselves, which help greatly to add colour and life to the story, and he can dwell on little personal touches which bring out the characteristics of prominent members of the regiment.

There are, however, some weak spots which are real blemishes. It is a pity Mr. Kipling did not have his proofs carefully read by some pedantic person who could have corrected howlers, *e.g.*:—" the 7th Norfolks of the 35th Brigade of the North Midland Territorial Division " (I. p. 122), or " d'Untal " (for d'Urbal); statements such as that on p. 260 which gives Byng's Third Army as holding the line from Barisis to Gouzeaucourt; and common errors such as the inclusion of the unsuccessful attack of the 9th of May, 1915, in the quite distinct action of Festubert. The three Guards battalions cut out of their brigades by the disastrous reduction from four to three battalions may have formed a new brigade, but they were exceptional, and the purpose of that ill-fated measure was not to make new brigades. These are minor blemishes, but there are too many of them, and it must be admitted that the maps, if very pretty as specimens of draughtsmanship, are of little help in elucidating the story. In

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narrating the doings of battalions what is most wanted is sketch-plans of the particular corners at which the units were engaged, sectors of trenches like those round Cuinchy, where the 1st Battalion had such hard fighting early in 1915, or areas like that between Merville and Nieppe Forest. Still, minor blemishes notwithstanding, this is a book of entrancing interest and great power, a book which will endure and will occupy a remarkable place in the literature of the war.

A Study of American Intelligence. By CARL C. BRIGHAM. Princeton University Press. 1923.

This is an extraordinary work. It embodies the results of a " psychological examination " to which the recruits for the United States Army were subjected when they joined up in 1917, and on the " data relative to intelligence and nativity " thus obtained draws various deductions on the problems of race admixture with which the United States have now to grapple. Immigration is a question of supreme importance to the States, as it is clear from the results of the inquiries contained in this volume that there is a distinct menace of race deterioration through the entry into America of elements demonstrably below the intellectual level of the existing population. It is interesting to notice that in the majority of the tests the immigrants from Poland, Italy and Russia tend to be at the bottom of the scale, those from England and Scotland at the top, that the marked intellectual inferiority of the negro even to the rather inferior white races, which are here described as " Alpine " and " Mediterranean," is fully established, that if the future population of the United States is to consist in the future of a blend between these Alpine and Mediterranean races and the " Nordic " element till recently predominant in the States with some admixture of a negro strain, the intellectual future of that race is anything but promising. But the methods by which these highly interesting conclusions are reached are really remarkable. After subjecting several people of more than average intelligence to the tests, one is inclined to wonder if the whole thing can be an elaborate farce, so incomprehensible and meaningless are some of the tests employed. Moreover, the book is written in a strange semi-technical jargon which makes it in places almost unintelligible. The American race may be going to become quite distinct racially from the British, indeed it is already showing signs of doing so, but, if this book is a fair specimen of what is understandable in America, then it is clear that the American language is

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already established as distinct and that it is high time interpreterships in American were set up.

Meade's Headquarters, 1863–1865: *Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman*. Edited by G. R. AGASSIZ. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press. 1922.

Colonel Theodore Lyman was attached as a "Volunteer Aide" to the Staff of General Meade, who commanded the Army of the Potomac from just before the battle of Gettysburg until the end of the war, though in the closing stages under U. S. Grant as Commander-in-Chief. Colonel Lyman was without military training or experience but was a personal friend of Meade's, to which fact he owed his appointment and his rank. His letters, which cover a period of nearly two years, give a good picture of the life at the Union Headquarters and contain much that is interesting and suggestive, for, despite his lack of experience, Lyman seems to have been a man of shrewdness and judgment, well able, for example, to appreciate the soundness of Meade's decision not to attack when, after crossing the Rapidan in December, 1863, he found that the slowness of his subordinates had thrown away all advantage of surprise and that the Confederates were warned and prepared. The letters will be useful and interesting to students of the American Civil War, though the evidence they contain is hardly likely to modify appreciably the received verdicts on the operations they describe. To readers not particularly interested in that struggle their chief interest lies in the light they throw on the state of efficiency reached by what was till then the largest improvized army ever placed in the field. It is interesting to read Lyman's verdict, "We have fought for two years and a half, but it takes no wiseacre to see that we yet have much to learn. Were it not for the remarkable intelligence of the men we could not do even as well as we do." The Federal Armies of 1861 and 1865 had no doubt an even smaller nucleus of trained professional soldiers on which to be built up and an even more unmilitary and unprepared nation, but the comparison with 1914–1918 is suggestive, and read from this point of view the letters are full of interest.

National Policy and Naval Strength. By Rear-Admiral H. W. RICHMOND, C.B. Reprinted from the Proceedings of the British Academy. Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press. 1923. 1*s*. net.

The foundation some five years ago by Sir C. Wakefield of the

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Raleigh Lecture has already led to the delivery of several lectures of interest and value and this last addition to the list fully sustains the level of its predecessors. Admiral Richmond's theme is the examination of the extent to which our national policy has been dictated by questions affecting our naval strength. He traces it from Raleigh himself, who enunciated emphatically and clearly the doctrine that the true policy for the Kingdom is that which will best defend our power at sea from being weakened, or, better still, will increase it. He goes on through Cromwell and William III. down to the Napoleonic wars and has little difficulty in establishing the fact that there has been real continuity in our policy, in its aim if not in its methods. We have never been able to afford to allow territory of naval importance—the Low Countries, Sicily, the Dardanelles—to pass into hostile hands, and the insistence upon Britain's "Maritime Rights," which appears as a constant factor in all instructions to our diplomats and peace negotiators, was dictated by the same considerations. Admiral Richmond brings out with great emphasis the vital importance to England of being able to stop the overseas trade of her enemies and to capture their goods by whomsoever carried. Without these "Maritime Rights," as he says, "our naval strength, shield and protection though it might be, was no sword." The right of search, the refusal to admit that "free ships make free goods," the many controversies over contraband, the obstinate resistance even to suggestions from allies for the modification of our claims, were essential as means to "compel compliance" from our enemies. Admiral Richmond has not gone on as he might to show how the Declaration of London, embodying as it did an abandonment of our principles which no eighteenth-century Minister would have admitted, detracted from the efficacy of the naval weapon in the late war, even though unratified and only in part taken as our guide. But his lecture is full of thought and of suggestive passages and bears very directly on the great problem of the coordination of the work of Army and Navy and of adopting a policy which shall make most surely in this direction.

A History of the Peninsular War. Vol. VI. By CHARLES OMAN, K.B.E. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1922. £1 12*s*.

This volume, long awaited, will receive a warm welcome. It deals with matter of exceptional interest. First, there is Wellington's ineffective pursuit of Clausel and his failure to reduce Burgos, followed by his retreat to Portugal with the episodes, which caused

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Wellington to brand his troops with a stigma, for which the British Army has perhaps never wholly forgiven him. During the winter of 1812–1813 and following spring the great strategic plan was thought out, which carried Wellington in little over a month from Portugal to the Pyrenees and achieved the crowning victory of Vittoria. The volume closes with Soult's vain attempt to relieve St. Sebastian and Pampeluna. As if to mark the contrast between the sublime and the ridiculous, there is coupled with Wellington's successes Sir John Murray's failure on the east coast. At Castalla he allowed Suchet to get off unpunished, whilst his operations against Tarragona constitute one of the most discreditable incidents in our military history.

It may seem surprising that Sir Charles Oman in this volume shows no signs of having been influenced by the lessons of the Great War. The historian has deliberately turned his back upon the temptation of illustrating the 1813 campaign by references to the late war. Perhaps he was right. It may have seemed to him that, when he had so nearly reached the end of his great work, it would be a mistake to change his method of treatment and introduce into the last two volumes a discordant element. But as a result of his self-denying ordinance, though the interest is fully sustained in this volume and the historical reader will find it a treasure-house of information, yet it is lacking in instruction to the military student. This record of daily marching interrupted by an occasional battle with minute details of the numbers engaged and casualties suffered, is not war as this generation knows it. The staff work on either side and the conditions under which the transport and supply departments worked, receive but little attention in these pages. That the indisposition of Marshal Jourdan on the night of the 20th of June caused all movements in the French Army to be postponed for eighteen hours indicates that there was something seriously wrong with its staff, and the blunders and misconduct of Wellington's Q.M.G., Colonel Gordon, suggest that all was not well with the staff work of the victorious army. In regard to Wellington's great advance to the Upper Ebro Sir C. Oman admits that " the most surprising features [*sic*] is that the commissariat was able to feed such a mass of troops in such a limited area," but his explanation that " somehow or other the commissaries generally contrived to find more or less food for the army," will hardly satisfy the student's curiosity. On the other hand, the French commissariat must have been badly organized ; it was want of food which compelled Joseph's Army to abandon a strong defensive position and retire on Burgos,

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and again fear of famine, if the retreat was continued, was one of the causes which led the French to make a stand at Vittoria. The author finds the detachment of Pakenham's Division on the eve of that battle " inexplicable from the information before us," but it is only inexplicable to him, because he gives such scant attention to questions of transport and supply.

If Professor Oman had incorporated in his work Wellington's actual orders, his criticism of some of the latter's strategical decisions, and especially of his tactical dispositions, would have gained vastly in weight. Room might very well have been found in the Appendices for these orders in place of some of the lists of casualties and the strength of the armies at various dates.

Apart from his neglect of a side of war which is of supreme importance to the soldier, the author's treatment of strategical problems leaves nothing to be desired. His statement of the time problem, which confronted Wellington after the occupation of Madrid, is admirably lucid, and his view that Wellington's solution made the initial mistake of dividing his forces into two nearly equal portions, leaving each half too weak to deal with the armies eventually brought against it, is convincing.

No less striking are his comments on " the second great secret," on which the success of the 1813 campaign depended—the change of the British base from Lisbon to the Bay of Biscay. He claims that it could not possibly have been foreseen by his opponents. " They were bound to believe that all Wellington's operations would be founded on and circumscribed by the basic fact that his line of communication was on Lisbon. A manœuvre which presupposed the complete abandonment of that line was not conceivable by officers reared in Continental campaigns and unused to contemplating the correlation of land operations and naval strategy."

The author's treatment of those problems, in which policy and strategy were closely connected, could not be bettered. Thus he shows that Wellington's decision not to press the offensive after he had repulsed Soult in the Pyrenees, though he might have annihilated the French Army, was dictated by political considerations. " The eternal Armistice of Plässwitz was still holding up operations in Germany." " No advance, however tempting the opportunity, should be made until he was certain that war had recommenced in Saxony."

Sir C. Oman's tendency to explain the French failure to hold Spain as due to the interference of Napoleon, seeking to control military operations in the Peninsula from a great distance, will not commend itself to every reader. So far as interference from outside

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was responsible for Joseph's defeat, a case might be made out against Clarke, the Minister of War, as more guilty than his master. But the character of King Joseph and the mediocrity of his generals after Soult's recall seem quite sufficient in themselves to explain the comparative ease with which Wellington carried through his great campaign to a triumphant conclusion.

With Allenby's Crusaders. By JOHN MORE. Heath Cranton, Ltd. 10*s.* 6*d.*

A plain tale, such as this, of personal experience on a fighting front during the Great War cannot fail to be of interest. Captain More was a company commander in the 1/6th Royal Welch Fusiliers before serving upon the Staffs of the 158th Infantry Brigade and the 53rd (Welch) Division, and must have been a very conscientious diarist.

All who assisted to drive the Turk from the Holy Land will read the unpretentious narrative with approval. The general reader, while adding considerably to his impressions of active service in the East, is presented with a fairly continuous account of the Palestine operations as seen by the author.

Captain More pays his tribute to the worth of the Turk as a fighting man and ventures to think that he would have made a gallant ally. He was not always well led. It is related that, in the fighting beyond Beersheba, those of the Turkish rear-guard who were taken at Khuhweilfeh said that they had no officers to command them. Their orders were to check the British advance for a certain time and then to rejoin; but they were not told in which direction the main body had retired, or where the next stand would be made, and they were left without rations. Small wonder that deserters were numerous.

Many incidents reflect the strained relations between Turk and German. When the enemy attacked the Australians at Abu Tellul in the Jordan valley, the Turks neglected to support the advance of a German battalion; and the Turkish gunners ignored the German signals to lengthen their range and wrought much havoc among their allies in consequence.

As a staff officer the author was often employed upon special missions among the inhabitants of the country, meeting all kinds of diverting people. He also made the most of his opportunities of exploring Jerusalem and the Holy Places. Altogether there is very little which was incidental to active service in Palestine that is not touched upon—the varying conditions, from stifling sandstorm and

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parching heat to rain and mud and even frost and snow; the difficulties of the transport moving over shifting sand and rocky hillsides; the insanitary condition of the villages and the peculiar ills to which the fighting man was heir. And leave to Egypt is made to appear—as it undoubtedly was—a very precious thing.

To illustrate the operations and movements, a few rough sketch maps might have been added with advantage. The photographs, obviously taken on the spot, reproduce as well as can be expected and each has its peculiar interest. Lieut.-Col. T. H. Parry, D.S.O., M.P., has written an appreciation by way of introduction, and hopes that the book will pave the way for the preparation of a history of the 53rd (Welch) Division. If such be undertaken the first step will certainly be to secure the assistance of Captain More.

A Short History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. Gale and Polden.

It is to be hoped that this little book is not typical of Messrs. Gale and Polden's series of miniature Regimental Histories, for scant knowledge and little care have gone to its preparation.

The date of the first permanent establishment of two companies of the Royal Regiment of Artillery is variously given as 1715 and 1716. Reference to the Eastern, Western and Southern Divisions of the Royal Garrison Artillery as present formations seems to denote that the writer has consulted an out-of-date Army List.

The title of "Master Gunner" dates from the fifteenth and not the seventeenth century as stated in the text. Albert Borgard was never "Master Gunner." First Colonel of the Regiment and "Chief Firemaster of England," a bigger tribute might well have been paid to this remarkable warrior who served his native Denmark, and then Prussia, before he came to England. Between 1675 and 1719 he was present at forty-one battles and sieges and was wounded eleven times. He died in his bed at the age of ninety-one.

Jonas Watson, first Lieutenant-Colonel and "Chief Bombardier of England," escapes notice altogether. He was killed in action when commanding the Train of Artillery at Carthagena in 1741, being then seventy-eight years of age. It is the careers of such men as these which fire the imagination of the young soldier and awaken the general reader to the fact that military history pulsates with real human interest.

In relating Norman Ramsay's exploit at Fuentes d'Onor, the writer errs in good company. Only one section of "I" Battery was extricated from the French cavalry in this dashing affair.

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It must also be pointed out that Lieut. the Hon. F. H. S. Roberts was not a gunner officer. This mistake is made in the account of the attempt to save the guns at Colenso, and repeated in the list of Victoria Cross heroes at the end of the book.

Coming to the incidents of the Great War, it would be interesting to know on what authority is based the account of the 134th Battery, R.F.A., at the battle of Le Cateau: and no Gunner will be grateful for the exaggeration of the achievement of "L" Battery, R.H.A., at Néry.

The illustrations in photogravure are reproduced in Messrs. Gale and Polden's usual excellent style. But one Imperial War Museum photograph is made to do duty twice. First, it illustrates "A 'Heavy' Gun ready for Action," and then "Bringing up the Ammunition."

The Spirit of Air-Force Discipline. By Flight-Lieut. A. S. G. LEE, M.C., R.A.F. Gale and Polden. 9*d.*

A young Service, in which the great bulk of the *personnel* is absorbed by technical duties, the Royal Air Force has its own peculiar difficulties in imbuing recruits with the true spirit of discipline. When compiling this little series of lectures Flight-Lieut. Lee did well to draw upon that excellent manual "The Handbook of Discipline, Royal Marines, Deal," and upon such lectures as "The Duties of a Soldier," and "The Spirit of Discipline," by Captain G. C. Thomson. It might have been more judicious to have insisted less upon the inevitable presence of the "slacker" in the ranks, and the author is rather redundant in his discourse; but his book should prove of considerable assistance to many an officer and instructor. The chapter on "Tradition" points the way to a more exhaustive handling of this important subject.

The Decisive Battles of Modern Times. By Lieut.-Colonel F. E. WHITTON, C.M.G. Constable. 12*s.*

This book of 254 pages is planned as a continuation of Sir E. Creasy's classic "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World." It is always a difficult matter to make a selection among a large quantity of material, whether of poetry for an anthology, or of battles for those which may fairly be termed decisive. Col. Whitton's selection comprises Vicksburg, Königgrätz, Mars-la-Tour, Tsushima and the Marne. With the second and the last few will, we imagine, be found to quarrel; as to the claims of the other three to inclusion in the list, there are bound to be differences of opinion and discussion.

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The reviewer's private opinion is that, as regards the American Civil War Vicksburg was no more "decisive" than Gettysburg and perhaps less so than Chattanooga; the former battle put an end to the only real prospect of victory for the South—that of forcing the North to make peace by a defeat on her own soil; while the latter rendered certain the loss to the South of all the Western States and the enveloping of the western flank of her main centre of resistance on the Atlantic seaboard. Mars-la-Tour in itself decided nothing; admittedly it induced Bazaine to withdraw to a defensive position between Gravelotte and St. Privat, but the Germans had to fight another fierce battle—of which the issue was doubtful until nightfall on the 18th of August—before they could complete the rounding up of the Army of the Rhine; and though Mars-la-Tour rendered Gravelotte possible, it was Gravelotte alone that can be said to have been in any sense "decisive." Similarly, it would seem—and contemporary opinion shared the view—that the dispatch of the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Far East was in the nature of a forlorn hope, an attempt to retrieve the national honour rather than to alter the issue of the campaign, which had already been for all practical purposes decided by the fall of Port Arthur and the battle of Mukden.

We fully realize, however, that in all these cases there is room for much difference of opinion. A more serious criticism is that Colonel Whitton's work is on occasion open to charges of inaccuracy. Only a few instances of this fault can be given for want of space; but any well-instructed reader who, for example, examines in the light of all available recent evidence the author's account of the Marne will realize that it is not always reliable as to facts. Colonel Whitton fails to appreciate that one reason for Moltke's modification of Schlieffen's plan of campaign against France and for his accumulation of large forces in Lorraine was his certainty that the French intended to open the campaign by an offensive in that area and his hope of being able to effect a decisive counter-stroke at the very commencement of hostilities. The French plan of campaign is nowhere described, nor is any mention made of the French doctrine of war—*l'offensive à l'outrance*—which was the principal cause of their ill success in the early encounters. The vital rôle played by Galliéni before the opening of the battle of the Marne is glossed over—needlessly it seems at this time of day. The late arrival of Joffre's orders for battle at British G.H.Q. and the resulting delay in our advance, which has so often been animadverted upon by French historians, is not mentioned: and so on.

It seems to us that Colonel Whitton's summaries of the political

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events leading up to his chosen battles are better than his narratives of the battles themselves. The former are models of their kind; in the latter, despite the author's clear and attractive style, there are to be found too many inaccuracies and misstatements for a book that purports to be a serious military history. The maps are good and adequate, but one or two of the places mentioned in the text are not to be found on them. There are also one or two slips of the pen to be noticed; *e.g.* "Lynckner" for "Lyncker" in the account of Mars-la-Tour; "*die* Wendepunict" for "*der* Wendepunict" in that of the Marne, which at once strike an eye acquainted, even superficially, either with the German language or with German military history.

The British Empire at Bay on the Western Front. By ALBERT CLOSE. London: Edward Stanford, Ltd. 21*s.* net.

This map—which measures about 5 feet by 3½ feet—has evidently been compiled with much care and industry; it gives in a picturesque form and in considerable detail a description of the fighting on the Western Front in 1918. It requires some slight effort of will fully to understand the numerous signs and somewhat intricate method of arrangement which have been adopted by the author, but, if the keys are carefully studied and mastered, it is quite easy to follow the movements of the rival armies in the various phases of the campaign. The only criticism which we have to make is that it is not always easy to decipher the names of places, especially in the parts of the map where the author has delineated so many large guns and aeroplanes.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The Contemporary Review, April, 1923. "Our 'severely disabled' Men," by R.A.F.

The National Review, April, 1923. "When Germany occupied France," by Stéphane Lauzanne (editor-in-chief of *Le Matin*).

A comparison between Germany's occupation of France in 1871 and the French occupation of Germany in 1923, has led the author of this article to collect some illustrations of the former event.

The Nineteenth Century, April, 1923. (1) "Competition and War," by Arthur Caspersz.

One of the questions discussed by the author is, "If there is Uncontrolled or Unregulated Competition, will it inevitably lead to War?"

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(2) " Air Power," by Squadron-Leader A. A. Walser, M.C., D.F.C., R.A.F.

A reasoned estimate of " the great part that the Air Force is destined to play in the next war."

(3) " Early Days on the Aisne," by Captain H. M. B. Salmon, D.S.O.

The Quarterly Review, April, 1923. " Haig and Foch," by Major-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B.

This article contains a survey of the war on the Western Front, and of the relations between the Allied Armies leading up to " the establishment of the so-called unified command by the appointment of Marshal Foch to coordinate the Allied efforts. . . ."

The Contemporary Review, May, 1923. (1) " The Armies of Europe," by Major-General Sir F. Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B.

The writer points out that the increase in European standing armies as compared with 1913 is due, chiefly, to the new armies of the new States and to increases by the smaller States—and not to increases by the Great Powers. These increases are due to the demand for security, which is not sufficiently well guaranteed by the articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. He is hopeful that efficient guarantees will be provided by a new scheme based on continental and regional agreements.

(2) " War Persons' Administration," by Arthur Greenwood, M.P.

The Cornhill Magazine, May, 1923. " Generation to Generation," by Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.

The National Review, May, 1923. " The Clash of Arms and Portfolios, 1914 and 1918," by the Earl of Midleton, K.P.

The relations which should be observed between the Home Government and the Commander in the field are discussed; and many instances during the periods of Lord French's and Lord Haig's command on the Western Front are quoted in illustration of the unsatisfactory methods which were employed by the Home Government during the late war.

The Nineteenth Century, May, 1923. " The Officers Training Corps: its Great Value," by Major E. E. A. Whitworth.

The writer is the Officer Commanding Rugby School Officers Training Corps.

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The Cornhill Magazine, June, 1923. "A Private Soldier in the Eighteenth Century," by James Aytoun.

This article consists of extracts from a private soldier's journal towards the end of the eighteenth century, which throws an interesting light on life in the Army at that period.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

"The Spirit of Air-Force Discipline." By Flight-Lieut. A. S. G. Lee, M.C. Published by Gale and Polden Ltd. 9*d*. net.

"Short History of the Royal Regt. of Artillery." Published by Gale and Polden, Ltd.

"Meade's Headquarters, 1863–1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman." Edited by George R. Agassiz. Published by the Atlantic Monthly Press. Boston. Price $4.00.

"A Study of American Intelligence." By Carl C. Brigham. Published by the Oxford University Press. Price 16*s*. net.

"The Decisive Battles of Modern Times." By Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Whitton, C.M.G. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd. Price 12*s*. net.

"With Allenby's Crusaders." By Captain John More. Published by Heath Cranton, Ltd. Price 10*s*. 6*d*.

"Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research." Vol. II. Printed and sold by Sir W. C. Leng & Co., Ltd. Price 6*s*.

"National Policy and Naval Strength, XVIth to XXth Century." By Rear-Admiral H. W. Richmond, C.B. Published by the Oxford University Press. Price 1*s*. net.

"Guide to a Second Class Certificate, Mathematics." Published by Gale and Polden, Ltd. Price 2*s*. net, by post, 2*s*. 2*d*.

"The Complete Guide to Military Map Reading." Fifth edition. Published by Gale and Polden, Ltd. Price 2*s*. 6*d*. net, by post 2*s*. 9*d*.

"The British Empire at Bay on the Western Front." By Albert Close. Published by Edward Stanford, Ltd. Price 21*s*. net.

"The Irish Guards in the Great War." By Rudyard Kipling. Published by Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Two vols. Price 40*s*.

"A Policeman from Eton." By Captain R. W. Campbell. Published by John Murray. Price 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The Development of International Law after the World War." By Otfried Nippold. Translated from the German, by Amos S. Hershey, Ph.D. Published by Clarendon Press, Oxford. Price 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

"Some Pitfalls of Army Accounts." By Captain G. L. Parker, R.G.A. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd. Price 3*s*.

"Patiala and the Great War." Compiled from Secretariat and other Records. Printed by the Medici Society, Ltd., for private circulation, 1923.

"The Life and Letters of Sir John Moore." By Beatrice Brownrigg. Published by Basil Blackwell. Price 6*s*. net.

"Alfred Yarrow, His Life and Work." By Eleanor C. Barnes (Lady Yarrow). Published by Edward Arnold & Co. Price 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The Life of Lieut.-General Sir James Moncrieff Grierson, K.C.B., C.V.O., etc., etc." By D. S. Macdiarmid. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd. Price 18*s*. net.

"List of Books concerning the Great War." By the late Sir George W. Prothero, K.B.E. Printed and published by His Majesty's Stationery Office. Price 15*s*. net.

"The Defence of India." By "Arthur Vincent." Published by the Oxford University Press. Price 3*s*. net.

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PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

House of Lords

Palestine.—On the 27th of March *Lord Raglan* raised the question of the strategical value of Palestine. *The Secretary of State for the Colonies* in his reply pointed out that we were not in Palestine for strategical purposes, but as a result of obligations placed upon us by the League of Nations.

Army and Air Force (Annual) Bill.—On the 24th of April on the third reading of the Army and Air Force (Annual) Bill an amendment was proposed by *the Secretary of State for War* and carried, abolishing field punishment No. 1.

North-West Frontier of India.—On the 3rd of May a debate was initiated by *Lord Montagu of Beaulieu*, with special reference to the recent construction of roads parallel to the frontier and the continuous need for mechanical transport. *Viscount Chelmsford* gave a detailed description of frontier policy in recent times, and sketched the arguments for and against the two possible frontier lines of the Indus and the Durand line, the present line running between the two, largely the result of historical accident. In reply *the Secretary of State*, *Viscount Peel*, described the methods of defence as carried on by the Khassadars, the Scouts and the Regulars, the progress in road construction, and the proposed redistribution (not withdrawal) of the Regulars in the frontier areas.

Ex-Service Territorial Secretaries.—On the 8th of May *the Duke of Northumberland* moved for a Joint Parliamentary Committee to report on the claim of secretaries of County Territorial Associations who served as such during the war, and were prior to the war in receipt of retired pay or pension, to have such pay or pension reassessed according to the terms of the Royal Warrant as amended by A.O. 324 of 1919. This motion was in continuation of a resolution passed by the House in 1922 in favour of the claim, since when the Government had decided not to admit the claim. He emphasized the military character of the services performed, and was supported by *the*

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Earl of Dartmouth, *Viscount Haldane* and *the Marquess of Lansdowne*. In reply, *the Secretary of State*, *the Earl of Derby*, while not concurring with the arguments put forward in support of the claim, agreed that a Committee (not a Parliamentary one) should inquire into the case and report. The motion was therefore withdrawn.

AIR POLICY.—On the 9th of May *the Marquess of Salisbury*, speaking for the Government in a debate initiated by *the Earl of Birkenhead*, announced that "the Cabinet has come to this conclusion: that they think a considerable increase in the Air Force will be necessary."

HOUSE OF COMMONS

BRITISH ARMY OF OCCUPATION, GERMANY.—On the 5th of March *Captain King*, replying to a question asked by *Sir J. Leigh*, stated that the total cost of the British Army of Occupation in Germany from the Armistice to the 1st of January, 1923, was £55,600,000, the whole of which had been paid by Germany.

DIRECTORATE OF STAFF DUTIES.—On the 6th of March *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Brigadier-General Spears*, gave details of the number of officers, their pay and allowances, in the Department of the Director of Staff Duties now and in 1913.

CAVALRY, INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY UNITS (COST).—On the 13th of March *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Mason*, gave the following figures of annual cost, 1922–23 :—

Regiment of Cavalry of the Line, at home (520 all ranks), £125,660.
Battalion of Infantry of the Line, at home (756 all ranks), £156,900.
Brigade of Royal Field Artillery, at home (563 all ranks), £140,200.

OFFICERS (TRAINING).—On the 13th of March *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Captain W. Benn*, stated that a Committee, with Lord Haldane as Chairman, was considering the regulations for entry into Woolwich and Sandhurst, and the early training of officers. [The names of the members of the Committee and the terms of reference were announced in the House of Commons on the 27th of March.]

AIR ESTIMATES.—On the 14th of March, in the debate following *the Secretary of State for Air's* statement, the questions of control and cooperation took a prominent place. *Major-General Sir F. Sykes* urged that imperial defence required the "corporate cooperation of the three Services in one."

ARMY ESTIMATES.—The following points are taken from the

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speech of *the Under-Secretary of State for War* on the 15th of March :—

(1) The Army Estimates have been reduced by over £10,000,000. They are now £52,000,000 as against £62,000,000 last year.
(2) The Vote for *personnel* shows a reduction of 55,000 men.
(3) We are advised by the General Staff that with the present reduced Army we are facing the same heavy risks as before the war, with dangerously decreased resources.
(4) The Army Education Corps has been reduced by about one-half.
(5) The Territorial Army has a reduced establishment of 8,000 officers and 172,000 other ranks ; it is at practically three-quarters full strength.

FIELD AND GARRISON ARTILLERY.—On the 20th of March *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Pownall*, stated that the amalgamation of the R.F.A. and R.G.A. was under consideration, but in view of the difficulties involved no definite decision could yet be made.

NAVY AND ARMY CANTEEN BOARD.—On the 27th of March *the Financial Secretary to the War Office* announced that a Select Committee would be re-appointed to inquire into the finances and management of the Navy and Army Canteen Board.

WAR GRAVES.—On the 10th of April *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Mr. Gilbert*, gave various details as to the progress of cemeteries in Belgium and France ; the number of headstones erected on graves, or in cemeteries awaiting erection, was 121,000 ; and the total estimated number of graves on which headstones had yet to be erected was 396,000.

R.A.F. (BOMBING ATTACKS).—On the 12th of April *the Secretary of State for Air* gave details of bombing attacks carried out during the year 1922-23 in Waziristan, Iraq and Southern Kurdistan.

AIR ATTACHÉS.—On the 26th of April *the Secretary of State for Air*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy*, stated that for reasons of economy air attachés were accredited to those two countries only whose aeronautical development is most advanced, namely, France and U.S.A. ; the question of appointments to two other countries was, however, under consideration.

CADETS (SANDHURST).—On the 8th of May *the Under-Secretary of State for War* gave the following figures : average number of cadets for the years 1921, 1922 and 1923 was 674, 671 and 658 ; net cost per head about £331, £320 and £321.

AIR POLICY.—On the 10th of May *the Secretary of State for Air*

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stated that a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was considering the question of the necessity of further expansion in the Air Force.

ARMY OF OCCUPATION (GERMANY).—On the 11th of May *the Under-Secretary of State for War* gave the following numbers at present in the British Army of Occupation in Germany: officers, 545; other ranks 8,231. The total cost since the Armistice had been £56,470,000.

TERRITORIAL ARMY (ARTILLERY TRAINING).—On the 11th of May *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Brig.-General Colvin*, said that the gunnery practice of Territorial artillery takes place only in alternate years.

[The Editors regret that, owing to the great pressure on the space at their disposal, they are unable to print the usual Appendix in this number of the *Army Quarterly*. It will appear again in the October number.]

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BERTRAND STEWART PRIZE ESSAY, 1924

Subject selected by the Army Council for the second Competition :

"No great power will voluntarily submit to 'position warfare' in the next war, with all its attendant evils of great length, excessive cost, enormous casualties and possibly indecisive results. Consequently the armies of the future must be more mobile, deploy more quickly and hit harder than is the case at present.

"What is the ideal composition—

(*a*) of a division,

(*b*) of a corps of two divisions

for future wars, making use of all modern inventions and improvements in weapons both on land and in the air?"

Rules of the Competition

1. The right to compete is limited to British subjects, who have served, or who are actually serving, as officers or in other ranks or ratings of His Majesty's forces.

2. The term " His Majesty's forces " includes the Navy and the Royal Marines, the Regular Army, the Special Reserve, the Territorial Army, the Militia, and the Royal Air Force, the New Armies which took part in the late war, and also the Naval, Military and Air forces of India, the Dominions and the Crown Colonies.

3. The essays submitted for the prize must not exceed 10,000 words in length; they must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.

4. The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto typewritten on the outside and his name and address inside.

5. The title and page of any published or unpublished work, to which reference is made in any essay or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.

6. The essays, which are to be addressed to the Editors of the *Army Quarterly*, must reach the office of the *Army Quarterly*,

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94, Jermyn Street, London, S.W., not later than the 1st of March, 1924.

7. The essays will be judged by three referees—two to be appointed by the Army Council, the third to be one of the Editors of the *Army Quarterly*. The decision of the Referees, or of a majority of them, will be final.

8. The referees are fully empowered if in their opinion, or in the opinion of the majority of them, no essay submitted to them comes up to a sufficiently high standard of excellence, not to award the prize; or they may, if they consider such a course desirable, divide the prize among two or more competitors.

9. The result of the Competition will be made known in the *Army Quarterly* in July, 1924, and the prize essay will be published in that number of the Review. In the event, however, of there being two or more prize essays, the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* reserve to themselves the right of deciding which of these essays they will publish.

10. The copyright in any essay which appears in the *Army Quarterly* belongs to the Proprietors of the Review.

11. Neither the Proprietors nor the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* are to be held responsible for the loss of, or failure to return, any essay submitted for the Competition; nor do they incur any liability whatsoever in connection with the receipt of the essays, any dealings therewith, the judging thereof, or the reports thereon.

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
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